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ABSTRACT 
The Federalist Papers’ Account of Human Nature 
by 
Jeffrey P. Smith 
Advisor: Benedetto Fontana 
This paper is an analysis of the account of human nature found in The Federalist Papers. 
This interpretation assumes The Federalist is a work of political rhetoric and advocacy, but also 
one of genuine significance as political science and philosophy. As a book, The Federalist is a 
coherent whole, which offers a coherent account of human nature, despite the collective nature of 
its authorship, the time pressures of its publication, and the piecemeal nature of its workmanship. 
This understanding of human nature is the thread which runs through all its analysis and numbers. 
Its arguments asserting the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation and the advantages of 
the Constitution are all grounded in key presuppositions about the nature of man.  
There are two central facets of human nature depicted in The Federalist. First, was the 
claim that human nature harbored its own moral Law of Nature, articulated by the Declaration of 
Independence, which provided the ends of the Constitution. Second, was the belief this nature 
exhibited universal laws of conduct gleaned through an assessment of the diverse facilities of the 
human soul which determine man’s motivations. These ironclad motivations were the 
psychological matter the Constitution had to negotiate. Through its orchestration of social and 
political circumstances, the Constitution is able leverage those reliable and durable motives in the 
interest of the constitutional good. Because of its practical nature the Constitution had to be more 
than a parchment celebration of cherished principles, it had to work with man’s constitution and 
devise a solid architecture of powers and procedures which both depend on and restrain human 
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nature. Therefore, the Constitution’s arrangement of powers which shape, channel and restrain 
man’s motives provides the constitutional means, to achieve the ends celebrated in the Declaration 
and Preamble.  
Lastly, Madison tells us that government is nothing other than the greatest reflection of 
human nature. This makes political science and statesmanship a permanent quest for sufficient 
knowledge of human nature. The science of politics is the science of human nature. All government 
is rooted in some opinion regarding the nature of man. The Constitution is then designed to be an 
arrangement of political powers commensurate to the nature, needs and faculties of man. Publius 
described the provision of the Constitution as “inventions” rooted in “prudence,” not prophecy or 
revolutionary zeal.  
Hamilton claims the project they undertook was to create a “limited constitution.” The 
limited scope of the powers provided by a limited Constitution necessarily produce limited 
government. The powers of government must be limited because men are neither gods nor angels. 
Since there are only ever imperfect men to rule over other imperfect men, it was necessary to 
permanently inhibit their powers. Thus, a limited constitution was devised for a middle being, 
forever caught between Heaven and Earth, who was himself fallible and limited. Part of the 
prudence of their inventions was to abandon the “deceitful dream” of utopian hopes and the 
perpetual perfectibility of man. The enduring success of the Constitution has been a product of 
their willingness to take, and even appreciate, man as he is rather than try to change him into what 
he is not and cannot be. Publius and the Founders understood that human nature fundamentally 
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The proper study of mankind is man. 
 




But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal controls on government would be necessary.  




Man, that flexible being who adapts himself in society to the thoughts and impressions of others, 
is equally capable of knowing his own nature when it is shown to him, and of losing even the 
feeling of it when it is concealed from him. 





Repeal the Missouri Compromise - repeal all compromises - repeal the Declaration of 
Independence - repeal all past history, you still cannot repeal human nature. 
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Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the plan submitted by the convention, not 
only without a disposition to find or to magnify faults; but will see the propriety of reflecting, that a 
faultless plan was not to be expected. Nor, will they barely make allowances for the errors which may 
be chargeable on the fallibility to which the convention, as a body of men, were liable; but will keep in 
mind, that they themselves also are but men, and ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the 
fallible opinions of others.1 
- James Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 37. 
 
 Written in 1787, The Federalist Papers sought to explain and promote the Constitution 
during the vital period of its ratification and beyond. Alongside transcripts of the Convention, The 
Federalist remains our principal source for the original reasonings and intentions behind the 
enumerated powers of the Constitution. It is principal in that it is both the first, and the primary, 
source for our understanding. Originally published as opinion essays in prominent newspapers, it 
is a work of political science and advocacy. As the timely product of circumstances, it was written 
to meet the demands of public debate over ratification. In providing their account of the 
Constitution its authors have only occasional recourse to those philosophical first principles on 
which their arguments are based. And yet, its numbers were also written with the intent of being 
compiled into a single book-length volume as a keepsake for future generations of Americans 
living under the republic whose foundations it explains. As a partisan document intended to 
persuade the public of its day, it was also written to be read by those “unborn Millions” whose 
political fate still lies in the hands of the Constitution it explains to this very day.2  
 
1 No. 37.  
2 George Washington. “General Orders.” July 2, 1776. 
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If The Federalist is not a work of political philosophy, it is an example of Modern political 
science and rhetoric. Its numbers stand as a contribution to the great American tradition of political 
pamphleteering so prevalent during the Founding Era. The progenitor of Modern political science 
is Machiavelli. Declining those “Utopian speculations” of the Ancients, he sought to think and to 
write in a manner that would minister to political practice, to statesmanship. Such a task cannot 
avoid rhetoric and exhortation. By its very nature it is speech designed to provoke thought and 
instigate action. Modern political science and rhetoric are then not entirely distinguishable, 
because the end of this science is not contemplation of the whole, but the advancement of political 
principles in a given time and place. The Federalist is dependent on first principles derived from 
political philosophy, yet its practical task was to pull those ideas down from the clouds and apply 
them to the building of an actual republic, not an imagined one. 
Madison famously says that government, and by implication, the science of government, 
is nothing less than “the greatest of all reflections of human nature.” When Hamilton asserts that 
the “science of policy is the knowledge of human nature” he meant that institutional order and the 
administration of government are the product of the science of man.3 The Federalist present one 
of the most comprehensive illustrations of how an account of human nature manifests itself in 
practical political infrastructure and policy, in contradistinction to mere observation and analysis. 
From their study of man, drawn from life as much as from books, they were men capable of 
drawing concrete prescriptions for action. The Federalist’s account of the Constitution illustrates 
just how its practical policies are the product the Founders’ understanding of man.4 Like 
Machiavelli, Publius’ arguments proceed from practical axioms and principles of government, 
 
3 Michael P. Federici. The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2012. p. 50.  
4 Ralph L. Ketcham. “James Madison and the Nature of Man.” Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan., 
1958). p. 62.  
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such as the power of self-love or the frailty of man’s reason for example. He then provides 
historical or hypothetical examples to animate and validate those principles in action. Few works 
of political philosophy compare to The Federalist Papers in their granular analysis of how the 
arrangement of political power actually generates the political ends to which they are dedicated. 
These ends and principles were a product of their experiences of and refection’s on human nature. 
No other work of such scope attempts to illustrate just how a given account of human nature and 
the specific political ends its dictates, are manifest the minutiae of government mechanics and 
procedure.   
The Federalist provides the reasonings, and explains the experiences, on which Publius 
believes the provisions of the Constitution are based. Madison, as the “Father of the Constitution,” 
primary scribe of the Convention, and architect of the Bill of Rights, would have known, if anyone 
did. Despite its many disputes, The Federalist closely tracks the logic of many of the arguments 
presented at the Philadelphia Convention, an assembly cloaked in secrecy. Despite the 
conspiratorial element of the Convention, the reasonings done before the public were 
fundamentally similar to the deliberations carried on behind closed doors. The fidelity and validity 
of The Federalist’s claims can be tested against the actual workings of the Constitution on display 
in American history. This history is then, the great judge of the utility, justice and truth of the 
Constitution.   
 The text of the Constitution is self-evidently the product of a process of political 
compromise, and reflected in some way the interests of those involved in crafting it. How could it, 
or any similar document made by mere men, not reflect such interests? The nation-wide ratification 
process and subsequent publication of the Convention’s proceedings make this abundantly clear. 
And yet, the serialized publication of The Federalist Papers and the public nature of the state 
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conventions guaranteed the Constitution was publicly and transparently debated by a diverse set 
of factional interests across the entire fledgling nation. It was ratified by states of diverse and 
contrary interests: large and small, commercial and agrarian, Northern and Southern, slave and 
free. If the provisions where merely the product of short-sighted self-serving partisanship, it is 
hard to imagine how such a constitution would have endured longer than any other in existence 
today, more than two-hundred years after its framing.    
In his 1830 preface to the publication of his convention notes, Madison wrote, “there never 
was an assembly of men, charged with a great and arduous trust, who were more pure in their 
motives, or more exclusively or anxiously devoted to the object committed to them than were the 
members of the Federal Convention of 1787, to the object of devising and proposing a 
constitutional system which would best supply the defects of that which it was to replace, and best 
secure the permanent liberty and happiness of their country.”5 Madison is of course speaking of 
both his allies and adversaries at the Grand Convention. The Virginian was not a man given to 
flattery or false praise. Meanwhile, in an 1852 speech criticizing the shortcomings of the 
Constitution, former slave and abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, was still able to praise the 
Founders Fathers. A man who was legally recognized as human chattel under the document they 
framed, was still about to say that their “statesmanship looked beyond the passing moment, and 
stretched away in strength into a distant future.”6 Douglass said, “They seized upon eternal 
principles, and set a glorious example in their defense.”7 
The Constitution was not simply a document born of political horse-trading. It was devised 
to be in conformity with the character of American society and a universal conception of human 
 
5 James Madison. Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison. Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1966. p. 19. 
6 Frederick Douglass. “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” Rochester, New York, July 5, 1852.   
7 Ibid.   
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nature. No participant of the Grand Convention doubted this. In notes to one of his speeches 
Madison wrote, “we must not shut our eyes to the nature of man, nor to the light of experience.”8 
Disputes at the Convention were not over man’s fundamental nature, but how the needs and 
aspirations of this nature might best be met, and his natural freedoms preserved. By 1787, the 
American character was already decisively shaped by state constitutions which served as templates 
for the new national government. Those constitutions were, in turn, imbued with the principles of 
human nature advanced by the Declaration of Independence and held to be universal. Mankind 
was equal in the rights with which it had been endowed by nature and nature’s God. The principles 
of the Declaration were the common ground of all the Convention’s opposing factions. In fact, 
numerous disputes involved opposing sides reasoning from the same premises, to different 
conclusions. No one doubted, for example, that all government and politics are merely a reflection 
of human nature. All political science and philosophy necessarily presuppose an account of human 
nature. In this claim, the Constitution and The Federalist, are no different than any other political 
work. As the canonical account of the Constitution, it helps itself to a particular image of human 
nature and human character.    
 Political foundings, if they are to endure, are all the more indebted to some notion of human 
nature. Human nature is the only matter with which political forms have to work. Unlike the 
supreme law of the land, the daily scrum and machinations of politics is held in greater thrall to 
immediate circumstance. Politics happens within the constraints of pre-existing institutional 
structures, and is by its very nature and design, more responsive to chance and fortune. Publius 
asserts that human nature itself provides “a standard for good government.”9 The account of human 
 
8 James Madison. Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison. Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1966. p. 75. 
9 David Epstein. “The Political Theory of the Constitution.” Allan Bloom Ed. Confronting the Constitution. New 
York: AEI Press, 1986. p. 138.  
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nature in The Federalist rests on the premise that there are diverse, yet fixed ends, proper to 
mankind by virtue of its very nature. Thus, whatever its precise contours, the Constitution 
presupposes that a common and robust human nature actually exists. Its very arrangement of 
powers polemically asserts that mankind’s identity exhibits a set of core characteristics that are 
irrevocable. While fortune and circumstance are unpredictable, human character is variable in 
foreseeable ways. Publius and the Founders accepted axiomatically John Adams’ assertion that 
“human nature has always been and is everywhere the same.”10 Human nature is not a palimpsest, 
“scraped clean and reinscribed exactly as often as is necessary.”11 Man’s nature cannot be simply 
or completely written upon by history, progress or those who wield the instruments of political or 
technological power. The central concern of Publius and the Founders in crafting free and durable 
political institutions was expressed by Benjamin Rush when he asked, “What kind of beings are 
men?”12     
Following the famous path first trodden by Machiavelli, Publius and the Founders accepted 
that man must be “studied as he is,” and “not as he ought to be.”13 The men of the Convention were 
“practical men of varied talents,” most of whom repudiated speculative flights of fancy.14 Hamilton 
contemptuously spurned what he called “philosophic politicians.”15 Likewise, Madison dismissed 
the “artificial structure and regular symmetry” an “ingenious theorist” might attempt to “bestow 
on a constitution planned in his closet.”16 History and experience, not religion, philosophy or 
metaphysics, were the proper method for the study of human nature and political organization.17 
 
10 C. Bradley Thompson. John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. p. 139.  
11 George Orwell. 1984. New York: Signet Classics, 1950. p. 40.  
12 C. Bradley Thompson. John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. p. 148.  
13 Gary McDowell. “Liberty’s Vestal Flame.” Times Literary Supplement. No. 5013(April 30, 1999). pp. 12-13. p. 
12.  
14 Dinesh D’Souza. The United States of Socialism. New York: All Points Books, 2020. p. 40. 
15 Gary McDowell. “Liberty’s Vestal Flame.” Times Literary Supplement. No. 5013(April 30, 1999). p. 12. 
16 No. 37. 
17 Gary McDowell. “Liberty’s Vestal Flame.” Times Literary Supplement. No. 5013(April 30, 1999). p. 12.  
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The political architecture of the Constitution would be “quarried from real experience” of human 
nature, and not from pure logic or the pages of books.18 They took their cue, not from armchair 
speculations, but from the “accumulated experience of ages.”19 The cornerstone of that architecture 
was their experiences and observations of human nature. The goal of Publius and the Founders 
was “an attempt to place Government upon the only Philosophy which can ever support it, the real 
constitution of human nature, not upon any wild Visions of its perfectibility.”20 
Observations of man’s imperfections were recognized by the Founders to be no less 
germane to themselves. Men are neither gods nor angels. If the limits and fallibility of human 
reason placed limits on human knowledge, no founder was ever in the position to completely 
prescribe the order they set in motion, or foresee its consequences. Statesmen and citizens, 
constrained by the founding order, must also have the freedom to be left to their own devices in 
order to confront unforeseen challenges inevitably thrown up by fortune. If human nature is subject 
to limit, it represents a limiting condition for all political experiments. The ramifications of such 
limits are manifest in the powers the Constitution does, and does not grant. A nature with limits 
leads to limited government and a “limited constitution.”21 In a letter written to Henry Lee, 
Madison wrote that the federal government was “limited” to “specified powers,” and that “if not 
only the means, but the objects are unlimited, the parchment had better be thrown into the fire at 
once.”22  
Human nature is a vast theme. The Federalist’s account of human nature was not intended 
to be comprehensive. The goal was not to present a complete epistemological or psychological 
 
18 Ibid., p. 13.  
19 No. 6. 
20 C. Bradley Thompson. John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. p. 119.  
21 Nos. 74, 78, 81. 
22 James Madison. Letter to Henry Lee. January 1, 1792.  
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account of man, but to dwell on those faculties and behaviors relevant to the context of founding.23 
Its essays address the study of man from the perspective of his political needs relevant to the 
founding and maintenance of the American Regime. 24 While The Federalist presupposes other 
elements, its account of human nature is primarily dedicated to an analysis of political psychology. 
In particular its arguments are underwritten by a psychological theory of human motivation based 
on the relevant faculties of the human mind. It animates this schema of motivation in practice as 
the play of those faculties is illustrated through historical examples and the hypothetical 
circumstances of the proposed Constitution. These faculties are the forces of the human soul the 
Constitution is compelled by necessity to depend on and contend with. Publius points to ambition 
as the arch passion which with the Constitution must simultaneously employ and defend against it 
ravages.  
 This writing is not a simple commentary. It hopes to present The Federalist Papers’ 
account of human nature with an emphasis on its analysis of faculty psychology. It is an exegesis 
of the text, synthesized with its context. In order to draw out its meaning it has been necessary, 
when warranted, to read back into it presupposed philosophical principles and historical context. 
It attempts to illuminate and clarify the underlying axioms on which Publius’ practical rules are 
based within the scope of the central theme. Context includes the historical and intellectual climate 
surrounding the Constitution, but also subsequent history which provides object lessons in the 
working mechanics of the government it created. Also referenced are subsequent views of human 
nature which have directly impacted our history, politics and the ongoing development of our 
political institutions. These divergent and competing views of human nature provide foils which 
allow us to see and to judge the Founders’ vision of human nature in greater relief and clarity.   
 
23 C. Bradley Thompson. John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. p. 148.  
24 Ibid., p. 119.  
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 The plan of The Federalist does not readily lend itself to this task. Not surprisingly, of its 
eighty-five numbers, not one is exclusively dedicated to the theme of human nature, Natural rights 
or faculty psychology. There is no linear development of this theme because it is not the basis of 
the intent or structure of the text. And yet, since politics is a product of human nature, every number 
illuminates some relevant facet of that theme. An account of man’s nature is the invisible thread 
which weaves the two arguments of its plan together. Publius’ argument for the inadequacy of the 
Articles of Confederation and his claims on behalf of the superiority of the Constitution, are both 
dependent on a more or less implicit account of human nature. In order to glean this account, it has 
been necessary to scour and parse the text to discern and bring together the most relevant passages. 
Much that is stated about human nature and psychology is explicit or readily inferable, at other 
times it is more dependent on source materials rarely referenced directly.  
 In order to infer this account of human nature it has been necessary to supplement The 
Federalist Papers. Also referenced are other writings of its authors, their contemporaries, and 
those intellectual forebears who offer the deeper underpinnings of their claims which they had 
neither time, nor purpose, to provide. The direct influence of many sources is evident in the 
language and nature of their arguments, other writings, or their biographies. Other sources exhibit 
uncanny parallels and are at the very least, the product of convergent thinking and a common 
intellectual climate, if not direct influence. During the course of this attempt, it became evident 
that The Federalist’s account of human nature cannot be fully appreciated or understood without 
reference to their respect for Biblical insights into man and the works of Locke, Montesquieu and 
Hume. Lurking at a somewhat greater and more elusive depth are the works of Machiavelli and 
Hobbes. At the very least they appear to have had a powerful indirect influence by way of the three 
names mentioned. Important parallels exist, but conclusive proof of direct influence remains 
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tentative. And yet, the moral and intellectual climate of the Founding period, unlike our own, still 
had a sense of discretion which tends to produce reticence. Discretion was once considered the 





















II. The Greatest of All Reflections 
1. Introduction: The Inner Ramparts 
On Earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordering finger of God am I - thus roars the monster.1 
- Friedrich Nietzsche. “On the New Idol” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
 
In 1956 Albert Camus published The Rebel: Man in Revolt. This work is a book-length 
meditation on the major revolutionary movements shaping events throughout the globe since the 
end of the 18th century. In it, Camus dwells on the ever-increasing radicalism of these movements 
as they developed into the 20th century. Their extremism was evident in their ever-broadening aims 
and increasingly unlimited methods. An era which had begun by seeking to transfer sovereignty 
from a king to a people, culminated in the attempt to destroy all received traditions, institutions 
and ideas. Early revolts and revolutions sought to solve targeted and specific problems, but by the 
19th century perfection was expected and a final solution demanded of all social, moral, economic 
and political problems. Camus calls this radical posture “metaphysical rebellion.”2 This he defines 
as modern man’s absolute protest “against his condition and against the whole of the creation.”3 
Bernard Yack has described this is as “the longing for total revolution.”4 
Revolutionaries came to believe “that a perfect secular order will emerge from the forcible 
overthrow of traditional authority.”5 In his Manifesto Marx writes that the Communists “openly 
declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social 
conditions.”6 Alexander Herzen, the father of Russian Socialism, writes, “The annihilation of the 
 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. New York: Modern Library, 1995, pp. 49. 
2 Albert Camus. The Rebel: Man in Revolt. New York: Vintage Books, 1956. p. 23.  
3 Ibid., p. 23.  
4 Bernard Yack. The Longing for Total Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.  
5 James H. Billington. Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith. New York: Basic Books, 1980. 
p. 3. 
6 Karl Marx. The Communist Manifesto. New York: Tribeca Books, 2010. p. 64.  
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past is the procreation of the future.”7 Nothing can be spared. Camus notes that the consequence 
of the European revolts and revolutions was that absolute monarchy was merely replaced by “a 
new form of absolutism.”8 Movements motivated by revolutionary absolutism refused “to accept 
things as they are” including mankind himself.9 For Camus, this was rebellion without limit. 
Everything was to be razed to the ground including human nature. 
  Human identity was in need of fundamental transformation. In the Social Contract 
Rousseau says the founder-legislator much be capable “of changing human nature, of transforming 
each individual” and “of altering man’s constitution.”10 Total revolution was made possible 
intellectually by the rejection of either God or Nature, and the embrace of History as the ultimate 
ground of human existence. In 1916 Gramsci wrote, “Man is above all else, mind, consciousness 
– that is, he is a product of history, not nature.”11 Revolutionaries became the prophets of History 
interpreting its will for the other mere mortals on Earth. With the deification of History, they began 
to assert “the idea that man has not been endowed with a definitive nature, that he is not a finished 
creation but an experiment of which he can be partly the creator.”12 Inspired by such thinking 
Russian Communism, for example, sought to experiment on man’s nature and complete the 
creation by producing Lysenko’s New Soviet Man. Meanwhile, in Communist China, Chairman 
Mao asserted that “human knowledge and the capability to transform nature have no limit.”13 An 
Indian diplomat once accused Mao of believing, as a political leader, he held the power to “alter 
 
7 Albert Camus. The Rebel: Man in Revolt. New York: Vintage Books, 1956. p. 120.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p. 129.  
10 Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p. 80. 
11 Antonio Gramsci. Prison Notebooks. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. pp. 203-204.  
12 Albert Camus. The Rebel: Man in Revolt. New York: Vintage Books, 1956. p. 134.  
13 Mao Zedong. A Critique of Soviet Economics. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. p. 138.  
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human instinct and incentive.”14 An essential goal of 20th totalitarian Communism was the 
fundamental transformation of human nature.  
Pope John Paul II wrote that the “fundamental error of socialism” was “anthropological in 
nature.”15 “Socialism,” said John Paul II, “considers the individual person simply as an element, a 
molecule within the social organism, so that the good of the individual is completely subordinated 
to the functioning of the socio-economic mechanism.”16 He asserted that Socialism holds “that the 
good of the individual can be realized without reference to his free choice, to the unique and 
exclusive responsibility which he exercises in the face of good or evil. Man is thus reduced to a 
series of social relationships, and the concept of the person as the autonomous subject of moral 
decision disappears, the very subject whose decisions build the social order.”17 Socialism’s denial 
of property rights, was for the Pope, simply an extension of Socialism’s denial of the free and 
voluntary moral existence he saw as synonymous with the full dignity of human nature itself. 
Without right of property, all men inevitably “come to depend on the social machine and on those 
who control it.”18 
In God and State, the Russian revolutionary Bakunin keenly recognized that God sat at the 
apex of traditional authority. God was the psychic, spiritual and customary foundation of the 
Ancien Régime’s throne and altar. The only way to destroy traditional authority was to bring about 
the death of God. Camus reminds us that once these movements opened the door to political 
murder and regicide, deicide naturally followed in train.19 Nietzsche bluntly claimed that modern 
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man had murdered God.20 For Nietzsche and others the death of God was to be taken literally and 
figuratively. Hegel noted that God’s death opened “an abyss of nothingness into which all being 
sinks.”21 God, as the source of all authority, truth and morality, had died. If the metaphysical source 
and foundation of life’s sureties had perished, so too had they. Nietzsche’s assertion “Everything 
is false,” was merely the secular corollary to the death of God. 22 Objective standards which might 
ground truth, morality and politics had apparently been refuted or simply obliterated. Camus 
explains that over time “amorality, scientific materialism, and atheism” begin to displace “the 
antitheism of the rebels of former times.”23 He says that since the 19th century mankind has 
attempted “to live without transcendence.”24 Camus’ emphasis on the unlimited nature of this 
rebellion reminds us of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche’s conclusion that once God is dead, “everything 
is permitted.”25 God, or the idea of God, represents among other things, ultimate and inextricable 
limit. God means, man is an animate piece of clay, forever wedged between Heaven and Earth. It 
reminds us that man is merely a finite middle being in the order of things, a creature of this world, 
not a creator of a new one.    
Hegel wrote that when God dies He is resurrected in this world.26 “The regicides of the 
nineteenth century,” writes Camus, “are succeeded by the deicides of the twentieth” which “draw 
the ultimate conclusions from the logic of rebellion and want to make the Earth a kingdom where 
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man is God.”27 Nietzsche asks, “Must we ourselves not become gods” in order to be worthy of our 
deicide? 28 He observed that once God is liquidated, the State becomes mankind’s “new idol” of 
worship.29 Since there is no deity in heaven, the State becomes the highest being, a mortal god on 
Earth. Camus writes that “despite the fact that there is no God,” a Church must still be built.30 In 
spite of God’s death, man’s need and desire to believe does not itself die, but is redirected and 
projected on this world. Politically the death of God means there no longer exists any being higher 
or more powerful, or of greater authority, than the State. Mankind’s ultimate allegiances and 
impulse to faith are merely transposed from an other-worldly Father, to a this-worldly Leviathan. 
With God’s providence refuted “the State will play the part of Destiny.”31 With our patricide of 
the Holy Father in Heaven, man, or his rulers on Earth, become the last gods standing.      
Camus shows that once God is murdered the credo “Everything is permitted” becomes the 
rallying cry of all revolutionaries complicit in the act. John Rawls once noted how the “radical is 
so appalled by the present situation that he is willing to exchange it for virtually anything.”32 When 
the revolutionary act is transformed from a means to an end in itself, all is permitted in its name. 
Force and fraud, violence and deceit, become the coin of the revolutionary realm. “The ends justify 
any means.”33 When revolution is the sole principle no method or goal can be considered evil. The 
Russian revolutionary Uspensky makes this plainly clear saying, “It is not a question of right, but 
of our duty to eliminate everything that may harm our cause.”34 “Everything,” in time, would come 
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to mean tens of millions of human beings who stood in the way of the revolution. Camus writes, 
“The greater the faith” placed in the final realization of the revolution, “the less the value of human 
life.”35  
Experience shows the radical revolutionary impulse always ends up devouring its own. 
Machiavelli wrote in the midst of the “inconveniences” and “disorders” of revolutionary foundings 
“there is no remedy more powerful, nor more valid, more secure, and more necessary, than to kill 
the sons of Brutus.”36 “The Revolution,” writes Mallet du Pan, “like Saturn, devours its own 
children.”37In overturning the past without any limiting principle, these radical movements negated 
the worth of human life itself in the process. The Party begins by purging the ‘reactionary’ 
elements of society, the kulaks and the bourgeois; it then cannibalizes itself in a never-ending cycle 
of political murder. The logic of unbounded revolution means that the common humanity and 
dignity of its targets can be ignored precisely because they represent nothing more than the last 
impediments to the full liberation of mankind and the true and final fulfillment of social justice. 
The denial of all limits and foundations means that the logic of power is the only certain principle 
of the unbounded revolution. Those with it thrive. Those without it perish at the hands who do.   
Unbounded revolution seeks to deliver the heavenly kingdom of God to Earth by the hands 
of mere mortals. Augustine’s distinction between the City of Man and the City of God is abolished. 
The fulfillment of the prophecy of unlimited revolution is a society unitary, pure and equal. The 
existence of diverse factions of opinion represents the ultimate heresy and thoughtcrime. 
Robespierre’s famous speech on May 26, 1794, celebrated the criminalization of political 
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differences.38 Those with different opinions were “enemies of the Nation.”39 Dissent was 
tantamount to treason. At this moment terror and terrorism replace consent and political dispute as 
the primary means of communal existence. Force deals a death blow to deliberation as the essence 
of politics. Political murder becomes the inevitable tool necessary to purify the body politic. A 
kind of political eugenics campaign ensues. Once minority factions are identified as obstacles to 
the revolution, their common humanity can be denied with justice. Whether it was a King or the 
royalists in the Vendée, the bourgeoisie, the capitalist or the Russian Kulak, the Gypsy or the Jew, 
the “feeble-minded” or the Uyghur, enemies of the revolution can be eliminated without qualms. 
Marat said, “Ah, what injustice! Who cannot see that I want to cut off a few heads in order to save 
a great number?”40 For such magnanimity he arrogated to himself the title “philanthropist”, lover 
of mankind. Unbounded revolution means whole peoples can be ‘liquidated’ with impunity so 
long as the name “justice” is invoked with the proper conviction.  
Camus argues that intellectual and political movements like nihilism, anarchism, 
Communism and Fascism, despite their apparent differences along the left-right axis of the 
ideological spectrum, are all united by their fundamental lack of any ideological limitation which 
might circumscribe their principles, aims and methods. For Camus this lack of limit, both 
theoretical and practical, was the philosophic lynchpin setting them on an inevitable path from 
mere tyranny and slavery to totalitarianism and the denial of the intrinsic dignity of human life. 
For these unbounded ideologies, political murder is a problem-solving method.41 Stalin was fond 
of saying “Death solves all problems…no man, no problem.”42 No idol quip, this was the logical 
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conclusion of ideology without limit. Once human beings are stripped of their dignity, they can be 
reduced to mere “inconveniences.”  
The capacious principles of these movements were so generous as to characterize genocide 
as “rational” and “scientific”, or merely the inevitable workings of History through man. If History 
is indeed a “slaughtering bench” on which nations and men are sacrificed, as Hegel suggested, it 
must need a butcher to carry out its Will on Earth.43 These radical ideologies lacked an intellectual 
anchor which might have prevented them from annihilating human beings in the process of 
destroying an Ancien Régime. As proof, an estimated 25 million people were murdered in the 
name of Fascism, while modest estimates conclude Communism killed “between 85 and 100 
million” souls.44 As Stalin reminds us, “if millions die, that’s only statistics.”45   
One need only look to the human economy of an Auschwitz or the Gulag where the Nazi 
and Communist regimes merely fulfilled the logical consequences of unlimited revolution. In these 
death camps human beings were reduced to mere matter in motion. In physics, Work done to move 
matter in the world is equal to the Force applied to an object multiplied by the Distance it has 
travelled, W = F ∙ D. Slave-laborers were treated as so many quanta of energy with the capacity to 
accomplish a specified amount of work, a mere variable in a physics equation, or line item in a 
book-keeping entry. In these camps efficiency and expediency were the only operative principles. 
Food was rationed and systematically reduced to extract maximal labor from ‘human resources’ 
with the most minimal outlay of overhead expenditures. Albert Speer poignantly, if self-servingly, 
describes an image of these human cogs. He writes, “What disturbs me more is that I failed to read 
the physiognomy of the regime mirrored in the faces of those prisoner.”46 Naziism, among others, 
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justified a total indifference to human life. Speaking of the slave labor under his supervision Speer 
writes, “I realized that the sight of suffering people influenced only my emotions, but not my 
conduct.”47 Speer, it turns out, was not particularly sociopathic, the ideology of his regime was. 
The slave labor camps of the totalitarian regimes epitomize the ultimate experiment in the 
centralized control, routinization and scientific social engineering of human life under ideological 
conditions in which all experiments are permitted. This is how totalitarianism maximizes its return 
on investments.   
Looking back on this era which had begun with the American and French revolutions and 
culminated in the totalitarian nightmare, Camus concludes, “We now know, at the end of this long 
inquiry into rebellion and nihilism, that rebellion with no other limits but historical expediency 
signifies unlimited slavery. To escape this fate, the revolutionary mind, if it wants to remain alive, 
must therefore return again to the sources of rebellion and draw its inspiration from the only system 
of thought which is faithful to its origins: thought that recognizes limits.”48 For Camus these origins 
and limits were to be found in a common and recognized human nature shared by all human beings. 
Human nature was the common measure to which we must defer for anything like remotely justice 
to be established. Human nature is the great fulcrum around which social and political order must 
revolve. It defines and delimits both the means and ends of rebellion, revolution and government 
itself. He continues, “If the limit discovered by rebellion transfigures everything, if every thought, 
every action that goes beyond a certain point negates itself, there is, in fact, a measure by which to 
judge events and men.”49 When the revolution contradicts its own initial premise, when it begins 
to devour its own, that limit has been reached. “In history,” writes Camus, “as in psychology, 
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rebellion is an irregular pendulum, which swings in an erratic arc because it is looking for its most 
perfect and profound rhythm. But its irregularity is not total: it functions around a pivot. Rebellion, 
at the same time that it suggests a nature common to all men, brings to light the measure and the 
limit which are the very principles of this nature.”50 Without regard for a common human nature 
all rebellions and revolutions are mere euphemism for tyranny. Revolution must be taught 
moderation. Moderation can only be achieved when revolution is anchored to a recognized 
common human nature as the natural standard of justice, shared by all human beings.  
Publius and the Founders built America’s institutions on belief that human nature itself was 
the standard of good government and its justice. Political institutions must be made commensurate 
to the being who both animates and is harnessed by them.  The Federalist’s account of human 
nature subscribes to what Thomas Sowell once called the “constrained vision” of human nature 
and the justice commensurate to it.51 Man’s nature and condition provide the fundamental 
constraints and limitations on his existence he must heed if he is to have any chance to be happy. 
The constrained vision begins with the recognition of the limits of human nature and culminates 
the necessity of limited government. There are limits on the ability of that nature to alter itself or 
its circumstances. Adherence to an acknowledged human nature, far from reducing mankind to a 
singular understanding is an acknowledgment and healthy respect of the human diversity that 
nature produces and the wisdom of giving it the freedom to flourish rather than the folly of 
imposing sameness and conformity on mankind. The fact of individual human diversity, difference 
and inequality “is evident from the long record of human experience.”52 A “world of coerced 
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uniformity” is therefore, be definition, antihuman.53 “Attempts to remake human beings,” or to 
make them conform “to the same mold or perfect equality, inevitably lead to tyranny.54 
Limits on what is possible, suggest the perfect should not be allowed to be the enemy of 
the good and possible in this world. There were limits on man’s faculty of reason and his ability 
to know, and to know what is right. Limit on human nature meant man was a being of passion in 
which their reasoning is always mixed with their self-love. The constrained vision sought the 
possible over the perfect. Reason’s limits, applied to founders and statesman as well as the people. 
This means men do not have the right to tinker as gods with human nature and society because 
they are fallible beings. Precisely because of this fallibility rulers are obliged to respect another 
man’s opinions of his own life and aspirations. Limits on reason lead to the denial that the 
systematic organization and social engineering of society was neither good, wise nor possible. The 
constrained vision denies that man “can make everything to our pleasure” whether the character 
of the individual or their society.55 Limits on man’s rational faculty lead to a limit on the 
shoemaker’s knowledge about what is right for the wearer of the boot.  
When The Federalists Papers were published in the aftermath of the Philadelphia 
Convention their immediate purpose was to argue on two fronts. On one hand, they sought to 
illustrate the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, and on the other to argue on behalf of 
the nature and superiority of the newly proposed Union enshrined by the Constitution. The 
inadequacies of the Articles were the very defects they believed the Constitution would solve. 
These aims are really two facets of one continuous argument, connected as they are, by an account 
of human nature. The Federalist’s account of human nature is the fulcrum around which all its 
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claims revolve. This account is the logical and rhetorical lever used to demonstrate the failings of 
the Articles, and justify the Constitution. This account establishes the vital and necessary 
relationship between human nature, government and the science of politics.   
The Federalist Papers were written to explain and defend the provisions for a national 
government drafted by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. Their authors sought to provide an 
“authoritative explication of the principles underlying the Constitution.”56 In No. 1 Hamilton lays 
out the central objectives of The Federalist. Its goals were to demonstrate “the utility of the Union”, 
the insufficiency of the Articles of Confederation, the necessity of energetic government, the 
Constitution’s conformity to the principles of republicanism, and the “additional security” afforded 
to “liberty and property” obtained by that “species of government.”57 At the foundation of this 
explanation is an account of human nature. 58 It becomes apparent its authors presuppose a political 
anthropology. In Aristotle’s works, anthropologos literally means “speaking of man,” or more 
precisely, “an account of human being or human nature.”59 Broadly speaking an anthropology is a 
science of human nature which addresses the body and soul, the physiology and psychology all 
human beings hold in common. A political anthropology aims at a description and analysis of 
those attributes and faculties of human nature particularly germane to political order. There is then 
an underlying anthropology embedded in the two central tasks of The Federalist. This account of 
human nature is the thread which binds together all its various claims.  
Two central premises of this anthropology are that human nature is fixed in its essential 
characteristics, and that in order for government to be just and achieve what Hamilton calls 
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“political prosperity”, it must be founded in proper conformity with these characteristics.60 The 
Federalist Papers presuppose that human nature is not indefinitely malleable, nor subject to 
fundamental transformation by historical change or assertions of the human will. The relative 
stability of human nature means that it is an étant donné, a given. The political scientist must 
confront, recognize and account for human nature as the acknowledged cornerstone of political 
inquiry. Likewise, the founder and the statesmen must, if they are to succeed, erect government on 
this same edifice. They must build political institutions in conformity with the fundamental and 
enduring characteristics of human nature.  
The thoughts of Publius and the American Founders on the relationship between human 
nature and government are no different than Aristotle’s Politics or Nicomachean Ethics. Moral 
and political order must be in conformity with human nature. The happiness of mankind, in its 
individual and collective forms, is predicated on the correct life in conformity with its own nature. 
For Aristotle happiness was a product of the recognition and perfection of our nature, from a raw 
and untutored condition to an educated and complete one. Moral and political institutions should 
be designed to achieve or permit freedom for man to pursuit himself. The Founders of course did 
not follow Aristotle particular prescriptions of education or regime they found appropriate for 
American society, but the general recognition is the same.  
Crafting political order appears to be a simple matter of making it conform to human nature. 
The challenge presented is that human nature is complex, not simple. Mankind has a body and a 
soul, reason and passions, an individual and collective existence. Human nature, because it is 
manifold and divided, is or has the potential to be, in conflict with itself. Human nature, in 
contradistinction to other animals, is really two natures. It consists of a first and second nature. Or, 
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as the Founders and those they drew upon put it, there was a ‘human nature’ in contradistinction 
to a ‘human character’ or spirit. The first nature exhibits a series of ironclad biological needs, 
instincts, impulses and passions that are never completely transformed or eliminated by the 
habituation of society or government. Those instincts, particularly ones detrimental to the common 
interest, which cannot be educated away or altered by civil society, must be accommodated, 
constrained and channeled by the appropriate political institutions and their proper arrangement. 
The nature of these institutions and the arrangement of their powers must be in conformity with 
the inextricable aspects of human nature. The permanent features of man’s nature cannot be 
reeducated or fundamentally altered. Human nature must be taken as it is. Man, in short, is not a 
blank slate.61   
The Founder’s recognition of a fixed human nature provided numerous limits to their 
thought. They identified human nature with limit. The American Founding recognized the 
demands of human nature and sought to found a regime commensurate to it. Human nature was 
bounded by limits, in particular life was a kind mean caught between liberty and necessity. The 
institutional order provided by the Constitution attempts to balance between the demands of liberty 
and those of necessity. This balance merely echoes the parameters of human nature and existence. 
Like all life, human nature must recognize and account for necessity or mere life, on the other hand 
to be a distinctly human existence it must also maintain a place for liberty. The arguments of The 
Federalist recognize there is a deterministic element to human life, but that it is not entirely 
determined by force and accident. Despite the force of the metaphor human beings are not fixed 
cogs in a fixed social machine. They can live by some degree of freedom, of reflection and choice. 
But nor are the wholly free to make and remake their nature or the type of political community 
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that would be best in light of that nature. Human beings were not, as Rousseau suggested, “free 
agents.” The balance the Constitution strikes between liberty and necessity is often referred to as 
“ordered liberty.”62  
The Founders recognized that human nature was bounded by its capacities and powers such 
as the limits of reason and self-making, by its regularity and by “the infirmities and depravities of 
the human character.”63 Their revolution was not radical, nor was its view of human nature. These 
facts represent two sides of the same coin. The American Founding, from Revolution to 
Constitution, maintained a sober view of human nature, simultaneously optimistic and reserved, 
admiring but also suspicious. In No. 76 Hamilton concluded that “there is a portion of virtue and 
honour among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence: and experience 
justifies the theory.64 In No. 55 Madison writes that there is “a degree of depravity in mankind, 
which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust: so there are other qualities in human 
nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government 
presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.”65 Echoing 
Madison’s claim in No. 55, Hamilton writes in No. 76 that “the supposition of universal venality 
in human nature, is little less an error in political reasoning, than that of universal rectitude.”66  
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 Publius and The Founders “took man to be a passionate animal endowed with but not in a 
straightforward fashion governed by reason.”67 One of their central acknowledgements in founding 
a political order, was that man’s reason was compelled to  “recognize its own limitations.”68 This 
meant Publius and the Founders would have to recognize the limits of their own powers of 
reasoning, the precipice where reasoning stops and opinion, passion and interest began. Certainly, 
they “did not believe that in the future men would subordinate passion to reason or self-interest to 
the public good.”69 Lacking true knowledge on such matters, government has no legitimate basis 
for defining completely the happiness of the people. In his “Vindication of the Funding System,” 
Hamilton refers to “the difference between the true politician and the political-empyric.” He says 
the “true politician...takes human nature as he finds it, a compound of good and ill qualities.”70 
This distinction separates the prudent man of action with realistic expectations from the theorist 
who has unreasonable expectations of human nature. Therefore the true statesman and political 
scientist with this view of human nature “will not attempt to warp or distort it from its natural 
direction.”71  In No. 6, Hamilton asks us to abandon “the fallacy and extravagance of those idle 
theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, the 
weaknesses, and the evils incident to society in every shape.”72 It is time, he says, “to awake from 
the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our 
political conduct” because we will never obtain either  “perfect wisdom” or  “perfect virtue.”73 
 
67 Paul Rahe. “Montesquieu, Natural Law and Natural Right.” The Journal of the Witherspoon Institute. January 17, 
2011 
http://www.nlnrac.org/earlymodern/montesquieu 
68 Edward C. Banfield. “Was the Founding an Accident?” Saving the Revolution (ed. Charles R. Kesler). New York: 
Macmillan Press, Inc., 1987. p. 275. 
69 Ibid., p. 275. 
70 Michael J. Rosano. “Liberty, Nobility, Philanthropy, and Power in Alexander Hamilton's Conception of Human 
Nature,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Jan., 2003). pp. 66.  
71 Ibid. 




Publius and the Founders saw human nature as a mean between execs and deficiency. 
Despite its acknowledged frailties, they held “a general consensus that all men had a capacity for 
reason” sufficient to justify their experiment in self-government.74 Hamilton claims that if we 
“view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues, or exaggerating its vices” we 
discover that it has the resources to meet the demands of genuine republican self-government.75 
Mankind had within itself the sufficient supply of reason and virtue for self-government, but is not 
capable of that final historical perfection which would have unreason and vice extricated from its 
nature altogether. In short, human nature had definable limits. In No. 11 Hamilton says, “It belongs 
to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother,” the Europeans, 
“moderation.”76 Hamilton and the Founders sought to teach them the meaning of limit.  
For most of the Founders, their sober view of man, translated into an equally sober view 
of revolution. Revolution was not, for them, an end in-itself, or an article of religious faith.77 
Jefferson remarks that the Philadelphia Convention represented a magnificent example of  
“changing a constitution, by assembling the wise men of state, instead of assembling armies.”78 
One 20th century author writes that revolution is “perhaps the faith of our time.”79 “Modern 
revolutionaries,” he continues, “are believers, no less committed and intense then were the 
Christians or the Muslims of an earlier era.” 80 There was no Saint-Just, Robespierre, Lenin or Mao 
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of the American Founding. Ironically it was in the Old World, not the New, where the fire of 
revolutionary faith would become the ideological idée fixe.81 Unlike 19th century activists like 
Proudhon, Bakunin, Marx or Nechayev, The Founders were not professional radicals, 
revolutionaries, or even pure intellectuals. They were “practical men of varied talents.”82 Most 
were neither “career politicians or mere men of letters.”83 They were soldiers, “scientists, 
inventors, entrepreneurs and builders.”84 One could find an instructive comparison between the 
lives of a Benjamin Franklin or a Hamilton on one hand, and that of a Marx, Nechayev or Trotsky 
on the other. Each side of this biographical comparison serves a microcosm symbolizing the vast 
differences of ideology, outlook and personal experience. The likes of Washington, Adams, 
Madison and Hamilton drew much of their knowledge of the world and politics from hands on 
experiences. Their thinking on the American experiment in self-government was profoundly 
informed by the commonsense worlds they all inhabited as professionals, citizens and statemen. 
They were practical men who knew how to build things, not just tear them down.  
The Founders did not consider revolution as a positive good, as would those in the 19th 
century. It was a necessary evil serving the negative function of throwing off our European 
masters. The American Revolution did not seek complete or fundamental transformation of man 
or his society. Its goals were primarily political and limited. Whatever transformation of society 
had occurred in America, it happened organically and of its own impetuses. These changes were 
not primarily the product of the war or the intention behind revolutionary principles. John Adams 
 
81 Louis Hartz. The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1955. pp. 3-5.  
Hartz famously observed that revolutionary socialism had by the 19th century a strong appeal in Europe, while it 
never genuinely seemed to take root in America. Hartz speculated that this was the product of the socio-economic 
and legal inequalities of feudalism lacking in the American experience.  





remarked, “The Revolution was effected before the War commenced,” he wrote. “The Revolution 
was in the Minds and Hearts of the People. A Change in their Religious Sentiments of their Duties 
and Obligations.”85 
This was the result of a mentality born of a desire for liberty, not fraternity or 
egalitarianism.86 It was a rebellion against tyranny. The vast differences between the American 
project of liberty and the French project of egalitarianism are underwritten by their distinct 
conceptions of human nature and their logical consequences and ramifications. Liberty is the 
central principle of republicanism. Of the various governing principles of political regimes 
throughout history, the Founding Fathers understood liberty, in the form of Natural Rights, to be 
in the greatest conformity with human nature. Liberty is more in conformity with mankind’s 
natural self-love than is fraternity or equality of outcome. The tendency toward self-love is a 
tendency toward self-interest. Human beings are naturally inclined to perform deeds which benefit 
themselves, or those extensions of themselves like family and immediate community. Self-love 
suggests that we love what is ours and we love most what is most ours starting with our lives and 
our bodies. The power of self-love limits the radius of our affections. Societies which attempt to 
extend man’s affection beyond their proper sphere are rightly called tyrannical. One can respect, 
but not love the stranger on the other side of the planet. Fraternité, and its corollary Egalité, are 
both less natural than liberty. Liberty gives free play to self-love. Self-love is the norm because it 
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is natural. Only through compulsion which goes against the grain of their own natures do men 
achieve a society of identical and equal brotherhood. Madison rejects this kind of unrealistic 
conformity and solidarity in No. 10. Such a bending of human nature, the Founder’s held, was at 
too high a cost, with too little meaningful reward.   
The Declaration of Independence is in many ways a radical document. Yet, while its 
asserted universal principles of freedom, they were recognized as true only on behalf of the opinion 
of the American people, not humanity itself. This limited and national recognition by the people 
demanded only a Union of states, not the unity of humanity under a Global World Order. The 
driving impulse on this side of the Atlantic was not a faith in revolution, but in the capacity for a 
people to govern themselves under the right circumstances and institutions. The Founding credo 
was not revolution, but the principles of life, liberty and happiness which provided its ends and 
circumscribed its means.  
This meant Americans sought to alter the government of former British colonies, not all of 
Europe as with the French Revolution, or all the world as with the Communist one. The demand 
for the global recognition of the universal rights of man is a recognition of the universal unity of 
humanity which demands a war on behalf of “humanity” to achieve this unity in practice. The 
attempt at the unity of globe and the denial of a diversity of self-determining nation-states, 
necessarily leads to a war on humanity in the name of humanity. The natural diversity and plurality 
of human nature left to itself tends towards factionalism, both domestically and globally. Thus, the 
war in the name of the global unity of humanity is a war against human nature itself.  
The American Revolution was not “a metaphysical revolt… against the conditions of life” 
or “against creation itself.”87 Nor was it a rebellion against all received tradition and its institutions 
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by bringing them before the tribunal of a merely human wisdom. The goal of the American 
Revolution was not to begin anew, or fundamentally transform human nature, the American people 
or their society. It did not seek the destruction of traditional religion, or its architectural and artistic 
edifices. It did not desire to displace Biblical religion and morality by a religion of reason, or the 
Culte de la Raison. It did not seek to rewrite time itself, the Gregorian calendar, or the days of the 
week. The exodus of the Colonies from this condition was not to be achieved through transforming 
human nature, but rather by transforming the circumstances and conditions of people so as to 
encourage peaceful passions and discourage belligerent ones. They would establish a new political 
order, dedicated to their own liberty, not the economic well-being of a mother country.  
The Revolution did not seek kill a king, but only the form of government called monarchy. 
It was not a root and branch revolution. On the contrary the American Revolution was to provide 
a form of government commensurate to an American society which had gradually devolved away 
from its European progenitors and their long historical memory during the hundred and fifty 
intervening years between the settlement of the New World and the onset of the Revolution. This 
society had developed increasing independency from its mother country since the early days of the 
17th century and taken a distinct and definitive form by the 1760s. The revolution was not sought 
to transform colonial America into a fundamentally new society, but to provide the necessary 
political infrastructure to support the one which had already come to exist. They sought to conserve 
a way of life, not invent a new one from whole cloth.    
Adams wrote, “But what do we mean by the American Revolution? Do we mean the 
American war?...This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the 
people, was the real American Revolution. The victory did not happen on the battlefield, but in the 
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hearts and minds of the citizens.”88 The war would merely re-instantiate the spirit of American 
society already in existence, by making possible a government commensurate to it. The period 
from independence to the Convention and ratification was one of consolidation as much as 
innovation. The Revolution may have been conservative in some ways, as Burke suggested, but it 
did not merely conserve the rights of British subjects, or elements of the English Constitution and 
Common Law. Rather, it conserved a novel way of life that had developed in the New World based 
on the sovereignty of the People, not the Crown.  
The spirit of this revolution and its founding principles came from a heady tincture of 
Enlightenment rationalism and Christian morality. This was a sober Enlightenment holding out a 
tempered optimism for the future and the betterment of society.89 Their thinking was moored in 
the deep pillars of wisdom inherited from Jerusalem and Athens. The Enlightenment of the 
Founders was rational in that it sought to found a regime by the lights of human reason and 
experience alone. If nature is the ultimate object of our rational faculty then it sought to erect a 
regime on the principles of human nature. Of the Constitutional Convention, Clinton Rossiter 
writes, “no one of this sober gathering would have dreamed of invoking the Goddess of Reason, 
neither would anyone have dared to proclaim that his opinions had the support of the God of 
Abraham and Paul. The Convention of 1787 was highly rationalist and even secular in spirit.”90 
Rossiter illustrates how the Founders sought a path between the Scylla and Charybdis of religious 
zealotry on the one hand, and an unbridled and unwarranted faith in human reason on the other. 
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 Even as Publius and the Founders may have believed, as Ethan Allan, that reason was “the 
only oracle of man,”91 they did not fail to express Biblical doubts regarding reason’s limits. The 
Founders’ rationalism contained within itself the seeds of a healthy skepticism toward the very 
fruits of an all-too-human faculty. This rationalism was one that understood experience, not pure 
speculative reason, was “the oracle of truth.”92 Unlike their French cousins the American Founders 
rooted their thinking in a sober Enlightenment and not the Radical or the occult93 Enlightenment 
which sought to transform human nature and society through a religion of reason94 or humanity 
itself.95 This skepticism toward mankind’s faculties was aimed at themselves no less than society 
at large. In No. 37 Madison says of the product of the Convention’s making, “that a faultless plan 
was not to be expected.”96 He speaks of the “errors which may be chargeable on the fallibility to 
which the convention, as a body of men, were liable.” 97 Madison reminds the reader “that they 
themselves also are but men,” subject like any other to “fallible opinions.”98 
Despite the secular tenor of the Convention, the Founders nevertheless understood 
Christian religion and morality as absolutely necessary to the experiment in republican self-
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government. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitutional Convention and its fruit were 
not framed by any overt references to traditional Christianity, but their language was left 
sufficiently open to harmonize with it. Whatever the exact nature of the Founders’ personal views 
on revealed religion, they accepted the practical necessity of its morality. The spine of morality 
was only provided by God, and faith in God. Religion in the people was required if republican 
self-government was to be genuinely established and preserved. Therefore, religion and its 
morality were considered both rational and correct.99 Religion was a moral precondition of 
freedom.100 Christianity taught self-restraint. Self-restraint was a precondition of self-government. 
All the Founders acknowledged that the restraints and limits provided by this morality were 
necessary if American was to keep its republic.   
The audacious, even radical, claim of the American Founding was to have erected a regime 
on the principles of human nature itself. Burke thought the original aim of the American rebellion 
“was not to secure independence from Britain, but to secure the legal rights of subjects under the 
English constitution.”101 Burke saw the American revolution in conservative terms. For him the 
Constitution was the capstone of the transplantation and “restoration” of English society in the 
New World, whose essential features were to be found in the English Constitution.102 The 
Revolution may have been conservative in some respects, but what did it seek to conserve other 
than a new way of life which had developed in the New World. This new society asserted the 
 
99 Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. p. 275. 
Paul Rahe. Republics Ancient & Modern Volume III Inventions of Prudence: Constituting the American Regime. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. p. 206. 
Thomas G. West. The Political Theory of the American Founding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 
165. 
100 Thomas G. West. The Political Theory of the American Founding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017. p. 165. 
101 Peter J. Stanlis. “British Views of the American Revolution: A Conflict over Rights of Sovereignty.” Early 
American Literature, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall, 1976). p. 198. 




sovereignty of the People, not the Crown. The belief in a “wholly popular” government wherein 
the People are sovereign has no parallel in English political history and is unintelligible without 
reference to the Natural Rights tradition of John Locke. The American Founders looked to Nature, 
not History or divine right for their solution. In England the people’s rights were provisionally 
secured from the King, in American they were “unalienable” and “endowed by their Creator.” The 
Founders adapted Lockean principles to a society whose character was already significantly 
shaped by them. John Adams himself asserted that the state constitutions on which the national 
one was based, were in conformity with human nature itself. This made America the “natural rights 
republic”, the regime founded on human nature.103 Zuckert writes, “the great novelty and power of 
the American experiment: the regime based on nature, the regime ordered to natural rights.”104  
Nature, not History, sits at the foundation of the American Founding. From the Revolution 
to the Convention and its Constitution, to the publication of The Federalist Papers and ratification, 
runs the thread of human nature. The Founders did not see themselves as on the right side of 
history, rather historical chance had merely granted fortuitous circumstances. When Hegel had 
seen Napoleon riding though Jena on October 13, 1806, he described the emperor as the historical 
“World-Spirit on Horseback.”105 The Founders understood the history-making nature of their 
endeavor, but did not believe themselves to be instruments of the transcendent, or prophets of 
History. They were not merely children of 18th century Enlightenment optimism. Their success 
was also the result of a providential wisdom, a discretion and a skepticism regarding the nature 
and limits of men. For them the real was not by definition rational.  
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In light of their combination of Enlightenment rationalism and Christian morality, Publius 
and the Founders rejected, avant le lettre, all those historicisms, progressivisms and scientisms 
which attempt to tether the human identity indiscriminately to time and history and willfully 
reshape it in their own image. The unchanging “laws of nature and nature’s God”, not those of 
time, history or progress, were the foundation of human identity. Human nature cannot be 
refashioned by working on itself in time. The attempt to refashion human nature would simply 
result in what C.S. Lewis called “the abolition of man.”106 Human nature transfigured, is human 
nature extinguished.  
The tragedy and carnage which has resulted from attempts to transform humanity in the 
20th and 21st centuries have shown the Founder’s account of human nature to be providential. Man 
comes from the Author with certain inextricable features and limits. To disrespect, to ignore, or to 
willfully attempt to transform those features is a recipe for human misery tantamount to tyranny 
and slavery. This is the errand of the zealot, the tyrant and the fool. Publius and the Founders were 
the first founders in history who explicitly sought to found a regime on what they believed to be 
the unchanging characteristics of human nature. This novel historical project is summed up in the 
name “republic”. The American nation was to be a novel form of republic “erected on the simple 
principles of nature.”107   
“In framing a government,” writes Madison, “which is to be administered by men over 
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”108 Madison acknowledges that the central problem 
the Constitution was designed to solve, and The Federalist Papers  explain, was how to grant men 
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the necessary and sufficient power to govern, yet guarantee the governed would remain free from 
government tyranny. The very recognition of this predicament as a problem only obtains under the 
premise of the principle of limited self-government whose raison d’etre is to secure the natural 
liberties of its citizens. The sacred principle of a government “of the people, for the people, and by 
the people”109 is only intelligible under the premise of a given, free and equal human nature. It is 
a political consideration found only in a nation “conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal.”110  
Concern for the problem of limited self-government only exists if statesmen treat human 
nature as given and morally equal. It rests on the premise that all human beings are by nature free 
and equal, and are the product of a “Creator” independent from itself such as nature or nature’s 
God. Only if human nature is given and rights unalienable because endowed by a power beyond 
human artifice is the Founders’ concern for limited government even intelligible. To acknowledge 
that human beings are endowed with a free and equal nature is to say that no man is the natural 
ruler of any other man. Jefferson wrote that the “palpable truth,” is “that the mass of mankind has 
not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few boote and spurre, ready to ride them 
legitimately, by the grace of God.”111 This fact alone establishes limited government, the uniform 
rule of law and points to the intrinsic problem of the necessity of the rule men over men. It is the 
automatic repudiation of all forms of slavery and tyranny. It is because none of the political 
ideologies generated since the Founding take freedom and equality as given by nature or God, that 
they never bother themselves with limits on government or countenance the proposition that rights 
come from anywhere but State.  
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Today we do not understand nature and purpose of the specific provisions of the 
Constitution and their peculiar arrangement. The logic of the Constitution is only revealed when 
seen through the lens of the Founder’s understanding of human nature from which they are derived. 
We do not understand how the Constitution is predicated on this particular account of human 
nature, motive and conduct. Our failure is a product of our ignorance, or frank rejection of this 
account. Often these two factors go hand in hand.  
Why does the account of human nature in The Federalist Papers remain so vital to our national 
identity, our politics and political science today? Why should we care about a theory of human 
nature advanced by Publius in the distant, rickety era of 1787? We might as well ask, why care 
about the Constitution?   
The provisions of the Constitution are based on speculations about human nature which 
sought to estimate how men would respond to the yoke of its powers and procedures. The 
Constitution is designed to anticipate likely human motives and channel human conduct. Most of 
The Federalist’s defense of the Constitution revolves around imagining how men will act under 
its constraints. These were no idle imaginings, but were the product of long experience of the 
actions of men, in the annals of history, but also as observed in the present. If our government is 
the “greatest of all reflections on human nature” this account remains of utmost importance to our 
understanding of the Constitution and the society it has fashioned.  
 The title of one historian’s book implies that The Federalist’s explanation of the 
Constitution “explains America” itself.112 As our supreme law, the Constitution does not merely 
structure government, but the society subordinate to it. Our own way of life, identity and outlook 
as a people are shaped by it. Attorney General Robert Jackson, who would later become a Supreme 
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Court justice and preside over the Nuremberg trials, said the Constitution not only “guarantees our 
freedoms and the supremacy of law” but represents the “inner ramparts of our society.”113 The 
Constitution not only guarantees our way of life, it is also our way of life. Our Founding documents 
are the mirror in which we understand our history and ourselves. Since we continue to remain the 
children of that 18th century document, it behooves us to be conversant with the core principles on 
which it is based. To understand its account of human nature is to understand the Constitution, and 
to understand the Constitution is to understand ourselves.   
 Echoing Publius, constitutional scholar Richard Epstein says “the choice of a constitution 
rests in large measure upon our conception of human nature.”114 He says the “relation between 
human nature and human government was well understood by the political writers who influenced 
the framers of our own Constitution, but it is often lost sight of today.” 115 The permanent existence 
of this relation should compel us to understand “the driving force[s] of human nature with which 
constitutions must contend.”116 The Constitution “presupposed a distinctive view of human nature 
and was intended to encourage the emergence of certain kinds of men.”117 The Founders believed 
that our republic “could not and would not persist under any and all conditions.”118 For example 
the Constitution presupposed a certain moral order of society where religion was central to its 
fabric. Likewise, it was designed to produce men of sufficient virtue in government. Can our 
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constitutional republic persist under a condition of ignorance regarding the account of human 
nature from which the Constitution’s powers and their arrangement stem? 
 The enduring relevance of The Federalist’s account of human nature rest on the assertion 
that no amount of historical transformation, progress or new knowledge can avoid posing and 
attempting to answer the question of the nature of mankind and the best possible order 
commensurate to it. Ideological transformations in thinking about human nature since the 
Founding illustrate the necessity of returning to a way of thinking which has been made 
questionable. What of a political society that still functions on a document based on principles of 
which the very people created by it, no longer know, understand or hold faith in? Does such a 
circumstance promote what Publius calls our “political prosperity” or its opposite?  
 Another reason The Federalist’s account of human nature remains so important is that we 
seem to be more conversant with ideologies which are rivals and challengers, even enemies, to the 
Constitution. All political theories necessarily rest on some conception of human nature. How we 
conceive that nature directly informs the principles on which we found, structure and reform 
political communities. Its shapes and defines our relationships with fellow citizens and ourselves. 
The account in The Federalist stands in direct opposition to various strands of thought percolating 
since the time of the Founding which have flourished particularly since the 19th century and have 
been transmitted into the 21st.   
 American history might well be conceived as a struggle over how we understand the 
essential characteristics of our nation and its political psychology. When for example Montesquieu 
speaks of the “spirit” of laws he is asserting the way the character of the regime through its laws 
shapes the soul of its people. Constitutions craft and promote a certain way of life and 
psychological type for a given people. American history exhibits a competition and synthesis of 
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psychologies from the interested entrepreneurs of Jamestown and the inspired religious piety of 
the Puritans, to the rationalist views of the Founders rooted in universal liberties inferred from a 
common human nature. The first open wound of the Republic emerged in its first decade. The 
sectionalism Washington feared in his Farewell Address was not simply a matter of competing 
and divided geographical and economic interests, but became a struggle over the soul of a nation.   
 The early conflict between industry, the urban merchant, the banker and the “monied 
interest” in contrast to Jefferson’s agrarian nation of country-side yeoman farmers, was not merely 
a struggle over the dominate economic class on which the nation would be founded. It was a 
struggle over its dominate moral psychology. Later Alexander Stephens would reject the 
democratic founding principle of the equality of man in favor of the feudal and aristocratic master-
slave relation as the “cornerstone” of the Confederacy. The Civil War was precipitated by a battle 
over the “slave power” and sectional economic interests as well as the Constitutional extent of 
“states’ rights,” but it was also a battle over the nation’s understanding of human nature. Were all 
men equally “endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights” or was the “cornerstone” 
of American society the natural inequality of men and the slavery that logically follows in train? 
 Lincoln would reassert the Founding principles inferred from human nature as an “apple 
of gold” in the silver frame of the Constitution. In the 20th century the growth of government and 
its never-ending encroachment on American society has been built in large part on the Progressive 
vision of an indeterminate, self-made, or evolving human nature. This “evolution” has had a 
parallel impact, evident in the speeches and policies of Wilson, FDR and later presidents, over our 
conceptions of the origins and substance of the rights to which we think we are entitled.119 The 
vision of an evolving human nature, individually and collectively, manifests in a change in the 
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meaning of “rights” and the size, structure and role of government commensurate to this new 
meaning. Was the first Bill of Rights enough, or do historical transformations demand a second?120 
This vision of a dynamic human nature meant a dynamic or “living” Constitution whose meaning 
does, in fact must, change with the spirit of each “new” age. Is our collective psychological to be 
as John Adams put it, a “natural aristocracy”121 where happiness is a pursuit, or shall we guarantee 
our happiness through equality of outcome, make government its distributor, and turn ourselves 
into a nation of last men?122 
The intellectual and political currents of the intervening two-hundred years since The 
Founding have coalesced in an ongoing rejection of the Founders’ own self-understanding of the 
political order they crafted and the account of human nature on which it is based. Progressivism 
necessarily means progress away from the Founding. Only a short time after the nation’s birth, 
American statesmen and European intellectuals and scholars began to systematically reject the 
core philosophical principles on which our founding documents are based. Belief in a free and 
equal, largely fixed human nature from which natural rights were derived and popular limited 
government instituted to protect, was replaced by an ever-changing human condition and an ever-
malleable human personality definitively subject to History, circumstance, and the manipulation 
of those in power.  
Natural rights had been understood by Locke and Jefferson to be universal, even as they 
have never been universally recognized by regimes past and present. The Founders statements 
make clear they recognized the fundamental and contradictory disparity between the principles of 
the Declarations and the laws of the Constitution. In spite of their personal conduct, they all 
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understood and accepted that the agreed upon public meaning of the phrase “all men are created 
equal” meant the moral equality of all human beings. “Men” referred neither to the male of the 
species, nor exclusively white men in particular. This was simply the accepted term to speak of all 
human beings.123 It was an utterly conventional and standardized usage of term. Natural rights were 
the logical extension of a rational human nature capable of knowing the laws of its own conduct. 
Natural rights are not speculative abstractions. They are reasoned inferences made from reflections 
on the empirical evidence of human conduct. In his 1806 address to Congress, President Jefferson 
was rather clear. He sought “to withdraw the citizens of the United States from all further 
participation in those violations of human rights which have been so long continued on the 
unoffending inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the reputation, and the best interests of 
our country, have long been eager to proscribe.”124 
The struggle over Natural Rights first broke out in Southern politics. Many would 
recognize universal equality in one breath, but defend the institution of slavery in another. No 
better example of this paradoxical thinking exists than John Randolph, a follower of Jefferson. 
Randolph embraced the injustice of slavery in theory but displayed an unprecedented ambivalence 
and ambiguity in practice. He said “The question of slavery, as it is called, is to us a question of 
life and death ... You will find no instance in history where two distinct races have occupied the 
soil except in the relation of master and slave.”125 For Randolph, historical fact superseded the 
moral theory of Natural Rights. Although he was “sensitive to the evils of slavery, Randolph 
ultimately insisted that his race must triumph in an ongoing war with the black enemy within.”126 
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He nonetheless made provisions in his will for the manumission of his own slaves. The conflict 
between the principles of the Declaration and the quite acceptance of slavery in the Constitution, 
the original sin of the Founding, persisted. In 1825 John Marshall’s opinion on the captured slave 
ship Antelope summed up this conflict. In his opinion, he acknowledged slavery contrary to 
Natural Law, but upheld the enslavement of the ship’s cargo of human chattel on the grounds of 
established man-made positive law. Relying on the fact of acknowledged precedent, or stare 
decisis, Marshall recognized slavery as “abhorrent”, yet acknowledge that it had “claimed all 
the sanction which could be derived from long usage and general acquiescence.”127 It was John 
C. Calhoun, that ardent defender of slavery, who in 1837 laid the groundwork for a new argument 
on behalf of slavery through the abandonment of the principles of the Declaration altogether. His 
direct attack against the principles of the Declaration only serves to confirm their original public 
meaning. For Calhoun, slavery was not only legal under the Constitution, but Natural Right meant, 
not equality but the natural right of the stronger to be master over the slave. The master-slave 
relation, not equality, was natural. Slavery was no longer a necessary evil and by-product of Union, 
but had become a “positive good.”128 In Calhoun’s view, “nothing could be more unfounded and 
false than the opinion that all men are born free and equal; inequality was indispensable to 
progress; government was not the result of compact, nor was it safe to entrust the suffrage to all.”129 
By the mid-19th century Natural Rights had become something of an intellectual 
embarrassment. Attacks came from both the left and the right of the intellectual and political 
spectrum. They were increasingly treated as a kind of chimerical abstraction and intellectual 
embarrassment. Elusory rights were a metaphysical and faith-based theological holdover, living 
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on in an age of perpetual enlightenment increasingly rooted in the exclusive authority of material 
natural science and its empiricist epistemology. In his Anarchical Fallacies, Bentham attacked the 
notion that the central object of government was “the preservation of the natural and 
imprescriptible rights of man.”130 “Natural rights” he said, “is simple nonsense, natural and 
imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts.”131 Thus the principles of the 
Declaration and the form of government they gave rise to in the Constitution, were no longer 
objective truths discerned through rational reflection on experience. Instead they were historicized 
as mere prejudices and children of a now bygone age.  
Locke had identified property in one’s body, its faculties and labor as the fundament of 
natural liberty. Slavery was unjust because man was a rational animal capable of knowing its own 
nature and its laws. Slavery was contrary to human nature itself. In the 19th century this position 
dissolved. Bentham was clear, saying “there is no natural property” because “property is entirely 
the creature of [positive] law.”132 Rights were a creature of law, and law was a product of men, the 
state and History, not nature. Rights that can be created by men can also just as easily be taken 
away.  
What of a nation which no longer understands or believes in the founding principles of its 
own social and political order? Woodrow Wilson was the first president to attack The Founding 
and the Constitution as both a scholar and statesmen.133 He could not have been more unequivocal 
when he asserted that the principles of the Declaration merely “speak the character of the men who 
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drew them as clearly as they speak the circumstances of the time” and no more.134 Rejected was 
the claim that the Founding principles reflected any evidence of the wisdom of the ages or the 
accumulated experience of mankind.  
Wilson said, “If you want to understand the real Declaration of Independence, do not repeat 
the preface.”135 The “preface” is where the Declaration asserts the self-evident truths that “all men 
are created equal,” and “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Wilson dismissed such claims as mere 
“rhetorical introduction” to the historically concrete grievances against the King. It was in the 
itinerary of grievances where the truth of the document was to be found, in concrete empirical facts 
alone.136 Wilson asserted that the ends and principles of the Founders do not “dictate the aims and 
objects of any generation but their own.”137 Therefore, Wilson concluded, “We are not bound to 
adhere to the doctrines held by the signers of the Declaration of Independence.”138 This was 
because “we have come to a new age and a new attitude towards questions of government.”139 
Wilson did not have to provide reasoned justifications for his repudiation of the Founding 
principles, he merely had to assert the passage of time. This lazy method of argument, by the only 
scholar-president in our nation’s history, lends itself to high-brow intellectual justification of our 
own ignorance. Since the past is always become obsolete, ignorance of it becomes a virtue.  
The technocratic or pseudo-scientific version of this argument was to say that the political 
structure provided by the Constitution was antiquated. It was not up to the task of coping with new 
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dynamic elements of modernity the Founders could have never foreseen - its novel technologies 
such as new modes of communication and transportation and the novel social and economic 
organization they made possible. The Founders and their ideas were nice, but past their sell-by 
date.  By the early decades of the 20th century, Natural Rights had become the mythopoetic cry of 
the Revolution and no more.  
This displacement of Nature in favor of History as the source of being went hand in hand 
with claims which centered on economic class interest as the source of historical change and 
political order. The Constitution was no longer a document grounded in a clear-eyed view of 
human nature reached through forthright deliberations. Instead, it was a backroom deal, struck at 
a secret convention where elites conspired to devise government in order to advance their own 
economic class interests. This paradigm was firmly established in 1913 by Charles Beard’s 
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. Beard’s argument, which dominated scholarship for 
half a century, was based on “the hypothesis that economic elements are the chief factors in the 
development of political institutions.”140  
Beard found in the Convention and Constitution what he was looking for. The true cause 
of the Constitution’s provisions, Beard asserted, was the “direct, impelling motive” of “economic 
advantages which the beneficiaries expected would accrue to themselves first,” as a result of their 
constitution making.141 This thesis was reasonable enough, but ultimately depended on the 
empirical evidence, not the mere assertion of an historical method. Beard’s faulty claims and lack 
of particulars to support them have long been exposed by numerous scholars, but the idea that the 
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Founders acted merely out of grasping or bigoted class interest has only proliferated in the popular 
conscience and in classrooms all across the nation.142 
Today the logic of raw power and naked interest has long been extended beyond the 
frontiers of class to race, sex, sexual orientation and beyond. Today the belief in the obsolescence 
of the Founders’ wisdom, or that they merely sought to advance their interests as elite, white, men 
of European racial and cultural descent are truisms of our Founding discourse. And yet, the authors 
of the Declaration, Constitution and Federalist Papers asserted the universal validity and relevance 
of their claims. Nor were the provisions of the Declaration and Constitution based on mere 
“abstractions”143 as Beard and Wilson have it. Instead they were derived from candid and extensive 
reflection on and concrete experience of the conduct and motives of men.  In No. 51 Madison 
claims that government is nothing other than “the greatest of all reflections on human nature.” If 
this is so, the Constitution is primarily a reflection on human nature. The Federalist’s exegesis of 
the government established by the Constitution it is then an exegesis of human nature itself.  
This study will present The Federalist’s science of human nature. Publius’ account is 
rendered in explicit claims about the nature of man and is implicit in the form of republican 
government he explains and defends. While this study draws primarily on The Federalist, 
complimentary sources are relied upon to flesh out its account of human nature. Writings and 
speeches, particularly of Madison and Hamilton, both before and after the Convention and 
publication of The Federalist, demonstrate the continuity of their principles and positions 
sometimes only hinted at in their role as Publius. The history of the United States is an ongoing 
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process of interpreting the Constitution and its account of human nature. The Federalist Papers, 
even in times of their perceived irrelevance, has always been the first and primary source in our 
nation’s attempt to glean the meaning of the Constitution. Citizens, commentators, politicians and 
jurists alike have all turned to The Federalist, whether to celebrate or condemn our Founding. 
Given its centrality, American history is an ongoing interpretation of The Federalist Papers as 
well. It has become something akin to a national scripture for friends and foes alike. 
The first task is to demonstrate the general importance of human nature to Publius’ 
understanding and defense of the government established by the Constitution. He claims the 
peculiar nature and arrangement of powers granted by the Constitution are nothing but a reflection 
of his and the other Founders’ experience and understanding of human nature. The second task is 
to present the specific substance of this account by illuminating key presuppositions and distilling 
and arranging various passages distributed throughout the text in an orderly manner.     
There are two premises on which every argument of The Federalist is based. First, is the 
necessary dependence on or identity between human nature and politics. An adequate 
understanding and practice of the latter is dependent on a penetrating inquiry into the former. 
Government is the human soul writ large.  The parts and motives of the soul which impact politics 
must be understood and accounted for. Publius acknowledges that devising the Constitution as the 
means to promote “political prosperity” could only come from an exhaustive attempt to know the 
human soul. Scanlan says The Federalist is committed “to a program of judging projected 
institutions by examining the motives of men.”144 The second premise involves the findings of 
their observations of human nature. Publius accepts certain general and constant characteristics of 
human nature as they understood them through examples of history and their own experiences. 
 




Men are not angels and restraints are needed for ruler and ruled alike. Self-interest is the dominate 
motive of men and it must be accounted for if good government is to be established.  
The arguments of The Federalist Papers establish a necessary relationship between human 
nature, government and the science of politics itself. This relationship is the central leitmotif 
running throughout all its numbers. Publius’ account of human nature is architectonic, it provides 
the foundation for all his arguments. The text repeatedly asserts that political order is a direct 
expression of human nature. Therefore, the account of human nature provided by the authors of 
The Federalist “logically shaped the kind of government they were advocating.”145 Madison 
famously says government is the “greatest of all reflections on human nature.”146    In No. 15 
Hamilton asks, “Why has government been instituted at all?” His answer? Human nature will not 
“conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”147    
Political science then must entail the study of human nature. At the Constitutional 
Convention Hamilton is reported to have said that the “science of policy is the knowledge of human 
nature.”148 In an 1784 letter to the citizens of New York Hamilton said “all political speculation to 
be just, must be founded” on a clear understanding of the principles of human nature.149 He calls 
political science simply “the science of human nature.”150 He asserts knowledge of human nature 
is the foundation of all political speculation and practice.151 “No ruler of men,” says Hamilton, 
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“certainly no builder of a new political system, could be ignorant of the most useful of all sciences 
– the science of human nature.”152 
The science of politics is the science of human nature. This science starts with a search for 
and understanding of politically relevant knowledge of human nature recruited in the practical 
service of political order and prosperity. Knowledge of human nature is ministerial to political 
practice. If government is the greatest reflection on human nature, political administration and 
policy participates in and depends on this knowledge. The central goals of Publius’ political 
science are to identify the true and regular motivations of human nature and conduct, and to design 
institutions which can properly account for them. In No. 15 Hamilton acknowledges that they seek 
to know the “true springs by which human conduct is actuated.”153 The central problem of political 
science is the problem of proper or sufficient knowledge of man’s faculties, motivations, vices and 
virtues.  
At the foundation of The Federalist’s account is an understanding of how and why human 
nature necessitates government. Government and law in themselves are not “social constructs.” 
They exist of necessity, not choice. They are necessitated by the defects of human nature, but can 
also employ and exemplify its bests assets. Government is necessary because, as Madison says, 
“men are not angels.” Hamilton translates this epigram by saying that the “passions of men will 
not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”154 Human nature exhibits a 
“defect of better motives.” This defect is caused by the fact that “momentary passions, and 
immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct, than general 
or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice.”155 Angels can govern themselves, men 
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cannot. Government is needed because individually men lack the necessary internal motivational 
resources to restrain themselves. Human nature necessitates the external restraint of government.  
Once human nature is identified, the problem of political science is to build a constitutional 
order commensurate to its demands. Government must provide the necessary order to establish 
peace, yet enough liberty to allow a distinctly human nature to flourish.  From the perspective of 
Publius and the Founders, government commensurate to the demands of human nature is good 
government.  Institutions must simultaneously account for what is noble and what is base in 
mankind. They must be devised in a manner to promote virtue and mitigate vice. In particular 
government must acknowledge the fundamentally interested nature of mankind. In Nos. 55 and 
76, Madison and Hamilton make clear that human nature is base enough to necessitate government, 
but noble enough to make good government possible. They concluded that there was “a portion of 
virtue and honour among mankind”156 which justifies our “esteem and confidence”157 that human 
nature is capable of genuine republican self-government. In 1807 Jefferson echoed Publius’ 
sentiments when he said, “We are a people capable of self-government, and worthy of it.”158 
Human nature is neither all good, nor all bad. Mankind lacks sufficient virtue and reason 
to be simply self-governing, to live without external constraints at all. Yet, at the same time there 
is sufficient supply of reason and virtue which makes human nature capable of the freest possible 
form of political constraint. The motive of self-interest marks the mean between the extremes of 
vice and virtue. It is neither particularly noble, nor is it diabolically base. That great French student 
of the American Founding, Alexis de Tocqueville says, “Self-interest” as a “doctrine not very 
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lofty, but clear and sure.”159 Self-interest is the “low but solid” foundation on which the 
Constitution is built.   
Publius’ science of human nature provides the grounds for demonstrating the inadequacies 
of the Articles of Confederation, the validity of Union and the republican principles of the 
Constitution. The failure of the Articles lay in their inability to properly meet the challenges posed 
by human nature. Meanwhile Publius hopes to demonstrate how the republican provisions of the 
Constitution are commensurate to this task. If our peculiar form of government is dictated by a 
science of human nature, our comprehension of the Constitution is dependent on our 
comprehension of this science.  
In No. 9 Publius asserts that he a partisan of a new political science which had made 
decisive improvements over Ancient Pagan and Christian thought and their Renaissance legacies. 
Madison insisted that American government was “a system without a precedent ancient or 
modern.”160 Gordon Wood for example has asserted that the Constitution and the political science 
on which it is based marked “the end of classical politics.”161 This new science represented a partial 
indictment of classical politics and political science. Publius’ new science rejected Ancient 
political philosophy precisely for, among other things, its failure to properly account for the 
deficiencies of human nature. Ancient theory and practice were seen as having failed to solve the 
problems endemic to popular government. These problems were the result of unrealistic 
expectations of the best citizens, and too low an opinion of the rest. Making unrealistic demands 
on human nature is a recipe for both hypocrisy and corruption, if not tyranny itself.162  
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Publius’s science follows in the footsteps of Machiavelli. It abandons airy speculations of 
“imagined republics” and virtuous men untainted by the motives of self-interest. It replaces them 
with hard-boiled mechanical analysis of human motives and institutions with an eye to the possible 
and the likely. Their analysis focused on the real, rather than hoped for, dispositions of human 
nature. What was achievable was precisely dictated by the parameters and limitations of human 
nature. The new political science put a premium on self-interest over virtue so as not to make the 
perfect the enemy of the good. The “decline of virtue had as its logical corollary the rise of 
interest.”163 At the New York State Ratifying Convention Hamilton said: “Men will pursue their 
interests. It is as easy to change human nature, as to oppose the strong current of the selfish 
passions”164   
While their attitude toward the Ancients was tinctured by influences from Machiavelli, 
Locke, Montesquieu and Hume, they recognized and respected many of their conclusions as 
inescapable. Therefore, the new science did not simply abandon all observations, conclusions or 
goals of the Ancients.  Among these was the necessity of virtue to good government and the belief 
that government could be a positive good rather than merely a necessary evil designed simply to 
restrain men. High office could still be a stage for human excellence and virtue, and the fulfillment 
of the highest individual natures. 
This new science of human nature was derived from modern natural philosophy which 
sought to demystify the natural world.165 It was grounded in a materialism whose provenance can 
be traced to Lucretius and Machiavelli, and later to Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Montesquieu, Hume 
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and Smith.166 The science of man was increasingly modeled on natural sciences and the 
“mechanical philosophy” of Hobbes and Descartes.167 In Leviathan and other works, Hobbes had 
applied a rigidly geometric model of causation in explaining man’s psychological faculties, 
motivation and conduct. Hobbes materialist bent allowed him to place human psychology “under 
the rubric of physics.” 168 The title of La Mettrie’s book, L’homme Machine, indicates the spirit of 
this aspiration.  
The Federalist is replete with mechanical metaphors which describe the workings of 
human psychology and government. The faculties of the human mind were “springs” of action. If 
man is like a machine, both he and his society function on certain knowable and persistent laws of 
conduct, however general. Conduct was based on motives generated by the faculties of the human 
soul, a tincture of reason and passion. The Federalist’s analysis of the faculties assumes the human 
soul is sufficiently mechanistic to be predictable within limits. Necessity, fear, ambition, desire for 
material gain, self-love and self-interest are the recognizable regular springs of action evident 
throughout the text.  
Publius’ faculty psychology stresses the limits of reason, the all-too-human tendency to 
succumb to passionate motives counter to the public interest. Self-interest is understood as the vera 
causa of human motivation. Ancient political philosophy and republics alike had set their sights 
too high regarding the ends of government. They overestimated the capacity of human beings to 
act rationally and virtuously. And that, at the peril of the justice and longevity of regimes. This 
wisdom regarding the limits of human nature had to be applied to founders and statesmen as well. 
In asserting that the purpose of political order was human perfection, Ancient political science 
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seemed to have confused its aspirations with its observations of human conduct. As a result, they 
failed to take the necessary precautions and provide the proper sentinels to restrain and mitigate 
human frailty. 
The Federalist Papers’ conclusions regarding human nature then flow directly into its 
conception of the political structure of the new American Republic. The crown jewel of Publius’ 
new science was a new and innovative form of republicanism. The Founders repeatedly asserted 
that this republican form, by accepting the centrality of self-interest, was in harmony with human 
nature itself. The modern republic would be “wholly popular”, “extended”, “commercial” and 
“compound republic” with a separation of powers foreign to the ancients. It would be dedicated 
more to commerce and liberty than to virtue and duty.   
The method of Publius’ analysis of human nature falls into two categories, one more 
rationalistic and inferential, the other more empirical and behaviorist. The first facet consists of 
rational inferences made from human conduct. The arguments of The Federalist presuppose the 
stability of human nature over time and the existence of moral laws of human nature, or Natural 
Law. These presumptions are derivative of Locke’s understanding of the Law of Nature as found 
in the Declaration of Independence. Locke called Natural Law a “dictate of Reason.”169 This law 
is rationally deduced from experience of human nature. It is revealed through logical inferences 
based on from observations of human conduct. In The Farmer Refuted Hamilton says that the 
“sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records. 
They are written with a sun beam in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity 
itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.”170  
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From human nature a set of universal moral principles or laws are deduced which dictate 
how human beings should act. Natural Law stipulate obligations but also imply rights, particularly 
in the Modern formulations of Hobbes and Locke. Self-preservation is for Locke both a right and 
a duty. The human individual is forbidden to take their own life. The law of human nature dictates 
Natural Rights and liberties. Republican self-government dedicated to the protection of Natural 
Rights was understood by Publius to be in conformity with human nature itself. Natural Law 
dictates how men ought to act and prescribes the ends of government, or the principles on which 
it is founded. These ends are recapitulated in the preamble of the Constitution.  
Meanwhile, the second behaviorist facet of The Federalist’s account of human nature 
consists of empirical observations of human conduct made from history and their own personal 
experiences. This component of their science involves a description and analysis of the reliable 
and durable motivations which determine how people actually do act, despite the moral dictates 
of reason. Much of The Federalist’s analysis of behavior focuses particular attention on, but is not 
confined to, the motives of those who occupy various offices within the structure of the 
Constitution and how the circumstances and powers of office direct, restraint and promote certain 
motives and conduct in their holders.  
This behavioral analysis is determined to illustrate how certain motives will be provoked 
by the peculiar provision and arrangement of powers. The constitutional structure of powers must 
anticipate these motivations in order to promote beneficial ones and thwart those destructive of the 
public interest and the true ends of government. Publius’ overarching rhetorical goal, as advocate 
for the Constitution, was to demonstrate just how it would accommodate these likely sources of 
motivation. Lesser, but likely motivations would be channeled or constrained through various 
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checks and balances such as public accountability, process of appointment and the specific nature 
and arrangement of the powers granted to government.   
The Federalist’s analysis of human nature can be viewed as a synthesis of the moral 
philosophy and epistemology of Locke, Hume and Montesquieu. The rationalist Natural Law 
theories of Locke and others are married to the psychological analysis of the Montesquieu and the 
Scottish Enlightenment, particularly Hume. The combination of these sources represents a 
marriage of Enlightenment rationalism and empiricism. Despite a large debt to Hume in a variety 
of matters, Publius does not follow his rejection of social contract theory or his belief that all 
regimes are founded on nothing more than force and habit. In No. 1 Hamilton makes clear that he 
believes it possible for a regime to be founded on “reflection and choice” in contradistinction to 
“accident and force.” Hume flatly denied the existence of practical reason and that it was capable 
of establishing moral rules of human conduct.171 Man was primarily a being of passion where 
reason was merely a servant to the master faculty. Despite his profound acknowledgement of 
reason’s limits, Publius demonstrably rejects that reason is and ought to be nothing more than the 
slave of the passions. The most obvious departure from the method of Hume is Hamilton’s 
assertion in No. 31 of “certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent 
reasonings must depend” derived from “internal evidence…antecedent to all reflection or 
combination.”172 Like Euclidian geometry, ethics and politics have their axioms which are not 
themselves observed, but drawn by “direct inference” from human nature. Hamilton continues that 
such inferences are obvious “to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of common-sense.”173 Here 
Hamilton seems to hint at the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence.  
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Meanwhile Publius followed Hume in his respect for experience as the “oracle of truth”174 
and the “best oracle of wisdom.”175 Hamilton says that when the “responses” of this “oracle” are 
“unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred.”176 If the provisions of the Constitution are 
nothing other than “inventions of prudence,” Hobbes tells is that “prudence is but experience.”177 
Publius insinuates that experience and history are the primary resources on which the Constitution 
is built, not abstract reasonings.  
But experience alone cannot determine the correct ends of our actions. A balance between 
empirical observation and rational inference from experience is required. Here Montesquieu enters 
the equation. While his influence is often confined to the role of “oracle” of the separation of 
powers, his complex understanding of Natural Law appears to be central to The Federalist’s 
arguments. In following the Natural Law tradition, Montesquieu takes into consideration historical 
circumstance in a way Locke does not. He therefore serves as a bridge between these two 
Enlightenment traditions often perceived to be in direct opposition.  
If Locke is the philosopher of the Declaration of Independence, Montesquieu and Hume 
are the philosophers of the Constitution. Locke’s arguments address the foundational moral theory. 
Montesquieu addresses the practical implementation of Natural Law, its modification and adaption 
to historical circumstance. Madison tells us that the Constitution is based on the “principles of the 
revolution” and “the genius of the people of America.”178  
The Federalist explains how the principles of Locke would be adapted to the conditions of 
American society. Montesquieu provided the theoretical lead for the delicate business of adapting 
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universal principles to the particular circumstances of a given society. These twin sources of the 
Constitution can today be summed up by the distinction between legal Rationalism and legal 
Pragmatism or realism. The Convention and its Constitution represent a synthesis of the two. This 
distinction is manifest throughout Publius’ political science. This political science has a theoretical 
underpinning rooted in a universal Natural Law theory, but is also geared toward solving the 
practical exigencies of their application in the conditions of 1787. Pangle acknowledges that the 
authors of The Federalist were “alive to this difficulty,” the challenge of adapting universal 
principles of liberty to the particular circumstances of American society in ways that others, like 
Jefferson, were not.179 In fact the essence of The Federalist is to explain just how the Constitution 
had successfully adapted the universal principles of human nature to the social and political 
exigencies of the day.   
If the revolutionary period depended more on Natural Law inspired by Locke, the era of 
the Convention and Constitution depended more on the principles of political realism derived from 
Hume and perhaps even Machiavelli and Hobbes. This significant intellectual shift was largely 
instigated by the distinct demands of the day rather than a supposed in a change in principles, or a 
supposed “conservative counter-revolution.”180 The thrust of The Federalist’s analysis of human 
nature involve speculations about how men will act under the constraints of the Constitution. Since 
the novel Constitution had not been ratified, let alone implemented, Publius is forced to speculate 
about future conduct under the Constitution, based on past experience. He is compelled to predict 
behavior based on experience and his model of human motivation derived from it. And historical 
hindsight demonstrates clear instances in which Publius was wrong in the predictions he made. 
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But only Locke’s rationalism can define the ends and explain why we should want men to act as 
the Constitution dictates. Lockean and Jeffersonian principles of Natural Right do not guarantee 
themselves, or even spell out how them might be realized. It was Publius’ task to explain just who 
the Constitution would preserve man’s liberties, while at the same time supply the defect of the 
Articles of Confederation.  
 The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are parts of one 
consistent whole, founded upon one and the same theory of government, then new, not as a theory, 
for it had been working itself into the mind of man for many ages, and been especially expounded 
in the writings of Locke, but had never before been adopted by a great nation in practice.181 
- John Quincy Adams, April 30, 1839 
 
In 1839 John Quincy Adams stated, “The Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution…are parts of one consistent whole, founded upon one and the same theory of 
government.”182 Locke’s Second Treatise, The Declaration of Independence and other writings 
rooted in the Natural Law tradition are the presupposed intellectual background of the Constitution 
and Publius’ analysis of it. Thomas Pangle writes The Federalist Papers insist “the American 
Constitution must be understood as growing out of and intending to advance what Madison in No. 
39 calls ‘the fundamental principles of the Revolution’.”183  
That the Natural Law tradition provided this theoretical predicate to the Constitution was 
perfectly obvious to enemies of the ‘Old’ Constitution such as Alexander Stephens, Frank 
Goodnow, John Dewey and Woodrow Wilson. Pestritto says the “Progressives rightly understood” 
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that the Declaration and its natural rights set “the purpose for the Constitution itself.”184 The 
Declaration tells us that “Governments are instituted among Men” in order “to secure these rights.” 
Yet it does not advance a specific form of government to secure them. This task was left to the 
Articles of Confederation, and later, the Constitution. The Declaration’s Natural Rights establish 
the ends of government. A version of these rights is listed in the Constitution’s Preamble. Its seven 
articles enumerate a republican form of limited government designed to fulfill them. The very 
notion of a limited constitution as a blueprint for limited government, is entirely unintelligible 
without the logic of Natural Rights. Why would men want to limit government at all, if not to 
protect their own pre-existing freedoms? 
If the authors of The Federalist were fully committed to the principles of the Revolution, 
why were they opposed for example to a bill of rights as found in most state constitutions? 
Hamilton responds to the charge with a number of arguments. The most obvious is that political 
liberty and the principle of free consent are established directly or indirectly in a “wholly popular” 
government where offices holders would be determined by various means of elections or 
appointment, and serve as representatives of the people. Hamilton acknowledges that although the 
Constitution had no bill of rights at that time he said “it contains in the body of it, various 
provisions in favour of particular privileges and rights, which, in substance, amount to the same 
thing.”185 Hamilton mentions a series of constitutional clauses consistent with Natural Rights 
thinking. The most notable of these is the denial of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, the 
preservation of habeas corpus except in the most extreme circumstances and only altered by the 
people’s representatives in the legislature. Add to this list, the denial of legal distinctions between 
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classes through the denial of titles of nobility and feudal privilege, and guarantees of due process 
through trial by jury as well as a very high bar on the capital crime of treason.186 In addition the 
First Amendment’s establishment clause is implicit in the lack of provision for a state religion or 
church. 
Hamilton feared that the inclusion of a bill of rights would make it seem identical in nature 
to the English Bill of Rights of 1688. The written enumeration of rights would make it appear as 
if government was granting, rather than securing rights. In English history rights were freedoms 
won from the Crown over time, not found in human nature universally.187 Lastly, Hamilton’s 
insinuates that a parchment bill of rights provides only parchment guarantees. Despite the 
American innovation of an expressed, explicit written Constitution, experience had taught 
Hamilton paper constitutions by themselves were “frail and worthless fabrics.”188 While they 
eliminate some of the mysteries and ambiguities of a tacit constitution both Hamilton and Madison 
understood papered principles do not enforce themselves.  In No. 48 Madison asks if the precision 
and clarity of a written document is sufficient ground to trust “parchment barriers against the 
encroaching spirit of power?”189 Antonin Scalia famously said “Every tin horn dictator in the world 
today, every president for life, has a Bill of Rights. But, the real key to the distinctiveness of 
America is the structure of our government.”190 The true guarantee of rights and liberties was to 
be found in the proper structure of government which provided genuine limitations on its power, 
not in parchment promises of moral rectitude. 
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If adherence to the Enlightenment understanding of Natural Law is a central tenet of 
Publius’ advocacy for the Constitution, why is discussion of it so conspicuously lacking in the 
text? White says Publius “continued to rely on the same doctrine of natural law” that had inspired 
the philosophy of the American Revolution a decade earlier. 191  Hamilton, Madison and Jay were 
“just as committed to a rationalistic doctrine of natural law and natural right as Jefferson was,” yet 
they “did not harp on these rights nor on their metaphysical and theological foundations” in the 
arguments of The Federalist.192  
Such omissions are a product of The Federalist’s scope and purpose. The Federalist is 
more akin to Plato’s Laws than his Republic. It simply “does not tell the complete story or provide 
all the answers.193 It is not “a treatise on political philosophy concerned with natural law, the origin 
and nature of the state, or the best form of government in the abstract.”194 Whatever historical value 
we attribute to The Federalist Papers it is not because of its comprehensive scope in arguing from 
first principles, but in its advocacy of practical measures that might best secure them. The function 
of the text was to discuss the appropriate form of government that could secure the natural rights 
of the Declaration.  
White concludes that the lack of discussion of natural rights in The Federalist is not 
because Madison and Hamilton’s thought had evolved since the heady days of the Revolution. 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike agreed that natural rights provided the proper ends of 
government. Sidney Pearson says, “Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike used the same self-evident 
truths derived from natural law to reach radically different conclusions.”195 Rather they disagreed 
 
191 Morton White. Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.  p. 87. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Hamilton, Madison & Jay. The Federalist. Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund, 2001. p. xlvii. 
194 Ibid. 




over the appropriate means to best secure them. One side saw a strong national government as the 
only secure means of protecting rights against the tyranny of the majority, while the other saw that 
same national government as the central threat to their natural liberties. What practical value was 
there, when space and time were precious commodities, in arguing for a premise which everyone 
already agreed upon and was secondary to the purpose at hand?   
Rossiter provides the historical background and explanation for Publius’ synthesis of 
rationalism and empiricism. He says that although the Founders “stood fast in devotion to every 
last teaching of the tradition of natural law and natural rights, they began to make room in their 
minds for assumptions and suspicions that almost no American had entertained in the first heady 
days of the Revolution.” 196  Although they maintained their fidelity to Natural Law teachers like 
Locke, Sidney, Coke, Harrington, Cicero, Burlamaqui, Vattel, Montesquieu, Pufendorf and 
Blackstone “they became slightly less uneasy in the presence of such hardheaded teachers of the 
facts of political life as Hobbes, Hume, and Machiavelli.”197 Rossiter believes the enthusiasm for 
the Revolution and its principles was displaced, not abandoned, when the post-revolutionary 
reality of governance set in. He concludes that a “redirection of American thinking about the nature 
of man” occurred between the Declaration and the Constitutional Convention.198 The redirection 
was a response to changing circumstances. New circumstances which brought new problems 
demanded new solutions. Justification for breaking bonds with King and Country were displaced 
by the need to establish a working government dedicated to the principles of that act of rebellion. 
Independence justified and fought for, gave way to the necessity of building political structures 
which could properly realize its principles in practice.  
 





Enthusiasm for the moral principles which inspired the Revolution gave way to a concern 
for the hard-boiled realities their mere assertion did not solve. The failure of the Articles of 
Confederation encapsulated the changing nature and mood of the situation. Statesmen looked to 
different sources and ideas to solve different problems. Rossiter says men like Adams, Madison 
and Hamilton were “moving beyond Locke and Calvin to seek new lessons about human behavior 
in their experience, and were finding that these lessons had already been confirmed in Adam 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature.”199  
By and large the Framers came to the Convention “more tempered and sophisticated 
political psychologists than they had been in 1776.”200 The “sobering effects” of the post-war 
government compelled them to spend less time “celebrating the rights of men to speculate about 
their interests”’ and to “notice how self-interested individuals cluster together in factions as they 
struggle for gain, esteem, power, and security.”201 While the “tension in the nature of man between 
frail virtue and well-armed vice” remained a central theme, they became “interested in the political 
implications of morally neutral drives such as “the need for security, the hope of gain, and the love 
of fame.”202 These were the topics of the new science of politics, initiated by Machiavelli and 
developed by Montesquieu and Hume, which ceased speculations on “imagined republics” and 
turned their attention to the sometimes brutal facts of existing ones. Thus, the effective truth of 
human behavior took precedence over what rational speculation might glean beyond it.  
Perhaps the primary reason The Federalist Papers do not address principles of Natural 
Right in any great detail, is that the task was to argue on behalf of the means and mechanics by 
which these ends were to be achieved rather than the ends themselves. The enumerated powers of 
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the Constitution are “inventions of prudence,” tools designed by prudent judgment rather than 
geometric rationalism. The constitutional provisions must concern themselves with how men 
actually behave if they are to encourage men to act as they ought. Therefore, The Federalist’s 
primary account of human nature comes in the form of political psychology. At the time of the 
Founding such analysis came under the auspices of a specific subsection of moral philosophy 
which has come to be called “faculty psychology”. Faculty psychology is a central branch of moral 
philosophy concerned with the “divisions of knowledge concerned with the human subject.”203   
Faculty psychology is “the science of human motivation.”204 Therefore the focus of The 
Federalist’s account of human nature “is primarily a theory of motivation.”205 This science 
attempts to fashion a theory of action based on the various faculties, or powers, of the human soul 
which motivate men to act. It is determined to discover, as Hamilton says, “the true springs by 
which human conduct is actuated.”206 It assesses the variety of springs and motives of human 
action, and how the constitutional provisions properly channel them, balancing the demands of 
order and liberty. The three central springs of action Publius identifies are reason, passion and self-
interest. In attempting to conform to human nature the Constitution must properly anticipate the 
nature and strength of each spring, motives which compel men to act as they do, whether in private 
society or public office.  
 If human nature’s deficiencies of reason and virtue necessitate the existence of government, 
how is it men can ever truly govern themselves? At stake in Publius’ account of human nature is 
this very possibility. If men are not angels, how can they institute good government when the same 
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nature in need of rule, also rules? Who, or what will rule the rulers? When in No. 1 Hamilton raises 
the specter of whether government can be instituted by “reflection and choice” in contradistinction 
to “force and accident” he is raising a more general question: Is there a correct arrangement of 
political power, in harmony with human nature, which can supply its defects and truly allow men 





















2. The Federalist Papers Themselves 
 
 Understanding the literary form and function of The Federalist Papers is instrumental to 
understanding its particular treatment of human nature. As indicated by the subtitle of numerous 
editions, the function of The Federalist is to provide “a commentary on the Constitution of the 
United States.”1 The first edition published as a single unitary volume was subtitled “a collection 
of essays written in favor of the New Constitution.”2 It was to advocate for and explain the 
provisions of the Constitution and their ramifications. The Federalist consists of a series of eighty-
five essays written by Hamilton, Madison and Jay, addressed to “the People of the state of New 
York” in order to “win public support for the ratification of the new Constitution.”3  
 The Philadelphia Convention had been convened from May 25 to September 17, 1787. 
Shortly after its conclusion the numbers of The Federalist first appeared and were published 
between October 1787 and May 1788. The state ratification process began immediately upon the 
conclusion of the Grand Convention culminating in the national adoption of the Constitution in 
June of 1788. Circulation of its numbers occurred during the proceedings of the state conventions. 
Originally published as a series of newspaper articles, their immediate purpose was to advocate 
for the Constitution in response to Anti-Federalist opposition and “the objections of many New 
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Yorkers.”4 Its numbers provided arguments for delegates supporting ratification in the contentious, 
and essential, states of New York and Virginia.5  Given the size and influence of these states it was 
imperative they embrace the Constitution as bellwethers of an incipient nation.  
All essays were written by its three authors anonymously, under the nom de plume, 
“Publius”. In an 1818 letter Madison acknowledges they had originally proposed the name 
“Citizen of New York” which was rejected in favor of “Publius.”6 Madison states the name refers 
to Publius Valerius Publicola, a Roman whose life is recorded in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives. 7 
According to Plutarch, Publicola was one of the founders and saviors of the Roman Republic.8 He 
“laid the foundations of the Roman republic after the overthrow of the monarchy.”9 Plutarch says 
he was so adored by the people they called him “Publicola,” or “friend of the people.” Publicola 
had been a general and statesmen in the sixth century B.C. “renowned for his eloquence, 
generosity, and dedication to republican principles of government.”10 A Roman noble, he helped 
“depose the Tarquin kings, found the ancient Republic, and defend it against its enemies with 
courage and prudence.”11 The name was synonymous with a great founding and popular 
government. It was a nod to republicanism and its stress on liberty. Publicola had been a 
conspirator whose overthrow of the Roman monarchy struck a bold parallel to colonial 
independence from the King of England.  
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Plutarch sets Publius’ life in parallel with another founder, Solon the Athenian lawgiver. 
The author “gave higher rank to the Greek as the originator of republican laws”12 yet says, “Solon, 
leaving his laws as soon as he had made them, engraven in wood, but destitute of a defender, 
departed from Athens; whilst Publicola, remaining both in and out of office, laboured to establish 
the government.”13 Whereas Solon was exiled from the city, the Roman Publius was both founder 
and defender of a republican order against tyranny. The role of Publicola as a founder-statesman 
parallels the role of those who both founded and then peopled the offices of the American republic 
they formed. The new Publius might claim the originality of a Solon, “but he would not leave the 
new republican laws of the United States” merely engraved in wood.14 Having thrown off George 
III the states now needed to consolidate the gains of the Revolution in a new political form in order 
to make their Union permanent. The new Publius would be both a founder and defender of the 
principles of the revolution. As Founders and defenders, the Revolution and the Convention run 
parallel to the Declaration and the Constitution.  
The invocation of the Roman history evokes certain assumptions The Federalist made 
about human nature and the government appropriate to it. The name harkens to the virtues and 
qualities of that nature which Madison held made republican government possible. The invocation 
of “Publius” stood for the “reinvigoration of the moral qualities displayed during the revolution: a 
genuine sense of fraternity, a capacity for individual self-sacrifice.”15 The new Publius exhorted 
his readers to dedicate themselves to the purposes of: 
…one united people; a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, 
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their 
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manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side 
throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty and independence.16 
 
“Publius” represented a “wise lawgiver” who “contrived a complex machinery in harmony with 
human nature for the welfare of the community.”17 If the new Publius was more circumspect in the 
role of reason, virtue, and duty he nonetheless accepted the premise that the virtue of a political 
order is but an extension of the virtue of the men who found it. The name’s connection to 
republican government echoes the harmony between this form and human nature itself.   
Hamilton had employed the pseudonym before. It reflected his love of Plutarch and the 
ancient teachers of statesmanship. Under it he penned a series of published letters attacking Samuel 
Chase in 1778. In them the new Publius identifies himself as a “partisan of aspirations for self-
government and liberation from tyranny.”18 The new Publius was a partisan of the new 
republicanism. Pangle says the name “testifies to their intention to establish a highly visible line 
with the Greco-Roman tradition of republicanism.”19 It alluded to the “spirit of classical 
republicanism” found in the Constitution and its defense in The Federalist.20 The name signals a 
rejection of monarchism in the name of a republican Constitution designed to organize, promote 
and preserve popular self-government. The name was also a sop to the Anti-Federalist fear that the 
Constitution enshrined an overly national government and was not “sufficiently federal” to secure 
the rights they jealously guarded.21 
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First published separately, the essays of The Federalist were written with the intention of 
being collected as a single coherent volume designed to provide the only extended available public 
commentary on the Constitution at that time. Despite the ebb and flow of time and reception, The 
Federalist retains its title as the best sign commentary on the Constitution to this day. This 
commentary on the Constitution was vital in lieu of convention notes from its participants. The 
Convention had been highly secretive. It forbade contemporaneous and “licentious publication of 
their proceedings” and deliberations.22 Newspapers described it as a “Dark Conclave” operating 
under a “thick veil of secrecy.” 23 This secrecy was taken so seriously that no material leaks of its 
internal deliberations occurred during either the Convention or ratification process.24 Delegates for 
example “were forbidden from discussing proceedings with anyone other than fellow delegates, 
and daily debate was held with windows closed and shades drawn.”25   
The veil of secrecy was never officially lifted, and a full account of the proceeding was not 
available for nearly half a century.26 Robert Yates did not publish his notes until 1820. And it was 
only upon the death of James Madison in 1836, and the execution of his will, which finally 
permitted publication of his notes in 1840.27 The most comprehensive account of the Convention’s 
deliberations was not published until 1911, over a century later, in Farrand's Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787.  Farrand brought “together the personal diaries and notes of several 
of the Convention delegates and the official Journal of the Convention” which he then arranged 
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chronologically.28 Meanwhile, the notes of New Yorker and fellow Convention delegate, John 
Lansing, were only published in 1939.    
Such secrecy meant The Federalist Papers provided the only public explanation of the 
Constitution. The release of The Federalist Papers as a single complete volume occurred on March 
22 and May 28, 1788, when each of its two volumes were respectively published.29 Its authors 
sought to write a book of advocacy which would also serve as a permanent guide to the nation’s 
political institutions.  In the years and decades following ratification, a fledgling nation relied on 
The Federalist Papers as the most comprehensive guide available to the meaning and intent of the 
Constitution. Bailyn has described it as the “finest explanation of the principles that underlie the 
American government and the most accurate analysis of the intentions of those who designed it.”30 
This function has endured to the present day. Whatever their political persuasion, The Federalist 
is still referred to by scholars, officeholders and Supreme Court justices alike as the gateway into 
the meaning of the Constitution. This special function obliged the authors to maintain a substance 
and tone designed to transcend daily rhetoric and its speedy obsolescence. Despite the dispatch 
with which the text was written and published, the authors demonstrate a high degree of 
coordination and coherence, and fashioned a penetrating work on themes they had been mulling 
over for an extended period of time. They sought to speak to fellow citizens in the present and 
across the ages.  
The Federalist is no doubt “a partisan document written under pressure of time to win 
ratification of the Constitution.”31 Yet, the ambitions of its authors drove them to a “high 
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partisanship in the general cause of republican government.”32 It has become fashionable to treat 
The Federalist as mere rhetoric or polemic. This is often done in order to dismiss its ongoing 
relevance to our political system as it exists today. Some commentators view it merely as a “work 
of political rhetoric written to gloss over the compromises of the Constitution and to make that 
document look consistent.”33 One scholar has suggested it was a “debaters’ handbook for Federalist 
delegates in the ratifying conventions of several states.”34 In fact, it is disputed the extent to which 
the numbers of The Federalist had a decisive influence over the delegates to the New York State 
Convention.35 Rather, Yarbrough says the “enduring claim of The Federalist does not rest 
primarily” as a polemic on behalf of the Constitution, rather, from the time of its publication it was 
“regarded as the most authoritative explication of the principles underlying the Constitution.”36  
Many scholars like Balkin or Tribe, and even President Obama himself, see United States 
politics as based on nothing more than a set of ongoing acts of “faith” in a series of historically 
shifting “narratives” and “stories”37 constructed around our Founding its meaning.38 The history of 
the United States and the meaning of our founding documents are little more than a series of 
changing myths we tell ourselves adapted to the public opinion and tenor of the times. To Abbott, 
Publius is little more than a “storyteller”;39 a bard reciting the comforting hymns of a nation’s birth. 
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The Federalist is then just one of many fictive narratives we might choose to tell ourselves based 
on the arbitrary and subjective tastes of the day. From this perspective The Federalist is little more 
than a mythopoetic founding narrative of a Virgil, Livy or the Old Testament. This despite the fact 
that the birth of the United States provides one of the most transparent, least mythic foundings in 
world history in part because of the contemporaneous documentation The Federalist provides. The 
primary truths of our nation’s birth are not the product of a hidden God we cannot know, nor have 
they been lost to the mists of time and memory. This treatment as mere rhetoric or myth denies the 
authors’ own self-understanding. They claim the text is a work of public reasoning which can and 
should be rationally scrutinized and compared to the evidence of history and experience. They set 
a high standard of scrutiny for their work and gladly invite our reasoned criticisms.  
At first glance Publius is addressing neither philosophers, nor a timeless humanity. He 
speaks as a citizen-statesman to fellow citizens. We immediately recognize The Federalist as a 
polemical work of political persuasion. It was written by men whose political experience gave 
them a keen sense of their audience’s dispositions and opinions. And yet, it is also a work of 
political science. The same men steeped in the political machinations of the day were also 
conversant with the great works of political philosophy and the lessons of the past learned through 
books. Their willingness to appeal to the reason, not merely the passions, of their readers is evident 
in the substance and tone of the text. This appeal to reason demonstrates that Publius set his sights 
above the mere horizon of the day. 
This concern for truth is evident in Publius’ refusal to flatter his audience and its prejudices. 
Nor did they “write down to their audience.”40 The Federalist offers a frank assessment of human 
nature and the mentality of the average citizen as an individual and as a collective member of 
 




groups and factions. Its arguments often closely track the closed-door debates of the Philadelphia 
Convention whose proceedings were veiled in secrecy. This is in part because much of the material 
Hamilton and Madison had compiled for the Convention and reiterated in their speeches served as 
the foundation of the text. 41 When we compare them, we see the Convention’s frankness evident 
in page after page of The Federalist. The Convention swore all participates to secrecy so that, 
among other things, they might speak their minds freely, openly and honestly about contentious 
and sensitive public matters. History shows that when C-SPAN peers onto the Senate floor or 
television cameras take residence at the White House briefing room, speakers become keenly 
aware of the public gaze and acted accordingly.  
Secrecy was necessary in order to allow participates to speak freely on controversial 
matters without the threat of the fickle fluctuations of public opinion which would have muddled 
and confounded the already complicated and tenuous deliberations. Scholars agree that the primary 
motive of this “mask of secrecy” was to permit the free and open discourse of the participants, to 
permit them to voice frank truths and take experimental positions which publicity and its effects 
would silence or censure.42 Gelman says that the “delegates operated with freedom to express their 
views as a result of the rules of secrecy.”43 Rossiter says secrecy “stirred the imaginations and 
loosened the tongues of delegates on the floor, permitted them to take advanced positions and then 
to withdraw gracefully under fire, guarded them against both careless and willful 
misinterpretations of their gropings for constitutional solutions and political compromises, 
permitted one consensus after another to form out of a wealth of half-formed opinions and half-
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baked prejudices” and “encouraged them to express honest doubts.”44 The condition of secrecy 
meant that “delegates should have been in a position to engage in true deliberation where opinions 
were shared openly and decisions were the result of member preference over a given policy that 
was influenced to some degree by the discussion that policy.”45 Rossiter describes the adoption of 
secrecy as “the most critical decision of a procedural nature the Convention was ever to make.”46 
George Mason found this veil a “necessary precaution to prevent misrepresentations or 
mistakes.”47 Years later Madison insisted that “no Constitution would ever have been adopted by 
the Convention if the debates had been public” 48  
The new political science promoted by Publius was less oriented toward speculation about 
timeless principles and more concerned with the practical mechanics and administration of 
government. Machiavelli initiated the shift in modern political science toward the practical and 
sought to collapse the distance between political analysis and political advocacy. Marx captured 
the flavor of this shift by flamboyantly asserting that prior to the modern era philosophers had only 
interpreted the world but the “point is to change it.” Publius might have responded as to the wisdom 
of changing the world without sufficient reflection first. Publius straddles a line between timely 
practical concerns and speculation on timeless truths and problems. Hamilton no doubt has his 
rhetorical force and eloquence, Madison his concision and incisive penetration.  
Yet the facts of the Convention and The Federalist do not simply point to motives at the 
nexus of language and power. The reader notices the particular form in which Publius’s advocacy 
is couched. He could have simply provided an article by article, section by section analysis of the 
 
44 Clinton Rossiter. 1787: The Grand Convention. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987. p. 283. 
45 David A. Gelman. “Ideology and Participation: Examining the Constitutional Convention of 1787.” Political 
Research Quarterly, SEPTEMBER 2018, Vol. 71, No. 3, (SEPTEMBER 2018). p. 546-47.  
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Constitution. Instead, he does not fail to cloth certain arguments in universal claims regarding 
human nature. He provides broad historical context and illuminates the operative general principles 
behind Constitutional provisions rather than engaging in legalistic textual microscopy.  
The Federalist and the Convention were central components of a genuinely deliberative 
process. Publius treats his readers as the convention delegates were compelled to treat one another. 
Human nature’s capacity for reasoned deliberation and genuine consent is only possible when 
fostered by conditions which make reflection possible. Tocqueville says the Convention adopted 
the Constitution “after long and mature deliberations.”49 The Convention established rules holding 
its participates to an extremely high bar of decorum in order that these conditions might be 
fulfilled. Delegates were “forbidden to whisper, read, or pass notes while one of their colleagues 
was speaking” and could be called to order by any other member for errant conduct.50  
These procedural rules permitted genuine “reflection”, which culminated in the people’s 
“choice” of the Constitution through ratification. Such claims are of a nation founded on consent 
and deliberation are course relative, a matter of degree, where historical context is illuminating. 
We might compare the nature and method of the origins of the American system to that of 
revolutionary France, Russia or China. In his speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention Madison 
says: “In this pursuit, we ought not to address our arguments to the feelings and passions, but to 
those understandings which were selected by the people of this country, to decide this great 
question, by a calm and rational investigation.”51  
When Hamilton asks the question of whether good government can be established on the 
basis of “reflection and choice” American exceptionalism is not being asserted as a fait accompli. 
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At the time of ratification, the answer to this question was being determined. The Federalist Papers 
sat at the center of this public process of reflection and choice. The authors’ tone enacts the 
reflective and deliberative process advanced within the substance of its arguments. It would have 
been contrary to Publius’ stated belief in the people’s capacity for self-government to advance 
arguments draped in mere rhetoric or poetry which exclusively appealed to the people’s passions 
while neglecting their reason. Despite claims of those who seek to undermine the authority of The 
Federalist, it represents a high watermark of public political discourse in the history of mankind. 
Our Founding was truly a deliberative and consensual act, rather than one coercion and force. The 
authors of The Federalist were determined to transfer the deliberative decorum of the closed 
Convention, into the open public square.  
Hamilton, Madison and Jay made it clear exactly how they desired to be read and judged. 
They sought to bring their claims before the tribunal of the reader’s reason. In Hamilton’s preface 
to the first book format publication, he says “Respect for public opinion, not anxiety for the literary 
character of the performance, dictates this remark. The great wish is, that it may promote the cause 
of truth, and lead to a right judgment of the true interests of the community."52 The framework of 
understanding was not sectarian or partisan faith, but “reason,” and “deliberation” and the “cause 
of truth.”53   
The very first sentence of The Federalist speaks directly to the reader. Hamilton invites the 
reader “to deliberate upon a New Constitution for the United States of America.”54 While he 
acknowledges an occasional “intemperance of expression” he addresses himself to the reasoned 
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“judgments” of men, not their partisan zeal or aesthetic sense. The active citizen is being asked to 
engage in an act of public deliberation by reading and scrutinizing his claims and arguments. 
Hamilton concludes The Federalist by speaking directly to the reader again. He offers its 
arguments up to the tribunal of the public’s judgement and speaks of the deliberative “spirit” in 
which his endeavors have been conducted. He says:  
Thus have I, fellow citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success your 
conduct must determine…I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously 
avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which 
have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the constitution. 
 
The permanent and accessible grounds of his arguments were nature and human nature 
gleaned through experience reason. In No. 85 Hamilton says, “I frankly acknowledge to you my 
convictions and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded.”55 In No. 1 
Hamilton says, “My arguments will be open to all and may be judged by all. They shall at least be 
offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.”56 Hamilton does not claim the 
infallibility of his reasoning, but invites the reader to scrutinize and judge by that same fallible 
faculty.  In No. 38 Madison says that “every candid reader will make the proper reflections on 
these important facts.”57 In No. 85 Hamilton asks the reader to pause and asks if “in the course of 
these papers, the proposed constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated?”58 Posing this 
question he speaks directly to the reader saying: “Every man is bound to answer these questions 
to himself, according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act agreeably to the 
genuine and sober dictates of his judgment.”59 
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In No. 1 Hamilton says “that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country 
to decide” whether good government can be established on the basis of “reflection and choice” 
and that it is to be considered “the general misfortune of mankind” if they should fail in this task.60 
We quickly realize the authors of The Federalist assume a grander purpose exceeding the bounds 
of the American context alone. The Constitution is an experiment to determine whether 
“mankind”, not just former British colonies, can establish good government.61 In No. 11 Hamilton 
says, “It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming 
brother,” the Europeans, “moderation.” If this is the true meaning of the Constitution then the 
arguments of The Federalist must be advanced on universal grounds of nature, toward universal 
goals recognizable by the rest of human history. Publius’ object is not merely an American ethos 
but a fixed and eternal human nature. 
The purpose of The Federalist straddles the line between the practical and theoretical, the 
timely and timeless. The text is no doubt a “brilliant piece of political propaganda,”62 addressed 
“to the circumstances of 1787,” but also to “political history and human nature generally.”63 Dietze 
says Hamilton “refutes the idea that the Federalist is only a treatise on the practice of 
government.”64 Epstein says its arguments do “not confine its analysis to America,” but reference 
a broad spectrum of the world history and America’s place in it. In fact, it is rarely noted just how 
theoretically oriented some numbers are. If we consider Nos. 1, 10, 15, 23, 31, 37-40 or 47-51 to 
name a few, we see the extent of their theoretical orientation. Within them there is an intriguing 
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parallel structure to Machiavelli’s Prince and Discourses, in which general principles are asserted 
and then exemplified by historical examples past and present. This suggests the text is not simply 
speaking to citizens of the states, but intended as “a possession for all time.” 
The Federalist occupies a distinct and unusual place in the history of political thought. Its 
authors would be the first to acknowledge that, despite its philosophical claims, it was not a 
philosophical treatise commencing with first philosophy. The text is not primarily “engaged in a 
disinterested pursuit of the truth.”65 It does not explore or directly raise the fundamental perennial 
questions of political philosophy such as the nature of the good life or the best regime simply. 
Mansfield say that it is “not a work of political philosophy, but it shows the influence of political 
philosophy in the thinking of the American founders.”66 The Federalist assumes as given the 
principles of the Declaration of Independence such as the God-given “natural rights of man.” 67  In 
so doing, it depends much on thought from Locke, Montesquieu and the Scottish Enlightenment 
and others.68 As a work of Modern political science it was not simply geared toward the practical 
realities of politics generally, but with the exigencies of a particular and unique historical moment 
in time. The Federalist might best be understood in relation to the long and great tradition of 
political pamphleteering central to the burgeoning political discourse in 18th century America. The 
text is a polemic engaged in one of the most consequential political debates of the nation’s history. 
The Federalist no doubt has a practical political agenda, but it is “by no means simply a tract for 
the times.”69 
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The grand purpose and virtuoso execution of The Federalist Papers have made it the single 
most important work of political theory in the American tradition and a classic generally. Editor J. 
E. Cooke opens his edition by saying the “United States has produced three historic documents of 
major importance: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and The Federalist.”70 
Jefferson described the text as “the best commentary on the principles of government, which ever 
was written.”71 Meanwhile Tocqueville thought it “an excellent book, though special to America, 
ought to be familiar to statesmen of all countries.”72  Ironically the great Supreme Court justice 
Joseph Story claimed that Tocqueville’s famed account of American democracy was in fact largely 
a product of the Frenchman’s intimate familiarity with The Federalist and his own 
Commentaries.73 In 1861, John Stuart Mill said The Federalist was “the most instructive treatise 
we possess on federal government.”74 Theodore Roosevelt said “it is on the whole the greatest 
book” on practical politics.75 An English journalist wrote that The Federalist can be called 
“seriously, reverently, the Bible of Republicanism.”76  
Madison’s biographer Ralph Ketcham says The Federalist is “the authoritative 
commentary on the Constitution and the best-known work of political theory ever written in the 
United States.”77 It has been repeatedly describe as “the most authoritative commentary on the 
Constitution which exists,” or the “preeminent commentary on the substance and philosophy of 
the Constitution.”78 Gary McDowell calls it simply the “bible that informs and guides American 
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political thought.”79 The distinguished authority, Benjamin Wright wrote it is “by far the greatest 
book on politics ever written in America.”80 Howe describes it as “a kind of secular scripture, an 
authoritative statement of how American political institutions work or should work.”81 Yarbrough 
says the “enduring claim of The Federalist does not rest primarily” as a polemic on behalf of the 
Constitution, rather, from the time of its publication it was “regarded as the most authoritative 
explication of the principles underlying the Constitution.”82 The fact that it is regularly cited by 
scholars, officeholders and Supreme Court justices alike demonstrates its ongoing and 
consequential role in our understanding of the Constitution today. Despite its immediate purpose 
the text continues to play a central role not only in American politics and government, but our own 
self-understanding as a people and a nation.  
Publius’ grand purpose exemplifies the text’s psychological analysis of human ambition. 
Given the centrality of its psychological theory of human motivation it is only natural to turn 
Publius’ analysis on himself. In No. 72 Hamilton says “the love of fame is the ruling passion of 
the noblest minds.”83 Douglas Adair and James Cesar both have applied this model, arguing 
Publius was motivated by a desire for fame. Adair believes the Founders had “become fantastically 
concerned with posterity’s judgment of their behavior,” and were “concerned with the image” that 
would “remain in the world’s eye.”84 The desire for fame has the power to be “spur and a goad…to 
act with nobleness and greatness, to make men rise above petty interests.”85 The love of fame could 
 
79 Gary L. McDowell. “Private Conscience & Public Order: Hobbes & "The Federalist.” Polity. Vol. 25, No. 3 
(Spring, 1993). pp. 421-443. p. 421. 
80 Benjamin F. Wright. “The Federalist on the Nature of Political Man,” Ethics, Vol. 59, No. 2, Part 2: The 
Federalist on the Nature of Political Man (Jan.,1949). p. 3. 
81 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). p. 485. 
82 Jean Yarbrough. “The Federalist.” This Constitution: A Bicentennial Chronicle Vol. 16. (1987). pp. 4-9. p. 9.  
83 No. 72.  
84 Douglass Adair. “Fame and the Founding Fathers.” Fame and the Founding Father. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 




marry the boldest personal passions with the selfless demands of the public interest.86 In No. 38 
Madison acknowledged for example that the Founding was “as fair a chance for immortality, as 
Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to depend on his own return from exile and 
death, if it were to be immediately adopted, and were to continue in force, not until a better, but 
until another should be agreed upon by this new assembly of Lawgivers.”87 
It is likely then the text is motivated by a concern for the judgement of future generations 
as much as present ones. Adair’s observation of the motives of Publius and the Founders partially 
explains the grand historical context and meaning Hamilton attributes to the 1787 Founding in the 
opening paragraphs of No. 1. Such motives raised their eyes above the day’s horizon to consider 
the broader significance of their actions. The desire for fame could only be satisfied if the scale 
and scope of the text were extended beyond the confines of the moment and addressed to all times. 
Conscious of the unprecedented nature of the Revolution, the Convention and the Constitution it 
crafted, Publius seems to have keenly sensed the opportunity to provide their definitive exegesis. 
What mode of political statesmanship is more closely associated with fame than the act of founding 
itself? As readers of the Bible, Plutarch, Livy and Machiavelli, they had a keen awareness of the 
fame which attaches to founders.  
The practical function of The Federalist affects the nature and scope of its arguments. 
Hamilton, Madison and Jay did not write as dispassionate observers, but as practical, if reflective, 
men of action.88 Progressive opponent of the Founding, Charles Beard compliments Madison and 
Hamilton by saying they were “not closet philosophers,” or “dust sifters engaged in dissecting the 
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ideas of other dust sifters.”89 They wrote as partisans of liberty and advocates of a political form 
they thought would best secure it. The goal then was not to provide proofs of the theoretical 
principles on which the Constitution was based, but demonstrate the practical correctness of its 
“inventions of prudence”. 
The Federalist is “not a treatise on political philosophy concerned with natural law, the 
origin and nature of the state, or the best form of government in the abstract.”90 Huyler says, the 
text “ is long on the science of politics but short on the philosophy that would inform such a 
science.”91 Publius’ arguments do not “tell the complete story or provide all the answers” to the 
theoretical assumptions which underly its argument. 92 The authors do not, like Hobbes, derive an 
account of human nature by depicting its natural condition. Nor do they, like Locke, attempt to 
demonstrate the existence and content of Natural Law in order to derive ultimate standards of a 
just political order. White speculates this would have confused readers while giving others “the 
opportunity to engage in … irrelevant controversy and logic-chopping.”93 The goal was not to 
invent an account of human nature out of whole cloth, but to apply one in order to illuminate the 
flaws of the Articles of Confederation and demonstrate the Constitution’s solution by its capacity 
to accommodate the likely motivates and conduct of men. 
Another source of the lack of theoretical reasoning was the prima facia agreement with the 
Anti-Federalists over principles. Huyler argues that it was precisely because both parties agreed 
on principles that The Federalist Papers do not bother to raise questions regarding the 
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philosophical foundations of government.94 Both parties agreed upon an understanding of human 
nature and the laws derived from it. Both parties acknowledged the intrinsic dangers of government 
which inspired legitimate fear of tyranny. For both sides tyranny was in fact nothing more than a 
pernicious compound mixture of interested ambitious human nature combined with power 
concentrated and unrestrained. Since the central elements of human nature were not in dispute, 
Publius treats them as axiomatic and in no need of making demonstrations. Therefore, Publius 
took such principles for granted. Divisions between the parties were over the appropriate form 
which might best guarantee liberty and order. Energy and space could be dedicated to explaining 
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3. Challenges of the Present Task 
The political and rhetorical purpose of The Federalist presents challenges to discerning 
from it a comprehensive theory of human nature. The task of the interpreter is to distill a political 
philosophy from a text written collectively in a piecemeal manner whose goal was public 
persuasion. Despite its practical function White says that “there is a psychological theory of human 
nature to be found in The Federalist even though it is never systematically expounded by the 
authors.”1 It does not present, but depends on, a complete account of human nature.  The scope of 
Publius’ account is tailored to its practical function. He concerns himself with those facets of 
human nature relevant to the political arguments of its two volumes. This account is largely 
confined to a political psychology focusing particular attention on a theory of human motivation. 
It relies on a schema of human motivations which move men to act and attempts to illustrate the 
way in which the Constitution will shape and respond to that schema. Given the voluntary and 
capriciousness nature of human conduct such an analysis is as much art as science, a mixture of 
prudent judgement and known fact.  
Publius’ account of human motivation is complicated by the fact that he rarely defines 
central terms such as “reason”, “passion” and “self-interest.” No doubt his understanding of them 
was not entirely original, and piggy backs on the common currency of contemporaneous moral 
and political discourse. Turning to the sources on which Publius likely drew, does not entirely 
resolve the problem of decoding their precise meanings. These concepts of motivation were much 
disputed at the time, as now, both in terms of their motivational efficacy and also there very 
meaning. Their meanings were sufficiently fluid so as to be used in contradictory ways within 
Eighteenth century moral philosophy.  
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Self-interest is perhaps the most elusive spring of action even as it is often considered the 
cornerstone of the constitutional edifice. Self-interest is a modern hybrid term combining reason 
and passion. In self-interest, passions conspire with instrumental reasoning. Rational calculation 
determines how best to achieve passion’s aims. However, there were varying degrees of rationality 
associated with self-interest.”2 There is the myopia of immediate self-interest and the rational 
foresight of self-interest properly understood. Likewise, “ambition” is often used as a generic term 
for the assertion of one’s own interest. Elsewhere it connotes the love of power and the desire to 
dominate. Other times it is more closely associated with the love of honor, and its extreme, the 
love of fame. Sometimes ambition is given negative connotations, other times, positive. Is 
ambition a passion or an interest?  
Madison’s No. 37 is probably the most philosophically probing of all the numbers of The 
Federalist. He raises complicated questions of epistemology such as the limits of reason and the 
degree of certainty the knowledge on which the constitutional provisions and their explanations 
are understood to rest. In No. 37 Madison acknowledges that these terms of motivation were 
“plagued by obscurity.”3 He says they have “never yet been distinguished and defined, with 
satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers.”4 This 
obscurity is not merely a matter of the failures of philosophic insight or the limits of the rational 
faculty, but arises from the object of inquiry itself. The ambiguities of the nature of the mind are 
compounded because the object of inquiry is same as the tool of observation. As a matter of 
principle, Publius was not interested in a factitious or sophistical precision. Publius’ 
acknowledgement of the fallibility of man’s reason produced a natural abhorrence of artificial 
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certainty and utopian schemes which would reduce politics to ironclad geometrical reasoning. This 
acknowledgement was a recognition of the value and necessity of prudence. The lack of a 
crystalline system is a feature, not a bug, of their own political science.5 Government must be 
limited and the people free, because the reason of a founder or central planner is unable to 
anticipate and account for all historical contingencies.  
The collective authorship of The Federalist poses another challenge to the task of 
discerning a uniform account of human nature. Unlike today’s editions, the earliest book versions 
of The Federalist were published under the name “Publius,” with no reference to its individual 
authors. The single pseudonym signals a collective effort and unitary intent. The nom de plume is 
a mask intended to conceal any distinction between the authors and their viewpoints.6 The name 
focuses attention on arguments and rhetoric rather than the character and supposed authority of the 
particular writer. The name celebrates the spirit of union over the spirit of faction in a politically 
contentious time. This literary unity is analogous to the unity of political purpose necessary to 
bring the states into a new Union. They wrote as patriots of the new republic willing to suppress 
their individual ambitions in the service of the new nation by working anonymously and without 
compensation. This is reinforced by the fact that all authors judiciously guarded their individual 
participation. They kept their roles secret, not disclosing them until decades after the Grand 
Convention. In 1802 for example, Hamilton rebuffed a publisher’s attempt to arrange the text 
based on individual authorship of the numbers.7  
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Along with a unity of purpose there is a continuity of treatment. Despite its plural 
authorship and certain notable departures, The Federalist stands as a single unitary whole. The 
Federalist is to be understood as a uniform work under the aegis of a single author with a single 
point of view. One author with one largely coherent, message. Much evidence indicates they 
actively sought to avoid disagreements and suppressed doctrinal differences and intraparty 
squabbles in the service of a collective effort. The fact that they “took special pains to guard the 
secrecy of authorship” lends credibility to their sincerity about presenting “a text of largely 
uniform and singular design.”8 Despite Hamilton providing the lion’s share of the numbers, on the 
last day of the Convention he said, “No man’s ideas were more remote from the plan than his were 
known to be.”9 As Publius, Mansfield asserts that Hamilton and Madison speak “together in one 
voice.”10 Under this name, Hamilton and Madison “thought alike and even wrote in styles so much 
the same, that when a dispute arose after Hamilton’s death as to who wrote certain of the papers, 
it became a feat of scholarship to decide which claim was correct.”11   
The process of divining who wrote what has become an academic industry since the early 
19th century. Today scholars often take authorial cleavages in the text for granted as obvious. 
Meanwhile, at the time, discerning and intimate acquaintances of these men could not distinguish 
the numbers by their individual authorship. George Washington, long time intimate of Hamilton, 
struggled to distinguish between the numbers of Hamilton and Madison. In a letter Washington 
asks an acquaintance “who the authors of the individual numbers” were.12 Jefferson, an intimate 
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of Madison, asserted he “knew” that Madison had in fact written them.13 Mansfield reminds us that 
the act of authorial dissection “ignores their cooperation and the texts’ coherence as a whole.”14 
Authorship is usually credited in accord with the order of magnitude of each man’s 
contribution to the project. Hamilton conceived and “organized the project”, writing a majority of 
its numbers.15 Madison the second most and with the greatest scope and philosophic penetration. 
Jay wrote the fewest and the duration of his involvement was the briefest. While there remain some 
minor disputes,16 there is general agreement that Jay wrote five (Nos. 2–5 and 64), Hamilton fifty-
one (Nos. 1, 6 –9, 11–13, 15–17, 21–36, 59–61, and 65–85), and Madison twenty-nine (Nos. 10, 
14, 18 –20, 37–58, and 62–63).17  Hamilton and Madison provided the main thrust of the document, 
its principles and arguments. This justifies the common focus scholars place on their involvement. 
Both men were in a unique position to contribute to the nation’s Founding. Madison and Hamilton 
were rare men whose characters combined political experience and book learning. They were 
“philosopher-statesmen”18 or what Scigliano calls a “scholar-politician” 19 Delegate to the 
Convention, William Pierce, described Madison as one who “blends together the profound 
politician, with the scholar.”20   
 It is striking the extent to which The Founders were “practical men of varied talents.” 21  
Most of the Founders were neither “career politicians or mere men of letters.”22 They were 
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“scientists, inventors, entrepreneurs and builders.”23 Washington was for example “a farmer, a 
whisky entrepreneur, military leader and stateman” while Franklin was “a publisher, inventor, 
diplomat, philanthropist and author.”24 These men were not dreamers. Their varied experiences 
kept them from the ethereal clouds of philosophical speculation and gave them a concreteness of 
vision to craft a vast political edifice requiring the knowledge of numerous spheres of society. 
Such a project required knowledge, moral and social, economic and political. Like Machiavelli, 
both Hamilton and Madison were men of theoretical acumen, but also steeped in the practical 
experience of men and politics. In their own way both exhibited their political wit in the early 
years of the Republic even as they had vastly different public presences. Their grasp of the 
intricacies of human motivation had great practical application in navigating their public offices 
in ways that it did not for John Adams for example. Hamilton and Madison were no doubt the 
more bookish of the Founders, with that prize going overwhelmingly to Madison who was 
recognized as such by his contemporaries.   
Both Hamilton and Madison were steeped in the first-hand experience of politics and war, 
the traditions of the Bible, Classical Greece and Rome, as well as the innovations of modern moral 
and political science. Madison had long been known and widely recognized as one of the most 
brilliant minds of the post-revolutionary period, but was no less formidable as a public political 
presence.25 Rossiter says Madison was “a combination of learning, experience, purpose, and 
imagination that not even Adams or Jefferson could have equaled.26 He attended the College of 
New Jersey under Reverend Witherspoon, the midwife of numerous revolutionary minds. After 
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colonial rule. During the Revolution, Madison and George Mason were instrumental in drafting 
the constitution for the state of Virginia. He was then elected to the Second Continental Congress 
from 1781-1786 representing his home state.  
At the Philadelphia Convention Madison was the author of the Virginia Plan, one of the 
two primary templates for the Constitution. He remains the ‘Father of the Constitution’ as one of 
its primary authors and central Convention note-taker. In the year leading up to the Convention 
Madison undertook “a systematic course of reading in political history with the apparent purpose 
of applying that learning to the problems besetting the American Confederation.”27 He spent this 
year studying Ancient and Modern confederacies. It was to Madison his colleagues would turn for 
a comprehensive understanding of the underlying principles and history on which the American 
confederacy was based. Rutland says “no other delegate came so well prepared.”28 Delegate 
William Pierce of Georgia concluded that Madison was the “best informed Man of any point in 
debate.”29   
On the other hand, Hamilton had a native intellect and rhetorical flair. Of Hamilton, George 
Washington said in 1781, “there are few men to be found, of his age, who has a more general 
knowledge than he possesses, and none whose Soul is more firmly engaged in the cause.”30 In his 
1787 Character Sketches William Pierce says, “Colo. Hamilton requires time to think—he 
enquires into every part of his subject with the searchings of philosophy, and when he comes 
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forward he comes highly charged with interesting matter, there is no skimming over the surface of 
a subject with him, he must sink to the bottom to see what foundation it rests on.”31  
Hamilton had been tutored by William Livingston, a leading intellectual and revolutionary. 
As a youth in the 1760s Hamilton became a clerk at Beekman and Cruger, a local import-export 
trading firm where he gained hands-on knowledge of the nuts and bolts of business, finance, 
commerce and trade. This experience would impress on him the centrality of commerce to political 
order and well-being. This experience foreshadowed his contribution on commercial republics in 
The Federalist, his ascension to the role of Secretary of the Treasury in the Washington 
administration, as well as his famed 1791 “Report on Manufactures.” Hamilton entered King's 
College in 1773, graduating in May, 1774. He came into his own intellectually around the time of 
the Revolution, penning both “A Full Vindication” and “The Farmer Refuted” in 1774. Both essays 
signal his adherence to the Lockean Natural Rights tradition and established his revolutionary 
bonafides. If Hamilton lacked the extent and depth of Madison’s book learning and philosophical 
penetration, he acquitted himself as a quick-witted political operative whose mettle was proven 
through years of exposure to the life of action in finance and trade, and no less as aid-de-camp to 
General Washington during the war, as well as his role as representative to the Continental 
Congress from the key state of New York.  
There is a tendency for political scientists and historians to project subsequent political 
differences and animosities between Hamilton and Madison back onto their time as Publius. It 
should be kept in mind that these men had “cooperated under the Articles of Confederation and 
the Continental Congress on various projects.”32 For example, they had collaborated to propose a 
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constitutional convention at Annapolis a year prior to the Grand Convention.33 Bernard Bailyn 
writes that between Hamilton and Madison there was “broad agreement on fundamental points.”34 
Meanwhile Garry Willis says, “The two main authors of the series knew what their task was, and 
made a common front in performing it.”35 Those searching for “any deep difference” between 
them, Willis says, are “forgetting the occasion.”36 Willis sees their time spent in the role of Publius 
as creating a deep intellectual and stylistic identification between the two authors. He sees a 
“Madisonian” Hamilton and a “Hamiltonian” Madison by comparing analogous passages between 
the two writers which are strikingly similar. He identifies numerous similar statements that mirror 
the overlapping portion between two circles of a Venn diagram.37  
Nevertheless, in 1850 John Quincy Adams wrote The Federalist was “not the production 
of a single mind.”38 While Hamilton and Madison speak with one mostly unified voice, there are 
notable cleavages in the text. Madison even acknowledged divergences “in the general complexion 
of their political theories.”39 There exists differences based on interest and expertise “visible in the 
division of labor.”40 McDonald says this division reflects “differences in temperament, talent, and 
preoccupations.”41 Such parceling out of responsibilities was driven by practical exigencies. 
Scigliano says “they assigned the numbers more or less according to their interests and also to the 
time that they had available.”42 There is also to be found a distinction in style. Hamilton “tended 
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to be more direct” and detail oriented while Madison writes in a “more theoretical” and sweeping 
manner.43 Hamilton, a learned but practical man, dwells on the minutiae of government mechanics, 
administration and policy. He did “most of the writing on national defense and matters concerning 
the economy.”44 Meanwhile Madison wrote “most of the pieces on history and political theory.”45 
As the more theoretic man, Madison delves more fully and broadly into the principles and realities 
which underly government. One hedges more toward political history and experience, the other 
toward speculation and political philosophy. These differences however turn out to be more 
“complimentary” than contradictory.46 
Madison and Hamilton are perhaps most coherent and consistent in their account of human 
nature. Even as they emphasize different aspects of the human soul, there are no fundamental 
discrepancies between them. Both men accepted the central thesis of human depravity. “Both 
men,” says McDonald, “used the so-called pessimistic view of human nature as the basis of their 
science of politics.”47 Both “maintained that men were governed by passion rather than by reason; 
both believed that a great danger to liberty and good government in America lay in an excess of 
unchecked power in the people, in the democracy or simple majority.”48 Both acknowledged the 
higher and lower inclinations of human nature in equal portion. Both saw that human nature’s lack 
of self-restraint necessitated government and that a government of men rather than angels must be 
made to constraint itself. Despite what is often described as a “pessimistic view”, both held that 
human nature had sufficient reason and virtue to make republican self-government possible if 
properly constituted.   
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The positions of Madison and Hamilton are not mutually exclusive as the Constitution 
represents a balancing act between freedom and restraint, efficiency and checks on it. Both 
acknowledged that prudent institutions alone would never guarantee good government. They must 
be occupied by men of some degree of virtue. The difference between Classical political science 
and Publius is a dispute over virtue as the end of political community and the degree of their 
dependence on virtue for good government. They could not transcend the need for virtue any more 
than men can transcend their need of government. Government must give sufficient freedom and 
impetus to promote reason and virtue while restraining vice.  
McDonald correctly asserts they “reasoned in opposite directions” from the same 
premises.49 While both recognized the deficiencies of human nature, Madison always seems to 
have hewed toward a greater pessimism and sobriety associated with the Protestant Christian 
intellectual heritage based on Calvin and Augustine which emphasized man’s sinfulness and 
depravity. Politics is no place for visionaries, redemption is only to be found through God. But this 
observation was not intended to condemn human nature nor provide impetus to save or perfect 
men’s souls through political institutions. Man’s imperfect nature led Madison to dwell on how to 
mitigate the negative effects of human depravity while preserving the liberty which inevitably 
allows men to pursue their vices. This concern focused Madison on constitutional restraints such 
as the separation of powers and the diffusion of the majority by factions dispersed in an extended 
republic. Man’s depravity requires strong external “sentinels” and “auxiliary precautions” beyond 
his own inner conscience, especially when given power. Internal restraints such as reason or moral 
sentiment were not sufficient to bend men’s conduct toward justice. These precautions are 





sobriety, Madison nevertheless speaks of those virtues which “justify a certain portion of esteem 
and confidence,” in human nature and make republican self-government possible.  
Hamilton echoes Madison in conceiving human nature as a mean between vice and virtue. 
Yet, the “portion of esteem” he granted to the nature of a few was perhaps something greater than 
Madison. He makes a wider distinction between the relative endowments of reason and virtue in 
the few compared to the many unrefined. Hamilton dwells repeatedly on how combinations of the 
many give way to their passions and become mobs. This is a running theme of Hamilton almost 
completely absent in Madison’s speculations. Hamilton believed there existed a sufficient few 
whose reason and virtue allowed them to be somewhat more trusted with power than Madison’s 
men of crooked timber. More vulnerable to the inspiration and examples of great men in history, 
Hamilton tends to grant higher motives more efficacy than Madison. He also demonstrates a 
greater admiration for the double-edged sword of human greatness and ambition.  
A key difference between Hamilton and Madison is the relative emphasis each place on 
tyranny. Madison, a Federalist advocate for strong national government, nevertheless was the more 
concerned with limitation on government. Unlimited power is ripe for abuse and the gateway to 
tyranny. Meanwhile Hamilton “aimed not just at the creation of a free government” but of a “great 
nation.”50 Their divergencies rest, in part, on their opinions of human greatness. While no less 
cognizant of human limitation, Hamilton demonstrates a Pagan admiration for human excellence. 
Hamilton placed more faith in the ambitious few. He celebrates the ambitious nature of great 
statesmen, and the capacity of a rare few to exhibit public virtue. Madison is much less sanguine 
and more fearful of the very same passions Hamilton celebrates. Madison rejected Hamilton’s 
“disdain for constitutional limits and his equally wishful suggestion that an elite few could 
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maintain the integrity of the constitution over an extended period of time.”51 Hamilton seems to 
conceive of great offices like the executive as platforms for the perfection and display of human 
excellence as an end in itself. For Madison government is primarily a restraint and necessary evil. 
Hamilton suggests government could at its best be a positive good as a crucible and stage for 
human greatness.  Nevertheless, their conclusions are based on different judgements drawn from 
the same premises of an identical human nature.  
This appears to be a disagreement over how much some men can be trusted with power. 
No doubt both entered the Convention as emphatic advocates of a strong national government. The 
goal was to solve the deficiencies of the Articles without reintroducing the tyrannies abandon on 
the shores of the Old World. Madison was the main author of the Virginia Plan which entirely 
scraped the Articles. Despite his nationalism, Madison was the more skeptical of the two when 
considering the ramifications of power placed in the hands of mere mortals. Madison’s vision of 
power in the hands of faulty human nature led him to dwell on the need to neutralize those impulses 
which lead to tyranny by neutralizing the possibility for concentrated power which gives such 
impulses opportunity. Madison writes that the “accumulation of all powers”52 concentrated in the 
“same hands”53 is “the very definition of tyranny.”54 Madison’s weariness toward ambition is 
manifest in his leading role in the exposition of the separation of powers and the need for checks 
and balances in Nos. 47-51. Meanwhile in No. 10 he dwells on the tyranny of the majority, 
identifying the extended republic as one solution to protect minority rights. Three branches and a 
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divided legislature provide some of the dilatory elements which serve as the cooling saucer of the 
machinations and ambitions of men.  
While Madison dwelt on checks to power, Hamilton’s attentions were drawn to matters of 
efficacy and what he called “good administration.” This led him to emphasize the effectiveness, 
“energy and efficiency” of government.55 Hamilton was far more comfortable with a more 
centralized national government with fewer restraints, centered on a strong executive. Frederici 
says Hamilton “was far less concerned about the prospect of tyranny’s emanating from centralized 
power.”56 On June 18, 1787, after a period of silence, Hamilton made his sole speech to the 
Convention. In it he proposed one of the most extreme nationalist models entertained at the 
Convention. Hamilton’s executive looked conspicuously like a monarch. His proposal is 
sometimes called the “British Plan” because according to Madison’s notes he said “the British 
Government forms the best model the world ever produced.”57 This claim must have had an 
unsettling effect on the members of the revolutionary generation on both sides of the constitutional 
debate.  
Hamilton advocated for a union so strong state sovereignty virtually vanished, with almost 
all power concentrated in a national government. Senators would have life tenure. State governors 
would be creatures of the national legislature and have an absolute veto over their state legislatures. 
This is a far cry from Madison’s analysis of the wisdom of federalism and the distribution and 
balance of power between the national government and the states.58 Hamilton argued for an 
exceptionally strong executive, only to have virtually all his recommendations rebuffed and 
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ignored. The executive is the only truly national office in the entire constitutional plan. He 
proposed an executive elected for life with an absolute veto over the legislature and the sole power 
to appoint department heads.59 Hamilton’s executive appeared to be nothing other than an elective 
monarch. Some have claimed Hamilton’s proposal for such an extreme concentration of power 
was a rhetorical device, a tactical maneuver to make the other plans for a strong national 
government appear more moderate.60 Whatever the truth, it must be acknowledged that Hamilton 
consistently demonstrates less discomfort with the idea of more power in fewer hands than 
Madison ever did. While both held a jaundice view of most men, Hamilton seems to have believed 
in a sufficient supply of great and virtuous individuals to fill such offices.  
Echoes of Hamilton’s convention speech can be found in The Federalist. This is 
particularly true of his numbers on the executive branch.  In No. 1 he speaks of his “enlightened 
zeal for the energy and efficiency of government.”61 If government is to be properly administration 
it must have the power and efficiency to meet its task. Only through sufficient concentration of 
power can government effectively stave off the anarchy and disorder which threaten liberty. But 
liberty is also threated by excessive “energy and efficiency.” In later numbers he dwells on the 
“energy”, “decision”, “dispatch”, “secrecy” and broad, even undefined, powers of the executive 
which provide unity to the national government. Such energy and dispatch only come from power 
concentrated in the hands of a unitary executive.  
Hamilton seems to envision the executive as a constitutional version of Machiavelli’s 
prince.62 It is the executive alone, as preserver of the Union, enforcer of law, Commander-in-chief 
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and arch defender of the Constitution, whose passions and ambitions are, if under a narrow range 
of circumstances, granted the freest rein of any constitutional officer. Locke called the broad 
emergency powers granted to an executive in a crisis “prerogative”. Prerogative was the “power 
to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law and 
sometimes even against it.”63 Such justifications give the executive the ability to act with broad 
discretion under conditions of “necessity” in matters of national self-preservation.64 Today such 
powers come under the equally ubiquitous and ambiguous umbrella of “national security.”65  
With his broad construal of executive power we can see in Hamilton’s analysis the first 
inklings of the imperial presidency.66 In No. 70 Hamilton says “in the conduct of war” the “energy 
of the executive is the bulwark of the national security.”67 In No. 72 Hamilton says that no nation 
in the course of their history, has not experienced “certain emergencies of the state” and “an 
absolute necessity of the services of particular men, in particular situations, perhaps it would not 
be too strong to say, to the preservation of its political existence.”68 Here, Hamilton references the 
potential need for a Roman dictator of sorts. Hamilton predicts that there are likely to be “certain 
emergencies of the state,” where the presence of such men of extraordinary ambition “might be of 
the greatest moment to the public interest or safety.”69 He concludes it unwise “to prohibit a nation 
from making use of its own citizens, in the manner best suited to its exigencies and 
circumstances.”70 There would be no Lincoln or FDR as we know them, without the potentially 
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broad and relatively undefined powers of the presidency hinted at by Hamilton’s numbers on the 
executive.  
The Constitution, it has been said, is not a suicide pact. When abrogating habeas corpus 
Lincoln asked, “Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, 
lest that one be violated?” Such powers border on the extra-constitutional. They are to be found in 
the mysterious penumbra and implied powers of the text. Only a few short years after ratification 
Hamilton argued for what has become known as the “inherent powers” of the presidency based on 
his “broad construction”71 of executive power.72 In his 1793-1794 Helvidius-Pacificus debates 
Hamilton publicly tangled with Madison over the scope of executive power. Hamilton’s argument 
for broad powers hinges on the fact that Article II grants the “Executive power” to the presidency, 
without the limiting “herein granted” clause of Article I.73  
Hamilton seems to envision the executive office in more classical terms. Hamilton’s 
powerful executive is however not only a tool of efficiency, but an outlet for political ambition 
and honor seeking.74 Unlike Madison, Hamilton appears to be more comfortable with, and places 
“more stress” on, the motive of ambition.75 Madison’s emphasis on human frailty compels him to 
cast a more jaundice eye toward ambitious men and their designs. “Great men,” said Lord Acton, 
“are almost always bad.”76 The presidency is designed to allow the rare natures’ of extraordinary 
men to flourish. Unlike the numerous legislators, the unitary executive provides larger and less 
crowded stage for human greatness. This seat was for men of “irregular” or extraordinary 
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ambition.77 The presidency appears to be designed to complete and fulfill the excellence of 
extraordinary human beings whose faculties and virtues find a commensurate office and 
opportunity to express themselves. 
The Executive office serves two psychological functions for Hamilton. In No. 72 he gives 
a frank and comprehensive psychological analysis of the character type of the individuals likely to 
seek it. Its first function is to perform the practical necessities of the executive function. The 
challenge of the office could only be men by men psychologically willing to embrace it. Its second 
is to serve as what Hamilton calls “the summit of his country’s honors.”78 It is a platform for human 
excellence. Mansfield says, “no part of the Constitution is more welcoming to greatness than the 
executive office.”79 Along with its imperial geographic extent Mansfield describes the presidency 
as “the ground for America’s greatness.” 80 He says the Constitution “establishes the first republic 
with a strong executive consistent with republicanism and not an exception from it like the Roman 
dictator, the Venetian doge, or the Cromwellian Protector.”81 The constitutional executive is a 
Machiavellian prince tamed by a republican form, bound by a written Constitution dedicated to 
limited government in the service of the people.82 The presidency provides a home in the 
constitutional edifice for those most capable individuals who harbor the most extreme and peculiar 
ambitions. Men of such ambition are a double-edge sword. Ambition is necessary to meet the most 
challenging of times, but perhaps also excessive, even tyrannical, in ordinary ones. As the highest 
office it provides an outlet or release valve for individuals harboring radical ambition and seeking 
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the highest honors.83 Thus the potential threat posed by these men’s nature and ambitions can be 
restrained by the office, or perhaps even channeled through it into a positive good.  
Ancient Greek democracy only entertained men of great ambition, like Solon, in times of 
crisis. When they were not needed, they were not wanted. Ostracism allowed the political 
community to come to terms with men of inordinate ambition. Hamilton asks whether it be wise 
to deny the existence of an office for men of “irregular ambition”, men who might wander as 
“discontented ghosts” in society without the opportunity it provides. He asks, “would it promote 
the peace of the community, or the stability of the government, to have half a dozen men who had 
had credit enough to raise themselves to the seat of the supreme magistracy, wandering among the 
people like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which they were destined never more to 
possess?”84 Where would such a nature produce the greatest benefit and the least harm in American 
society? Would they be better inside the tent of government under its constraints, or outside of 
them? The executive is confined by Article II, constrained by the people and the other branches. 
Hamilton suggests such men are better kept inside the tent. Is it really wise to encourage an 
Alcibiades to join the Spartans and the Persians? 
No doubt these incipient tensions between Madison and Hamilton reveal the seeds of their 
future political disputes. Jefferson, for example in his Anas, saw Hamilton as a monarchist who 
never ceased in his quest for a more centralized national government headed by a strong 
executive.85 Meanwhile Madison abandoned the Federalists for Jefferson’s Republican party. Once 
a strong national government had been founded Madison hewed toward the principles of limited 
government, a restrained executive and robust state sovereignty. He would soon become the father 
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of the Bill of Rights. Later disagreements between Madison and Hamilton, should however be 
seen in light of political circumstances subsequent to the Founding where they were acting within 
the very system they helped create. Matters shifted constitutional theory to practical policy. Men 
who could agree on principles, could reasonably disagree over their practical application. While 
they were not intimates, they had collaborated on key projects which lead to crafting the national 
government. They acted as political allies in a united front on behalf of the Constitution. 86 It would 
be inappropriate to retroactively project their future disputes back onto The Federalist and 
exaggerate their differences in 1787.   
It is rather misleading to characterize Madison as a “Jeffersonian.” Mathews says even 
though Jefferson and Madison are often linked by their “great collaboration” in constructing 
Jeffersonian Democracy their political theories are “qualitatively different.”87 Madison was “more 
market-oriented and more anti-democratic” and “stood closer to Alexander Hamilton than to 
Thomas Jefferson.”88 Jefferson asserted man’s natural sociability was grounded in social passions, 
not reason. Contrary to Madison, he believed “that all men have a “moral sense” which means 
“they can live in tranquility” without the Leviathan.89 Every observation about human nature made 
by Madison in The Federalist militates against this point of view. Madison was a liberal 
republican, not a Jeffersonian radical. This position is a direct product of his jaundiced view of 
human nature. Sheldon Wolin also recognizes the distinct intellectual differences between 
Madison and Jefferson when he says “the roots of the divergence between the liberal and the 
 
86 Hamilton, Madison & Jay. The Federalist Papers: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States (ed. 
Robert Scigliano). New York: Modern Library, 2001. p xii. 
87 Richard K. Matthews. The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986. pp. 
17-18.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid., p. 20.  
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radical democratic traditions lie in their contrasting faiths concerning the ability of the human mind 
to fathom reality and to translate the results into practical action.”90  
Madison was no radical or utopian. He held roughly the same faith and skepticism in human 
nature as Hamilton. Hamilton is often seen as a kind of Burkean conservative in his concern from 
the preservation of tradition, his admiration for the British system and his belief in a strong central 
government with a strong executive.91 This places him at a great distance from Jefferson’s 
democratic communitarianism where, under the proper circumstances, men as farmers, could 
largely government themselves autonomously.92 Matthews concludes, “Jefferson’s faith in 
humanity’s ability to govern itself is what separates” him from the likes of Madison and 
Hamilton.93 Their emphasis on the inefficacy of reason and moral sense is exactly why both 
Madison and Hamilton, along with Washington, were strong advocates of a powerful national 
government to displace the weak Articles of Confederation which had precisely depended too 









90 Sheldon Wolin. Politics and Visions. Boston: Brown & Co., 1960. p. 297.  
91 Clinton Rossiter. Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc, 1964. p. 126.  p. 114, 
181.  
92 Richard K. Matthews. The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986. pp. 
17.  
93 Ibid, p. 18.  
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4. The Abolition of Man 
 
The urge to save humanity is almost always a false face for the urge to rule it. 
- H.L. Mencken 
 
Power always sincerely, conscientiously, de très bon foi, believes itself right. Power always thinks 
it has a great soul and vast views, beyond the comprehension of the weak.1 
- John Adams, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Feb. 2, 1816. 
 
In 2010 President Obama gave a speech celebrating the historic passage of his healthcare 
reform bill. “Our future,” he said, “is what we make it.”2 A few years later at the 2016 Democratic 
National Convention he reiterated this belief saying, “We don’t fear the future – We shape it.” 
Taken a face value this language is little more than the sweeping rhetoric one expects to hear on 
the campaign trail in any election year. Yet the passage of bills like the 2009 American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) were in line with the 
visionary rhetoric; they were transformative works of legislation which appeared to demonstrate 
our ability to transform the nation into whatever we choose to make it.  
In the broader context of his public speeches and published writings these remarks revealed 
President Obama’s underlying political philosophy and a conception of human identity and its 
powers. His claims depend on the malleability of man and his society, and the degree of control 
human agency has over history and chance. President Obama took a clear stance on the desirability 
of transforming the current nature of American government and society. When Obama spoke of 
“Hope and Change”, what he cryptically espoused was a vision of human progress. This vision is 
 
1 John Adams, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Feb. 2, 1816. 
2 Obama, Remarks Following passage of the ACA in Iowa City, Iowa. March 25, 2010 
Charles Kesler. “ObamaCare & the Costs of the Welfare State.” RealClearPolitics. September 28, 2010. 
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reiterated in his fondness for Martin Luther King Jr.’s assertion that “the arc of the moral universe 
is long, but it bends toward justice.” Change can be good or bad, beneficial or harmful. Progress 
is change toward a goal; change for the better.  
But if we have the power to completely control our fate, human identity would be 
contingent on history and subservient to human making. The nature of man and his society would 
not be fixed, or in any sense meaningful, accept in regard to the assertions of power by any elite 
capable of them. Society would be in a constant state of change and evolution. If human nature is 
in no way fixed, it has no identifiable essential or enduring features that must be respected or 
celebrated, in need of restrain or desiring fulfillment. We would be unable to indicate a specific 
goal as better or worse because human nature provides the only known standard for some goal we 
might agree on.  If human identity is totally malleable, it would longer provide the standard and 
measure for government and the justice it metes out. The goal, even obligation, of government or 
a visionary leader would not be to craft justice commensurate to human nature, but to shape man 
and his society into their own ideological self-image. Despite this, it would not be clear how change 
could be considered good or bad, beneficial or harmful, because the standard of nature by which 
this could be evaluated would have been obliterated in the process. 
When Hamilton spoke of the establishment of the American Republic on the grounds of 
“reflection and choice” over “accident and force” he hardly considered this proposition to mean 
absolute control this implies. Rather, the Founding was to an historically unprecedented degree, 
the result of the former over the latter. Nor would Hamilton or Madison have thought such total 
shaping of society either possible or desirable. They would have called it tyranny. They hardly 
denied that numerous accidents, that all actions in society and government would be based on 
deliberate making, still less on the things outside of human control and making, would define the 
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nature and operation of government and society. One of those “accidents” which shaped the 
thought of the Founding was human nature itself. Human nature was given, not a contrivance of 
man of History. Following Aristotle, the Founders acknowledged that things like the education or 
habituation of human nature represent its extension and perfection, not a deviation or 
transformation of its essential characteristics. 
Even if we had the ability to radically transform man and his society, would it be either 
desirable or just? The Founders numerous remarks illustrate that they believed human nature was 
the standard on which their political regime would rest. Justice itself rested on this natural standard. 
Government was “the greatest of all reflections on human nature.” The premise of Publius’ new 
republicanism was that it was a more natural regime, more in conformity to human nature, than 
any that had existed on Earth.  It was the regime most in harmony with human nature. It was 
precisely for this reason that they rejected the Articles of Confederation. The Articles were not 
commensurate with the needs and demands of human nature. These shortcomings manifest in 
practical problems evident in the history of the period. The Constitution’s durability and justice is 
a reflection of its fidelity to that nature. Good government exhibits the most fidelity to human 
nature. Human nature is the standard. 
Lurking underneath Obama’s rhetoric of control was a desired “transformation” of 
American society and government made possible by political and technological power.  On the 
2008 campaign trail he said the goal of his administration would be “fundamentally transforming 
the United States of America.”3 Throughout his presidency this rhetoric of transformation was 
never abandon. Today this mantel continues to be carried by President Biden. The current 
President echoed President Obama’s language of twelve years before verbatim, saying that the 
 
3 Charles R. Kesler. I am the Change: Barack Obama and the Future of Liberalism. New York: Broadside Books, 
2012. p. 31. 
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crisis created by the coronavirus is an “incredible opportunity…to fundamentally transform the 
country”4 In Obama’s First Inaugural Address he said that in “the midst of a crisis” the “time of 
standing pat…and putting off unpleasant decisions” had passed and that through “the quiet force 
of progress” it was time to begin “the work of remaking America.”5 He sought to 
“transform…schools and colleges and universities to meet the demands of a new age” in which 
the historical “ground has shifted.”6 He asserted there are “some who question the scale of our 
ambitions- who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans.”7   
As today with COVID-19, an opportunity for transformation was found in the 2008 
financial crisis. Despite its depredations, it seemed a new America could emerge, a phoenix from 
the ashes. In his Second Inaugural Address President Obama conceded that Americans have “never 
relinquished our skepticism of central authority” or “succumbed to the fiction that all society’s ills 
can be cured through government alone,” and yet he quickly pivoted to assert just the opposite, 
saying “we have always understood that when times change, so must we.”8 Did the Constitution 
and its account of human nature which gives rise to “our system” stand in the way of the ambitions 
of this new age?  
Legislation like the ARRA and the ACA appeared to demonstrate an incipient 
transformation of American society through a new and expanded role for government, achieving 
a new, more equitable, American society. This transformation would be made possible by the 
president’s vision of history and human identity as it applied to the American regime. In his 2017 
 
4 Kyle Olsen. “Joe Biden: Coronavirus an ‘Incredible Opportunity’ to ‘Fundamentally Transform’ America.” 
Brietbart News. May 4, 2020.  
5  The U.S. Presidents. The Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States. New York: Pantianos 
Classics, 2018. p. 260.  
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid, p. 264.  
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Farwell Address President Obama said, “America is exceptional” not because of its Founding 
principles but because of its “capacity to change.”9 “Constant change,” he said, “has been 
America’s hallmark.”10  
American exceptionalism has been traditionally associated with the fortuitous 
circumstances of the nation’s birth coupled with its founding principles of natural justice, self-
government and the spirit of its people. Many have believed these virtues make the nation a shining 
“city on a hill”, a standard of government for the rest of the world.  In Federalist No. 1 Hamilton 
says that of all the nations on Earth it “seems to have been reserved to the people of this country 
to decide…whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government” 
on the cornerstone of consent and liberty.11 The mantra of many needed reforms throughout 
American history have not been couched in the language of fundamental change, but in a demand 
she live up to the “promissory note” of her founding principles.12 
In light of his goals and an ideology which suited them, it was not surprising that Senator 
Obama announced his candidacy in 2007 by emphasizing that “the genius of our founders is that 
they designed a system of government that can be changed.”13  He reminded his audience that they 
“should take heart, because we’ve changed the country before.”14 He passionately exhorted them: 
“Let us transform this nation.”15  He claimed the very reason he sought office was “to transform a 
nation.” Invoking Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, Obama spoke of a “new birth of freedom on 
Earth.” Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, preservation of the Union and the subsequent 
 
9 Barak Obama. “Barak Obama’s Farewell Address, January 10, 2017.” in Farewell Addresses of the Presidents of 
the United States. Carlisle: Applewood Books, 2017. p. 90.  
10 Ibid., p. 97.  
11 No. 1. 
12 Martin Luther King Jr. “I Have a Dream Speech.” August 28, 1963. 
13 Charles R. Kesler. I am the Change: Barack Obama and the Future of Liberalism. New York: Broadside Books, 





Reconstruction Era has often been described as a “Second Founding”.16 Historian Eric Foner has 
said these changes were “so profound” that they “should be seen not simply as an alteration of an 
existing structure but as a ‘second founding,” a ‘constitutional revolution’”17 Foner goes so far as 
to call the transformation brought about by Reconstruction as a “regime change.” 18 The Civil War 
was a second revolution. President Obama seemed to be hinting at a third.    
What Foner’s calls a “regime change” would be described by many historians and political 
scientists as part of the ongoing fulfillment, not transcendence, of the Founding principles.19 This 
is certainly how Lincoln framed the Civil War at Gettysburg. It would be a new birth, of old 
freedoms. Foner glosses over the fact that the Civil War victory, the elimination of slavery and 
Reconstruction amendments were achieved through the assertion of the principles of the 
Declaration, and through constitutional prerogatives and principles, all in the name of conserving 
the old Constitution and the Union it forged. It is no small irony that it was the Confederacy no 
less, that first modified the name of our Constitution with the adjective “old.” The principles of 
the Reconstruction amendments can be seen as a reassertion of the Declaration’s freedoms and the 
Bill of Rights now extended to all, that the Constitution had failed to fully live up to. The 
Declaration holds simply that “all men are created equal.” Lincoln’s second founding was 
achieved on the same principles as the first. The golden apple of the Declaration remained, while 
the silver frame of the Constitution had its founding flaws polished away. Lincoln’s “new” birth 
of freedom, was a revival of the old Founding freedoms.  
 
16 Eric Foner. The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the Constitution. New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2019.  
17 Ibid., p. xx.  
18 Ibid., p. xxvi. 
19 Ibid., p. xxvi. 
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The very fact the South felt obliged to secede from the Union and replace the “old” 
constitution with a new one speaks to their understanding of the founding principles they rejected. 
Garrison’s “pact with the devil” had within itself the mechanisms to remedy itself. This is what 
many of the Founders had hoped for all along, however feckless some may have been in failing to 
achieve it themselves. Even the former slave and orator Frederick Douglass, departing from 
Garrison, eventually came to believe that the Constitution was “a glorious liberty document.”20 He 
was therefore in favor of the “strict construction” of its text.21 Foner even concedes that in the 
“mid-1850’s, Douglass embraced the view that the federal government possessed the power, 
without any change in the Constitution, to abolish slavery throughout the nation.”22 How can this 
be a “regime change” as opposed to mere reform?  
In recognizing the ingenuity of the Founding most politicians and political scientists tend 
to celebrate the continuity and stability endowed on our regime by its founding documents. 
Ironically despite its twenty-seven amendments, and the growth of government by statute and the 
administrative Leviathan, no amendment has fundamentally transformed the enumerated powers 
of its seven articles or the principles on which they are based.   
In times of crisis, much of American history has consisted in statesmen reiterating and 
reaffirming the principles on which the Constitution is founded not changing them. In his 1852 
July Fourth Oration, as the storm of division gathered, Frederick Douglass described the principles 
of the Declaration as “the ring-bolt to the chain” of the nation’s destiny which secured it.23 He said 
the “principles contained in that instrument” are the “saving principles” of the nation.24 He 
 
20 Frederick Douglass. “The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery?” March 26, 1860. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Eric Foner. The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the Constitution. New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2019. p. 9. 
23 Frederick Douglass. “What is to the Slave the Fourth of July?” July 4, 1852.  
24 Frederick Douglass. “What is to the Slave the Fourth of July?” July 4, 1852. 
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implored the nation to “stand by those principles, be true to them on all occasions, in all places, 
against all foes, and at whatever cost.” He implored his audience to “cling to it” because if that 
ringbolt were broken, “all is lost.”25 
 America’s political institutions, despite certain changes foreign to the Framers intent, have 
been significantly durable compared to the other leading nations of the world. The U.S. 
Constitution is the oldest continuously operational constitution of any major nation in the world 
by far. The wisdom and understanding of Founders must account for some of this durability. For 
President Obama, it seems the Constitution, as a document of continuity expressing the essential 
and fixed nature of the American republic, is instead a mechanism and lever of change.  
 The former president’s desire to fundamentally transform society is of course not new. He 
merely gave new voice to an old Faustian desire as ancient as civilization itself. The economist 
and social scientist Friedrich Hayek stated that “one of the dominant ideas which governs thinking 
since the end of the Eighteenth century is the idea that we can make everything to our pleasure” 
whether the character of the individual or their society.26 In 1603 Francis Bacon sought to clarify 
the major forms of human ambition which he believed had shaped history. In his Novum Organum 
he states “The first is of those who desire to extend their own power in their native country; which 
kind is vulgar and degenerate. The second is of those who labour to extend the power of their 
country and its dominion among men. This certainly has more dignity, though not less 
covetousness. But if a man endeavour to establish and extend the power and dominion of the 
human race over the universe, his ambition (if ambition it can be called) is without doubt a more 
wholesome thing and more noble than the other two.”27   
 
25 Ibid. 
26 William F. Buckley Jr. with Friedrich Hayek Firing Line. November 7, 1977.  
27 Francis Bacon. The New Organon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 100.  
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 With this statement in mind, it is no surprise Bacon, among others, gave impetus to an 
intellectual revolution, through a “reformed natural science” which sought “the dominion of the 
human race itself over the universe.”28 Bacon proclaimed that human beings were “not animals on 
their hind legs, but mortal gods. God, the creator of the universe and you, gave you souls capable 
of understanding the world but not to be satisfied with it alone.”29 As Karl Marx says in his Theses 
on Feuerbach, modern science and philosophy are no longer satisfied to interpret the world, their 
goal is to change it. 
 Given his ambitious nature, if mankind had such a power over the universe, what might he 
do with it? In his 1930 book The Scientific Outlook Bertrand Russell gives us an insight into the 
possibilities. He states that as scientific knowledge, technique and power increase mankind “will 
tend more and more to view himself also as a manufacture product, and to minimize the share of 
natural growth in the production of human beings. He will come to value only what is deliberately 
caused by human agency, not what results from nature’s unaided handiwork. Men will acquire 
power to alter themselves, and will inevitably use this power. What they will make of this species 
I do not venture to predict.” 30 Nothing in human existence will be an étant donné, nothing will be 
given, all will be made. A comparison to the powers of God during the period of Creation is not 
hyperbolic, nor should it be overlooked. Such assertions indicate that the most ambitious among 
us seek God-like power to make ourselves into any image they so choose. Mostly likely this will 
be their own. If such a comprehensive power were developed and deployed we would become 
what the historian Yuvel Harari has recently called “Homo Deus”31   
 
28 Ibid. 
29Stephen A. McKnight. The Religious Foundations of Francis Bacon’s Thought. Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 2006. p. 117.  
30 Bertrand Russell. The Scientific Outlook. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1931. p. 168-69. 
31 Yuval Noah Harari. Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. New York: Harpers Inc., 2017.  
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 We see Russell explicitly takes up the call to ambition laid out by Francis Bacon. Russell 
was a philosopher, mathematician, historian of philosophy, but is not typically credited as a 
political philosopher or scientist. John Rawls however takes this Baconian dictum and transplants 
it to his theory of justice. In his book A Theory of Justice, Rawls denies the time-honored notion 
of desert based on human nature. Desert is a moral notion which holds that rewards or punishments 
should be deserved based on an account of justice. His theory holds that the state should establish 
its justice only on “what is deliberately caused by human agency, not what results from nature’s 
unaided handiwork.” 32 All theories of justice assume good should be rewarded and bad punished. 
What matters is the principle or criterion on which rewards and punishments should be meted out.  
 The traditional notion of desert ignores the underlying cause of your conduct as a relevant 
factor of justice. If you act with virtue you are rewarded, if you act basely you are punished. In A 
Theory of Justice Rawls denies the traditional notion based on the criteria of given talents and 
flaws.  Nature creates a “natural lottery” which confers benefits and demerits based factors like 
nature and chance not fashioned by man and his institutions. Human conduct is the product of 
genes and circumstances outside the control of the individual.33 As such this conduct is the product 
of chance and therefore arbitrary.  Rawls believes that since nature and circumstance are 
“arbitrary” endowments that they cannot serve as the basis of desert. We do not deserve to be 
rewarded or punished based on something over which we have no control, but only something 
man-made.34 Rawls asserts that our given faculties and our circumstances, our vices and virtues 
 
32 Bertrand Russell. The Scientific Outlook. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1931. p. 168-69. 
33 John Rawls. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999. p. 64. 
34 Michael Zuckert. “Justice Deserted: A Critique of Rawls' "A Theory of Justice".” Polity, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring, 
1981). pp. 476.  
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are “arbitrary from a moral point of view” since they are not the product of human making and 
agency.35   
 For Rawls justice and desert must be “rational.” Rational here does not simply mean the 
product of reflection, it means a construct established on a “non-arbitrary”, non-natural principles. 
If justice is based on a “rational” principle then it can serve as a non-arbitrary standard for desert. 
Rawls asserts two principles of justice as “rational”. These “rational” standards are the liberty 
principle and the difference principles. In fact, these standards are merely based on the fantasies 
and fears of those choosing from an imaginary “original position.” In such a condition none of 
life’s necessities and desires are actually operative, they are only imaginary hypotheticals. 
Therefore they do not and cannot properly inform Rawls decision making as they do in Hobbes’ 
and Locke’s account of the entirely plausible and ever-present state of nature.  
 Rawls logic is as follows: we do not deserve either the talents or demerits nature has given 
us, or our fortuitous or unlucky circumstances, therefore we do not deserve either of their fruits. 
Rawls says “the fixed points of our moral judgments” is that “no one deserves his place in the 
distribution of natural assets any more than he deserves his initial starting place in society.”36 
Nature and the natural distribution is arbitrary; therefore it cannot serve as a standard for justice. 
Rawls always seems focused on the economic distribution, but the implications for criminal justice 
would be astounding. Since our assets, or what Publius would call our natural “faculties”, are 
arbitrary, a matter of chance, they are undeserved. Any distribution of goods pegged to these given 
natural endowments would then be equally “arbitrary” and undeserved.  It would in fact be 
fundamentally unjust. Therefore, we have no natural right to either our faculties or their fruits. A 
man-made system of justice must be built, not on the standard of nature, but in order to go to war 
 
35 John Rawls. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999. p. 284. 
36 Ibid., p. 274. 
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with her. Rawls theory of justice is merely the political dimension of man’s “conquest of nature.” 
Human nature must be conquered, perhaps abolished, if “justice” is to be served. 
 Rawls concludes that we must establish “a conception of justice that nullifies the accidents 
of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance.”37 This Baconian impulse 
desires to have, and to believe it is possible to have, systematic social control over every dimension 
of society, big and small. Anything “arbitrary”, that is nature, is to be displaced by human construct 
and conscious fashioning just as Russell predicted in the 1930s. Only social conditions that are 
“deliberately caused by human agency,” and not the “results from nature’s unaided handiwork” 
can be considered “justice.” Nature, in all its forms, turns out to be the fundamental injustice of 
human existence. For Rawls the tragedy of Job need only be a children’s fable, never a reality. The 
last man has come knocking. Nature “nullified,” is man abolished. 
 Such a position is fundamentally contrary to Locke and Madison who tells us that the 
protection of “the diverse faculties of men” distributed by nature “from which the rights of property 
originate…is the first object of government.”38 Despite the depth of their disputes, on this point 
Jefferson whole heartedly agreed saying,  “To take from one, because it is thought his own industry 
and that of his fathers has acquired too much, in order to spare others, who, or whose fathers, have 
not exercised equal industry and skill, is to violate arbitrarily the first principle of association, the 
guarantee to everyone the free exercise of his industry and the fruits acquired by it.”39 Rawls 
redistribution of assets was a fancy way of “wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's 
 
37 Ibid., p. 15.  
It is worthy of note that the word “nullifies” in the original edition is changed to “mitigates” or “eliminate the 
significance of” in the later revised edition. One wonders if Rawls has in time come to realize the implications of the 
desire and attempt to nullify nature itself, or whether he is merely making rhetorical concessions to make his project 
appear more genteel.   
38 Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. The Federalist Papers. New York: Signet Classics, 2003. p. 73.  
39 Thomas Jefferson. Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Washington D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 
1904. p. 466. 
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faces.” Lincoln understood Rawls’ theory of justice perfectly well. He called it slavery. Lincoln 
was an advocate of free labor. “I always thought,” he said, “the man that made the corn should eat 
the corn.” It is hard to imagine that economic complexities obscure this basic reality, but ever since 
Wilson and FDR proposed prototypes of Rawls’ theory, many have attempted to say as much. 
Madison and Jefferson saw that a system of justice pegged and responsive to our natural faculties 
is the very opposite of arbitrary.  
 Like others before him, Rawls rejects the standard of nature and human nature. It can play 
no role as guide or foundation for society and its conception of justice.  In so doing he “repudiates 
the conception –accepted from the Old Testament to recent times – that justice consists in giving 
people what they deserve: reward for good conduct and punishment for bad.”40 Zuckert writes that 
by “negating all given claims which might provide the basis for judging “fairness,” Rawls does 
not supply a purer notion of fair exchange but again altogether loses the category of fair exchange 
and thus of “justice” itself.41 Zuckert concludes that if “neither ability nor effort, level of need nor 
any natural base is a legitimate factor in fair exchange, what we are actually doing is destroying 
all criteria of exchange.”42 Rejecting nature as the standard, leaves us with no standard at all. By 
creating a man-made foundation his standard is more, not less arbitrary than the natural one. Locke 
and Madison thought the givenness and uniformity of human nature was the natural foundation for 
the uniformity of the rule of law and the denial of legal classes, which liberated the United States 
from a medieval privilege which treated our natural endowments arbitrarily.  
 
40 John Kekes. “Dangerous Egalitarian Dreams.” City Journal. Vol. 11, No. 4, (Autumn 2001). 
41 Michael Zuckert. “Justice Deserted: A Critique of Rawls' "A Theory of Justice".” Polity, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring, 
1981). p. 483.  
42 Ibid., p. 482.  
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Leo Strauss has meditated on the dire implications of the modern conquest of nature more 
than any other thinker. He says the “modern project was originated as required by nature.”43 This 
project was meant to satisfy “the most powerful natural needs of men: nature was to be conquered 
for the sake of man who himself was supposed to possess a nature, an unchangeable nature.” 44 
Strauss continues saying that “after some time it appeared that the conquest of nature requires the 
conquest of human nature and hence in the first place the questioning of the unchangeability of 
human nature: an unchangeable human nature set absolute limits to progress. Accordingly, the 
natural needs of men could no longer direct the conquest of nature; the direction had to come from 
reason as distinguished from nature, from the rational Ought as distinguished from the neutral 
Is.”45 This is exactly Rawls position broadly stated. But this is a “reason” fundamentally dirempt 
from its object, nature. So long as reason is fallible and tinctured with self-love, as Madison says, 
it is unable to make either conclusive determinations of the “ought” or ones absent self-interest. 
When reason alone inevitably fails to provide an “ought” independent of nature, ambition, love of 
power and the assertion of the will substitute for a reason now detached from the standard of 
nature.  
The words of Francis Bacon were neither intended nor taken as poetry. We are now told 
by scientists that we live in the age of the “Anthropocene”. This fact is the result of a history set 
in motion by the spirit of Bacon and his confrères. The Anthropocene is an epoch of geological 
time dominated by human influence and control over the planet. This age is said to set “a different 
trajectory for the Earth system” altogether.46 In 2002 Leon Kass, a medical doctor, professor at 
 
43 Leo Strauss. The City and Man. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1964. p. 7. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Damien Carrington. “The Anthropocene epoch: scientists declare dawn of human-influenced age.” The Guardian. 
August 16, 2016.  
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University of Chicago and member of The President’s Council on Bioethics said that today 
“human nature itself lies on the operating table, ready for alteration, for eugenic and neuropsychic 
‘enhancement,’ for wholesale redesign. In leading laboratories, academic and industrial, new 
creators are confidently amassing their powers and quietly honing their skills, while on the street 
their evangelists are zealously prophesying a posthuman future. For anyone who cares about 
preserving our humanity, the time has come to pay attention.”47 
A society with such awesome scientific powers and the ideology to wield them 
indiscriminately would seek to transform society and human nature itself. Mankind would be 
remade in the image of those who wield that power. Even in a democratic society, as Kass points 
out, this power would only be wielded by the few at the expense of the many.48 In the Republic, 
Plato has Thrasymachus says “justice is the interest of the stronger” In our posthuman age will say 
“human identity is the image of the stronger.” 
The very meaning of such dusty notions as “human nature” would be meretricious and 
chimerical. The species would be mere clay in the hands of those who control scientific and 
political power. We might ask just how could “a species that is a product of nature, ‘control’ the 
very processes of nature from which it has emerged?”49 It seems such total control and refashioning 
of our own nature would be something akin to sawing the very branch of the tree of nature on 
which we sit. The complete conquest or transformation of human nature in contradistinction to its 
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reform, habituation and perfection, is what C. S. Lewis called the “abolition of man.”50 Human 
nature transformed, is human nature abolished.  
Ironically enough, the Faustian ambition for the power to control the universe or remake 
man and his society might well be seen as the primary attribute of a fixed human nature such 
aspirations appear to deny. The attempted denial of human nature reveals a timeless motive of the 
species. In his Epistles Horace says, “You may drive out nature with a pitchfork, yet still she will 
return, and, insensibly victorious, will break through men’s improper disgusts.”51 Hume says: “For 
whatever may be the consequence of such a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would 
endow them with every species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice; this concerns 
not the magistrate who aims only at possibilities. He cannot cure every vice by substituting a virtue 
in its place. Very often he can only cure one vice by another; and in that case, he ought to prefer 
what is least pernicious to society.”52 No amount of moral, technological or biological 
transformation will alter the all-too-human motives of ambition, love of power and self-interest. 
Augustine held man’s libido dominandi, our “lust for mastery” and “desire to dominate others” is 
an inextricable part of our nature. For Augustine, this passion was the root cause of civil society 
which “arose out of man’s lust for power and violence.”53 Hamilton identifies our “defect of better 
motives” than these as the “original inducements to the establishment of civil power.”54 This 
passion “refuses to accept that all men are by nature equal.”55 Rousseau reminds us that only in 
civil society do we find masters and slaves. If this passion founded government it is also in need 
 
50 S.C. Lewis. The Abolition of Man. New York: HarperOne, 2015.  
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of guidance and restraint by government. Cain slew Abel and founded a city. In time Babel and its 
tower followed.   
The Founders jaundiced view of human nature would have well recognized the 
psychological forces at work in such grandiose ambitions. Underlying The Federalist Papers’ 
defense and explanation of the Constitution is a meditation on the limits of human nature. This 
reflection largely focuses on political psychology and an assessment of human motivations. It 
paints a portrait of human nature and identifies ambition as perhaps the central psychological 
motor with which political order must contend. Ambition can be defined as “a strong desire to do 
or to achieve something.”56 In this sense all human beings desire to achieve their goals. The ancient 
Greek word for ambition, philotimia, literally means “love of honor”.57 But the truly ambitious 
typically have grander aims and greater desire to fulfill them than the ordinary individual. Both 
their aim and magnitude of the desire differ. The Federalist treats ambition as akin to an "eager or 
inordinate desire for honor or preferment.”58 The ambitious seek not only to achieve goals, but 
extraordinary ones which give them public honors from their fellow citizens and posterity.  
At its root, ambition is a dramatic form of self-love and a special species of self-interest. 
The Federalist identifies the most extreme form of ambition as the desire for “fame”. Fame is the 
motive which inspires human beings to achieve monumental goals and be recognized, not only by 
the living, but also by posterity. Bacon’s desire to control the universe through powers obtained 








One can use power to gain recognition, and one can be ambitious to gain power simply for 
the love of power itself. Thus, power and ambition go hand in hand. What is clear is that ambition 
inspires the pursuit and use of power in self-serving ways. The goal of a republican political order 
is to harness human nature and its ambition in the service of liberty and order. The authors of The 
Federalist well understood that ambition was the double-edged sword of political order. Ambition 
was the necessary psychological motor to propel men to seek power through public office and 
meet its challenges. But it was also a constant threat inclining men to abuse those powers in order 
to dominate others. The authors understood that power needs to be constrained, ambition educated, 
by the force of other passions if necessary. This can only happen if human nature is obediently and 
prudently recognized and obeyed, not willed out of existence. “Intelligent beings,” writes 
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5. Human Nature in Context 
 
The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records. 
They are written with a sun beam in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity 
itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.” 
- Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted 
  
Transforming our nation would go hand in hand with the transformation of our 
understanding of human nature and vice versa. All The Federalist’s arguments on behalf of the 
Constitution are grounded in knowledge and experience of human nature. In his preface to The 
Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu that “oracle” to the authors of The Federalist, says “I began by 
examining men” and “did not draw my principles from my prejudices but from the nature of 
things.”1 From his observations, Montesquieu concluded that “amidst the infinite diversity of laws 
and mores, they were not led by their fancies alone.”2 In short men lived in conformity with an 
underlying human nature and its laws in relationship to given historical circumstances. Publius’ 
arguments on behalf of the Constitution are also rooted in an account of a universal human nature 
and its laws of motivation and conduct which underlie the kaleidoscopic diversity of time and 
place. 
Today it is not fashionable to speak of “human nature.” The expression reeks to some of 
antiquarianism, of white ethnocentric European men in powdered wigs, knee-high stockings and 
shoe buckles discoursing in candle lit drawing rooms, opining from the comfy security of the 
armchair. We do not, often cannot, speak of human nature within the human sciences. This, even 
as hard sciences like biology and genetics continue to plumb once dimly lit recesses of the species. 
 




To the contemporary ear such talk is at best quaint or ignorant of the historical use and abuse of 
the term. At worst it is downright bigoted, wreaking of the pseudo-science of phrenology, colonial 
claims of racial superiority, or the ethnocentric proprietorship of the mantle of civilization itself. 
No doubt the word comes with historical baggage like any other. But no one would condemn 
modern natural science itself just because, for example, Alexander Stephens believed that the 
“physical, philosophical and moral… departments of science” of his day had definitely established 
the racial inferiority of the black man.3  
Today we ‘know’ there is no such thing as human nature. Instead we speak the language 
of “identity”. This distinction of nomenclature is not without significance. While the term “human 
nature” suggests all those things human individuals and communities hold in common as a species, 
“identity,” ironically enough, speaks to the differences which make us unique and divide us into 
factions and tribes. The vast array of individuals and groups seen throughout history and across 
the globe, their many habits and ways of life, appear to attest to primacy of difference, and to deny 
the very existence of a common human nature. Circumstance reigns. This diversity appears to 
illustrate the way exogenous forces, like history and circumstance, completely determine human 
identity. We ‘know’ that this diversity is the product of history, language and culture, the artificial 
construction and socialization of mankind. There is no human nature, only a human condition 
which we can likely alter with enough power as well.  
We ‘know’ human nature is radically plural, indefinitely malleable, and nothing more than 
a linguistic cudgel to subordinate out-groups. We ‘know’ “human nature” is a mere locution of 
power, employed by self-interest to elevate the speaker and exclude others from the status of full 
humanity. “Human nature” is reduced to a rhetorical tool in the hands of the powerful, those people 
 
3 Alexander Stephens. “Cornerstone Speech. March 21, 1861” in Hillsdale College Politics Faculty. The U.S. 
Constitution: A Reader. Hillsdale: Hillsdale College Press, 2012. p. 578. 
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with a voice. It is politically incorrect to even countenance the idea that there might exist certain 
intractable truths or commonalities between human beings across time, space and culture. Perhaps 
there exist common challenges of human nature which dictate certain fundamental needs and 
problems of political order? This is what the Founders and the authors of The Federalist Papers 
wisely took for granted. 
 Since shortly after the birth of the American Republic there have been numerous challenges 
to the Founding. These have included such ideologies as slavery, historicism, pragmatism, 
Progressivism and Postmodern Identity politics.4 All of these challengers and their cousin 
ideologies subsumed under them reconceive our political, social and economic relationship with 
nature, human nature and history. Today’s challengers to the Constitution reject its claims 
regarding the proper ends of government because they reject the account of human nature on which 
those ends are premised. They also reject it means, limited government with powers arranged and 
separated in a manner which causes them to check and balance one another and create dastardly 
inefficiencies of power. Constitutional scholar Richard Epstein concludes that the “remorseless 
and enormous expansion in government power can only be explained by the systematic repudiation 
of the basic principles of limited government which informed the original constitutional 
structure.”5 And yet, the principles of limited government ultimately rest on an account of human 
nature and its limits.  
 These fundamental transformations are a direct product of their denial of human nature. In 
rejecting both the ends and the means of government as explained by The Federalist these 
challengers implicitly or explicitly reject its account of human nature. The principle of limited 
 
4 Ronald Pestritto. Challenges to the American Founding: Slavery, Historicism and Progressivism in the Nineteenth 
Century. Lexington: Lexington Books, 2014.   




government is built an acknowledgement of human nature’s intrinsic and permanent frailties. Since 
men are not angels and governments are made of men you must enable “government to control the 
governed” but also to “oblige it to control itself. If the Founders were wrong in their understanding 
of human nature these errors would be reflected in own our history. They would give us reason to 
change the constitutional order.  
Constitutions and constitutional constructions do not spring from a mere process of philosophical 
speculations and reasoning. They grow out of conditions, circumstances, events, sympathies, 
prevailing interests. 
- Speech by Senator Karl Schurz on the Senate Floor, May 19, 1870  
 
 The Founders universalist claims, whether that of Natural Rights or a government 
commensurate to human nature itself, were of course made in an historical context with its own 
particular demands and interests. In light of inevitable limitations of foresight, the Founders may 
well have reached the wrong conclusions about how precisely to mitigate the frailties of human 
nature they observed. This ironically would only serve as a confirmation of them. Or, they may 
have simply been wrong about the nature of man. They may have erred because the Constitutional 
Convention was not a conclave of philosopher-kings at the Sacred Academia Grove. Instead it was 
a meeting of politicians representing various interests and factions of post-revolutionary American 
society circa 1787. Their purpose was not philosophic knowledge of the whole, but political 
compromise in order to obtain practical goals under limiting circumstances. As Madison reminds 
us, the Constitution was “the work of many heads and many hands.”6  
 
6 Forrest McDonald. Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution. Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 1995. p. 225. 
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 McDonald says the “diversity of interests and points of view among the delegates made for 
alignments that shifted with circumstances and necessitated repeated compromises.”7  In fact 
Publius’ judgment of human nature concludes philosophers would have been no less immune than 
statesmen to the ills of self-interest, self-love and the distorting effects of passion on reason. In 
No. 85. Hamilton says “I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect men. The result of the 
deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of errors and 
prejudices, as of good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed.”8 Both 
Madison and Hamilton conceded that it is in the very nature of collective bodies that passions and 
interest “wrest the sceptre from reason.”9 In No. 55 Madison asserts without irony that “had every 
Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”10 It was 
not simply a matter of what kind of government could be conceived in the human imagination, but 
which was possible in practice and had a sufficient majority consent to it.  
But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected, as the philosophical race of kings wished 
for by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational government will not find it a superfluous 
advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side. 
- Madison, No. 49 
 
 Whatever flaws there may be in the Founder’s extrapolation from human nature to its 
ramifications in the nature and arrangement of power, there is overwhelming historical evidence 
of the general accuracy of their account in comparison to other modern regimes. Where are the 
Communist regimes today hailed by intellectuals of the 1930s as the inevitable future of the planet 
in the1930s? If the Founders were correct this should motivate us to understand them. It should 
 
7 Ibid. 
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give us great pause in transforming our form of government in the service of the transient and 
emotional causes of the day. In particular the various currents of thought which repudiate the basic 
principles of the Constitution have a marked tendency to ignore or reject the Founders wise 
observations of human behavior, especially when wielding power.  
 Since the Founding there have been three major ideological challenges to The Federalist’s 
account of human nature. Other challengers can be considered variants of these main three and 
subsumed by them. The historical antecedents of these rivals were well known to the Founders, 
but fully emerged as threats to the constitutional order only after the Founding. These challengers 
remain to this day and retain the ideological core of their progenitors. Some have the explicit 
intention of displacing the Founding account of human nature in order to displace the political 
structure which it produced. Such a dispute is then not merely academic, but a fight for the soul of 
a nation. 
 These three central challengers to the Founding as understood by The Federalist Papers 
are Progressivism, Identity Politics and Transhumanism. All three ideologies or attitudes are 
interlinked in a variety of ways and hold in common the central plank of the denial of a relatively 
fixed human nature. All are rooted in a novel understanding of the relationship of human being to 
time and History. All are beholden to some variety of historicism, the attitude that History, not 
nature, is the prime mover of individual and collective human existence. All three conclude that 
human identity is not significantly anchored in a fixed nature, therefore man and his society can, 
or must under the specter of a categorical imperative, be radically remade in response to time and 
history with no loss to human life or happiness, but only great gains. In practice this inevitably 
means that man and his political institutions must be remade in the image and aspiration of each 
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ideology. Happiness had once been understood as achieved only by a life or political order in 
conformity with the dictates of our nature, now it is to be found in its fundamental transformation.11  
 The first threat to The Federalist’s account of human nature is Progressivism. 
Progressivism was the first American political theory with the explicit intent of displacing the 
principles of the Founding. If the Founding was to be displaced, an alternative source of political 
theory was necessary. Progressivism represents the first foreign-born political theory to shape 
American politics and society. Progressivism adopted elements of pragmatism, historicism and 
Darwinism, and Marxism translating their philosophic and scientific tenants into political terms. 
It was partially built on the first genuinely foreign influences in U.S. politics and political theory. 
It imported the latest academic developments of the German University, its theories of history and 
the state, and its analysis of modern bureaucratic administration.12    
 Progressivism was an American variety of Fascism, both established on the foundation of 
European Historicism. Historicism is a philosophy that all expressions of human life and thought 
are merely and necessarily “children of their times.” Humanity is unable to know the truth nor live 
by it and an age or epoch is collectively infused by a ruling opinion or myth. Nature is that which 
is fixed and eternal, independent of human artifice. Meanwhile custom connotes variable habits 
which are the produce of human artifice, or a contingent response to historical circumstance. This 
orientation is derived from the ramifications of Pascal’s conclusion that living by custom and habit 
is the very nature of mankind. Pascal, as latter Historicism would do, conflates and confuses nature 
and custom. “Custom,” he writes, “is natural to us.”13 He says, “Nature is itself only the first 
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custom, just as custom is a second nature.” 14 “Custom is a second nature which destroys the first.”15 
When Nature is entirely reduced to only to custom, History supersedes Nature as the ground and 
foundation of human existence.  
 The arch claim of the American republic was that it was considered to have been founded 
on the principles of human nature. The inalienable rights of the Declaration of Independence were 
considered to be true and correct because in conformity with human nature. These principles 
established not only a theory on which government would be based by a form which would 
guarantee and secure these rights against government itself. With the development of Historicism, 
the question of whether these rights were true, or merely an opinion, was displaced by the claim 
that such assertions can be nothing other than opinion. One need no longer argue for their truth or 
falsity, but simply claim time has passed. Famed scholar of the Declaration, American historian 
Carl Becker argues that “to ask whether the natural rights philosophy of the Declaration of 
Independence is true or false is essentially a meaningless question.”16 It is “meaningless” precisely 
because Becker’s Historicism collapses the distinction between nature and custom. The distinction 
between truth and opinion is replaced by a portrait of history as nothing more than a kaleidoscopic 
mélange of essentially arbitrary opinions rooted in historical epochs which deterministically 
dictate such worldviews.17 The rights of the Declaration are transformed from a truth claim, to 
mere aesthetic self-expression of a bygone era. All claims to truth are reduced to historically 
contingent acts of faith.  
 
14 Ibid., p. 39. 
15 Ibid. 
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 Progressivism synthesizes Historicism with Darwinism and gives History a direction and 
a goal called “Progress”. The first principle of Progressivism is that human nature is not fixed, but 
contingent and progressive. It is in a perpetual process of evolution. Its synthesis of pragmatism 
and Darwinism marries the primacy of historical contingency to “a faith in progress.” 18Human 
nature is not permanent or cyclical but perpetually develops forward in novel ways. With 
Progressivism, human nature is overcome by History. Progressivism historicizes human nature. It 
reduces human identity to a condition and subjugates it to circumstance. If human nature is always 
evolving then the constitutional edifice is obliged to constantly adapt in parallel to keep pace with 
these transformations. This might be considered Progressivism’s very definition of justice.   
 President Obama’s “Hope and Change” mantra was a taciturn grandchild of Progressivism. 
His desire for a visionary “transformation” of the United States is a direct descendent of this 
intellectual and political lineage. The great exponent of Progressivism was Woodrow Wilson. 
Surprisingly, Wilson did not hide either his contempt for the Declaration and Constitution or its 
implications in theory or practice.  He said, “We are not bound to adhere to the doctrines held by 
the signers of the Declaration of Independence.”19 These attitudes made Wilson “the first president 
to attack the founding.”20 Human nature and political order must evolve in tandem if justice is to 
be achieved.  If human society is constantly evolving we cannot be bound by the principles and 
institutions of our forefathers. This would be an injustice. Jefferson says: “I set out on this ground, 
which I suppose to be self-evident, 'that the Earth belongs in usufruct to the living:' that the dead 
have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by any individual ceases to be his 
 
18 Ronald J. Pestritto. Woodrow Wilson: The Essential Political Writings. New York: Lexington Books, 2005. p. 2. 
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when himself ceases to be, and reverts to the society.”21 Two-Hundred years later Chief Justice 
Earl Warren asserted much the same principle when he wrote the nature and complexity of 
contemporary circumstances far outstrip the prudence of the Founders.22 Progress makes the 18th 
century Constitution a suicide pact because as a child of its times, it could only confine itself to 
their needs and concerns rather than those of the present and future. “Progress,” by definition, 
meant, progress away from the Founding. 
 Since historical change, not nature, is fundamental there can be no fixed or true principles 
on which government might rest. The value of principles is not to be found in their universality or 
truth, but in their efficacy or pragmatic value, the concrete work they do in advancing one’s own 
goals and interests. A flippant Wilson said, “If you want to understand the real Declaration of 
Independence, do not repeat the preface.”23 The preface is of course where Jefferson articulates 
those unalienable rights we are endowed with by our Creator. Universal claims are treated as 
abstractions whereas, only motives connected to historical circumstance are considered “concrete” 
and therefore real. Wilson added sardonically, that “the Declaration of Independence, so far as I 
recollect, did not mention any of the issues of the year 1911.”24 Jürgen Habermas makes much the 
same criticism writing a government founded on the basis of Natural Right is “the autonomous 
creation by contract, of legal compulsion spring solely from the compulsion of philosophical 
reason.”25 Habermas seems to miss the part where Americans chose to live by those dictates of 
“philosophical reason,” and, doing so, found them practical and in conformity with their tastes.  
 
21 Thomas Jefferson. Letter to James Madison. September 6, 1789.  
22 Chief Justice Earl Warren. The Memoirs of Earl Warren. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1977. p. 333.  
23 Woodrow Wilson, An Address on Thomas Jefferson, May 12, 1911. 
24 Ibid. 
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Wilson concluded that the words of the Declaration “lay no compulsion upon the thought 
of any free man.” 26 Wilson is here laying the intellectual foundation for the wholesale 
abandonment of the principles of the Declaration. Following its letter prevents the living from 
satisfying the demands of their day. Wilson was unequivocal. He simply said, “we are as free” as 
the Founders “to make and unmake governments. We are not here to worship men or a 
document.”27 Instead we come to worship History and the men who guide it. He said that instead 
of venerating the principles of our nations birth, “Every Fourth of July should be a time…for 
determining afresh what principles and what forms of power we think most likely to effect our 
safety and happiness.”28 This logic would hold no less true of the Constitution, or any amendment 
or law which are perpetually subject be being transcended by the progress of time. Those who 
question the “big plans” of a “new age” or attempt to hold onto time honored truths embodied in 
the First and Second amendments are bitter clingers who simply will not let go of childish 
illusions.29 
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the nature and complexity of contemporary circumstances 
far outstrip “the wisdom of even the wisest of the Founding Fathers.”30 A court which interprets 
the rights found in the Constitution, for example, “must be an activist court” because they are not 
to apply the language and meaning of the text directly, but rather consider its language as pointing 
to a more general and abstract “moral theory” that is the basis for the language of the Constitution. 
The consequence is the same, the living must be prepared to interpret the Constitution to suit its 
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needs, circumstances and ideological preferences under the premise that the wisdom of the 
Founders is not, or cannot be, applicable. 
The Progressive vision of history demands the Constitution be a “living document.” An 
evolving human nature must generate an evolving Constitution. The very meaning of the words of 
the Constitution must be no less organic. Their meanings must “evolve” with the evolution man 
and his society. The Constitution as a ‘living’ document” keeps up with the times, lest it become 
retrograde and trap society in an unjust past.31  As Charles Kessler says that Progressivism 
characterizes “What we have called ‘reality’ and ‘human nature’ in the past is a reflection of an 
early and inferior stage of development.”32 The practical political consequence of this philosophy, 
as Ronald Dworkin acknowledges, is the necessity of an “activist” judiciary33 whose primary 
function is to “read its own meanings into the works of the Constitution.”34 “Living political 
constitutions,” said Wilson “must be Darwinian in structure and in practice.”35 This is because:  
Society is a living organism and must obey the laws of life, not of mechanics; it must develop. All 
that progressives ask or desire is permission - in an era when "development," "evolution," is the 
scientific word - to interpret the Constitution according to the Darwinian principle; all they ask is 
recognition of the fact that a nation is a living thing and not a machine.36 
 
Newton’s mechanical laws of matter and motion are replaced by the organic model of 
Darwinian evolution. Wilson said that the trouble with the Newtonian model “is that government 
is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the 
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theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It is modified by its environment, 
necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure of life. No living thing can 
have its organs offset against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary, its life is dependent 
upon their quick cooperation, their ready response to the commands of instinct or intelligence, 
their amicable community of purpose.” 37 Meanwhile, the Constitution was based on a Newtonian 
mechanical model of “action and counteraction,” which establishes equilibrium and is a “not meant 
to go anywhere, not meant to make progress.”38 The Constitution lives by its “checks” of limited 
government and the “offsets” established by the separation of powers. Wilson seems to think this 
is exactly how society, as an organism, dies. The governing equilibrium it establishes posed a 
fundamental obstacle to organic progress. What were once sentinels protecting rights emanating 
from human nature, became obstacles to fulfilling Progressivism’s new conception of ever 
evolving entitlements endowed by the state.  
 Like all things, Progressivism identifies Natural Rights within the progress of History. Cass 
Sunstein says, “Rights are a product of wrongs.” 39 This is a precise paraphrase of Wilson’s 
understanding of the true meaning and significance of The Declaration. Rights do not come from 
nature, but as a response to specific historical injustices rectified. This model is explicitly derived 
from conceptions of the development of the British Constitution and its Bill of Rights, contingent 
freedoms wrested from the King over time. Thus, rights have no enduring significance beyond the 
specific wrongs they sought to ameliorate in a specific time and place. In particular, says Sunstein, 
rights emerge from times of historical crisis which serve to heighten people’s “appreciation of 
human vulnerability” and “insecurity.40 This is precisely why Wilson elided the preface to the 
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Declaration and sought refuge in the list of grievances against the king which is what really 
justified the revolt. Progressivism comes to realize that rights the state did not guarantee in 
response to history’s depredations necessitate new guardrails, new rights for the people, often ones 
which contradict the old. Thus the threat posed by two World Wars, the Spanish Flu and the Great 
Depression demanded the new or Second Bill of Rights proposed by FDR.41 This second or 
Economic Bill of Rights such that citizen were no longer guaranteed the negative liberties of life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but are now entitled to a “freedom from want” and even 
“freedom from fear.”42 Now we can see, that the proper response to historical crisis demands a 
Great Reset in response to COVID-19 and new “rights” were national sovereignty will be 
abolished, and man will own nothing and be happy.43 
 The second principle of Progressivism is that the political community is not only an 
evolving, but a unitary collective. The political community, as a “living organism, is not made of 
individuals of a “separate and equal station”, as The Federalist describes them. The Progressive 
description harkens to the tribe and family as the true model of political association. Naturally the 
familial model of Progressivism tends toward paternalism. The paternal role is played by the State. 
In his aptly titled book, Social Control, Progressive sociologist Edward Ross says that as the State 
evolves it “becomes paternal and develops on the administrative side.”44 Political association, says 
Wilson, is one based on blood and soil, rather than individuals living by commonly understood 
and agreed upon ideals. Here Wilson rejects the wisdom Aristotle, Augustine, Hobbes, Locke and 
the Founders accepted about the fundamental nature of political association as one which 
transcends the family.   
 
41 Franklin Delano Roosevelt. State of the Union Address, January 11, 1944.  
42 Franklin Delano Roosevelt. “The Four Freedoms Speech,” State of the Union Address, January 6, 1941. 
43 Klaus Schwab. The Great Reset. Cologne: World Economic Forum, 2020. 
44 Edward Ross. Social Control. New York: MacMillan, 1918. p. 82.  
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 Society is not an aggregate of “separate and equal” individuals engaging in consensual 
associations, but an organism where the individual is only a derivative appendage. The human 
individual is treated as a mere “fraction” of the whole, rather than a discrete “integer.” 45 The whole 
can exist without one individual fragment, but the part cannot exist without dependency on the 
whole. The well-being of the individual is completely dependent on and subordinate to the larger 
organism. The organic State precedes the individual politically, morally, legally and economically. 
Progressivism sees the individual as a cell of a larger organism on which they depend politically 
and legally for both their rights and welfare. Rights are now a product of political community and 
dependent on the wishes of the rulers. 
 This model precisely inverts the relation of the individual to government and its ends 
spelled out by the Declaration and Constitution. The State is no longer “instituted among men” to 
secure pre-existing Natural. Instead it exists to divine and execute the “democratic” majority will, 
filtered by way of political parties as the head of the larger organism. Its task is to execute this will 
as efficiently as possible through a technocratic regulatory bureaucracy. Through this process the 
State is the ultimate arbiter of the nature and scope of its citizens rights. Human beings only have 
rights in so far as they are members of the organism. Rights are endowed by the State, not a product 
of human nature. This makes the State the ultimate source of power and authority on Earth. That 
which can be given by the State, can be taken away. 
 Wilson and Progressives made clear that the “will of the people” was manifest by the State. 
Nor was the State genuinely representative of the will of the majority, rather it would “manufacture 
consent” and execute the very opinions it engineered. Progressive Edward Ross was quite clear on 
this point: “The State is an organization that puts the wise minority in the saddle” and “aims more 
 
45 Woodrow Wilson. “The Author and Signers of the Declaration of Independence.” The North American Review. 
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steadily at a rational safeguarding of the collective welfare than any organ society has yet 
employed.” 46 Yet, the more power is asserted by the “wise minority,” the more they speak of “the 
people” and the sanctity of “democracy.” 
Ross writes that the State is an “independent center of social power” and control which “guide[s] 
the society it professes to obey.” 47 The State channels the energies of the people, leading them to 
pre-ordained opinions social engineers have already mapped out. This is nothing short of a 
repudiation of the “wholly popular” constitutional republic structured by genuinely representative 
institutions and a separation of powers and checks and balances designed to limit “State” power 
over the people in order to protect their unalienable Natural Rights. 
Progress implies that History has a definite and concrete direction and goal. Without 
direction toward a goal, progress is mere change. Change can be for better or worse and progress 
implies change for the better. The evolutionary model of Progressivism appears to admit a natural 
telos toward which the State labors on behalf of society. This is a political goal beyond the static 
ordered liberty aspired to by the Constitution and The Founders. There must be some pre-
established positive, not merely negative, goals of political community. Happiness is to be defined 
and provided by the State as it refines the opinion of the organism through its party structure and 
the propagandistic shaping of public opinion.    
On this Darwinian model Progressivism sought to develop a new social and political 
science which departs from and displaces the political science of the Founders. This newer science 
of politics would identify and implement policies designed to promote the great goal toward which 
society would progress. Yet, this goal is left unnamed or vague by Progressivism, perhaps 
intentionally. One cannot actually know what it is until one has met the novel circumstances of the 
 




future. The people are likely to find out after the fact, what the “wise minority” had in store for 
them.  
The goal of Progressivism is a cypher. Since human identity has no core and is in constant 
flux, this grand telos is forever elusive. Kessler says, “Obama never discovered that this quandary 
could be resolved by returning from history to nature as the unchanging ground of our changing 
experience, as the foundation of morality and politics.”48 This is why for example, Obama spoke 
of “change” and left his goals unspecified, like a picture screen on which admirers could project 
their hopes and dreams. In practical terms however, as history shows, the State will, in name of 
the people, seize on and define this ‘final’ goal as it sees fit in order to advance its own parochial 
political interests. Meanwhile the “fourth branch of government”, an administrative state peopled 
by wise technocrats will execute the plan. Here science of government administration would 
devise, implement and minister to a new “non-political” administrative state that would engineer 
the final goal into existence through “intentional”, “organized”49 and “deliberate social planning 
and foresight.”50   
 The lynchpin of the newer science was that politics had to be replaced by the efficient and 
knowledgeable administration of specialists. Politics as the play and struggle over opinions of the 
good would be replaced by the expertise of those who know. This science would train men to 
divine and “know” the good itself. Deliberate planning can only be achieved through the 
abandonment of politics and its inefficiencies as it has been known since the Greeks. One cannot 
advance toward the goal if government is in gridlock or constantly debating with itself over the 
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means and end of its actions. The age of political deliberation, in any serious sense, must cease 
and give way to the age of total social administration and engineering. This was progress.   
 The age of the expert had arrived. Politics would be reconceived as administration. 
Administration meant technocratic management by experts.51 The techne of the expert could 
replace the rhetoric and psychology of the orator. If so politics, as the realm of opinion and 
persuasion, can then be “replaced by administration, by bureaucratic management of the society 
and economy.”52 Frank Goodnow, professor and ideologist of Progressivism and the 
Administrative State, and Wilson, believed administrators, in contradistinction to politicians were 
“neutral,” technical experts whose goal was “the pursuit of truth.”53 “Politics”, says Goodnow is 
“‘polluted’ and full of ‘bias,’ whereas administration is all about the ‘truth’.”54 Government does 
not rest on opinion, and politics is no longer a factional struggle over opinions of what is right. 
Instead, specialists in an unelected administrative bureaucracy manage society based on technical 
knowledge and direction given to it by the State.  
 From the perspective of Progressivism, the constraints of limited government which place 
restraining checks on the concentration of power and its corrupting effects are roadblocks to good 
government, not the guarantees of it. They inhibit the fulfillment of the democratic will and the 
deliberately planned transformation of society.  Such outmoded mechanisms as federalism and 
separation of powers disrupt the efficiency consolidated power makes possible. Even the political 
choices of the people at election time are undercut by the existence of a permanent unelected and 
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faceless administrative bureaucracy. In a democracy, faceless power, is power unaccountable. 
Limited government inhibits the ability of the State to perfect man and his society.  
 The concentration of power would no longer be called tyranny, but progress. This new 
power would work in the service of the people and the organism at large. The solution to achieving 
greater efficiency was to have the administrate state surreptitiously take on the functions of all 
three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. Pestritto says that while “the agencies 
comprising the bureaucracy reside within the executive branch…their powers…include both 
legislative and judicial functions,” and are “often exercised in a manner that is largely 
independent” of any political control.55 The administrative state becomes the judge, jury and 
executioner of interests it regulates without any check that would guarantee either uniform policy 
or application. The Founders’ fear of tyranny produced by such a concentration of several powers 
in the same hands is the worry of a bygone age transcended. The age-old warnings against the 
perennial problems of judging in one’s own case become the political version of Aesop’s fables 
for the young and naïve, or the Golden Oldies of a generation in its twilight.   
 The second threat comes from Identity Politics. Identity Politics is an ideology which 
denies the existence of a common human nature and the meaningful efficacy of an end-determining 
reason. Identity Politics is based on a more virulent, radical, or non-teleological historicism often 
associated with Postmodernism. It has its roots in German historicism, and the marriage of 
Marxism and Existentialism and their subsequent use in the assertion of minority and postcolonial 
identities. Heidegger, Sartre, Simon de Beauvoir and Franz Fanon were some of the godfathers, 





 Intellectually, the politics of identity abandons history as goal oriented in favor of a purely 
relativistic conception between human identity and morality and time. Unlike Progressivism, it 
honestly acknowledges that goals are not the product of a grand historical eschaton, but are set by 
particular factions and oriented to their particular ends. Black Power is for blacks, and so on. 
Unmoored from either a fixed human nature or common historical destiny, identity is either a pure 
product of the will, or a prisoner to genes and historical circumstance. Here we see the 
commonality between these two ideologies. Since Progressivism cannot openly identify its 
historical goal, the telos is merely left to the will and the power of various interest groups.  
 Human nature implies all that we hold in common with our fellow human beings, including 
the existence of norms derived from this common nature. Identity Politics is determined to view 
humanity from the perspective difference over identity. There is no common human nature that 
binds us together with a common moral worth and dignity, common aspirations, faculties and 
needs, as well as weaknesses. Rather there are only tribalistic warring factions of race, gender, 
class, and other identifications engaged in a zero-sum competition, red in tooth and claw. These 
groups, often under the guise of universalizing ideologies, are all really simply advancing their 
own faction’s interests through the logic of might makes right.  
 Identity Politics self-consciously abandons the universalism of the American Founding. It 
correctly identifies the hypocrisies of the Founding and its failings to establish a society where “all 
men are created equal”56 meant all human beings, as the Founders themselves asserted.57 Identity 
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Politics has quite reasonably sought to gain political, civil and moral recognition for historically 
marginalized groups. Where once the civil rights movement sought refuge in a common humanity, 
as with Dr. King, they have sought to assert elements of identity which distinguished them as 
“Other.” For each member of a specified faction their identity is confined to an essentializing 
stereotype from within as well as without. 
 Often it is the means of Identity Politics and their implications of them which condemns it 
to reinscribe the injustices they seek to ameliorate. Like Progressivism, there are no natural 
principles which impose guardrails on this form of popular will. What matters is the forcefulness 
with which this will is asserted. Right does not make might as Lincoln would say, but might makes 
right. Those who embrace Identity Politics speak the same language of Thrasymachus, Alexander 
Stephens and Stephen Douglas.58 Stokely Carmichael makes this all too clear in his “Black Power” 
speech of 1966. He says that the only thing that matters in society is “Who has power to make his 
or her acts legitimate? That is all.”59 Society is a war of every identity against every other identity 
where the law of the jungle is the only one really recognized. Moral principles are mere 
rationalizations of force, that is all. The logic of Stokely Carmichael is also the logic of Stephen 
Douglass and Alexander Stephens. One form of racism replaces another, one sexism with another. 
If the logic of Identity Politics morally justifies “Black Power,” it also justifies the assertion of 
“White Supremacy.”  
 Identity means only particular politically preferred facets of human identity are privileged. 
Identification with a racial or ethnic minority, a sex, gender or sexual orientation becomes the new 
class consciousness. Such identity consciousness has become the new bigotry and racism. Identity 
political claims to liberate victim groups from the tragedies of the past, but it only gives you this 
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helping hand up if you subscribe to their version of who you are. Carmichael makes clear that 
blacks “must wield the power we have”, not as human individual, but as members of the black 
identity.60 Much like Progressivism, the power, rights, dignity and identity of the individual only 
come from membership in the group. Abandon the dominate ideological voice of your racial or 
sexual faction and you lose the privileges of your identity. Blacks become “white” in doing so as 
a current gubernatorial candidate in California has discovered.  
 Democrat representative Ayanna Pressley made this perfectly clear. She said that if a 
minority is going to come to politics and public life that, “If you’re not prepared to come to that 
table and represent that voice, don’t come.” Why? U.S. Representative made no bones about what 
Identity Politics is and how it helps minorities. She said, “We don’t need black faces that don't 
want to be a black voice. We don't need Muslims that don’t want to be a Muslim voice. We don’t 
need queers that don't want to be a queer voice. If you’re worried about being marginalized and 
stereotyped, please don't even show up because we need you to represent that voice.”61 Blacks only 
have “black” lives, voices and thoughts. We have returned to the essentializing features that 
Identity Politics claims to liberate groups from. This creates a categorical imperative, not only do 
blacks have black voices, they must have black voices, or they are not truly black. If you do not 
conform to the establishment vision of your identity, you are no less disenfranchised than under 
the old bigotry. A Democrat nominee for president put it more bluntly, if you don’t vote for me, 
then “you ain’t black.”   
 The conflict between politics based on difference in contradistinction to commonality calls 
to mind a proud black man and former slave, Frederick Douglass. Douglass had once despised 
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President Lincoln because he was “preeminently the white man’s President, entirely devoted to 
the welfare of white men.”62 Douglass referred to him pointedly as merely a “white man” who, 
however great, “shared the prejudices of his white fellow-countryman against the Negro.”63 This 
attituded changed twenty years later in his 1893 autobiography the Life and Times of Frederick 
Douglass. Douglass’ attitude began its transformation when he met Lincoln in the White House. 
This chapter in his autobiography is aptly titled “The Black Man at the White House.”  
 He prefaces his account of the meeting by saying: “The distance then between the black 
man and the white American citizen was immeasurable. I was an ex-slave, identified with a 
despised race, and yet I was to meet the most exalted person in this great republic…I could not 
know what kind of reception would be accorded me. I might be told to go home and mind my 
business.”64 Go home and mind your own business, is precisely what Rep. Pressley has told the 
uppity segment of her black constituency.  
 Despite the immeasurable distance between the black and white man, and their 
disagreement over policy pertaining to black soldiers, Douglass said of Lincoln that he could still 
“respect his humane spirit.”65 A spirit they held in common as human beings with human feeling 
toward their fellow man precisely because of the recognition of their underlying common nature. 
Douglass says that while he “was not entirely satisfied with his views” he was “so well satisfied 
with the man and with the educating tendency of the conflict.”66 What Douglass discovered, despite 
the vast gulf between their superficial identities was that he was in “the presence of an honest man 
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– one whom I could love, honor, and trust without reserve or doubt.”67 Thus he was in the room 
with a being identical to himself in the decisive respects despite their superficial differences.  
 In another White House meeting Lincoln bade Governor Buckingham to wait because he 
wanted “to have a long talk with my friend Frederick Douglass.” 68 Douglass observes: “This was 
probably the first time in the history of this Republic when its chief magistrate had found an 
occasion or shown a disposition to exercise such an act of impartiality between persons so widely 
different in their positions and supposed claims upon his attention.” 69 He continues writing that 
“In his company I was never in any way reminded of my humble origin, or of my unpopular 
color.”70 In short, Lincoln treated Douglass not as black man or a former slave, but as a man simply, 
a human being with a common nature and equal dignity. Abolitionists and former slaves like 
Douglass sought to have the black man’s universal and equal manhood recognized as no different 
than the white man. They did not seek to be put in the “separate but equal” ghetto of black Identity 
Politics. Rep. Pressley seems determined to put them all back in the intellectual chains of a new 
plantation and call it “freedom.”   
 The consequence of the emphasis on difference over identity is that such norms of conduct 
on which law is built are obliterated in favor of civil and legal ghettos tailored to the special 
minority identities which divide us. This is a kind of new feudalism. The political consequence of 
the denial of a common humanity is to undermine the notion of the rule of law and its equal 
application founded on the natural moral equality of all human beings and their natural rights. In 
the vacuum of the absence of natural moral equality emerges a tribalistic creation of legal 
privileges based on identities one is born into and has no control over.  
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 Legal theories like Critical Race Theory (CRT) seek to institutionalize race in law. While 
focus on the plight of blacks in America this ideology can, and is being redeployed for numerous 
other victim groups. CRT is a branch of legal scholarship, derived from elements of Marxism, 
which places race and racism as the prime mover of law and the administration of justice in the 
United States. It also challenges the validity more fundamental philosophical tenants such 
rationality, objective truth, and possibility of judicial neutrality.71 CRT takes the economic class 
consciousness of Marx and repurposes to race. Thus race becomes the deterministic prime mover 
of all conflict in society. Through the racial lens of CRT all individuals are reduced to than their 
skin color in a manner consistent with that which they claim to fight against. It promotes the 
divisive, destructive and false theory of systemic racism, where white supremacy is no longer a 
fringe and irreputable phenomenon, but the essence of the American regime since its founding. 
This means the Constitutions, all the laws, the capitalist economic system and all of society is a 
systematic and institutionalized expression of white supremacy.  
 Derrick Bell sums up this condition saying that “traditions of racial subordination are 
deeper than the legal sanctions."72 This implies no amount historical effort, civil rights reform, or 
affirmative action can remedy the original sin of racism permanently etched into the American 
ethos. Additionally, the amelioration of discrimination can never be a sufficient solution to such a 
systemic and deeply rooted problem. Ultimately, only regime change, and the historical 
transformation of the nation will liberate blacks from historical oppression. No amount of reform 
is possible because of the intrinsic nature of the disease. Any thought contrary to its claims is 
merely evidence of unconscious racism or a false consciousness promoted by the indoctrination of 
 
71 Daniel A. Farber. Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. p. 37.  
72 George H. Taylor. "Racism as the Nation's Crucial Sin: Theology and Derrick Bell.” Michigan Journal of Race & 
Law. Vol. 9, No. 2, (Spring 2004). p. 278. 
 
 153 
a white ruling class. Any appearance of progress toward equality is in fact an illusion born of the 
system which actually facilitates ongoing oppression. “Progress in American race relations,” says 
Bell, “is largely a mirage, obscuring the fact that whites continue, consciously or unconsciously to 
do all in their power to ensure their dominion and maintain control.”73 
 CRT denies that any social or political institution is capable of serving as a neutral third 
party in adjudicating justice. All is power, will and interest, despite the existence of institutions 
designed to check such tendencies. This ideology self-segregates blacks onto an intellectual 
plantation which says that so long as the nation operates under a republican constitution produced 
by white men of European ancestry, they will remain a permanent victim class. Such victim 
ideology is guaranteed to be self-fulfilling and even likely to conceal problems in need of honest 
talk as much as redress.  
 Such theories are now a common place of the laws schools of Harvard and Yale 
universities, along with gaining increasing influence in grade school education throughout the 
country. Despite the challenges of achieving a color-blind society, the solution is surely not to 
make such differences the foundation of law. Furthermore, the exaggerated and pernicious 
interpretations of American history and its justice system are quite simply specious. These 
specious claims do little than keep blacks ignorant about the complete history of the United States. 
Such a strategy was employed effectively on plantations and can be read about in slave narratives.  
 Even the supposed arch-liberal and universalist John Rawls, the one-time standard bearer 
of liberalism, acknowledged that “social institutions” would have to constantly intervene in society 
in order to rectify the outcomes of the “disadvantaged”. Rather than producing a level playing field 





unanticipated by society’s actors. He has long been criticized for focusing on economic classes 
and not explicitly mentioning matters of race and gender, but his framework can easily be adapted 
to take them into account.74 As Justice Sotomayor put it, “I would hope that a wise Latina woman 
with the richness of her experiences would, more often than not reach a better conclusion.”75 What 
Justice Sotomayor seemed to be asserting was not the superiority of Latina judges, but rather that 
they are the only ones capable to establish justice for Hispanic minorities because of sympathies 
which arise from a common factional identity and historical circumstance. As if all Latinas have 
the same nature and life circumstances. Legal prudence becomes a matter of identity, of empathy 
and group identification rather than the equal application of law to facts based on precedent. From 
this perspective, what was considered a radical achievement of the Constitution, the denial of legal 
orders of rank in society, is now rejected and replaced by a series of minority factions in need of 
special redress through a system of arbitrary judicial fiats.  
 For over fifty years the typical categories of identity have been race, gender and class and 
sexual orientation. Once this logic is accepted the potential categories of identity are limitless 
depending on the tenor of the times. These divisions are reinforced through government asking 
identity information. In some cases, these identities are the creation of such categories through 
their inclusion on government forms like the Census. Such documents include an incommensurate 
set of rubrics, from race and national origin, to cultural heritage and skin color. Despite all the 
concern for the protection of victim groups, the government still gets to determine who you are 
under this ideology. Many politicians now want to include sexual orientation and gender identity, 
as if these categories are the defining features of the people they apply to. For example the 
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proposed The Census Equality Act would expand identity categories to include “questions to the 
Census asking respondents about their sexual orientation and gender identity.”76 
 This emphasis on difference over common identity establishes an ethos in society that each 
group should be a special interest entitled, not only to their own moral codes and systems of belief, 
but their own legal codes. The way in which political campaigns and polls demographically ‘slice 
and dice’ the electorate appears to filter into the legal system. For example if we are to truly respect 
new immigrants when they come to the United States perhaps we are obliged to recognize the laws 
they have brought in tow from foreign lands. Perhaps law and legal precedent should be based on 
foreign examples from all over the world, rather than from within our own legal traditions and 
philosophies. Here the rule of law would be replaced by a never-ending system of arbitrary legal 
fiats adjudicated on the basis of group identification. Groups should not be subject uniformly to 
the law, but have standards tailored to their own particular identity. Great Britain for example 
permits Muslim communities to enforce Sharia law even if those laws are contrary to the laws of 
the land. In 2018 a British court recognized “sharia law in landmark divorce case.”77 
 Identity groups would be treated legally in the same manner politicians tailor their political 
rhetoric depending on who they believe they are talking to. The legal ghettoization of society 
would dissolve the very ties that bind. These are the ties by which we recognize our common 
citizenship in a single political community. One of the fundamental observations of all political 
philosophers and scientists is that the nature and existence of political community is predicated on 
legislating a common set of laws recognized by all from a single sovereign authority. If there is no 
common acceptance of a single and uniform political authority as manifest through law, there is 
 
76 Jesse Rifkin. “Census Equality Act would add Census questions on sexual orientation and gender.” Medium.com. 
August 10, 2018 
77Kate McCann. “British court recognizes sharia law in landmark divorce case.” The Telegraph. August 1, 2018 
 
 156 
no political authority. If there is no genuine political authority, there is no political community to 
speak of.   
 The third threat to the constitutional order described by The Federalist is Transhumanism, 
also known as post-Humanism. This is an ideological movement which promotes the modification 
of our psychological, physical and biological nature by means of scientific advancements in such 
fields as genetics and computer technology. The Scientific Revolution, under its founding fathers 
Bacon and Descartes, saw scientific knowledge about nature as a tool that could be used leveraged 
to control nature in the service of the human will and the practical needs of mankind. Descartes 
said “[t]he conquest of nature is to be achieved through number and measure.” We would establish 
dominion over nature and thereby gain dominion over our own destiny as a species. The goal was 
“the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate.” Transhumanism advocates the usurpation 
of the role of nature in order to transform the species by means of its own hands. The conquest of 
nature, which heretofore was content to control external factors and merely optimize our natural 
capacities, now seeks to transform them limited only by our power and imagination with no 
acknowledgement of limit but the will. At base, this is an ideology of the assertion of power as a 
means to transform nature and human nature at the behest of those who have it, obviously in service 
to their ends. This movement is particularly dangerous in light of the way it piggybacks on our 
natural awe toward novel technologies, and our disposition as moderns, which accepts all 
technological developments as routine and their role in society as inevitable. Transhumanism is 
merely the latest iteration of the Scientific Revolution’s Faustian ambition to conquer nature in the 
service of the human will and its passions. Now this conquest is extended over human nature itself.   
 Transhumanism’s desire to artificially control our physical development is a product of an 
impulse which emerged in Progressivism. Progressivism had been inspired by a certain 
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characterization of evolution where the species was under constant modification. Many 
Progressives believed that this process which occurred spontaneously, must in the name of 
Progress, be placed under the yoke of human choice, reason and science, under the 
“administration” of technocrats in order to bring about superior form of society that could never 
have been conceived of in the Founding era. 
 Transhumanism is the fulfillment of Russell’s prophetic words about advancements of 
scientific knowledge and technology advance. He envisions a not too distance future in which 
mankind “will tend more and more to view himself also as a manufacture product, and to minimize 
the share of natural growth in the production of human beings.” 78 He writes that, “He will come 
to value only what is deliberately caused by human agency, not what results from nature’s unaided 
handiwork. Men will acquire power to alter themselves, and will inevitably use this power. What 
they will make of this species I do not venture to predict.” 79 Leo Strauss acknowledged over a 
half-century ago that at some point the modern conquest of nature appeared to require “the 
conquest of human nature” and “the questioning of the unchangeability of human nature.”80  
 The impetus to change human nature psychologically and physically is as old as human 
civilization. Modern science has amplified this taste as new insights into nature are discovered 
along with the technological means which enhance our power to change it. Power breeds 
opportunity, motive must be assumed. Mass and social media, medical research institutes, 
universities, corporations, intelligence services and the defense industry in concert with other 
research institutions have long been exploring and experimenting on altering or enhancing human 
capacities or seeking new ways to control and modify human behavior. In 1971 Leon Kass wrote 
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that “human nature itself lies on the operating table, ready for alteration, for eugenic and 
neuropsychic ‘enhancement,’ for wholesale redesign. In leading laboratories, academic and 
industrial, new creators are confidently amassing their powers and quietly honing their skills, 
while on the street their evangelists are zealously prophesying a posthuman future. For anyone 
who cares about preserving our humanity, the time has come to pay attention.”81  
 These technologies hold out the prospect of mankind fundamentally altering its own nature. 
Given that this type of research and development requires massive funds it holds out the possibility 
of government and large corporations actually claiming intellectual property over human identity 
in the way a Monsanto holds intellectual property over its seeds. Furthermore, the expense of such 
procedures, now a palpable reality, will make them only accessible to the ultra-wealthy who could 
in theory establish an entirely distinct race between themselves and the many. Furthermore, these 
technologies could be easily imposed on the populace at large in the name of matters of the “public-
interest”, “public health” or “national security” or the threat of “terrorism,” foreign or domestic. 
What if claims of national security demanded a tracking chip in each human being or public health 
a permanent regime of compulsory vaccines or certain genetic modifications? What if the 
economic system demanded a subcutaneous chip as a form of electronic currency if one wanted to 
participate in the economy at all? What if, in the name of public education, students were 
compelled to have genetic modifications? What if in the name of the government of healthcare 
cost reductions certain bodily modification were demanded? What if like vaccinations one could 
be restricted from all kinds of institutions and opportunities if one did not accept these 
modifications? 
 
81 Leon Kass. Life, Liberty & the Defense of Dignity. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002. p. 4. 
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Meanwhile a former member of the Yale University department of physiology is recorded 
in the U.S. Congressional Record of 1972 on the topic of human freedom and the individual 
liberties protected by our Founding documents. He said: “This kind of liberal orientation has great 
appeal, but unfortunately its assumptions are not supported by neurophysiological and 
psychological studies of intracerebral mechanisms."82 “We need a program of psychosurgery for 
political control of our society. The purpose is physical control of the mind. Everyone who deviates 
from the given norm can be surgically mutilated. The individual may think that the most important 
reality is his own existence, but this is only his person view. This lacks historical perspective. Man 
does not have the right to develop his own mind. This kind of liberal orientation has great appeal. 
We must electrically control the brain. Someday armies and general will be controlled by electric 
stimulation of the brain.”83 
 These modifications are not the stuff of the future, they have already long existed and are 
merely being perfected as we speak. At least as early as 1999, DARPA was intent on the strategic 
development of what they called “military transhumanism.”84 “Cyborgs” or “biohybrids” represent 
the merger of man-made technology with living organisms including human beings. These 
technical possibilities are no longer the stuff of science fiction but science fact. Through 
modifications to the body and brain the Department of Defense is developing a human “super-
soldier”.85 One primary ambition is the enhancement of human mental capacity, what they call 
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“Augmented Cognition” or AugCog.86 By inserting electrodes directly into the brain or nervous 
system, they have already succeeded in making rats and moths enabled to be steered remotely by 
human beings with computer controls.87 Professor Yuvel Harari has recently said man is on the 
way to become a “hackable human,” achieved through inserted computer chips and 
nanotechnology which would create permanent connectivity of any human being by means of the 
internet.88 We now live in a world of “smart” technology, that no longer is merely interested in an 
“internet of things” but in an “internet of bodies” where all human beings could be permanently 
connected to the internet, controlled and surveilled.89 How can privacy and freedom survive in 
such a world?  
 This agenda is merely the continuation of pushing the limits of the changeability and 
“perfectibility” of human species long practiced by regimes throughout history in a more 
technologically sophisticated and invasive manner. But never has the human species had so much 
knowledge and so much power to achieve these transformations. It is now claimed that we are 
reaching an unprecedented historical moment in time of “technological singularity.” Technological 
is a hypothetical point in time where technological development becomes uncontrollable and 
irreversible, resulting in fundamental changes to human civilization. It is described as an event that 
“will radically change human civilization, and perhaps even human nature itself, before the middle 
of the 21st century.”90  
 These technologies are the H-bomb of our day. Rarely are their moral and political 
implications adequately contemplated. The only boundaries to the exploration of these 
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transformations are moral and ethical. Such goals would easily have far-reaching and unforeseen 
political consequences especially when we consider who would likely wield and access such 
technology, and who it might be used upon. The many would no doubt be at the mercy of a very 
few. Once technology exists, history shows us that it is used one way or another. What if the total 
annihilation of suffering, not merely its reduction and amelioration, became the end of a given 
regime? At what cost does this goal come given the faulty implicit belief that such goals entail no 
trade-offs? What if the rights of the individual stood in the way of this annihilation? What are we 
to make of a human nature that can be remade on the basis of nothing more than mere will and 
whim? Kass essentially asks, “At what price comes the relief of our estate?” What political brave 
new world would we live under? 
 All three ideologies have one central feature in common: they replace Nature with History. 
They see history as a record of change which demonstrates only diversity while denying 
underlying commonalities. They see history as a “past” to be transcended rather than a reservoir 
of knowledge usable to the present which reveals the same nature under different circumstances. 
History appears to demonstrate that all is permitted because it is only bound by physical, not moral, 
laws. It tells you what human beings can do, but less clearly what they should do, especially if 
history has no goal or direction to guides it. History understood this way cannot, by itself, serve as 
guide to human action unless it is approached under the assumption that a common nature is its 
source. The Founders, by contrast, saw in history, a unity, where general truths about human nature 
could be discovered. For Publius history was simply a record of human action which depicted the 
diversity, possibilities and limits of human nature. History as a record of the past, merely records 
the futility and limits of the human will in the face of larger natural forces which define it. The 
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more they became acquainted with the past, the more they saw a common nature with common 
motivations unfolding in unique circumstances. 
 While each challenger exhibits an “historical sense,” this sense manifests in two forms. 
Progressivism and Marxism for example, own their debt to Hegel who propounded an account of 
the rational development of history progressing toward a final eschaton or end state. There is a 
chain of historical continuity from Europe to the United States which entrenched this line of 
thought by the last decade of the 19th century. This thinking, fueled by the historical sense, begins 
with Hegel and Darwin and proceeds to the pragmatism of Charles Pierce and William James and 
is carried forth in the thought Woodrow Wilson and John Dewey, a student of James. Professor 
Frank Goodnow became the academic and ideologist of Progressivism within and without the 
university. These ideas were put into practice by Woodrow Wilson, a man deeply influence by the 
German university and its cutting-edge thought. The pragmatism of progressive historicism was 
coupled with an American optimism about the future and a sense of philanthropy to its fellow man 
which concealed the darker and more radical implications of this political theory moored to time 
and change and untethered from the ringbolt of nature.  
 Meanwhile Postmodern historicism traced to Rousseau and Nietzsche merely drew the 
more radical and darker implications of the historical sense. Radical historicism denies a coherent 
or rational direction to History. All is aleatory change in which human identity is either entirely 
subject to circumstance, or the arbitrary product of assertions of the human will.  And yet this view 
claims that there can be no true knowledge of the nature or human nature, and that only the human 
will ostensibly drives the historical process.  “There are no facts, only interpretations.”91 The first 
two challengers reconceive the relationship between human identity and time. As history changes, 
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human nature changes with it. Human being has no independent integrity or reasonable autonomy 
from circumstance.  Nor is knowledge of human nature free from the situatedness of its zeitgeist. 
Human nature becomes a product of History and completely situated knowledge cannot be 
knowledge of nature. “Nature” becomes a word. The concept it signifies is a child of the changing 
times, a more or less unconscious reflection of its prejudices.  
 The Founders were sufficiently conversant with incipient versions of these later theories. 
The thought of Rousseau, Turgot, Condorcet and Thomas Jefferson foreshadowed 19th and 20th 
century visions of the utopian perfection of mankind and the elimination of the human depravity 
and self-interestedness on which the U.S. Constitution is based. While Madison and Hamilton did 
not confront theories of progressive historical development along the lines of a Hegel or Marx, the 
broad outlines of a theory of linear historical development had been established by Enlightenment 
philosophers. 
 In his famous letter to Madison penned September 6, 1789, Jefferson “speculated that 
constitutions were legitimate for only one generation, because each generation should be free to 
create its own political system and laws without the prejudice of past generations.”92 Jefferson says: 
“I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self-evident, that the Earth belongs in usufruct to 
the living: that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by any 
individual ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, and reverts to the society.”93 He concluded 
that each generation needed to have its own constitutional convention. But by envisioning human 
nature as sufficiently fixed from one generation to the next, Publius and the other Founders had 
flatly, if implicitly, rejected such an alternative. 
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 Rousseau and the Radical Enlightenment had asserted ideas such as progressivism, 
perfectionism, and the free agency or total malleability of human nature. In 1755 in his Second 
Discourse Rousseau asserted there was no fixed human nature. Man was a “free agent”. Man’s 
“perfectibility” was not to be found in the cultivation and extension of his natural faculties, but in 
his historical malleability. Human nature was radically contingent, subject almost entirely to 
circumstance or what he called a “fortuitous concatenation of circumstances.”94 Turgot and 
Condorcet for example proposed a vision of the perpetual progress of the species. This was 
proposed by a number of thinkers under an ideology that has come to be known as Perfectiblism. 
This belief has persisted in the form of Marx’s “species being” or Woodrow Wilson’s perpetual 
organic evolution of human nature or, in the extreme of Lysenkoism and the New Soviet man of 
Communist Russia.  
Not long after the ratification of the Constitution the Cult of Reason, Robespierre’s Cult of 
the Supreme Being emerged in the midst of the French Revolution. This faith believed in the 
infinite perfectibility of human nature. In America, Thomas Paine became a great admirer of this 
intellectual and political ideology which he summarized in his book The Age of Reason. If only all 
received opinions could be held up to the genuine scrutiny of reason for the first time in human 
history, then reason and science could and would remake man and his society in toto. Reason 
would liberate human nature from the chains of tradition and superstition. Once the patinaed layers 
of historical varnish were removed by the corrosive and illuminating effects of reason, a 
fundamentally new and different being would be revealed and a society commensurate to it 
realized. Robespierre sought not a republic of liberty and order, but one of virtue in which public 
vice was the enemy of the people. On 25 December 1793 Robespierre asserted: "The revolutionary 
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government owes to the good citizen the fullest protections the state; it owes nothing to the 
Enemies of the People but death.”95 In the name of “public safety” political differences were 
criminalized. Political criminals were put to death in the name of justice, virtue and The Goddess 
of Reason.   
 In all of these visions, politics as an area of debate over opinions is replaced by the unipolar 
state technocratically establishing a blueprint for the future and working singularly to bring about 
a new type of citizen, and a new type of human being. This citizen would be historically 
unprecedented, one totally reconciled with their regime by premediated design. The slave would 
be so adapted to his slavery, he would perceive it as freedom. Human depravity would be 
habituated out of the species. Is such a thing possible? Would human interestedness or evil 
dissipate just because the species was altered in some fundamental way? Or is it the case, as Leo 
Strauss put it, that “no bloody or unbloody change of society can eradicate the evil in man.”96 
Strauss says “as long as there will be men, there will be malice, envy and hatred, and hence there 
cannot be a society which does not have to employ coercive restraint”97  
 Even the most ideologically disparate interpreters of The Federalist Papers have arrived at 
the same conclusions regarding Publius’ understanding of the inextricable limitations of human 
nature. Miller claims Publius concluded that “the doctrine of the perfectibility of Man” was “a 
preposterous fiction.”98 Clinton Rossiter says the Constitutional Conventions marked a “refusal to 
engage in social engineering.”99 Instead it maintained “the continuity of experience with the 
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English and American pasts, the continuity of principles with the teachings of Cicero and Locke,” 
and maintained a “moderately pessimistic view of human nature that pervaded the debates,” and a 
“cautiously optimistic view of human destiny that had persuaded these men to come together."”100 
Richard Hofstadter says “One thing that the Fathers did not propose to do, because they thought it 
impossible, was to change the nature of man to conform with a more ideal system.” 101 Rather “human 
nature presupposed that men in all ages and all places have been actuated by essentially the same 
desires and passions and that they would always continue to act in the same way. There was no 
possibility of an improvement in man’s nature: the mold had been fixed for all time and the laws 
governing human behavior were as immutable as the laws of nature.” 102 Government then is 
primarily, if not exclusively, a medicament of mitigation, not a panacea for the ills of human 
nature. When men seek to cure human nature of its ills, the remedy is always far worse than the 
disease.  
Human nature exhibited vices which required government and self-restraint which made 
self-government possible. What of the role of reason in the Founding? Most of the Founders 
rejected this type of excessive faith in reason, which in their mind was an excessive faith in the 
rational faculties of man. Publius did not think that “the kingdom of darkness could be replaced 
by the republic of universal light.”103 Such views played no role in the substance of the Constitution 
or the early politics of the republic. West says “for the most part, the founders’ stance toward the 
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Enlightenment was sober and cautious, even if they did at times express strong hopes for a more 
general diffusion of knowledge.”104  
For the Founders the fully rational position was to see and accept the limits of reason. 
Hamilton and Madison follow the observations of Christianity, but also Hume and others, which 
say that human nature is generally passionate and succumbs too easily to immediate interest. 
Reason is too fallible and the flaws of human nature too inextricable. Reason, is but all-too-human 
reasoning. It is typically too weak to be relied upon by itself. In No. 37 Madison is clear that our 
knowledge is imperfect and uncertain, not simply because we are motivated by our interests, but 
because of the relative weakness of our faculties compared to the elusive objects they seek to 
understand. Hume says this weakness is “incurable in human nature” and therefore men must 
“endeavor to palliate what they cannot cure.”105 For this reason Madison and Hamilton did not 
conceive politics as “an historical process by which human beings were progressing toward greater 
and greater freedom.”106 The Federalist Papers make very clear such unbridled faith in reason is 
an unbridled faith in man. It is as unwarranted as it is unwise.  
 Yet, the third threat from Transhumanism, however, is an historically unpreceded direct 
assault on our physical and psychological makeup itself. This assault is often framed by or coupled 
with modernist celebration of novelty and innovation often combined with progressive or relativist 
notions of human identity. If human nature is in a constant state of evolution how can this moving 
target be taken as the standard for government and justice especially when government is reflecting 
or directing this change? “Evolution” will be achieved by “intentional”, “organized”107 and 
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“deliberate social planning and foresight.” 108 Now progress, which was once viewed as caused by 
nature or world historical forces outside human control in a Hegel or Marx, might now be directed 
by the reason, will or passions of mankind. More likely it will be controlled by an elite minority 
within it.109 This means that the few will be shaping not only the political order, but the very nature 
of the many without their consent. And, no doubt, the natural tendencies of this elite would be the 
motivating springs of their actions. And as John Quincy Adams reminds us, that “Power always 
sincerely, conscientiously, de très bon foi, believes itself right. Power always thinks it has a great soul and 
vast views, beyond the comprehension of the weak.110 Those in power always act “in very good faith.” For 
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6. Human Nature, Now & Then 
 
Whoever considers present and ancient things easily knows that in all cities and in all peoples there are 
the same desires and the same humors, and there always have been. So it is an easy thing for whoever 
examines past things diligently to foresee future things in every republic and to take the remedies for 
them that were used by the ancients, or, if they do not find any that were used, to think up new ones 
through the similarity of accidents. But because these considerations are neglected or not understood 
by whoever reads, or, If they are understood, they are not known to whoever governs, It follows that 
there are always the same scandals m every time. 1 
- Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses 
 
In his Discourses Machiavelli says: “Whoever considers present and ancient things easily 
knows that in all cities and in all peoples there are the same desires and the same humors, and there 
always have been…But because these considerations are neglected or not understood by whoever 
reads, or, if they are understood, they are not known to whoever governs, it follows that there are 
always the same scandals in every time.”2 When Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu or 
Publius spoke of a universal human nature they never denied the multiplicity of ways of living or 
the multiplicity of human character. All they denied however was that change were fundamental 
or essential. While human character changes, human nature gives rise to “the same desires and the 
same humors” and “the same scandals in every time.”3 Publius and The Founders conceived of 
human nature in a narrow, but also a hardened way. There was a small tranche of human identity 
which remained rigidly fixed and predictable, despite change. Reason was what separated man 
from animal, but men are more reasoning than reasonable animals. This meant the passions 
generally dominate in all men taken as they are in aggregate, and that the passion of ambition in 
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all its forms is the double-edged sword of human civilization. Meanwhile, man’s needs of self-
preservation coupled with both his reason and his passion incline all men to pursue their self-
interest first and foremost. While circumstances change, constant are the problems of political 
order produced by the constant springs of human conduct which give rise to them.  
A delegate from New York to the Philadelphia Convention, Melancton Smith gives perfect 
expression to The Federalist’s take on human nature. He said “the same passions and prejudices 
govern all men” and yet “the circumstances in which men are placed in great measure give a 
[unique] cast to the human character.”4 Human nature is fixed; human character is variable. 5 Such 
an observation is at least as old as Aristotle. There is a first and second nature of mankind. 
Mankind’s first nature is fixed, the second is shaped by habit, custom and education. Montesquieu 
reiterates this tradition when he said political communities and their laws are the result of both 
nature and nurture, where human character, or “spirit,” is shaped by circumstances of history and 
climate. When Publius asserts the universality of human nature he implicitly distinguishes between 
a human nature that is fixed and a variable human character built on top of that fixed foundation. 
More specifically in speaking of this nature he focuses, not on ways of life, but on the constancy 
of unchanging needs and springs of motivation.  
Today we tend to deny a fixed common denominator of human conduct and psychology 
across time and space which would justify the use of the expression “human nature”. We accept 
human identity as radically malleable and plural. Today, we hold this truth to be self-evident, that 
there are only a series of identities which are the product of human agency or historical 
circumstance. All of Publius’ claims about human nature are underwritten by the assumption that 
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it is universal. At the very moment during the period of the Late or Radical Enlightenment when 
History and Progress began to replace Nature as the standard for man and his society, Publius 
clearly rejected any form of historicism which denied the continuity of human nature through time.  
Publius denies mankind can be fundamentally altered by History. Nature, not History, 
dictates the demands of moral and political order. Howe says “probably every reader of The 
Federalist has noticed that its arguments are based on ideas about universal human nature.”6 
Progressive historian Benjamin Wright says, the “universal element is its recognition of the 
importance of human nature in politics, together with its remarkably penetrating analysis of the 
motives and behavior of men in a free society.”7  Howe says the text appeals “to immutable 
scientific laws of human behavior illustrated by historical examples and confirmed by the 
Americans’ own experiment in free government.”8  
In identifying this constant human nature, history and experience played a central role for 
Publius. In his Enquiry Hume says that history demonstrates “the constant and universal principles 
of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations” and acquaints 
us “with the regular springs of human action and behavior.”9 White says “For Publius the 
psychological laws of nature record the behavior of actual men; and Publius thought we establish 
these laws by recourse to experience and history.10 The psychological springs of human action 
remain constant across the ages. Political order and constitutions must contend with these springs 
if they are to perpetuate themselves and flourish. When Madison says government is a reflection 
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on human nature he acknowledges that while its structure and laws may vary, its existence and 
necessity do not. Government and law are products of human nature.  
In No. 6 Hamilton speaks of “the uniform course of human events,” evident in the “the 
accumulated experience of ages.”11 History, the record of concrete and particular events, is 
“uniform” because it is underwritten by a constant human nature with the same passions, 
disposition and motivations. Miller says Publius’ “view of human nature presupposed that men in 
all ages and all places have been actuated by essentially the same desires and passions and that 
they would always continue to act in the same way. There was no possibility of an improvement 
in man’s nature: the mold had been fixed for all time and the laws governing human behavior were 
as immutable as the laws of nature.”12 Only in this way are the motives of the men of antiquity 
intelligible to us Moderns, precisely because they are actuated by the same impulses as men of the 
18th or 21st century. 
Since there is a definable and fixed nature, it comes with its own given fixed limits. These 
parameters are based on the constancy of human faculties, needs and desires which delimit the 
extent to which human nature can be bent. There is no historical perfectibility. No amount of 
progress will overcome the intractable realities of human nature. Federici says: “Hamilton believed 
that much could be done to change the basic maladies that stemmed from the human condition. 
Evil was a permanent part of existential, social, and political life, but the fallen nature of man did 
not negate the possibility of ordered liberty.”13 Frederici says that the “imperfectability of man is 
at the core of Hamilton’s political philosophy.”14 In No. 6 Hamilton says it is “time to awake from 
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the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our 
political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the 
happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?”15  
Men can never be made into angels. All government must account for the problems created 
by self-love, evil and the limitations of reason and virtue. The permanent need of government is 
an expression of the permanent limitations of human nature. The immutable law of human 
motivation on which the Constitution is based is the principle of self-interest. It is precisely because 
men have diverse and conflicting motives that they do not and cannot follow moral law uniformly. 
Distinct bodies with their diverse faculties and motivations means diverse interests. The object of 
the Constitution is to provide the tools to manage conflicting interests in the service of the common 
one.   
As he was about to take the reins of the presidency in February 1789, George Washington 
said to Henry Knox he felt like “a culprit who is going to the place of his execution.”16 Three years 
into his presidency, Donald J. Trump could have expressed a similar sentiment, only dropping the 
word “like.” On December 10, 2019, the House of Representatives passed H. RES 755 impeaching 
the 45th president of the United States. The president was charged with two articles of 
impeachment, “abuse of power” and “obstruction of congress.” In their opening arguments House 
managers claimed the president “used the powers of his office...for his own personal benefit.”17 
The first article of impeachment states the president abused his powers “by ignoring and injuring 
national security and other vital national interests to obtain an improper personal political 
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benefit.”18 This charge was predicated on the assertion that the president personally benefited from 
the exercise of his office at the expense of the nation.   
One of the more curious premises of both indictment articles is that the president was 
accused of committing impeachable acts on the grounds that he pursued policies designed to 
benefit his own self-interest. The articles alleged the he “engaged in this…course of conduct for 
corrupt purposes in pursuit of personal political benefit.”19 He used his Article II powers in order 
to “benefit his reelection, harm the election prospects of a political opponent, and influence the 
United States Presidential election to his advantage.”20 By pursuing his self-interest he not only 
“ignored and injured the interests of the nation”21 but such use constituted a “threat to national 
security and the Constitution” and was in the last, “grossly incompatible with self-government and 
the rule of law.”22 Such self-interested conduct, so said the House Articles, rose to the level of 
“High Crimes and Misdemeanors.” 
The premise of the charge was that self-interested motive alone was intrinsically contrary 
to national security and the national interest. Therefore, self-interested use of Article II powers 
alone constituted an abuse of those powers.23 The House managers’ arguments hinged on self-
interest as a “corrupt” and therefore impeachable motive. Implicit in the articles was an admission 
that the president’s actions were not in themselves criminal or impeachable. The articles failed to 
charge either statutory or constitutional crimes such as treason, bribery, extortion or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors. Rather such conduct was impeachable solely because it was perpetrated 
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under “corrupt motives.”24 The president’s actions were corrupt precisely because they were 
motived by “personal benefit” which was claimed to be contrary to the oath he swore to uphold.25 
The articles assumed these ends were by their very nature, mutually exclusive.  
Evidence of corrupt motive was found in the fact the president’s actions ran counter to the 
policy opinions of what unelected Executive branch officials and the House managers themselves 
believed to be in the national interest.26 This despite the fact that under Article II, the president is 
the sole and superior officer of the executive branch as well as “the sole organ of the nation in its 
external relations” and “sole representative with foreign nations.”27 It would seem, as it pertains to 
foreign affairs, the Constitution places broad power to determine policy and the very meaning of 
the national interest in the hands and opinions of the president. Oddly the House managers’ 
arguments presume that the greater danger comes from the political authority of an elected 
constitutional officer directly accountable to the people, rather than the “interagency consensus”28 
of an “unelected mandarin class” of bureaucrats who persist from one administration to the next 
suffering no direct democratic accountability for their actions.29 
Unacknowledged in and contradicted by the impeachment articles is a central assumption 
which undergirds the entire constitutional arrangement of power: which policy or conduct is 
considered in the national interest is fundamentally a question of political opinion. The preamble 
of the Constitution enumerates the central ends which comprise the national interest. They include 
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the establishment of justice, the promotion of public tranquility and the general welfare, to provide 
for the common defense and secure the blessings of liberty. The Constitution’s subsequent 
enumerated powers and their arrangement are the means to these ends. In most, but not all, 
circumstances, none of these ends dictate a clear or self-evident best policy or use of the 
Constitution’s powers that would guarantee them. They are a matter of political preference, 
opinion, judgement and prudence. The national interest is like happiness, we all know we want it 
and that it should motivate all our actions, but nonetheless we disagree on both what it is and how 
we might achieve it.  
Following Hume, Madison says in No. 49 that “all governments rest on opinion.”30 
Government rests on opinion from top to bottom, from the most fundamental constitutional 
principles to the most superficial political disputes. Even serious matters of public interest like 
national security and self-preservation do not simply recommend a single or unequivocal policy 
which might ensure their fulfillment. What was the right thing to do for Lincoln when Fort Sumter 
was attacked? Or what of the decision to go into Iraq after 9/11 under the premise of national 
security and the threat of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction? Men can easily reason from 
the same facts to different conclusions. Such issues remain matters of opinion. As a matter of 
opinion, they are fundamentally disputable. The very existence of factions such as political parties 
presupposes the existence of groups built around competing claims as to what the national interest 
in fact is. The nature of the national interest is the very object of virtually all political dispute, 
debate and deliberation. Every law passed and presidential action taken is claimed by their authors 
to be in the nation’s best interest. The House impeachment articles take the national interest for 
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granted as self-evident, a kind of summum bonum, or as simply synonymous with the opinions of 
their authors. 
The second article of impeachment claims the President obstructed congress by asserting 
the very prerogatives and privileges of office afforded by the Constitution, law and legal precedent. 
He was accused of having “directed the unprecedented, categorical, and indiscriminate defiance 
of subpoenas issued by the House of Representatives pursuant to its ‘‘sole Power of 
Impeachment.”31 The House had subpoenaed executive branch officials as part of their ongoing 
impeachment inquiry and the president had “without lawful cause or excuse…directed Executive 
Branch agencies, offices, and officials not to comply” with them.32 The House managers argument 
seems to rest on interpreting their “sole power” to mean that they, and only they, were to be the 
total arbiters of the impeachment process. If the president defended himself from their charges and 
respected the benefits afforded to him by the separation of powers and the judicial precedent of 
executive privilege, he had therefore usurped their “sole” power, thereby violating the Constitution 
and committing an impeachable offense.  
What the President had in fact done was provide legal rationales for non-compliance with 
potentially faulty subpoenas resting on the assertion of executive privilege. The president then 
sought redress from the Judicial Branch on the validity of the House’s subpoenas. Such rationales 
presented by the president’s lawyers could simply be adjudicated by the Judicial branch and 
deemed legally valid or not. By seeking to resolve his inter-branch conflict with the House through 
remedy in Article III courts the president was accused of obstructing congress, acting outside the 
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constraints of the Constitution, and even usurping powers left solely to the legislative branch.33 
Drawing up an article of impeachment was an odd course over what is considered standard 
operating procedure for the Executive branch. All administrations jealously seek to preserve the 
powers of the presidency itself, not merely the power of the individual occupant, from the natural 
and ongoing incursions of other branches. The other branches tend to follow suit in this regard. 
Madison explains all this in No. 51.  
Thomas Jefferson holds the honor as the first President to be issued a subpoena. It 
demanded he appear in the 1807 treason trial of Aaron Burr. He was subpoenaed, duces tecum, 
which “orders a person to appear in court and “bring with you” certain specified documents.”34 On 
June 13, 1807, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall issued his opinion declaring the subpoena of 
the president and executive branch documents constitutionally valid.35 Despite the subpoena and 
Marshall’s ruling, Jefferson never appeared in court. Nor did he even formally acknowledge the 
existence or legitimacy of either the subpoena or Marshall’s opinion. In fact, Jefferson argued for 
the principle of “executive privilege” by maintaining that the “President must be the sole judge of 
which documents could be safely disclosed” in “the interests of national security.”36 Of course 
what counted as a matter of “national security” was left to the President’s discretion. Jefferson 
went a step further, citing the separation of powers. He did not recognize the power of the judiciary 
to compel the executive branch “to answer legal process” at all.37 
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Despite such defiance, the President surreptitiously produced some measure of the relevant 
documents demanded by the court. Marshall tacitly deemed this acceptable.38 The matter was 
resolved by personal judgements, not constitutional bludgeons, through the discretion and 
prudence of persons acting on behalf of the two branches. Marshall accepted voluntarily the 
documents Jefferson had produced voluntarily, thus avoiding the use of the awesome compulsory 
powers afforded by the Constitution. The constitutional authority of either the subpoena or the 
president’s right to resist it, was never fully tested or clarified. Rather the solution was achieved 
informally by tacit horse trading so that the constitutional powers of both branches need not be 
either invoked or tested. Thus, an awkward constitutional crisis was averted. This is how such 
interbranch disputes have often been dealt with throughout our political history. The participants 
understood the negative constitutional consequences of an open declaration of war between the 
branches.   
The irony of the allegations against President Trump is that they make criminal and 
impeachable the very conduct the constitutional framework is precisely designed to encourage 
when agreement between branches is not to be found. In Nos. 47-51 Madison makes this patently 
clear, and it is one of is great innovations of republican government. Again, the articles assert that 
by seeking redress the president acted out of self-interest and therefore in violation of the House’s 
constitutional powers of impeachment.  And yet, in No. 51 Madison says that in their disputes the 
Constitution must provide each branch with “the necessary constitutional means, and personal 
motives, to resist encroachments” of the others branches.39 How could conduct the Constitution is 
designed to encourage, interbranch conflict through assertion of countervailing interests, be 
deemed unconstitutional? Resistance is not merely self-interested. The pursuit of self-interest is 
 
38 Ibid., p. 14. 
39 No. 51. 
 
 180 
made a virtue, a kind of constitutional duty which preserves the discrete nature of the branches and 
inhibits deleterious usurpations.  
In light of their views on human nature, the divisive partisanship of the recent impeachment 
battle would have hardly surprised the Founders.40 In No. 10 Madison tells us the spirit of faction 
is “sown in the nature of man.”41 Factions such as parties are but collections of individuals built 
on and actuated by common passion, opinion or interest. Factions are but the means to amplify the 
power needed to promote and achieve one’s aims. In No. 65 Hamilton says impeachments “will 
seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties.”42 He says 
an impeachment “will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their 
animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases there 
will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative 
strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.” 43 Hamilton’s words 
were rather prescient. Presidents Johnson, Clinton and Trump would all have agreed, and with 
good reason.  
But how strangely these charges would have rung in the Founder’s ears in light of their 
account of human nature and conduct. Their understanding of human nature sits as the axiomatic 
foundation of all the Constitution’s enumerated powers and their peculiar arrangement. Their 
conclusion that government rested on opinion, not knowledge, of things like the national interest 
was a direct consequence of this understanding. Based on careful observation of the faculties and 
deficiencies of human nature they admitted that no party or individual can claim omniscient 
knowledge of the nations’ “true” interests.  
 
40 No. 65 
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They observed that human reason is fallible and limited in general, but particularly so under 
the enticements and charms of power. In No. 10 Madison says of man so “long as the connection 
subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal 
influence on each other.”44 Passions and self-interest always color and distort political opinion of 
things like the national interest. Therefore, matters of national interest are not, cannot be, and 
should not be decided on the grounds of who claims to have genuine knowledge of such things. 
Rather they are decided by public opinion regarding the apparent knowledge or ignorance of the 
actors involved. If a party or politician is deemed ignorant of the nation’s interests they will simply 
be held accountable to the opinions of the people in the next election.    
The second premise of the impeachment articles is equally foreign to the Founders: that a 
constitutional officeholder can act “corruptly” and “abuse their power” simply by acting in their 
own self-interest, without the additional specification of the assertion or evidence of actual crimes. 
This premise flies in the face of the central observation about human nature which undergirds the 
constitutional order. Men are not angels. Passions like self-love, ambition and love of power 
incline men to err, to be myopic in their aims, and to abuse power in pursuit of their own self-
interest. Men are not angels because their passions “will not conform to the dictates of reason and 
justice, without constraint.”45 Human nature exhibits a “defect of better motives.” Motives superior 
to self-interest cannot reasonably be relied upon by themselves. Therefore, they should not be 
relied upon. Sentinels of external constraint are always necessary. It is folly to expect self-restraint 
or for human beings to hold themselves accountable. Angels regulate themselves. Men require 
laws and force. 
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 In light of the venality of human nature the Founders conceded that our expectations of 
human conduct must be realistically tempered by the probable and likely motive of self-interest. 
The tincture of power and self-interest cannot be undone; it is all too engrained in human nature 
to act on one’s own behalf. This permanent feature needs to be accepted, and even exploited, in 
order to be accounted for. It cannot be wished away by moral condemnation alone. Our natural 
moral defect is that better motives such as reason and virtue are both too scarce and too weak. 
They lack sufficient incentive for most men to regularly act upon them, precisely in those decisive 
moments when it is hard to act on them. While the Founders hardly denied the existence of real 
virtue or moral sentiments like “sympathy”46 and “humanity”47, they nevertheless did not believe 
these motives held sufficient sway over men to compel them to act virtuously under the beguiling 
effects of power.  
 In No. 51 Madison, the Father of the Constitution, plainly asserts that the marriage of self-
interest and the powers of office is the natural constitutional course of things. Self-interest as a 
motive, is not merely to be expected, but depended upon in the proper operation of the 
constitutional mechanism. Even if self-interest leads to criminal conduct, it will depend on the 
interested assertion of other officers to hold that conduct accountable. Take for example the 
election of 1864. It occurred in the midst of a raging Civil War, a fight for the preservation of the 
Union. Lincoln granted Union troops leave from the battlefield so they could vote for him and help 
ensure his reelection. Assistant Secretary of War Dana said that “all the power and influence of 
the War Department…was employed to secure the reelection of Mr. Lincoln.”48 Meanwhile 
Secretary of War Stanton deployed “immense power to bring military voters into line” to ensure 
 
46 Nos. 13, 16, 29, 52, 57, 58, 74. 
47 Nos. 21, 74. 
48 Jonathan W. White. “How Lincoln Won the Soldier Vote.” New York Times. November 7, 2014. 
 
 183 
they either voted for Lincoln “or kept their Democratic opinions to themselves” as the New York 
Times puts it.49  
In the midst of a civil war, the existence of the Union at stake, Lincoln used the mighty 
powers of the War Department, the executive branch, to secure a personal benefit in the service of 
his reelection. He used his powers just as the impeachment articles describe: to “benefit his 
reelection, harm the election prospects of a political opponent, and influence the United States 
Presidential election to his advantage.”50 In fact he went so far as to penalize soldiers who would 
not vote for him. Secretary Staton dismissed dozens of officers in the months prior to the election 
because they were either Democrats or preferred Gen. McClellan for president.51 When an officer 
protested their dismissal Stanton replied, “When a young man receives his pay from an 
administration and spends his evenings denouncing it in offensive terms, he cannot be surprised if 
the administration prefers a friend on the job.”52   
Was this an impeachable abuse of power? Were the interests and national security of the 
Union harmed by pulling soldiers off a live battlefield merely for the personal benefit of Lincoln’s 
reelection? We can wonder to what extent Lincoln’s election ploy negatively affected the war 
effort. Meanwhile the House managers in the Trump impeachment, despite claims of 
compromising national security, were unable to adduce any evidence that the pause in the 
president’s foreign aid to Ukraine, an utterly common and routine procedure in such matters, 
caused any threat to the national security of either the United States or Ukraine. 
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The problem for the Founders was not self-interest as such. In asserting that men are not 
angels, Madison intimates how the Constitution accepts and expects officeholders to act with a 
permanent eye on their own self-interest. Madison tells us in No. 10 that eliminating the liberty 
which permits free men to pursue self-interest is undesirable and unrealistic. It is too Spartan, too 
contrary to the regular dispositions of human nature. The cure is worse than the disease. Having 
accepted the disease, the true problem is fashioning institutions which properly channel and 
constrain its worst effects while the competing aims of order and liberty. If not constrained by 
properly designed institutions self-interest is averse to both liberty and order.   
Here Publius and the Founders abandoned Plato and Aristotle’s hope of the coincidence of 
wisdom and power in the ruling class as a fantasy of an “imagined republic.” The marriage of 
power and interest is the necessary and proper course of the constitutional order. The solution is 
not to eliminate self-interest but temper its worst effects. This marriage of interest and the powers 
of office turns out to be the innovative solution of the Founders novel science of politics which 
gave birth to their novel form of republicanism. The expectation of interestedness can be employed 
and leveraged against the worst abuses of self-interest. The constraint Hamilton speaks of in No. 
15 is achieved through leveraging interest against itself. This is precisely what Madison means 
when he says the “defect of better motives” will be remedied through the “policy of 
supplying…opposite and rival interests.”53Madison concludes this strategy of countervailing and 
rival interests “might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as 
public.”54 
Motives such as reason, virtue and duty were not so much abandoned, as demoted, and the 
republic was to be founded on the lower but firmer foundation of self-interest. His claim illustrates 
 




the centrality of this innovation and the permanence of self-interest or the defect of better motives. 
Self-interest is the primary feature of human nature with which social and political order must 
contend if it is to succeed. The mechanical equilibrium of the Constitution depends on such 
motives. In No. 72 Hamilton, discussing the executive’s motives for action, states the obvious, 
“that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct.”55 From this 
observation he concludes that “the best security for the fidelity of mankind,” to the national 
interest, “is to make interest coincide with duty.”56 The success of separate branches checking and 
balancing one another in order to prevent a dangerous concentration of power in one branch is 
directly dependent on officeholders asserting their own self-interest through the tools and powers 
of their office.  
Interests check and balance one another only when they are married to the powers of office 
and set in countervailing opposition. Checking and balancing is not the result of a spontaneous 
generation of order. Private vices do not simply make public virtues. Virtue remains necessary but 
a greater burden is placed on well fashioned institutions which mitigate vice and promote virtue 
through external constraint. Officers are compelled to be “virtuous”. It is achieved by mixing and 
“blending” the three branches properly so that they have distinct but also over lapping prerogatives 
which become the constitutional territory over which they assert their claims.57 It seems 
counterintuitive but an absolute separation between the branches results in mere “parchment 
barriers” because it denies a domain of contested prerogatives. It is precisely this area of redundant 
prerogatives which provide the leverage, the actual rather than merely nominal power, for the 
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branches to restrain and defend the attack of the other. But this power must be used.  It is activated 
only through the motive and assertion of self-interest.   
Checks are achieved through a system of countervailing interests. Equilibrium only occurs 
when the appropriate “constitutional means” are properly married to “personal motives.”58  Francis 
Bacon, the scientist and statesman well known to the Founders, says in order for “nature to be 
commanded, must be obeyed.”59 Understanding the prior cause results in being able to predict the 
future effect. Or as Machiavelli puts it in slightly different terms: “whoever examines past things 
diligently” will be able “to foresee future things in every republic.”60 Hume says that that “a 
remedy” for the ills of human nature, “can never be effectual without correcting this propensity; 
and as ‘tis impossible to change or correct any thing material in our nature, the utmost we can do 
is to change our circumstances and situation, and render the observance of the laws of justice our 
nearest interest and their violation our most remote.”61 Once the law of self-interest could be 
identified, the institutional dykes and damns could direct human passions and ambitions 
accordingly. In the service of order and liberty the Constitution was designed to control and contain 
human nature by obeying its ironclad law of self-interest on display throughout history. This 
system seems to paradoxically preserve liberty provide security, by placing the motives of men 
under circumstances of near necessity.62 
 In April 1787, one month prior to the Philadelphia convention, James Madison penned a 
series of observations titled the “Vices of the Political System of the United States.” These notes 
were an itemized analysis of the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation. Underlying his many 
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detailed criticisms lay the general weakness of the national government. Without the requisite 
power it was unable enforce its will on the states nor protect them from one another in their 
disputes. The lack of central power left the states too free and independent, which in turn bred the 
spirit anarchy and faction among them and left them vulnerable to foreign meddling. These 
conclusions were drawn from his own experiences as a member of the Virginia House of Delegates 
and as a delegate to the Congress of the Confederation under the Articles. They were no less 
informed by his extensive reading on the fate and flaws of such confederacies throughout history. 
A year prior, in 1786, Madison had made extensive study titled “Notes on Ancient and Modern 
Confederacies.” The broad conclusion of Madison’s investigations was that the political structure 
of confederacies such as the Articles did not properly account for the regular tendencies and defects 
of human nature.  
The Articles of Confederation were too weak to overcome the ills of self-interest 
factionalism sown into human nature. Howe says Publius’ analysis of human nature provides “his 
basis for discrediting the Articles of Confederation."63 The Articles were an “odious…engine of 
government,”64 so “radically vicious and unsound”,65 precisely because they were not properly 
reconciled with human nature. Howe says the particular flaw of the Articles was that it relied too 
much on "the weaker springs of the human character."66 They lacked a respect for the power of 
self-interest and had insufficient “sentinels” and “auxiliary precautions” needed to restrain factions 
and preserve the “public rights.” A more perfect Union was needed because the Articles did not 
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provide a government commensurate with human nature. They did not solve the problems raised 
by the defects of human nature.   
In the wake of Shays Rebellion Washington said “We have, probably, had too good an 
opinion of human nature in forming our confederation.”67 Meanwhile Jay had written Jefferson 
saying of the Articles “there is reason to fear that too much has been expected of the virtue and 
good sense of the people.”68 Hamilton says in No. 23 that the Articles "presumed that a sense of 
their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges for 
the punctual performance of the duty of the members to the federal head. The experiment has, 
however, demonstrated that this expectation was ill-founded and illusory"69 In No. 15 Hamilton 
asserts the Articles of Confederation were erroneously founded on a belief that “a sense of common 
interest would preside over the conduct” of the states and “would beget a full compliance with all 
the constitutional requisitions.” This hope for the Articles, says Hamilton, clearly “betrayed an 
ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original 
inducements to the establishment of civil power.” The tendency of human nature toward self-
interest, its “defect of better motives”, its inability to seek the “common interest” without external 
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III. The Regime Founded on Human Nature 
1. City and Soul 
  
As the story goes Benjamin Franklin was walking down the street shortly following the 
resolution of the Constitutional Convention and was confronted by a woman asking about the 
nature and form of government its members had fashioned. His answer? “A republic, if you can 
keep it.” What did he mean? The type of republic proposed by the convention was in many ways 
without precedent in the annals of human history. Republican government is a form of self-
government. The question was implicitly raised: Was human nature, being what it is, truly capable 
of genuine self-government? Does human nature have the resources, the self-restraint and moral 
virtue to maintain self-government? Publius and the members of the Convention answered in the 
affirmative. Human nature held a mixture of vice and virtue which, if the proper moral and 
constitutional restraints where devised, was capable of genuine self-government. Franklin’s 
admonition is of course an acknowledge of the tenuous balance that must be struck in order for 
human beings to truly govern themselves. Nonetheless republican government was possible 
because of its commensurability to the vices and virtues of human nature itself.  
What justifies The Federalist’s account of human nature in a book on government? In the 
Laws, Plato says the theory and practice of politics is rooted in knowledge of the natures and habits 
of human souls.1 Plato’s Athenian stranger says “it would be one of the most useful tools – this 
ability to know the nature and disposition of people’s souls – for that art or science whose function 
it is to look after these things. And that, of course is the science of politics.”2 Long says political 
order “needs to be compatible with the interests, consent, and aptitudes of the persons, who make 
 




up” its “diverse living parts.”3 “External political order is to be mirrored by internal psychological 
order” and vice versa.4 “Hence the virtues of the state as a whole,” says Long, “are to have their 
counterpart in the virtues of the individual citizens.” 5 It is because of this relationship between 
government and the human soul that Aristotle can say in the Nicomachean Ethics “that the 
politician ought to know” and “contemplate the soul.”6 Political science is the science of the human 
soul. 
In the Republic Plato establishes the fundamental relationship between the soul of the 
citizen and the soul of the regime of which they are a part. Thomas Reid says, “In the most ancient 
philosophy” such as the “Pythagorean school, the mind of man was compared to a state or 
commonwealth, in which there are various powers, some that ought to govern, and others that 
ought to be subordinate.”7 Plato asserts that the parts and attributes found in the individual human 
soul naturally find their magnified expression in the city. This city is nothing other than the 
arrangement of many souls. As such it reflects the needs and faculties of the human soul writ large. 
Plato’s description of this relationship has come to be known as the “city-soul analogy.” This so-
called analogy between the soul of the city and the individual soul asserts that the constitutional 
order of the city is a parallel macrocosm to the microcosm of its citizens’ individual souls. Like 
Plato, this analogy allows The Federalist to treat “politics and psychology as two aspects of a 
single investigation.”8  
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Psychology is the science of the soul. Given its centrality to politics, political science is a 
form of psychology. It requires knowledge of the human soul pertinent to public order. For Plato 
human nature consisted of a body and a soul. The soul was the ruler of the body and the organizing 
principle of its actions. The parts of the soul represented disparate sources of motivation. These 
motivations were divided between reason and the passions. These parts and their accompanying 
motivations were responsible for organizing and guiding the series of actions which make a human 
life. The soul had needs and appetites connected to the animal self-preservation of the body, and 
needs and appetites connected with the mind or intellect. All these appetites govern the actions of 
the individual. By shaping their character these appetites ultimately shape their way of life. 
Like the individual, the city also had a body and soul. The body is its substance and its 
soul, the particular constitutional form given to it. The people are its body, and its soul is the form 
of government which shapes the life of the people into a genuinely political community. What 
truly makes a group into a people, is their constitution, the politeia. The politeia is the soul of the 
city. It is the city’s form of government, and the arrangement of its powers. The city is “given its 
character and its peculiar way of life is established by the organization of the city's diverse 
elements.”9  The politeia is their organizing principle of the city and determines their way of life. 
The soul of the city, its politeia, is the soul of the citizens writ large. The soul of the city is both 
the shaper and expression of the citizens’ souls. The harmony of city and soul is made possible by 
the way in which the city’s soul educates, shapes and habituates the souls of its citizens through 
its fundamental principles manifest in its laws.  
Every city has those who rule and those who are ruled. As a regime’s constitution or 
structure, the politeia is primarily connected with the ruling class, or politeuma, those who 
 
9 Plato. The Republic (trans. Allan Bloom). New York: Basic Books, 1991. pp. 440.  
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governed.10 Who rules determines that structure of government and the nature of its laws. Plato 
acknowledges that the ruling class make laws in their own self-image and self-interest.11 The ruling 
class shapes the life of the city by impressing their own image on the citizens through the laws 
they make. 12  The laws of the city are guided by and manifestations of the citizens’ opinion of their 
own happiness. As the city legislates, its laws regulate the conduct of citizens. This regulation 
shapes and habituates the citizen’s souls, and their moral taste, their conceptions of what is right 
and wrong, just and unjust, good and evil, beneficial and harmful. This moral taste makes and 
shapes the way of life of the city. Thus the soul of the individual citizen echoes the soul or 
constitution of the city. 
A soul, like a city, is said by Plato and Aristotle to have a ruling part and a part that is ruled 
by it. The politeia represents the part of the city which rules. The ruling class guides and organizes 
the body of its citizens just as the soul rules over the body of the individual. Within the soul itself, 
Plato and Aristotle, understood that reason was the rightful ruler over the passions, just as the city’s 
politeuma, are the rightful rulers of the city. The parts of the soul of the citizen, reason and passion, 
are reflected in the factions of the city and the motivations of its citizens. Each form of government 
represents a different ruling principle, or dominate appetite of the human soul. The various types 
of regimes were understood as expressions of different parts of the soul, different ruling appetites, 
each with a distinct ruling motivational passion. This ruling passion rules as a “monarch” over the 
entire city and everyone in it.13 
In the Republic, Plato’s divides the soul into reason and passion. In all the soul consists of 
three irreducible parts, reason, spiritedness and appetite. In a sense all three parts of the soul are 
 
10 Ibid.   
11 Ibid.   
12 Ibid.   
13 J.G.A. Pocock. The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. p. 465.  
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appetites, motivational sources who differ in the nature and object of their respective desire. Each 
has a specific object of desire which motives action toward that end. These motivational 
components exist in a hierarchy of worth and dignity with reason atop and bodily appetite below. 
For Plato, just as the soul rules the body, reason was the rightful ruler of the soul. Reason should 
rule, and its rule consists of regulating the passions. The rule of reason produced harmony and 
order in the soul and was synonymous with human happiness. Plato asserts that “the harmonious 
and just soul is the soul ruled by reason.”14 Just as reason must rule in the soul to produce order 
and harmony, reason must also rule the soul of the city if it is to achieve order and harmony and 
establish justice. 
The ruling appetite of the rulers is the true ruler of the city. The principal motivation which 
rules and shapes the souls of the citizen, also rules and shaped the regime at large. Democracy 
imbues its citizens with a democratic soul, aristocracy an aristocratic one, and so on. In Book 8 of 
the Republic for example, Plato claims that the arrangement of the soul of the democratic citizen 
resembles the democratic city.15 Plato’s narrow claim that the parts of the soul are literally writ 
large in any city is much disputed, but the more general claim that any given form of government 
is an expression of the various needs and desires of human nature is irrefutable. While not simply 
identical there is an identifiable relationship between the nature of the political regime and the 
psychology of its citizens.   
Plato’s treatment of the relationship between regime and its dominate psychological type 
is echoed in Montesquieu treatment of regimes in The Spirit of Laws. For Montesquieu each regime 
has a nature and structure as well as a defining principle of soul. This principle of soul is either a 
passion or a virtue. Montesquieu, following in the footsteps of Plato, says that each regime does 
 
14 Stephen Buckle. “Hume on the Passions.” Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 340 (April 2012). p. 205. 
15 Plato’s Republic, 544a5, 558c6 
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not exist merely as an institutional order, but as a “certain quality” or “modification of the soul.”16 
Montesquieu views both city and soul on the analogy of a watch. A “certain spring” and “a certain 
gear” make the watch move, just as a certain psychic spring of society motivates its laws and way 
of life collectively and individually.17 This “modification” is the same spring in the soul of the 
citizen, as in the mechanism of the regime.  
 Montesquieu’s “modification of the soul” is the spirit of the regime. This spirit shapes its 
peculiar way of life and form of justice. It is the organizing principle of its form of government, 
its laws and the souls and habits of its citizens. Each regime has its own unique spirit which orders 
the souls of its citizens in a particular way, drawing on one psychic source as the dominate spring 
of action. Montesquieu’s arch principles of government are also what he identifies as the prime 
ruling passions of the soul which cause men to act as they do. From this modification of soul is 
derived a peculiar passion or virtue that is the “spring that makes a government act.”18 In a 1792 
essay, Madison glosses The Spirit of Laws saying, “Montesquieu has resolved the great operative 
principles of government into fear, honor, and virtue.”19 Just as each individual type is driven by a 
peculiar psychic spring, so too is each unique form of government.   
Scholars have asked of the city-soul analogy: Is it politics or is it psychology?20 The answer 
is both. They are inextricably linked. The analogy between the individual soul and political 
community, “in which there are various powers, some that ought to govern and others that ought 
to be subordinate,” is one of the oldest staples of philosophical discourse.”21 Adam Ferguson 
 
16 Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. xli.   
17 Ibid. 
18 Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. xli.   
19 James Madison. “The Spirit of Governments.” National Gazette, February 18, 1792 
20 A. A. Long. “The Politicized Soul and the Rule of Reason.” Greek Models of Mind and Self. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2015. p. 127.  
21 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). pp. 495. 
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asserted: “The seeds of every form of government are lodged in human nature; they spring up and 
ripen with the season.”22   
The relationship between the human soul and government is a central leitmotif running 
throughout The Federalist Papers. Publius repeatedly asserts the essential relationship between 
human nature, government and the science of politics.23 Its observations and analysis of human 
nature are architectonic and provide the foundation to all its arguments. All its claims are generated 
out of insights into the nature and behavior of mankind. This relationship is what justifies 
Madison’s claim that government is nothing but the “greatest of all reflections on human 
nature.”24At the Constitutional Convention Hamilton asserted that “The science of policy is the 
knowledge of human nature.”25  Despite the vast differences of time and outlook, this claim is 
virtually identical to Plato’s in his Laws. Hamilton and Madison acknowledge the fundamental 
relationship between constitutional order and the order of the human soul. In asserting the primacy 
of this relationship Publius merely recapitulates an ancient observation of moral and political 
philosophy. 
The Constitution defends by Publius is based on a reasoned vision of the human soul writ 
large in the context of a specific political community. Publius makes clear that government is the 
necessary byproduct of human nature because of its “defect of better motive.” Men are not angels. 
The Federalist also makes clear how the proposed Constitution is in harmony not only with the 
 
22 Adam Ferguson. An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. p. 120.  
23 The “science of politics” is here used in its Aristotelian sense to include both a theoretical science which seeks to 
grasp the political for the sake of knowledge and a practical science which ministers to political actors which 
educates and informs their decisions.  
24 No. 51.  
25 Michael J. Rosano. “Liberty, Nobility, Philanthropy, and Power in Alexander Hamilton's Conception of Human 
Nature,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Jan., 2003). pp. 61.  
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general principles of human nature, but the particular habits of American society shaped before, 
during and after the Revolution. 
The implications of this analogy are that the peculiar nature and arrangement of the 
Constitution are nothing but a reflection of the Founders experience and understanding of human 
nature. The authors did not go fishing in human nature for elements that demonstrate their desired 
a priori ideology, rather they build their political order on the foundation of human nature in a 
manner few theorists in history ever have. Williams says, Publius’ account of the “nature of man 
logically shaped the kind of government they were advocating.”26 Hirschman captures the circular 
relationship between the government and the human soul by saying that the concerns of Publius 
“had started with the state; when it turned to consider problems of individual conduct, and in due 
course the insights” about the nature of human conduct “yielded by this phase were imported back 
into the theory of politics.”27 
Through The Federalist’s arguments “runs an implicit analogy between the human mind 
and the body politic. Just as the mind has faculties of reason (knowing wisdom and virtue), 
prudence (knowing self-interest), and the passions, so there are in society a small natural 
aristocracy of wisdom and virtue, a larger group of prudent men capable of understanding their 
enlightened self-interest, and the turbulent masses, who are typically motivated by passion and 
immediate advantage.”28  Howe says: “In Publius's argument there is a marked, if implicit, 
tendency for the different branches of government to mirror particular faculties of mind.”29 He 
 
26 Tony Williams. “The Federalist and Human Nature.” The Washington, Jefferson and Madison Institute. Sunday, 
August 15, 2012 
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27 Albert O. Hirschman. The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. p. 31.  
28 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
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says “Publius's rhetoric sorted his potential audience into three horizontally defined, hierarchically 
ordered groups-rational men, self-interested men, and passionate men-and addressed only the first 
two.”30 Publius has broken society down into the parts of the soul which are operative in different 
groups and factions. For Publius the central faculties of the soul were reason, interest and the 
passion, which parallel these three society constituencies. All this suggests that the authors of The 
Federalist had to take the nature and complexity of the human soul seriously. Despite their 
disagreements with Classical philosophy, they inherited its basic conception of the soul along with 
much of the faculty psychology generated by the Scottish Enlightenment. And, despite its vital 
departures, the Scottish Enlightenment owes much of the general structure of its moral psychology 
to the Ancient Greeks.  
In the Laws, Plato envisions the human being as a divine puppet, a puppet of the gods, 
whose soul consists of three strings which animate its actions in different and potentially contrary 
ways. Plato’s Athenian stranger says “Let's think about these things in this way. Let's consider 
each of us living beings to be a divine puppet, put together either for their play or for some serious 
purpose—which, we don’t know.”31 Mankind is a puppet with three strings attached to the gods 
which represent the three distinct sources of motivation within the human soul. These three strings 
or chords represent the parts of the soul and their pull on our motivations and conduct. Plato’s 
distinguished the motivational sources of the tripartite soul into logos (reason), thumos 
(spiritedness) and epithumia (appetite). Plato and Aristotle initially divide the soul in two, between 
reason and the passions, and subsequently subdivide the passions into spiritedness and appetite. 
Plato’s Athenian Stranger says “these passions work within us like tendons or cords, drawing us 
and pulling against one another in opposite directions toward opposing deeds struggling in the 
 
30 Ibid. 
31 Plato. The Laws of Plato (trans. Pangle). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. p. 25.   
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region where virtue and vice lie separated from one another.”32 In the myth of the divine puppet, 
the soul is pulled by two iron string which represent the ineluctable forces of the passions, and a 
golden thread which represents the “sacred pull of calculation” or reason.  
Taken allegorically, these strings represent our internal psychological endowment of our 
faculties given from nature. They are inner forces which produce outward actions. The problem is 
that these internal forces are not intrinsically in harmony with one another left to themselves. They 
represent conflicting sources of motivation, naturally pulling our impulses and conduct in opposite 
directions. They draw us forward “pulling against one another in opposite directions toward 
opposing deeds.”33 The divergent tugs of each chord illustrate how different motivational sources 
guide us toward different objects of desire, and hence toward different courses of action all at the 
same time. It is this simultaneous divergence of impulses that creates the conflict of human life 
and ultimately the need for government.   
Of the three cords two are iron, the passions, and one is golden, reason. Plato appears to be 
making a reference to Hesiod’s Ages of Mankind. The Golden Age is one of near human perfection 
and harmony, whereas the Iron Age is the period furthest in time from this state of perfection, 
representative of the present. Here iron symbolizes a deterioration of worth, but also is emblematic 
of strife and war. The existence of these multiple sources of motivation demonstrates that the 
psychology of the individual and the collective are always potentially in conflict with themselves. 
This conflict is in permanent need of some kind of reconciliation or amelioration. The Athenian 
Stanger says “each person should always follow one of the cords, never letting go of it and pulling 
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sacred pull of reason.”35  The pull of reason should rule as master. The dominate thread of reason 
should always be the one which determines our course of action. The pull of reason is the guide to 
life because it is the only one with the capacity to see the consequences of man’s actions. Reason 
has foresight, whereas the passions are blind. They do not see the consequences of their desires. 
Reason sits in the seat of the soul as a judge. It judges the proper course of action. Reason is the 
true and correct guide to the life of the individual and the political community. Naturally, following 
the pull of reason produces virtue and harmony, whereas following the threads of passion alone 
produces vice and what the Greeks called stasis.  Stasis is strife and faction which produce vice 
individually and collective. Stasis is civil war in the soul and the city. 
The Athenian stranger identifies the dictates of reason as synonymous with law. Reason 
“is called the common law of the city.”36  Only if political community is guided by the pull of 
reason as manifest in law can it be harmonious and achieve political prosperity. If reason truly 
rules in the soul of the city, the three strings will work in mutual harmony with one another and 
avoid the conflict which produces warring factions within civil society. When in No. 15 Hamilton 
asks, “Why has government been instituted at all?”37 his answer is in conformity with Plato’s 
depiction of the human soul. He says “the passions” in the souls of men “will not conform to the 
dictates of reason and justice.”38 
The golden thread of reason is described as “soft”, which suggests flexibility and elasticity. 
The thread of the passions is made of iron. Their pull is ironclad. The passions are forceful, 
unremitting and beyond our control. They have no elasticity; they cannot be altered. The iron 








passions. Rather its voice, unlike the passion, can be ignored. It rules precisely because it is correct. 
It rules through reflection, deliberation and rational persuasion rather than its force. The elasticity 
of the golden thread of reason appears to have two meanings. The golden thread does not pull 
ineluctably or as forcefully as the others. Reason can be ignored despite is correctness. Its 
flexibility also implies a degree of freedom from pure determinism which separates the mere 
locomotion of animals based on pleasure and pain, from the moral realm of human action based 
on categories of good and evil. Human action is life in accord with moral categories. While 
Madison and Hamilton where all too aware of the passionate and interested nature of human 
psychology, they concluded human history demonstrates that human nature has sufficient rational 
power to discriminate between virtue and vice and to choose to act in accord with this rational 
discrimination.  
The problem is that while the golden pull of reason has the moral authority, it lacks the 
force of the passions. That which is right, lacks the might. It has the weakest pull or mildest voice 
within the soul. On the other hand, the pull of the passions is hardest and inflexible. In No. 42 
Madison says “the mild voice of reason” pleads “the cause of an enlarged and permanent 
interest.”39 Likewise in No. 34 he says “the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human 
breast with much more powerful sway, than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that 
to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility, would be to calculate on 
the weaker springs of the human character.”40   
The problem of the pull of the golden thread is an exact description of the “defect of better 
motives” which shows that the passions “will not confirm to the dictates of reason and justice 
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without constraint.”41 The defect of human psychology is the inefficacy of reason. The Athenian 
stranger says that “It is necessary always to assist this most noble pull of law because reason, while 
noble, is gentle rather than violent, and its pull is in need of helpers if the race of gold is to be 
victorious for us over the other races.”42 In light of its “mild voice”, reason needs assistance, it “is 
need of helpers.” If reason is to have real efficacy over men’s actions, Publius makes clear that the 
internal pull of reason, needs external allies. Publius speaks of “sentinels” and “auxiliary 
precautions” which will act as external constraints on the passions and assist reason in the process.  
The Athenian stranger says one who seeks to be beneficial to the individual and the city 
should “acquire within himself true reasoning about these cords and live according to it, while a 
city should take over a reasoning either from one of the gods or from this knower of these things, 
and then set up the reasoning as the law for itself and for its relations with other cities. Thus, 
certainly, vice and virtue would be more clearly distinguished for us.”43  
What would be beneficial for the political community is for the political scientist to have 
true understanding of the human soul, its motivations and their consequences for the well-being of 
any political community. This “true reasoning” would be the science of politics itself. Political 
science rests on a foundation of knowledge of the human soul and its motivations. One must now 
the nature and object of these motivations, their relative force and the consequences of their 
fulfillment in terms of virtue and vice, and the order and justice of the political community.  With 
this knowledge in hand, the science of politics would be able to craft a just constitutional. Plato 
asserts that in order to establish harmony and justice it is necessary to know the science of the soul 
which is knowledge of these three conflicting parts of the soul and how to manage them and 
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subordinate them to the mild voice of reason. A just regime would be capable of promoting reason 
and vitiating the disharmonious effects of the passions.  
Like Plato, The Federalist envisions human psychology as a polytropic.44 The soul consists 
of a diversity of faculties: reason, passions and interests. The core springs of conduct, reason and 
passion, are capable of producing a mixture of vices and virtues. Publius was “steeped in classical 
philosophy” and believed “man was mired by passions, self-interest, and habits of vice but also 
capable of self-control, reason, and habits of virtue.”45 Like Plato, Publius’ account of the soul 
consists of multiple motivational sources with the capacity to pull in contrary directions at the 
same time. The soul is rent into factions which places it in conflict with itself on the individual and 
collective level. The individual will be pulled by their faculties in different directions, one way by 
reason, and another by passions. If, for example, men yield to their immediate interest, they work 
against both their own true interest and that of their political community. In Madison’s discussion 
of the diversity of men’s faculties in No. 10, he acknowledges that the desires and abilities of 
different groups and individuals exhibit their different faculties, varying in degree and mixture. 
The diversity of faculties among men is the root cause of faction and conflict in society.  
Plato and Publius are separated by a fundamental disagreement characteristic of the divide 
between Classical and Modern political philosophy. Both diagnose the same psychological 
deficiencies which are the seeds of conflict in civil society. Both accept the essential role and 
necessity of reason. Yet, they disagree on the remedy. This is largely because they disagree on the 
ends of political community and the means of achieving them. For the Ancients the end of political 
community was human excellence. Philosophy was the true good and the highest form of life for 
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the human being as such. Short of that, the best life was that of the good citizen rooted in moral 
virtue and patriotism which prioritized duties over rights and freedoms.  
Classical political philosophy identified justice as the aim of government. Justice was 
achieved by shaping the souls of the citizens in conformity with its demands. Statecraft was 
soulcraft.46 Soulcraft was moral or civic education, or what the Greek’s called paideia and 
Renaissance Humanists called institutio.47 The soul of the citizens would be shaped by habits 
engrained by law and education. Learning “conditions conduct” and shapes the lives and souls of 
citizens.48 The laws educate the citizens’ souls. Laws rear citizens and make them who they are. 
Good laws make good citizens. Almost all legislation was understood as “moral legislation 
because it conditions the action and the thoughts of the nation in broad and important spheres in 
life.”49 For Plato true or liberal education was training in virtue in order to make the “perfect citizen 
who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice.” 50    
The Modern political science of The Federalist does not, as the Classical tradition had, see 
“politics, fundamentally, as soulcraft.”51 Or rather, Modern political science has a radically 
different conception of soulcraft. In fact, Publius’ new science and its new republicanism represent 
an explicit departure of statecraft as this type of soulcraft. Government and its laws were not to be 
part of moral education, or if so, only in the most minimal way. Government would not “legislate 
morality”, at least not in the intrusive manner of the Ancients. At the very least this would be left, 
in a composite republic, to state government and local municipalities. The goal of Modern 
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government was neither to save or perfect men’s souls. Hume says: “For whatever may be the 
consequence of such a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would endow them with every 
species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice; this concerns not the magistrate who 
aims only at possibilities.”52 The ends of government would be liberty, order, and comfortable self-
preservation in the form of economic well-being. Justice would be grounded in durable motives 
like self-interest, not lofty ones like duty and virtue.   
The Federalist does not abandon soulcraft any more than any political science can. George 
Will says: “Without soulcraft of some kind all statecraft must fail.”53 Soulcraft is mostly “opaque 
to contemporary political scientists” and this is why they fail to understand things political.54 The 
influences of behaviorism and social science based on the Modern natural science have made the 
human soul into something meaningless or nonexistent. They do not consider the soul and its 
relationship to government. Justice Felix Frankfurter said: “Law is concerned with external 
behavior and not with the inner life of man.”55 If Justice Frankfurter meant the Constitution did 
not represent a large intrusion into the souls of citizens this is true. But Frankfurter is blind to the 
fact that all rules of conduct, such as laws, necessarily shape and habituate the souls of citizens. 
This is the very definition of habit. Publius however, was no Skinnerian avant le lettre. 
Frankfurter’s distinction between superficial “behavior” and “the inner life of man” is utterly 
foreign to The Federalist’s analysis of human nature. Given the invisibility of the inner life of man, 
gauging the exact nature of the relationship between inner and outer is challenging. These 
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challenges do not deny the existence of the connection however, only the limits of the observer. If 
one sought a certain effect of conduct, one would have to tinker on the level of inner causes to 
achieve this. One must first know and obey, if one is to control. This like Modern natural science, 
the new political science remained a science of causes. For Publius, conduct was an outward 
expression of the inner springs of the man. Man’s faculties are the inner cause of the outer effect. 
The Federalist is replete with psychological analysis of the inner springs which motivate outward 
actions. When the music stops men’s true motives are revealed.  
The provisions of the Constitution are a mechanism to shape and influence men’s motives. 
Features like accountability though elections, duration of terms, and the tripartite separation of 
powers, were all strategies of coaxing conduct by influencing motive, toward the common interest. 
The “proper structure”56 to account for the psychological defects of better motives “involves 
checks and balances of the separation of powers, and the dispersal of powers through a federal 
system.” 57 This external system is designed “to channel and manipulate self-interestedness into 
social equilibrium.”58 Tocqueville said of self-interest that through “its admirable conformity to 
human weaknesses it easily obtains great dominion; nor is that dominion precarious, since the 
principle checks one personal interest by another, and uses, to direct the passions, the very same 
instrument that excites them.” 59  
The need for soulcraft remains, but the ends and means of this moral education were 
different. The Classical tradition demanded that the passions be strictly educated to the extent they 
can, and repressed to the extent they cannot. As Madison says in No. 10 this solution is only 
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possible by attempting to give all citizens the same opinion through law and education. Political 
order is achieved at the price of freedom and man’s natural dispositions. This is the hard Spartan 
virtue of the Ancients. Plato demanded a Spartan order of city and soul. Publius’ analysis of 
Ancient republics concluded this was a failure of theory and practice. More to the point, it was a 
theory and ideal rarely if ever achieved in practice. Instead they saw in the Ancient republic, the 
perennial play of passions and interest untethered from proper constitutional restraints.  
The soulcraft of The Federalist is the statecraft of self-interest. The principle of taking men 
as they are meant accepting the psychic springs and motives they typically exhibit. The weak and 
inconsistent voice of reason would not be made to directly compete with the superior force and 
certain regularity of the passions and the interests. Publius’ new republicanism lowers the sites of 
political order by placing liberty and comfortable self-preservation through the promotion of 
property rights, commerce and industry at the center of its ends. Self-interest is the “low but solid” 
foundation. The solution was to apply reason’s foresight to crafting political institutions arranged 
to employ the power of the passions and the interests against themselves when necessary. 
Tocqueville says that “the principle of self-interest rightly understood is not a lofty one, but it is 
clear and sure. It does not aim at mighty objects, but it attains without excessive exertion all those 
at which it aims. As it lies within the reach of all capacities, everyone can without difficulty learn 
and retain it.”60 The central moral teaching of the American Republic, as Tocqueville saw so well, 
was training in “self-interest rightly understood.” For the Ancients this would have been no moral 
education at all.   
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The central moral principle of Publius’ arguments is the teaching of natural liberty. Liberty 
is the central principle of his new republicanism. Virtue is not the central end of the political order, 
but liberty provides a place for the life of genuine virtue. The Constitution does not demand, but 
rather rejects, the ironclad and static hierarchical society depicted in the Republic. Instead the 
principle of liberty permits faction through the now liberated pursuit of self-interest. Plato says 
that in a democracy there is “freedom and free speech”, each man organizes “his life in it privately 
just as it pleases him.”61 He says, “Just like a many-colored cloak decorated in all hues, this regime” 
is “decorated with all [psychological] dispositions.”62 When liberty is the principle of a regime, it 
gives free play to the passions and interests of the individual just as it gives free play to the passions 
and opinions of factions within society. In No. 10 Madison depicts a society whose factions are 
the product of the free expression of the diverse faculties of its citizens.  
Society is free to contest and compete with itself without resulting in Plato’s much feared 
stasis.63 Stasis is the factionalization of society which culminates in debilitating internal conflict. 
Stasis would be diffused through the diffusion of factions in an extended republic. For Madison 
the play of factions is as much a horizontal conflict as it is vertical. To the extent there is hierarchy, 
it is one of merit, and appears to be naturally generated out of men’s faculties relative to the needs 
and demands of civil society.  
Harmful passions would be mitigated not educated away. In Publius’ new republicanism 
“the task of restraining and transforming the appetites is replaced by the task of directing them into 
useful, or at least not harmful, channels.”64 This is achieved through a system which exploits “the 
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principle of countervailing passions.”65 Passion is set against passion, interest against interest, 
avarice against avarice, and ambition will counteract ambition.  Following the logic of Publius, 
Adams opines that it is perhaps possible that a well-ordered constitution could prove that a republic 
can exist “even among highwaymen, by setting one rogue to watch another; and the knaves 
themselves may in time be made honest men by the struggle.”66 Perhaps well-ordered institutions 
could make a republic of knaves. For Plato good government was the product of virtuous men. 
Adams for example reversed the causal relation between government and virtue. Meanwhile for 
Adams in the best republics virtue was an “effect of the well-ordered constitution rather than the 
cause.”67  
Another facet of this disagreement rests on the Modern distinction between state and 
society. There is no corresponding distinction between state and society in the Greek city. Greek 
political theory and practice do not recognize this difference. With the city, regime and society are 
one. This means there was little freedom of distinction between the soul of the regime and the soul 
of the citizen. The Constitution represents, on the other hand, the bare minimum of powers to 
promote liberty and order. By design it was not intended to provide the rigorous moral education 
of the Ancient city. Federalism distributes responsibility for the souls of citizens to state and local 
government as much as it distributes sovereignty. The Modern state manages justice on the level 
of necessity, freedom, order and public tranquility, while it leaves moral education to citizens to 
society.   
The Modern distinction between state and society manifests a greater distance between 
public and private life. The spirit of the laws would be increasingly distant from the soul of the 
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citizen. Jefferson went so far as to say that the moral spirit of the people would certainly not be 
found in the Constitution, “but merely in the spirit of the people.”68 Jefferson’s extreme view that 
the politeia was neither architectonic nor had any direct effect on the spirit of society was a 
minority one among the Founders. For them the relationship between state and society remained, 
but the demands and influence of the national government on society would be reduced. 
Citizenship would entail less duties, demand less virtue, be less public. These were the products 
of liberty, the lowered ends of political community and the distance of man from state. In the 
Ancient regime the name “citizen” was a near synonym for statesman. In Modern regimes 
citizenship takes on a more legalistic meaning. Driven by private interests over public duties in 
“society” citizens would have the minimum obligation to follow the law, be industrious and pursue 
their interests in ways that benefit the economic them and the well-being of society as a whole. 
Most citizens would live an increasingly private life of industry and commercial activity.69 Citizens 
would not be legislators deliberating, but employees and consumers. 
The distinction between state and society explains the utter absence, outside of No. 10, of 
virtually any discussion of society, religion or any form of education, moral or otherwise in The 
Federalist Papers. Therefore, while Jefferson may have overstated things, there is something vital 
in his observation about the distance of the national government to the people, and with this 
distance, the precise role it would play in their lives. The national government was not responsible 
for these parts of the citizen’s soul. We can see just how far we have come regarding the everyday 
role of the federal government in the lives of ordinary Americans if we compare The Federalist’s 
picture with today’s ever-increasing intrusion into the private realm. Yet, the Founders hardly 
abandoned the soulcraft moral education. The Federalist presents a composite republic foreign to 
 
68 Thomas Pangle. The Learning of Liberty. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993. p. 3.  
69 Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019. pp. 58-78.  
 
 210 
the Ancients. The full constitution of the American regime consists in three strata of government, 
not one. Thus, the national government of the Constitution represented “the state” while state and 
local governments more directly regulate “society.” Outside the broad principles of liberty and 
self-interest, the details of moral and religious education would be delegated to state and local 
governments.70 One need only examine the Revolutionary Era constitutions of the states to see that 
almost all had a Bill of Rights, and explicit provisions promoting religion and virtue. The 1780 
constitution of the Massachusetts states that “the happiness of a people, and the good order and 
preservation of civil government, essentially depend on piety, religion and morality.”71 The 
Massachusetts constitution was hardly unique in this regard, and yet this type of language is 
conspicuously omitted in the national Constitution.  
The national government formed by the Constitution represents the supreme law of the 
land, but not its only law. This constitutional layer was largely about an arrangement of powers 
which would provide the most basic ends of government by in part neutralizing the worst 
tendencies of human nature. While the national government is designed to mitigate evils than the 
promote social goods, it maintained an increasingly negative role compared to most regimes of the 
past. Government was a necessary evil, less a positive good. It is not that soulcraft ceased to be 
essential to a self-governing people, rather these were matters for the mediating institutions 
referenced by Tocqueville, which are closer and more accountable to the people. The distinction 
between state and society does not eliminate the obligation of moral education and its cultivation 
of moral or social sentiments. Mention of the moral sentiments are not absence in The Federalist. 
Hamilton and Madison speak of the moral sentiments of “humanity” and “sympathy”.72 But such 
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sentiments are not so much formed by the Constitution as presumed. The Constitution presumed 
self-interest and was designed to encourage self-interest rightly understood. Moral sentiments were 
the prerequisites demanded of the ethos of a self-governing society. In his Farwell Address, George 
Washington writes, “virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government.”73 In his First 
Inaugural Address, Washington states, “there is no truth more thoroughly established than that 
there exists in the economy and course of nature an indissoluble union between virtue and 
happiness.” Publius and others made clear that only a moral society can be a self-governing 
society. In 1775 John Adams stated, “Public virtue cannot exist in a Nation without private Virtue, 
and public Virtue is the only Foundation of Republics.”74 For republican self-government to 
succeed “public passion must be superior to all private passions.”75 “We have no government,” 
said Adams, “armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality 
and religion. Avarice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry would break the strongest cords of our 
Constitution as a whale goes through a net. Our Constitution was made only for a moral and 
religious people.  It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.” 76 Benjamin Rush 
illustrated the causal chain between religion, virtue and liberty. In his essay on the moral education 
proper to a republic, he stated the only foundation for “a republic is to be laid in Religion. Without 
this there can be no virtue, and without virtue there can be no liberty, and liberty is the object and 
life of all republican governments.” 
77
 
Adam Smith. It is of note, however that the term “compassion” while generally implied by these terms, and central 
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2. The Regime Founded on Nature 
 
The Constitution of 1795, like its predecessors, was made for man. In the course of my life I have 
seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians etc.; I know, too, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be a 
Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never met him in my life; if he exists, his is unknown 
to me.1 
- Joseph de Maistre, Considerations on France 
 
The American Revolution represented a partial “emancipation from history” which 
allowed the new nation and its Founders to attempt an experimental founding of a regime based 
on the principles of human nature.2 Founding a regime on nature meant building it on the twin 
cornerstones of human nature: Natural Rights, on the one hand, and its faculties of mind which 
generate the likely and durable motives by which the actions of those in society and government 
can be reasonably predicted Was the American republic founded on nature or history? The answer 
is that Publius does not make the schismatic distinction between these two phenomena, that would 
be characteristic of historicist thought of the 19th and 20th centuries. Human nature was the unifying 
ground of human history and therefore human nature could be inferred from history, properly 
understood, as an inquiry into the actions of men. 
In No. 39 Publius asserts that the Constitution is consistent with both history and nature. 
He says it is in harmony with “the genius of the people of America” and “the fundamental 
principles of the revolution.”3 The Constitution would be rooted in the American ethos and the 
Natural Rights of the Declaration which provided the Revolution with its principles. Yet, this ethos 
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was itself decisively shaped by Natural Rights thinking already embedded, as it was, in the 
Revolution and the state constitutions which were its fruits. American society itself appeared to 
the Founders to have some of the admirable attributes and liberty of a nation founded increasing 
in conformity with human nature, and in particular with the human equality not recognized in 
European class societies and constitutions. John Adams himself asserted that the state constitutions 
on which the national one was based, were erected in conformity with human nature itself. The 
Founders’ synthesis of Enlightenment rationalism with religion, allowed them to reject, avant le 
lettre, all those historicisms, progressivisms and scientisms which attempt to tether the being of 
man indiscriminately to time and history and willfully reshape it in their own image. The 
unchanging “laws of nature and nature’s God”, not those of time, history or progress, were the 
guidepost of human identity and conduct. 
This conformity with man’s nature did not simply mean, of course, that the Constitution, 
or its underlying principles, were “written on a blank slate.”4 When Hamilton speaks of a Founding 
based on “reflection and choice,” rather than “accident and force” he does not claim that they entire 
nature of the regime was the product of rational speculation and a rejection of all received tradition 
handed down by the accidents of history. Nonetheless, these traditions would be brought before 
reason’s tribunal and refashioned in a novel manner. History was seen, not only as an accidental 
force which imposed its standards on the present, but as a repository of human action for men to 
weigh, consider and judge in the present. Publius and Founders concretely adapted Lockean 
principles to a society already significantly shaped by them. Edmond Burke attempted to claim 
that the American Constitution “reflected national character and history” and “not any abstract 
 




‘rights of man.’”5 The problem with this assertion is that it does not seriously take into 
consideration an American society of 1787 imbued with those “abstract” principles. Nor is it 
accurate to say that Lockean rights are mere abstractions. There is nothing abstract about the right 
to life or to justly defend yourself from the threat of violent death. At the base of Lockean rights 
is the primordial and concrete biological imperative of self-preservation and its ramifications.  
In the Social Contract Rousseau says the founder-legislator must be capable “of changing 
human nature, of transforming each individual” and “of altering man’s constitution.”6 For 
Rousseau the legislator was a singular being who crafted the keystone of law alone through self-
contained and conscious exertions of intellect, as opposed to a collective, unconscious and 
spontaneous process of historical trial, error and correction. Speaking of such founders, Hayek 
says “all the famous law-givers did not intend to create new law but merely to state what law was 
and had always been.”7 Publius and the rest of the members of the Grand Convention acted neither 
like Rousseau’s Great Legislator, nor did they simply capitulate to the mere facts of history by 
simply reasserting their rights as Englishman. 
The American Revolution was no doubt conservative in some ways, as Burke suggested, 
but it was no longer merely determined to conserve the rights of British subjects, elements of the 
English Constitution or English Common Law. Instead, the Revolution and the Constitution sought 
to conserve a new and distinct way of life that had developed in the New World which asserted 
the sovereignty of the People, not the Crown. This practical assertion that it is the people who are 
truly sovereign has no parallel in English history and is unintelligible without reference to the 
Natural Rights tradition of John Locke and others. Burke thought the original aim of the American 
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Founding “was not to secure independence from Britain, but to secure the legal rights of subjects 
under the English constitution.”8 The radical, even audacious, claim of the American Founding 
was to have erected a regime on the principles of nature itself. Nature, not history was the 
foundation and standard of the Revolutionary period from 1776 to the Grand Convention and 
subsequent ratification. The Founders did not see themselves as on the right side of history, rather 
historical chance had merely granted fortuitous circumstances to implement this unprecedented 
form of regime. When Hegel had seen Napoleon in Jena on October 13, 1806, he described him 
as the “World-Spirit on Horseback.” The Founders understood the history-making nature of their 
endeavor, but did not believe themselves to be the instruments of the transcendent, or prophets of 
History.  
Edmond Burke had written, for example, that "the people of America had ... formed a 
constitution as well adapted to their circumstances as they could.”9 Burke saw the American 
revolution in primarily conservative terms. The Constitution was merely the capstone of the 
transplantation and “restoration” of English society in the New World whose essential form was 
to be found in the English Constitution.10 It is no doubt true that the “constitution was the product 
of centuries of tradition, wisdom and experience.”11 No one doubted this vital inheritance. Of 
course it not a speculative document but an “invention of prudence” which found its wisdom in an 
ingenious reflection on past experience. Wisdom is by definition a product of experience, and as 
such a product of reflection on the past. But prudent conclusions about the past do not entail the 
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dogmatic recitation of our forefather’s wisdom. Hamilton and Madison repeatedly stress the 
novelty of the constitutional experiment. Publius and the Founders talk not as if they are merely 
securing the rights of Englishmen, but rather assert the novelty of their enterprise. The evidence 
for this novelty is evident first and foremost in the provisions of the Constitution itself. The proof 
that received tradition is not the whole story is evident in the difference between the constitutions 
of American and England.  
Look no further than the repudiation of monarchy and a full dependence on the People as 
the essence of the regime. One regime enshrined equal rights under the law, the other maintained 
a multitiered feudal class system which was a legacy of the Middle Ages. No regime in history at 
that time, had ever asserted equality under the law or the moral premise on which it rested, that 
‘abstraction’ that “all men are created equal.” One distinguished noble from commoner, the other 
did not. One constitution was written and expressed, the other existed only as an unwritten set of 
traditions and habits. One was literally the product of the piecemeal accumulation of historical 
precedents, the other of a Convention which devised the social compact in its entirety based on 
conscious deliberations. One was a monarchy, the other a republic. One pledged fealty to the 
Crown, the other placed sovereignty in the People. One blended the executive and legislative in 
parliamentary fashion, while the other established a strong separation of powers which would be 
guarded jealously. One had would have a Bill of Rights based on moral principle, while the other 
would have one based solely on historical precedent. 
Hamilton argues that the inclusion of a Bill of Rights would made it seem that government 
was granting to the citizens that which they already possessed by nature.12 He explicitly invokes 
the model of the English Bill of Rights of 1688, in which rights had been wrested from the Crown, 
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as that which was rejected. Hamilton feared that the inclusion of a bill of rights would make it 
seem identical in nature to the English Bill of Rights. The written enumeration of rights would 
make it appear as if government was granting, rather than securing rights. In English history rights 
were freedoms won from the Crown over time, not found in human nature universally.13  
In the Spirit of Law, Montesquieu writes that the “government most in conformity with 
nature is the one whose particular arrangement best relates to the disposition of the people for 
whom it is established.”14 The relationship between city and the soul, government and human 
nature, illustrates how political order is a direct product of human nature. Government is the 
outward expression of our inner nature. 15 Political science and statesmanship therefore necessarily 
depend on a “view of human nature, and the government…appropriate” to it.16 Human nature is in 
need of a form commensurate to it. For Montesquieu, the government that is most nature, is also 
most compatible with the faculties and interests of the people, as human beings and members of a 
particular society.17  
Good government is that form most in harmony with human nature.  All thinking about the 
best regime simply, or the best possible, is predicated on a form which might best perfect or fulfill 
human nature in its individual and collective existence. Government’s conformity to human nature 
culminates in political prosperity and human happiness. If government is nothing less than the 
greatest reflection on human nature, the men who crafted the Constitution simultaneously sought 
to navigate the horse trading of the Convention, while hewing as closely as possible to human 
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nature and the particulars of the American spirit. Publius and the American Founders believed that 
in fact, the novel republican form they had devised was more in conformity with human nature 
than any other regime in history. The American republic would be the first regime truly founded 
on human nature. Madison describes American republicanism imbued with a “manly spirit,” which 
“posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous 
innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favour of private rights and public happiness.”18 
The explicit goal of the American Founding was to contrive a regime in harmony with the 
human soul itself. Williams says The Federalist’s view of the “nature of man logically shaped the 
kind of government they were advocating.”19 This statement does not go far enough in clarifying 
the Founders’ intent. They sought to devise and justify the Founding precisely because it was seen 
as in conformity with the universal characteristics of human nature. By erecting a regime on “the 
simple principles of nature” the Founders sought a form of government that would stand as more 
than a mere child of its times.20   
In response to the 1795 constitution of the French Republic and the Universal Rights of 
Man proclaimed by the French Revolution, Joseph de Maistre famously said that he had searched 
in vain for this universal “man,” and had found only Frenchmen.21 de Maistre saw “man” as such 
and his “universal” rights, as mere abstractions. For de Maistre human life existed only within the 
particular and concrete confines of a specific historically rooted regime. This criticism echoes 
Wilson’s latter remarks that no mention of the concerns of 1911 are to be found in the 1776 
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Declaration. In this same vein Habermas concludes that a government founded on the basis of 
Natural Right is “the autonomous creation by contract, of legal compulsion spring solely from the 
compulsion of philosophical reason.”22 By contrast, most regimes throughout history, like England 
and its ancient constitution, have conceived of the principles of their national identity, their rights 
and their duties, as rooted in the particulars of their histories. These regimes had seen their 
constitutional principles as primarily the product of historical development over time. Their nation 
was a natural outgrowth of their particular history, habits and institutions, not a universal notion 
of human nature. The distinct social conditions of the colonies, uprooted and distant from the long 
historical memory of the Europe, held out the promise of a new type of regime. The United States 
of America would instead be built on the cornerstone of man qua man. This is the universalist 
creed of the American.  
In Federalist No. 1 Hamilton writes that the proposed constitution conforms with “the true 
principles of republican government.”23 Publius’ “revised republican form” was considered to be 
more “consonant” with the “constitution of human nature.”24 In his Political Sketches of 1787, 
congressman William Van Murray, speaking of the states, said the “American republics” were 
“built upon the realities of human nature.”25 They were “free and responsive to the people, framed 
so as to give ‘fair play’ to the actions of human nature.”26 The “true principles” of republicanism 
were understood as themselves in harmony with human nature. They were “true” precisely in so 
far as they were natural. In 1787 on the verge of the Convention, John Adams wrote that the 
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constitutions which would provide the template for the national government were “perhaps, the 
first example of governments erected on the simple principles of nature.”27 At the Convention 
George Mason said “republican governments” were “in favor of the rights of the people—in favor 
of human nature” itself.28 In his Farewell Address, Washington had written that the foundation of 
the American regime “was not laid in the gloomy age of Ignorance and Superstition; but at an 
Epoch when the rights of mankind were better understood and more clearly defined, than at any 
other period.” Michael Zuckert writes, “the great novelty and power of the American experiment” 
was to found a “regime based on nature, the regime ordered to natural rights.”29  
If the Constitution asserts the “true principles of republican government,” Publius and 
Founders believed in turn, these principles were in conformity with human nature itself. The “true 
principles” of the American republic are synonymous with the “simple principles of nature.” The 
Lockean rights of the Revolution and the novel political science on which the Constitution was 
based convinced the Founders they were establishing a historically unique regime precisely 
because of such a conformity. Epstein says that “republican government, because it is wholly 
popular, might be said to take its essential character from human nature, its blending of qualities 
derives from the way in which human nature may be expected to behave in certain prescribed 
circumstances.”30 George Mason said republicanism was “in favor of the rights of the people.”31 
Adams echoes this assertion almost verbatim writing that republican principles were “in favor of 
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the rights of mankind.”32 Zuckert has described this new form of republicanism, in harmony with 
human nature, as the “the natural rights republic.”33  
The Federalists and the Anti-Federalists had debated tirelessly over the precise meaning of 
“republicanism.” Was America to have the hallmarks of a Classical Republic, or would it 
increasingly yield the Republicanism of modern liberals dedicated to popular sovereignty like John 
Locke? Clearly the solution explained by Publius is heavily indebted to Modern liberalism and 
Modern Republicanism, yet with an eye to vital dimensions of the Classical tradition that could 
not be ignored. What is a republic? The central principles both sides agreed on was that a republic 
was a form of government in which all were equal under the law, and primarily dedicated to the 
sovereignty and the liberty of the people. Therefore a republic was “natural” precisely because its 
political structure made all men equal under the law, and reflected the natural moral equality of 
mankind. John Adams in 1787 defined a republic as “a government, in which all men, rich and 
poor, magistrates and subjects, officers and people, masters and servants, the first citizen and the 
last, are equally subject to the laws.”34 This form of government originates with a written 
constitution dedicated in principle to the res publica.  
A republic, or res publica, was literally the common “thing of the people.”35  It was a form 
of government which was the property of the people. Adams says the word res, “signified in the 
Roman language wealth, riches, property; the word publicus, quasi populicus, and per syncope 
poplicus, signified public, common, belonging to the people; res publica, therefore, was publica 
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res, the wealth, riches, or property of the people”36 A republic was “a government in which the 
property of the people predominated and governed; and it had more relation to property than 
liberty.” 37 A republic “signified a government, in which the property of the public, or people, and 
of every one of them, was secured and protected by law. This idea, indeed, implies liberty; because 
property cannot be secure unless the man be at liberty to acquire, use, or part with it, at his 
discretion, and unless he have his personal liberty of life and limb, motion and rest, for that 
purpose. It implies, moreover, that the property and liberty of all men, not merely of a majority, 
should be safe.”38 Therefore, the government is the property every man, because “every man has a 
share in government.”39   
What do Adams and Mason mean when they affirm the American republic as “natural”? 
The claim of a government “erected on the simple principles of nature” should not be over-
construed. This profession was simultaneously bold and humble. In fact they were negating 
historical claims of divine authorship and implicitly calling the fruits of their own deliberations 
before the tribunal of public scrutiny to an historically unprecedented degree. The Convention was 
not the stormy peak of Sinai. The Founding would not be set in a mythical past lost to the mists of 
time, but reported in the daily paper. For all its secrecy, the Convention was not a conclave whose 
proceeding remained permanently concealed in order to perpetrate a fraud. The fidelity of The 
Federalist to many of the arguments proposed at the Convention is a testament to this ultimate 
transparency.  
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A natural regime does not claim divine authorship or authority. It is a founding publicly 
acknowledged as natural, not supernatural. It is made by men and their reasonings not gods or 
heroes and their omnipotence. There was virtually no invocation of God or the divine in the 
rhetoric of either the Convention or The Federalist. It a regime based on empirical observations 
of human conduct by mere mortals and established through the self-acknowledged imperfect 
reasonings of men. It instantiates mortal opinions about human nature in a self-acknowledged 
man-made document evident for all to see. Adams writes the nation was not founded on “artifice, 
imposture, hypocrisy” or “superstition.”40  It would rest on “the natural authority of the people 
alone, without pretense to miracle or mystery.”41 Adams makes clear that “It will never be 
pretended that any persons employed in that service had interviews with the gods, or were in any 
degree under the inspiration of Heaven.”42 He concludes that “Neither the people, nor their 
conventions…considered legislation in any other light than” the mundane, “as ordinary arts and 
sciences.”43 The regime founded on nature can be judged before nature’s tribunal of reason and 
experience. It was literally an experiment whose results could be rationally and empirically tested. 
American history is this test. The self-conscious absence of supernatural rhetoric in the founding, 
at that point unique in history, is a central dimension of the naturalness of the American regime.    
The attempted conformity of the American republic to human nature is evident in a variety 
of ways: The central meaning Publius and the Founders attributed to the term “natural” was 
government that rested in “the natural authority of the people alone.”44 Popular sovereignty was 
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dictated by man’s moral equality of Natural Rights which manifests politically as a “wholly 
popular” government, of, by and for the people. The republican form was singularly associated 
with the natural principle of liberty. A fully human existence demands liberty. Government by the 
people’s consent is then consistent with the Natural Rights inferred from human nature. Writing 
in April of 1787 in his Vices of the Political System of the United States, and repeated verbatim in 
his speech on the merits of the New Jersey Plan to the Convention on 19 June, Madison said 
“Where slavery exists the republican theory becomes still more fallacious.”45 Republican theory is 
contradicted by slavery because liberty is its essential principle. The distinct dignity of human 
nature conferred by its rational faculty necessitates liberty.  
This new form of republic was a popular government. Popular government is in conformity 
with the natural liberty of mankind. It was an expression of the law of human nature and its Natural 
as understood by the statesmen and philosophers of the day. Popular government is rooted in action 
based on the distinctively human act of deliberation and consent rather than mere impulse or 
animal coercion. Popular government is a recognition of natural human equality. There are no 
natural rulers or those who should be ruled. The supreme law of this regime recognizes man’s 
natural moral equality, his equality of rights. This is achieved through the equal application of the 
law and the political and legal denial of a hereditary nobility, or any other acknowledgement of a 
fixed hierarchy of class distinction within society. All men would be equally subject to the same 
laws in the same way. Nonetheless it recognizes the natural or given distinction of men’s birth and 
faculties, which if utilized, allow men to prosper and distinguish themselves in accord with their 
merit. This would establish a “natural aristocracy among men”46 and “obtain for rulers” men of the 
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highest virtue.47 Diverse men with diverse births and faculties will benefit differently under the 
same laws.  
The natural regime takes men as they are given, naturally. Taking men as they are means 
taking into account those features given by nature. This meant respecting their actual conduct and 
natural or likely motives. It would be based on how men actually behave rather than beatific images 
of how they ought to. This principal manifests in a healthy respect for the diversity of actual human 
types and their real motivations. Central was an acknowledgement of the natural gravitational role 
of self-interest as the prime mover and shaper of human action. Taking men as they are naturally 
meant respecting both the vices and virtues of human nature. Recognizing its vices, this regime 
acknowledges the limits and fallibility of human reason. Government would be grounded 
theoretically and practically in the authority of opinion and respect its natural diversity. Opinion, 
not the fallacious mantle of authoritative truth or divine right, would rule. Taking men as they are 
motivated the Modern liberal attitude of tolerance to the diversity of men and their opinions.   
If the essence of the republican form is liberty, the essence of the novel republicanism of 
Publius is a priority on civil, as opposed to political, liberty. This realism led the Modern republic 
to be dedicated to the civil, not political, liberty of all the people. Civil liberty would be manifest 
and maintained through the rejection of the small, homogeneous, public spirited, mixed regime of 
Classical republicanism. The modern republic would be extended, commercial, wholly popular 
and dedicated to the protection of civil liberties and the right of property in particular. It would be 
a regime largely dedicated to private self-interest which would leave its citizens free to pursue 
their own needs, desires and happiness. The pursuit of self-interest would particularly come in the 
form of the pursuit of economic well-being within the context of a commercial society which 
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would promote its tendencies as virtues. The principle of civil liberty promoted by modern 
republicanism was understood as more in conformity to human nature than the excessive political 
liberty of classical republics and the pure democracies of the Ancient world. Classical republics 
concerned themselves with cultivating the distinctly human features of its citizens through public 
life. They concerned themselves with the rigorous demands of human excellence. As Madison 
reminds the reader in No. 10, extraordinary Spartan measures, were necessary to shape and unify 
the citizens of the Classical republic. These regimes had to expressly go against the grain of the 
natural inclinations of human nature. In rejecting the Classical republic Montesquieu had observed 
that in a commercial society like England, “the inhabitants are the least coerced, the least 
“modified” in their souls, and the least “artificially educated.”48 Instead, with their civil liberties 
protected “each individual, always independent, would follow to a great extend his caprices and 
fantasies.”49  
The liberal and commercial society of the Modern republic was often considered the least 
coercive, and therefore the least obstructive to the natural tendencies, needs and desires of the 
diversity of human beings. A society in which those desires are liberated therefore gives us a more 
accurate vision of the nature of man acting under his free inclinations. Montesquieu suggests that 
the political scientist is able, through observations of man largely left free to his own devices in a 
liberal commercial society dedicated to civil liberty, to arrive “at the true science of human 
nature.”50 The Ancients had presented a distorted, even fallacious, image of man solely by 
observing extraordinary examples of excellence, rather than men as they are ordinarily. The 
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science of human nature on which Modern republicanism is built, claims then to be superior to, 
and supersede, the Ancient science of human nature which identifies its destination as the closed 
and morally demanding Ancient city. 
Acknowledging the frailties of human nature meant striking the proper balance between 
order and liberty. The lurking passions and defects of human nature demand external constraints. 
The principles of liberty and consent would be counterbalanced by the appropriate checks. This 
was a workable form of ‘wholly popular’ government with sentinels against the deficiencies of 
popular rule like majority tyranny. Natural rights dictate limits to what the majority can consent 
to, and the Constitution provides sentinels to make those boundaries real. Republican government 
is a mean between pure democracy and aristocracy. Through representation consent is preserved. 
Meanwhile the passions of the many are channeled and filtered through their representatives who 
are also their rulers.   
A political science which frames the evaluation of regimes by their degree of naturalness 
was hardly new or unusual. Political philosophers since Plato have viewed regimes as more or less 
natural, more or less in conformity with human nature. This was no less true of the political science 
of the 18th century. They typically assessed the degree to which human nature was bent in 
conformity to the demands of a particular regime or allowed to more freely express its universal 
characteristics. Plato’s Republic was to be a regime rooted in nature, by means of the rule of reason. 
No doubt between the Ancient city and the Modern commercial republic, the meaning of what was 
“natural” had changed, from the highest ends of man’s soul, to the lower needs of mere life pursued 
by the body. Yet, even Plato acknowledges the way democracy gives free reign to the natural 
diversity and impulses of the human soul and does not make burdensome and distorting demands 
of it. In his political essays, Hume writes “Sovereigns must take mankind as they find them, and 
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cannot pretend to introduce any violent change in their principles and ways of thinking… And the 
less natural any set of principles are, which support a particular society, the more difficulty will a 
legislator meet with in raising and cultivating them.”51 Hume, like Montesquieu, captures the 
ambiguity of human nature: What is natural to man as such, is different from what is “natural” to 
an already formed nation whose character has been habituated into a particular second nature. 
Hume identifies the practical advantages and justice of a regime whose principles are in the 
greatest possible conformity with our first and fixed nature. Hume notes for example that the 
principles of the Romans were “somewhat more natural” than those of Sparta.52 The extreme 
habituation required to cultivate Spartan virtue in the Ancient republic is not natural by Modern 
standards. Spartan soulcraft sought to make a virtuous second nature through a discipline so 
extreme as to be contrary to the natural inclinations of our first. Taking men as they are does not 
mean abandoning the cultivation of a second nature; it means having a more healthy respect for 
the first. 
The novel republicanism articulated in The Federalist Papers was the experimental answer 
to an age-old question. How can institutions of genuine self-government be contrived in such a 
way so as to avoid the inevitable diseases to which they are prone? The problem of popular 
government is a conundrum of human nature. Human nature is complex, not simple. The faculties 
of reason and passion are the crosscurrents of the human soul. Both must be respected. Liberty is 
in conformity with the rational element of man’s nature, but the restraints of and on government 
are required by reason’s weakness and the dominance of the passions. The running thread of The 
Federalist Papers is that while human nature demands liberty, history shows self-government has 
failed to properly secure the blessings of nature it was intended to establish. The central problem 
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was how to contrive a form of popular government which could successfully withstand the ills 
incident to popular government by supplying the defects of human nature, while remaining both 
free and stable.  
In Volume I The Federalist illustrates the failures of the Articles to properly anticipate the 
defect of better motives in human nature. These deficiencies are presented as an emblematic 
instance of the more general historical failings of popular governments. The deficiencies of 
democracy were the deficiencies of human nature writ large. Publius and the Founders “distrusted 
democracy for the same reason that they distrusted aristocracy – because they distrusted human 
nature.”53 Both give human nature, whether the few or the many, too much free rein. Both expect 
more virtue than man is capable of. The government of the Articles lacked the power and structure 
to confront these deficiencies. It did not respect or mitigate the factious tendencies “sown in the 
nature of man.” The first government was unable to manage conflict created by competing 
factional interests. The Articles did not attempt to unnaturally bend human nature so much as 
expect more natural virtue and sociability than is reasonable. In light of their experiences under 
the Articles, the Philadelphia Convention concluded the republic “could not live on virtue alone.”54    
Volume II of The Federalist is dedicated to the republican principles, and an account of 
the mechanics, which could remedy the problems incident to popular government. Publius explains 
the arrangement of powers designed to solve the problems posed by self-interest and the passionate 
nature of man. He provides a detailed account of how the enumerated powers and procedures of 
the Constitution can check the defects of human nature. In No. 51 Madison acknowledges that the 
“great difficulty” of “framing government” is that it is “administered by men over men.” 
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Government needs sufficient power to rule men, but not so much that men in power can tyrannize 
over them.  
Publius and the Founders sought to solve the deficiencies of democracy without 
abandoning the principle of popular sovereignty. The solution was a novel form of republicanism. 
The Federalist’s answer was to apply the “republican remedy for the diseases most incident to 
republican government.”55 At the Convention Madison said a republic is the only “defence against 
the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of government.”56 A 
peculiar and innovative form of popular government is the solution to the ills of popular 
government. “A republican system,” said Madison “will control all the evils which have been 
experienced.” 57 The answer to the problem of popular government was a regime founded in proper 
conformity with the vices and virtues of human nature. This started with a more honest assessment 
of the deficiencies of human nature but also a greater appreciation for the common nature of the 
many, and new thinking about the institutions which would be up to the task.  
The Constitution represents this “republican remedy.”58 The constitutional order would 
provide the “dykes and dams” to restrain, channel and control the vicious elements of human nature 
while amplifying the virtuous ones.59  The Constitution channels passions and promotes virtues 
the Founders saw as necessary to the public good, without making excessive or unrealistic 
demands on human nature. The appropriate constitutional mechanisms would be necessary to both 
preserve popular sovereignty and simultaneously mitigate its ills, the ills of human nature. The 
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provisions of the Constitution needed to be based on motives more reliable and durable than virtue, 
honor, duty or some innate moral sense. The Founders did not believe reason, virtue or moral 
sentiments alone were sufficient deterrents to conduct contrary to the public good.  
The Founders’ republicanism was designed to balance the demands of security, stability 
and liberty demanded by human nature in order for all citizens to pursue the good life. It would be 
“wholly popular,” but would both represent and restrain the people. Political liberty would be the 
privilege of an elective aristocracy. The American republic hoped to supply both a sufficient grant 
of freedom commensurate with the reason and dignity of human nature, but also sentinels to guard 
against its own ills and vices. It provides mechanisms for the voice of the people to be heard and 
checks to constrain it Popular sovereignty was consistent with man’s natural liberty, while 
representative institutions would “refine and enlarge” popular opinion for the sake of the common 
interest. The governing majority is constrained by the principles of natural right and the checks of 
separated powers. Constraints would help guarantee liberty would not become license. Self-
governance would require industry and accumulation but also moderation, freedom but also 
rational self-restraint. Self-restraint would be fortified by various checks, like the separation of 
powers, and a moral education which cultivated religious opinion and the citizens’ deliberative 
faculties. The need for reason and virtue remained unabated, but the Founders understood the 
historical calamity of making man’s rational faculty shoulder more than it could bear.   
The liberal principles of American republicanism place it more closely in line with the 
natural inclinations of human beings. Publius and the Founders believed that the way the 
Constitution respected both human vice and virtue made it more natural than any other form. If 
human nature is a mean between vice and virtue, republican government would be a mean between 
the acceptance of vice and the promotion of and dependence on virtue. The regime will not bend 
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and habituate human nature in the name of extreme virtue or self-sacrifice, but only to the extent 
political prosperity demands it. Herbert Storing asserts that Publius rested “his argument for the 
primacy of the Union, not on any notion of a band of brothers or popular patriotism and self-
restraint, but on self-interest and private passion, properly regulated.”60  
Self-interest was accepted as the natural motor of human conduct. The American regime 
embraces self-interest as harmonious with our natural rights, and encourages it, if only to the extent 
in can be leveraged for the common interest. The self-interest of our first nature, however, must 
be educated into a second nature self-interest understood rightly. Civic virtue would be patriotism 
to a regime dedicated to the liberty of the individual. Likewise the republican form would leverage 
certain “vices” of our first nature for public benefit. It would be a commercial republic. Ancient 
acquisitive vices could be deemed modern commercial virtues. Part of the “republican remedy” 
was a self-conscious de-escalation, of the national level, of the conflict between desire and duty, 
private interest and public. “Private rights and public happiness” would be brought as closely in 
line with each other as possible.61 This de-escalation allows for sufficient conformity between the 
passions and interests of the individual and those of the political community in order to solve an 
age-old problem.  
Nonetheless, the success of the republican experiment depended on the proper estimation 
man’s ability to live by his deliberative faculty. What was the natural quotient of reason within 
society at large and how can those more exceptional faculties be recruited into public service? 
Whatever the differences in “the relative strength or exercise of the rational faculty among 
individual men” which Publius and the Founders “readily admitted,” there was “little doubt that 
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the faculty itself was universal.”62 Despite the acknowledged frailties there “was a general 
consensus that all men had a capacity for reason.” 63 Echoing Madison’s claim in No. 55, Hamilton 
writes in No. 76, “the supposition of universal venality in human nature, is little less an error in 
political reasoning, than that of universal rectitude.”64 Hamilton claims that if we view “view 
human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues, or exaggerating its vices” that it has 
sufficient reason and virtue to meet the demands of republican self-government.65 Hamilton 
concludes that “there is a portion of virtue and honour among mankind, which may be a reasonable 
foundation of confidence: and experience justifies the theory.66 In No. 55 Madison  writes that 
there is “a degree of depravity in mankind, which requires a certain degree of circumspection and 
distrust: so there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and 
confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree 
than any other form.”67   
Publius and the Founders believed the true principles of republicanism were synonymous 
with the true principles of human nature. If the solutions Publius proposed are correct, then their 
novel republicanism was not only consistent with the American ethos, but with human nature itself. 
Yet, the republican solution is only possible if human character stands as a mean between virtue 
and vice, between reason and passion. Republican liberty is designed to accommodate both what 
is noble and what is base in human nature. The depravity of human nature, its “defect of better 
motives,” necessitates government. Yet men must also have sufficient reason and virtue to devise 
a regime to compensate for those defects. In No. 39 Madison writes of republicanism that “no 
 
62 Quentin P. Taylor. The Essential Federalist. Madison: Madison House Publishers, 1998. p. 23. 
63 Ibid. 
64 No. 76 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 No. 55 
 
 234 
other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental 
[and universal] principles of the revolution; or with that honourable determination which animates 
every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-
government.”68 Speaking of the provisions of the Constitution, Hamilton writes in No. 57 that “It 
is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of men. But are 
they not all that government will admit, and that human prudence can devise?”69 This constitutional 
republic was an experiment to determine whether men were sufficiently rational to genuinely 
govern themselves. The answer was not a foregone conclusion and held consequences for the fate 
of mankind, not merely the United States.  
The natural regime is not a utopian scheme. The regime rooted in nature, is a more modest 
claim than it might first appear. Publius’ republicanism acknowledges that human nature lacks 
sufficient reason and virtue to be simply self-governing, to live without external constraints at all. 
Men are neither gods nor angels. At the same time there is a sufficient supply to give us “esteem 
and confidence” that mankind is capable of the freest possible form of political constraint. 
Ironically, writes Rahe, this arrangement “seeks to vindicate man’s capacity for self-government 
by teaching him to acknowledge” the limits of this same capacity.70 In 1807 Jefferson’s sentiments 
echoed Publius’ underlying premise of the Constitution when he said, “We are a people capable 
of self-government, and worthy of it.” This is an affirmation human nature and the American ethos. 
In 1797 Jefferson observed that “It was by the sober sense of our citizens that we were safely and 
steadily conducted from monarchy to republicanism, and it is by the same agency alone we can be 
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kept from falling back.”71 Burke sounds the warning regarding the ever-present reality of this 
precipice. “Society cannot exist,” he says, “unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be 
placed somewhere; and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained 
in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions 


















71 Thomas Jefferson. Letter to Arthur Campbell, September 1, 1797. 
72 Edmond Burke, A Letter from Mr. Burke to a Member of the National Assembly; In Answer to Some Objections to 




3. Men Are Not Angels 
 
As all those demonstrate who reason on a civil way of life, and as every history is full of examples, 
it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and orders laws in it to presuppose that all men are 
bad, and that they always have to use the malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free 
opportunity for it. When any malignity remains hidden for a time, this proceeds from a hidden 
cause, which is not recognized because no contrary experience has been seen. But time. which they 
say is the father of every truth. exposes it later.1 
- Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses 
-  
Journalist Horace White once claimed the Constitution “is based upon the philosophy of 
Hobbes and the religion of Calvin. It assumes that the natural state of mankind is a state of war, 
and that the carnal mind is at enmity with God.”2 Historian Richard Hofstadter says the authors of 
Constitution and the Federalist Papers “had a vivid Calvinistic sense of human evil and damnation 
and believed with Hobbes that men are selfish and contentious.” 3 He says these men of experience, 
“having seen human nature on display in the market place, the courtroom, the legislative chamber, 
and in every secret path and alleyway where wealth and power are courted, they felt they knew it 
in all its frailty. To them a human being was an atom of self-interest. They did not believe in man, 
but they did believe in the power of a good political constitution to control him.”4   
While the tenor of both man’s claims is overblown, the general substance is accurate with 
the appropriate caveats. Benjamin Wright says “at first glance the conception of human nature 
stated, reiterated, and depended upon in The Federalist is pessimistic or, in the most unusual sense 
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of the word, realistic”5 Lovejoy say Publius presents “a sound and realistic theory of human 
nature.”6  Dietze writes, Publius “depicts man as able and worthy of self-government but does not 
hesitate to show that frailty of human nature which brought about the crisis under the 
Confederation.”7 Diamond describes The Federalist as presenting “a sober argument for 
democracy, derived from a sober idea of man and the propensities of his nature.”8 In 1788 at the 
Virginia ratifying convention, Madison said that in a “candid examination of history we shall find 
that turbulence, violence, and abuse of power by the majority trampling on the rights of the 
minority, have produced factions and commotions, which in republics, have more frequently than 
any other cause produced despotism.”9  
In No. 6 Hamilton reminds the reader that “men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.”10 
In No. 15 he concludes government is necessary because of the “folly and wickedness of 
mankind.”11 Men are prone to wickedness and folly because their passions do not “conform to the 
dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”12 Even Hume, a man inclined to embrace man’s 
petty foibles, speaks of how good institutions can be a “considerable check on the natural depravity 
of mankind.”13 
Hume acknowledges the “frailty” and “perverseness of our nature,” saying that “it is 
impossible to keep men, faithfully and unerringly, in the paths of justice” because “he is seduced 
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from his great and important, but distant interests, by the allurement of present, though often very 
frivolous temptations. This great weakness is incurable in human nature.”14 Hamilton, quoting 
Hume approvingly, said that “in contriving any system of government…every man ought to be 
supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, but private interest.” 15 A “knave” 
is a “self-interested creature” who ignores the harm they commit to the good of others, while 
blindly pursuing their own.16 Machiavelli is rather more blunt. He says it is “necessary” for anyone 
devising a republic “to presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always have to use the 
malignity of their spirit whenever they have free opportunity for it.”17 In short, The Federalist 
acknowledges that the Constitution presupposes that men are not angels.  
Men are not angels. This is the central insight of The Federalist. It is the permanent political 
problem presented by human nature. This observation haunts the analysis of every aspect of social 
and political relations in The Federalist.  It found its way into the minds of Hamilton and Madison 
by way of their faith, their education, their intellectual heritage, and no less from their reasonings 
on and experience of their fellow man. It represents what Hamilton calls “the accumulated 
experience of ages.”18 That men are imperfect, and their imperfections are in need of restraint, is a 
problem evident throughout history, across time and place. This matter cannot be wished away or 
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made to disappear through progress, the accumulation of scientific knowledge, or utopian schemes 
exhibiting the most virtuous arrangements of political power.  
The Founders and the authors of The Federalist rejected “the popular Enlightenment view 
that man was basically good, and corrupted only from without by faulty institutions such as 
monarchy or mercantilism.”19 The view that men were by nature good led to the conclusion that if 
faulty institutions were merely overthrown, men would “live together in harmony with little or no 
government.”20 Instead venality, corruption, discord, enmity and evil were permanently “sown in 
the nature of man.”21 Man’s shortcomings could never entirely be blamed on exogenous factors 
such as institutions or his circumstances. These flaws were as elements of a cosmic periodic table 
which cannot be fully extricated from his nature. 22 Therefore, they cannot be ignored, only 
accounted for.23 Since no arrangement of political institutions, however virtuous, can eliminate 
depravity and evil altogether and make men good simply, government and the threat of coercion, 
would always be necessary.24 Thus, the cause of the imperfections observed in man and his society 
are imperfections intrinsic to his nature; they are not the product of imperfect institutions alone. If 
human nature has definitive defects and limits, neither mankind nor his institutions are perfectible, 
or subject to final solutions. The lesson to be learned from the fact that men are not angels is that 
the role of government and social policy is to mitigate existing ills, not transform man and his 
society in order to banish them from human nature itself. Abolish man’s imperfections and abolish 
man. 
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The inextricable problem is the depravity and limits of human nature. Yet, if the Founders 
had been as pessimistic about man as Hobbes, they would have advocated for a Leviathan, a statist 
vision of monolithic government rooted in quivering fear of a Mortal God. Instead, they advocated 
for republican self-government rooted in liberty and self-interest rightly understood. Despite their 
belief in the existence of sufficient virtue for self-government, this observation meant government 
itself was in need of restraint as much as those it governed. A limited government, whose sole 
purpose would be to secure Natural Rights, is the novel goal which stems from this observation. 
The Federalist does not present government merely a necessary evil, but they are at great pains to 
acknowledge the evils of power unrestrained. Power unrestrained gives force to the less than 
angelic impulses of human nature. The authors of The Federalist do not, like Hobbes or Spinoza 
see everything natural in man from a morally neutral or amoral perspective. They were moral 
realists who identify good and evil as inevitable products of human nature, not the artificial 
constructs of naming and society. Their thinking on morality and justice is more in line with 
Christian Theology and John Locke. Human depravity or evil was not a social construct. Strauss 
puts this attitude rather tersely: “no bloody or unbloody change of society can eradicate the evil in 
man.”25  
When Madison invoked “angels” in contradistinction to “men” he raised the specter of his 
Calvinist outlook on man. Calvinist theology “stressed the fallen state of human nature.”26 A 
notebook from Madison’s teenage days as a student contains the following syllogism: 
1. No sinners are happy. 
2. Angels are happy; therefore 
3. Angels are not sinners.27 
 
25 Leo Strauss. The City and Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. p. 5.  
26 Roger Smith. The Norton History of the Human Sciences. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997. p. 286.  
27 Garrett Ward Sheldon. The Political Philosophy of James Madison. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
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The implication of this syllogism’s conclusion, “Angels are not sinners” is that if men are sinners, 
they are not angels. Man, is that “ambiguous being, in between, more than an animal, less than a 
god.”28 Madison’s syllogism represents a sound rejection of the theory of the natural goodness of 
mankind or the belief in historical progress and human perfectibility. Both Hamilton and Madison 
speak in a language tinctured by Christian traditions including the Calvinist Protestantism woven 
into the fabric of colonial America. They speak of man’s “wickedness” and “depravity”. In No. 55 
Madison says, “there is a degree of depravity in mankind, which requires a certain degree of 
circumspection and distrust.”29 In responding the Federal Farmer, Hamilton says “Your conduct, 
in every respect, affords a striking instance of the depravity of human nature.” 30 The term 
“depravity”, used twice in The Federalist, is of unmistakably religious origin. It was the coin of 
the realm for the Christian thought which dominated America from its colonial foundings onward. 
In the Christina context the term signifies man’s terrestrial limitations and fallenness, in short, his 
sinfulness. The Westminster Confession was “the creedal authority of English Calvinism familiar 
to all Colonial Presbyterians.”31 In said, “From…original corruption…we are utterly indisposed, 
disabled, and made opposite to all good and wholly inclined to evil.” 32 This is the very definition 
of man’s depravity and fallenness.  
What are men truly like? In No. 1 Hamilton lists the permanent and prevailing motives of 
human conduct as “ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other 
motives, not more laudable than these.”33 In No. 57 Hamilton writes of the “caprice and wickedness 
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of men.”34 In No. 72 he speaks of their “avarice” “vanity” and “ambition”. In Nos. 6 and 73 
Hamilton writes of their “love of power” and dominion.35 In No. 6 he writes how popular 
assemblies are “frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of 
other irregular and violent propensities.”36 Such sentiments on human Hamilton nature echoed his 
remarks at the Constitutional Convention. On June 22, 1787, he announced: “Take mankind in 
general, they are vicious... Take mankind as they are, and what are they governed by? Their 
passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may act from more worthy 
motives. One great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than they are. Our prevailing 
passions are ambition and interest; it will ever be the duty of a wise government to avail itself of 
these passions, in order to make them subservient to the public good.”37 In No. 78 Hamilton says 
that social and political conflicts “grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind.”38 Throughout 
The Federalist Hamilton and Madison speak of how human nature is subject to “quarrels, 
jealousies, and envy” prompted by its “love of preeminence” and “wounded pride,” which lead to 
political “vindictiveness” and strife.39  
Men are all the more unmoved by their better angels when assembled in a mass. Speaking 
of “great councils,” Madison writes in No. 37, that their goal is to reconcile discordant opinions, 
and assuage mutual jealousies, but has been little more than “a history of factions, contentions, 
and disappointments; and may be classed among the most dark and degrading pictures, which 
display the infirmities and depravities of the human character.”40 In No. 49 Madison says “a nation 
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of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato.”41 
There are no mortal men of perfect wisdom or virtue. In No. 55 Madison doubles down, saying 
that even if “every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have 
been a mob.”42 In No. 15 Hamilton concludes government is necessary because “the passions of 
men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice.”43 
The central concern in the observation of man’s depravity was not the redemption of his 
soul, despite the centrality of Christian influences in these observations. No doubt, Publius paints 
a compelling Christian portrait of fallen man colored by the language and observations of 
Augustine and Calvin. For Augustine, fallen man, because he was “governed by self-love, is 
constantly subject to destructive emotions and impulses. He is envious and vindictive; he loves 
glory; he desires material riches; he is consumed by what Augustine calls libido dominandi, the 
lust for mastery, the desire to dominate others.”44 This desire for mastery “refuses to accept that 
all men are by nature equal.”45 Augustine held man’s libido dominandi, its “lust for mastery” and 
“desire to dominate others" was the arch passion of the soul that posed the central problems of the 
City of Man. This passion was both the root cause of evil, but also the origin of civil society which 
“arose out of man’s lust for power and violence.”46 A jealous Cain, slew his brother Abel, and 
founded a city. Departing from his Pagan forebears, Augustine understood government as an 
expression of the base impulses of a fallen human nature.47 Government “arose out of man’s lust 
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for power and violence… and it has always existed largely to acquire and preserve those things 
which man desires only because he is greedy and sinful.”48  
Depravity is a synonym for what Hamilton calls in No. 24 “the frailty of human nature.”49 
Human beings have neither “perfect wisdom” nor “perfect virtue.”50 What is the cause of these 
limitations? In No. 55 Madison says the “passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason.”51 
Reason fails to overcome the dominion of the passions.  In his Essay on Man, Alexander Pope 
writes, “The ruling passion conquers reason still.”52 Hamilton and Madison follow Hume’s 
observation which identifies the fundamental flaw in human nature that man is primarily a being 
of passion succumbs to immediate interest because his reason is typically too weak to dictate action 
based on considerations of long-term interest. Reason is limited, either because it is made 
inoperative by the passions, or in light of its insufficient knowledge of its objects of understanding. 
The limits of reason in most men and society at large are identified as the cause of injustice. 
Madison merely paraphrases Augustine when he says, “If men were angels, no government would 
be necessary.”53 Since men are fallen beings, with reason frail and unruly passions, unable to 
restrain themselves by internal means alone, the external restraint of government is necessary.  
The concern for Publius and the Founders, however, was not to save souls, but preserve 
life and liberty. The problem of human nature was political, not moral. Unlike Augustine and 
Calvin, Publius is too concerned with the City of Man to simply condemn the depravity of human 
nature. The very name “Publius” illustrates their respect for worldly ambition and the glory of the 
City of Man. Rather, this is a disinterested scientific observation of man’s limitations the political 
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scientist and founder must consider. Despite his central concern for the unruly passions which 
militate against the common good, there is a quiet celebration of its self-interestedness. Avarice 
can be channeled into industriousness and ambition trained and tempered by restraints and 
provided the proper objects of desire.   
Human nature is naturally egoistic, inclined to self-interest and self-love. Evil exits because 
men are willing to harm others in order to benefit themselves. Man’s natural sociability inclines 
him not only to amity and harmony, but also to enmity and conflict. Conflict and enmity are no 
less a product of man’s sociability as is harmony. Men desire and perhaps even need enemies as 
well as friends. Hobbes illustrates how men desire dominion, mastery, honors and glory in a zero-
sum game of recognition. If some desire to be masters, there must have slaves to realize and 
recognize their dominion. The conflict between individual and common good, and the failure to 
glean long-term interests, is as much the product of natural egoism and reason’s limits, as it is 
man’s natural diversity and individuality.  
Hume says the source of all injustice is our self-love, untutored and unrestrained. “Self-
love”, says Hume, “when it acts at its liberty,… is the source of all injustice and violence.”54 Hume 
observes the dire and “pernicious effects” of self-love, when given unrestrained liberty, culminate 
in “the total dissolution of society.”55 Hume says it is evident that “each person loves himself better 
than any other single person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations 
and acquaintance.”56 This propensity to self-love, however must “necessarily produce an 
opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions; which cannot but be dangerous” 
to civil society.57 Self-love naturally inclines men “to extend his acquisitions as much as 
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possible.”58 The acquisitive impulse is merely an extension of man’s self- love. Hume says the 
avidity “of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, 
perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society.”59 As man extends the sphere of his 
acquisitive impulse, he necessarily begins to encroach and invade on others and commit injustice.  
Depravity suggests our myopia to discern our own interests even when we seek to 
understand them rightly. This myopia is caused by the connection which subsists between man’s 
“reason and his self-love,” which cause his opinions and his passions to “have a reciprocal 
influence on each other.”60 The problem is that our opinion of our self-interest is always tinctured 
with self-love. Our interest comes in a form as it “appears” to us, rather than in its “real and intrinsic 
value.”61 Self-love conspires with reason to distort our understanding of our genuine interests. Self-
love inclines men to be increasing indifferent to things and people sufficiently remote to our own 
immediate sphere of existence.62 When people are sufficiently remote committing injustice against 
those who are anonymous becomes permissible because we cannot see how it might harm our own 
interest.  
Both our affections and understanding diminish as people and things become increasingly 
remote in time or space. At such a distance, we lack the ability to sympathize and see others as an 
extension of our own sphere of self-love. Hume says, “There is no quality in human nature, which 
causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to 
the distant and remote, and makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their 
intrinsic value.”63 Men, says Hume, are always “inclined to prefer present interest to distant and 
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remote.”64 They are unable “to resist the temptation of any advantage, that they may immediately 
enjoy, in the apprehension of an evil, that lies at a distance from them.” 65 Since distance 
anaesthetizes us to those things sufficiently remote to ourselves, we are willing to pursue our raw 
desires without the call of pity, or the pangs of conscience, guilt or shame. This reciprocal influence 
means men will always consider their own interest first, and when considering themselves, their 
immediate interest over remote. This is why no man can be a judge in his own case and government 
becomes necessary to the third-party administration of justice. This explains why self-love needs 




















4. The Original Inducements to Civil Power 
 
A Government like ours has so many safety values, giving vent to over heated passions, that it 
carries within itself a relief against the infirmities from which the best of human Institutions cannot 
be exempt.1 
- James Madison, Letter to General LaFayettte, November 25, 1809 
 
 “Government,” says Madison, is nothing less than the “greatest of all reflections on human 
nature.” Government is a product and expression of human nature. All political science and 
philosophy, all government, is nothing less than a great meditation on human nature. Governance 
is an act of steering or guiding, commanding or ruling. Its very existence indicates men do not or 
cannot simply direct their either their individual or collective lives by themselves. They are unable 
to rule themselves by internal controls alone. Unlike angels who need no government, men require 
external channels to guide and restrain their motivations and actions. The necessity and structure 
of law and government is the most telling admission that the uneducated and unrestrained passions 
and interests of human nature are averse to the rights of others and the public interest because it 
cannot restrain itself through internal means alone. The existence and necessity of government is 
an admission of a central fact of a human nature: “men are not angels.” Therefore, man is in need 
of external constraint.   
Government is a consequence of a nature incapable of ruling itself simply. To say men are 
not angels is to say that “human nature does not by “itself generate social harmony.”2  Rather civic 
harmony necessitates government and the “appropriate legislation.”3 Hamilton asks, “Why has 
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government been instituted at all?” He answers: “Because the passions of men will not conform to 
the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”4 In the Social Contract, Rousseau writes, 
“If there were a people consisting of Gods, it would govern itself democratically. So perfect a 
Government is not suited to men.”5 Thus popular government cannot simply recognize the consent 
of the people. Government exists because men exhibit a “defect of better motives, they lack 
sufficient self-control and are therefore need external constraint. In No. 78 Hamilton writes that 
the constitutional order is a product of “the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human 
nature.”6 The very existence and structure of government are a product of the peculiar nature of 
mankind and its weaknesses.  
In language evocative of Madison’s No. 51, Hume speaks of the “ills” of human nature and 
its only “remedy.” Hume says “a remedy” for these ills “can never be effectual without correcting 
this propensity.”7 Yet, such weaknesses are “incurable in human nature” and therefore men must 
“endeavour to palliate what they cannot cure.”8 The observation of the incurability of man’s 
limitations sits as the foundation of Publius political philosophy.9 Only through “reflection and 
experience,” by can man learn the “pernicious effects” of self-love at its liberty.10 Only when his 
“original inclination” is “checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or observation” can 
man begin to mitigate the negative consequences of his destructive passions.11 And, since it is 
impossible to “change or correct any thing material” in human nature, the best that can be done “is 
to change our circumstances and situation, and render the observance of the laws of justice our 
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nearest interest and their violation our most remote.”12 In language later echoed by Madison, Hume 
says it is through civil society alone that mankind “is able to supply his defects and raise himself 
up to an equality with his fellow-creatures.” 13 “By society,” Hume writes, “all his infirmities are 
compensated.”14 And yet, passions which place man in a State of Nature, then, also become the 
very inducements by which he will liberate himself from it.  Government is the only palliative for 
the defects of human nature. 
Government represents the “remedy for the deficiencies” of human nature.15 It is the mark 
of Cain indicating man’s limits. The opening lines of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, illustrate 
the relationship sitting at the heart of Publius’ essays. Paine says: “Society is produced by our 
wants and governments by our wickedness…government in its best state is but a necessary evil.”16 
The existence of society demonstrates we are not self-sufficient, we have needs which our own 
individual powers, of themselves, cannot satisfy. Meanwhile the existence of government provides 
the monopoly of coercion to compel citizens to the performance of their covenant, to follow the 
laws which protect their neighbor from their malignant desires. Man harbors numerous desires 
destructive of the happiness and well-being of others. The very existence of government proves 
the existence of such malignant passions within the soul of man which would harm others. 
Paine says society “promotes our happiness positively” while government promotes our 
well-being “negatively by restraining our vices.” 17 The necessity of force and compulsion, and the 
loss of some portion of man’s total liberty is proof of man’s depravity. “Like a dress,” Paine writes, 
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government “is a badge of lost innocence.”18 Government is an emblem of the limits of human 
nature. In 1776 Paine asserted that the primordial function of government is “to supply the defect 
of moral virtue” found lacking in our nature.19 In 1787 Madison tells us that government exists 
because of the “defect of better motives” in human nature. Our internal motives, reason and virtue, 
lack sufficient efficacy. Paine tells us that government is “rendered necessary by the inability of 
moral virtue to govern the world.”20 Man’s depravity, his lack of better motives, are the “original 
inducements to the establishment of civil power.”21 
The original function of government is “to control the caprice and wickedness of men.”22 
Human nature needs government because it is made of a crooked and incompatible timber. The 
interests of the individual or group do not naturally conform with the interests of the political 
community. Government is necessary because the “passions of men will not conform to the 
dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”23 The seeds of strife in society are “sown in the 
nature of man.”24 From this Spinoza concluded that “no society can exit without government and 
force, and hence laws to control and restrain the unruly appetites and impulses of men.”25 The 
ultimate function of government is to establish “the degree of authority required to direct the 
passions of so large a society to the public good.”26 Since men are ruled by their passions rather 
than their reason, they do not simply rule or govern themselves. While laws, customs and habits 
vary over time and place there is no functioning society which lacks them in the service of peace, 
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security and the hope of political prosperity. In No. 6 Hamilton asserts that it is “time to awake 
from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of 
our political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the 
happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?” Epstein concludes that those theorists and 
statemen “who would like to adopt a more flattering view of human nature should not merely reject 
Madison’s plan for “controls on government”; they must also deny the necessity of government 
altogether.”27 Since these flaws are inextricable they must “be accommodated, not denied.”28 
The function of government is to compensate for this “defect of better motives” lacking in 
man naturally. This means that the ordinary and reliable motives of men are not sufficient in 
themselves for men to govern themselves simply. It must supply adequate incentive through its 
arrangement of man’s condition and circumstance to good conduct. In 1790 Adams says: “I am 
for seeking institutions which may supply in some degree the defect [of our nature]. If there were 
no ignorance, error, or vice, there would be neither principles nor system of civil or political 
government.”29 Having accepted the fundamentally passionate and self-interested nature of 
mankind, the central question arose of just how to “bind him down from mischief.” 30   
Publius’ solution “The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the 
government.”31The reason of the public alone,” he writes, “ought to control and regulate the 
government.”32 The question remains how this is to be done, given man’s passionate nature and 
the frailty of his reasonings. Publius concluded that political order and liberty cannot reasonably 
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depend on reason, virtue and the moral sentiments alone. These motives are not reliable because 
they are not sufficiently strong enough sources of motivation by themselves. They must be fortified 
by institutions which provide more robust deterrents and incentives. In No. 10 Madison admits 
that “neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control.” Thus, external 
restrains become mandatory for a just and civil order. Men are not naturally good, they are made 
good by external restrain. Only good fences make good neighbors. 
The purpose of government is to provide the external constraints necessary to compensate 
for the internal deficiencies of human nature. Publius is unequivocal on this. This is not the only 
function of government, but it is the first one. As the greatest reflections on human nature the 
“fundamental and principal object of government is the administration of justice” because it is 
more advantageous to the needs and interests of society than the alternative. 33 Without the 
establishment of justice in a community, “there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor 
mutual intercourse.”34 Government must provide security from threats foreign and domestic. Thus, 
government exists because limits of human nature necessitate that an external power administer 
justice. Justice is a virtue only found and acquired in civil society and more specifically under 
good government. It is necessary because it is the only remedy for what Locke calls the 
“inconveniences” of the state of nature.  
In No. 54 Hamilton writes, “Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, 
than of the persons of individuals.”35 And, in No. 10 Madison writes that it is the protection of the 
human faculties, particularly of those which generate property, that “is the first object of 
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government.”36 Government must protect life, liberty and property through force or the threat of 
force. These threats are a product of the deficiencies and realities of human nature. Government 
must induce respect in all for the well-being of others through compulsion or the threat of coercion. 
In this matter Publius, like Locke, is a Hobbesian. History shows man’s defects inextricable. These 
defects place both the liberty and order of civil society at risk. Madison and Hamilton characterize 
the condition of the nation under the Articles of Confederation, in many ways which echo the 
shortcoming of the State of Nature. The problems of the Articles were for Publius symptomatic of 
the State of Nature where there is no sufficient “common power” to compel all equally to the 
actions demanded by justice and the common good. It was the civil turbulences under the Article 
of Confederation while had illustrate their inability to remedy and mitigate the inherent the defects 
of man’s nature. 
This portrait of the passionate and depraved human nature and the government it 
necessitates, follows closely the teachings of Hobbes and Locke. As the founders of the Modern 
liberal tradition, they understood that man’s unruliness, if left in the State of Nature without proper 
institutions, tends toward a disposition to and condition of war. It is regularly ignored, perhaps 
because of their captivating images of the State of Nature as a condition lacking any government, 
that both Hobbes and Locke recognized this state of war obtains, not only in a condition lacking 
institutions, but in a circumstance of flawed and imperfect institutions incapable of properly 
administering justice and the uniform rule of law. The conflict in this condition, which is a product 
of human nature, is also incompatible with the natural strivings and goals of that nature. The State 
of Nature is designed to illustrate that government is at least a necessary evil which provides a 
needed monopoly of coercive power to restrain men, and confine their liberties to the pursuit of 
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only those goods harmonious and compatible with the life and liberty of their fellow citizens. The 
state of war, the passion of self-preservation is the cause of strife, but also the potential impetus to 
peace. The very passions which set man one against another, in the state of war, are also some of 
the same passions which provide the incentives for man to liberate himself from this destructive 
and tenuous condition.  
The problem of government is then a problem of human motivation. Government cannot 
depend on extraordinarily rare or insufficiently reliable motives. It must provide an impetus to 
motivations which human nature lacks by itself in sufficient supply. Institutions must provide what 
Hamilton calls in No. 30, “incitements…to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.”37 What 
motivations did the Framers and Publius believe they could reasonably depend upon in fashioning 
a regime? There was a great divide in the disciple of political psychology since Machiavelli over 
the primary and dependable psychic springs which motivate humans to act. The Enlightenment 
thinkers Publius drew on were never in “strict agreement on the overall character and prospects of 
humanity.”38 However they “generally accorded mankind a significantly greater native capacity 
for sociability than Hobbes.”39 They believed “man possessed a moral sense, an innate 
understanding that certain actions are right and others wrong.”40 Moral sense was a faculty which 
motivated man’s natural sociability.  The school of moral sense considered the very existence of 
morality, and conduct in accordance with the well-being of others, as a product of mankind’s first 
nature. It did not need to be “artificially” compelled through “terror” and “awe” as Hobbes 
describes. Man’s natural sociability would be facilitated by sympathy. Sympathy and identification 
with one’s fellow man or citizen, would naturally encourage to appreciate the sentiments of others 
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and promote benevolence, peace and harmony.  Thus, social cooperation with their fellow man 
was possible without the draconian measures of the Leviathan.   
By contrast, Hobbes maintains a hard-boiled attitude regarding our sociability. He 
explicitly denies the existence, not merely the efficacy, of a morality native to human being. 
Morality is an artificial construct, where men abide by their social compacts not because it is right, 
but because it is prudent. For Hobbes the names “right” and “wrong”, “just” and “unjust”, have no 
place, no status in the State of Nature until there is a “common power” to over-awe men to the 
compulsion of their duties.41 Men act passionately and always and only ever in their strict self-
interest. When they reason, it is on the strict basis of rational calculations of self-interest and gain. 
Evil, if it can be called that, is not wrong, merely foolish, only because it runs generally counter to 
one’s interests. Hobbes denies the existence of pure self-sacrifice or what later came to be known 
as “altruism.” We do not naturally seek to benefit others for their own sake. We seek profit even 
at the expense of our neighbor, especially if there are no real consequence for the harm done which 
might alter the course of our calculations of rewards and punishments. Since there was no natural 
sociability in man, the function of the Leviathan was to instill the necessary awe and terror, the 
fear of God, in order to inspire men to the “performance of their covenants.” For Hobbes humans 
“do the right thing” purely out of rational calculation, or cost-benefit analysis of their own self-
interest. They weigh whether doing the right thing will actually benefit their self-interest. For 
Hobbes, the only way for government to compel men to comply with the demands of justice, is to 
make sure that there are greater costs for pursuing injurious desires, than rewards for fulfilling 
them. Hobbes implies that this logic of rewards and punishments provides the only tried-and-true 
motivation magistrates can depend on for compelling just conduct.  
 
41 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994. p. 78. 
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Such an attitude, clothed in more delicate rhetoric, was also held by Locke, Montesquieu 
and Hume even when they acknowledged the existence of the very moral sentiments Hobbes 
appears to deny. Those like Hume, Hutchinson, Rousseau and Adam Smith hardly denied the 
significance of self-interest, but believed certain social passions or “moral sentiments” like 
“humanity,” “sympathy”, “pity” or “compassion” played a greater role in making men concerned 
for others. Hume dubbed the thought of Hobbes and Locke, rooted as it is in self-interest, as the 
“selfish system of morals.”42 Despite his condemnation of the selfish system in matters of society, 
he recognized that in matters pertaining to political justice the only appeal to be made was to man’s 
self-interest, and not his moral sentiments. All agreed in matters of justice, men are not naturally 
good, they are only made good external restraints.   
Publius acknowledges the existence and role of social sentiments. Yet, he concludes the 
efficacy of such sentiment is only made possible by the coercive power of political order, not the 
cause of it. Unaided moral sentiment is too weak for a durable and just political order to depend 
upon. Jefferson, by contrast, asserted the natural goodness of mankind. His study of the American 
Indians led him to believe “that man was a [sufficiently] social, harmonious, cooperative, and just 
creature who, under the appropriate socioeconomic conditions, could happily live in a community 
that did not need the presence of the Leviathan.”43 Publius’ lack of faith in man’s natural sociability 
lead him to follow the “selfish system” by placing self-interest as the central spring which 
motivates human action. This hard-boiled decision reflects Publius’ observations of men, past and 
present, which illustrated that moral sentiments cannot be reliably counted on to restrain their 
passions. Departing from the Scottish Enlightenment, reliable social sentiments are actually 
 
42 David Hume. Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. New York: CreateSpace, 2012. p. 79.  




derived from the mutual recognition of self-interest. This mutual recognition is only achieved 
through the coercive power of government at all levels. The political founder must therefore 
perspicuously build his edifice on the cornerstone of self-interest and devise various external 
sentinels in proper conformity with it.  
The role in ameliorating the defect of better motives makes the Constitution a 
psychological mechanism designed to navigate the conflict within man’s soul. It is designed to 
mitigate the pitfalls of the passions and promote and strengthen fragile reason and moral sentiment. 
Government is instituted in order to apply the necessary external constraints and pression so that 
the man’s passions will conform to the obligatory demands of political justice.44 Such constraints 
are a properly order constitutional edifice.45 This process of amelioration of man’s defects is 
achieved through mechanisms like a written constitution, popular sovereignty through periodic 
elections, representation, federalism, and the separation of powers with its checks and balances. 
These stratagems are all designed to “refine” and “enlarge” public opinion. They dilatory 
mechanisms are designed to cool and channel the passions, and encourage reflection and 
deliberation such manner that the only actions government can take are based on constitutional 








5. Impulse, Power & Opportunity 
 
There is danger from all men. The only maxim of a free government ought to be to trust no man 
living with power to endanger the public liberty.1 
– John Adams, Notes for an Oration at Braintree, Spring,1772. 
  
 The authors of The Federalist were nothing if not astute observers of men. With few 
exceptions, most of the Founders concurred with Publius’ sober appraisal of human nature. This 
view was all the more jaundiced when passion and self-interest were alloyed with the awesome 
powers of government. On the floor of the Philadelphia Convention Madison said, “The truth is, 
all men having power ought to be distrusted to a certain degree.”2 In the Kentucky Resolutions of 
1789, Jefferson writes, “In questions of power then let no more be heard of confidence in man, but 
bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.”3 On July 11, at the Grand 
Convention Morris said, “The truth was that all men having power ought to be distrusted to a 
certain degree.4 Meanwhile Roger Sherman asserted that, “From the nature of man we may be 
sure, that those who have power in their hands will not give it up while they can retain it.”5 
The central assumption on which the powers of the Constitution are granted and arranged 
is that the concentration of power necessarily leads to its abuse, abuse to tyranny. These features 
are an implicit commentary on human nature. “Eternal experience,” writes Montesquieu, “shows 
that any men who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds limits.”6 Hume writes 
 
1 John Adams, Notes for an Oration at Braintree. Spring, 1772. 
2 Alpheus Thomas Mason. “The Federalist--A Split Personality.” The American Historical Review, Vol. 57, No. 3 
(April, 1952). pp. 625-643. p. 638. 
3 Thomas Jefferson. “Extract from Jefferson’s Fair Copy of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798.” 
4 Max Farrand. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787: Volume I. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1911. p. 584.  
5 James Madison. Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison. Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1966. p. 266. 
6 Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 192.  
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that in “reflecting on the great frailty and corruption of human nature” such “that no man can safely 
be trusted with unlimited authority.”7 Power unlimited is power concentrated. Power concentrated 
is power undivided and unchecked. Power corrupts precisely because it gives opportunity to the 
lesser yet more powerful motives of men. The defect of better motives is that men do not achieve 
self-restraint by internal means alone. Jefferson asserted that political power “affords the greatest 
temptations for human weakness.”8 If it is true, as Lord Acton said, that “Power tends to corrupt, 
and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” it is precisely these features of human motivation that 
make our nature susceptible to such corruption. “Every man,” writes Montesquieu in The Spirit of 
Laws, “who holds power is brought to abuse it.” 9 Such power is the calling card of tyranny and a 
permanent threat to man’s liberties. John Adams wrote that the only maxim “which can ever 
preserve the liberties of any people” is “Nip the shoots of arbitrary power in the bud.”10 
Given man’s nature, Publius and the Founders identified government as the midwife of 
tyranny. If not constructed properly its powers were little more than the instruments of the passions 
of those who ruled. As a monopoly of legitimate force, it is a manifestation of concentrated power 
subject to abuse. Government is necessary to protect citizens and provide for the common good, 
but the monopoly necessary for such a task consolidates power in the hands of mere mortals apt to 
use it contrary to its original purpose. In No. 48 Madison say, “It will not be denied, that power is 
of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits 
assigned to it.”11 By its very nature, power inclines to invasion and usurpation. On the floor of 
 
7 David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. p. 44. 
8 Garrett Ward Sheldon. The Political Philosophy of James Madison. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2001. pp. 24-25. 
9 Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Book XXI 
10 John Adams, Novanglus Essays, No. 3. 
11 No. 48.  
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Congress Madison said “all power is subject to abuse.”12 “So that none can abuse power,” writes 
Montesquieu, “we must arrange, by the disposition of things, that power shall check power.”13 
There must be an equal and opposing external force if this satisfaction is to be thwarted. The 
provisions of the Constitution assume that men are unable to restrain themselves where no external 
constraint exist. In light of the depravity of human nature, government breeds a fatal tincture of 
power and interest. Power produces opportunity and interest motivates its abuses. Concentrated 
power allows individuals to act on their passions because it removes impediments to their 
satisfaction. Power concentrated is a synonym for tyranny.  
 The Federalist’s science of man is primarily a science of human motivation. The central 
flaw of human nature is its “defect of better motives.” Men are not angels because they lack an 
internal motive with sufficient force to restraint those passions which run counter to the common 
interest. In light of these defects, private interest never coincides with public interest without 
external regulation. Power concentrated creates a circumstance in which human virtue cannot bear 
it’s temptations.14 Hamilton illustrates how external sentinels to protect against abuses of power 
are necessary because of what he calls “the force” of the “obvious distinction between the interests 
of the people in the public felicity, and the interest of their local rulers in the power and 
consequence of their offices.”15 Scanlan writes, “in any political system, the immediate and 
personal interests of the rulers may be opposed to the interests of the ruled, and may motivate the 
rulers to use their power for oppression.” 16  
 
12 James Madison. Writings (editor Jack Rakove). New York: Modern Library, 1999. p. 440. 
13 Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 192.  
14 No. 53. 
15 No. 59.  




 The simple problem which makes the abuse of power an ever-present threat is that the 
“passions of men do not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint.” The 
passions are blind to the consequences of their own appetites. And yet they are the dominate spring 
of the human soul. The flaw of human nature resides in its lack of internal checks when external 
circumstances are discovered to be propitious to the satisfaction of their desires. Higher motives 
such as reason are no less real as the passions, yet it is weaker and languishes without the assistance 
of external reinforcements. In fact, without proper external constraint reason is likely to conspire 
with the passions in order to better satisfy them. The simple conclusion to be reached is that no 
human being can or should be trusted with unchecked power. Unchecked power is arbitrary power, 
arbitrary power is tyranny. All men therefore need guardians. But, men cannot be their own 
guardians. Rulers must check the ruled, but the rulers themselves are also in need of restraint. Who 
or what will rule the rulers? 
Evil is the inevitable consequence when opportunity and power have been obtained without 
any counterbalancing check. The Federalist’s account of human nature is predicated on the ever-
present evidence of history and experience of the corrupting nature of power in the hands of mere 
mortals. Whether their knowledge came from portraits painted in books, such as histories, Plutarch 
or the Bible, or from their own experiences on the front lines of politics and war, all these sources 
placed them face to face with the limitations of men. If their religious educations did not instill a 
simple orthodox belief in the divine or metaphysical existence of evil, it certainly made them open 
to its reality as a real and permanent empirical feature of human nature. Whether because our faith 
in progress, our increasing public detachment from religion, or as the progeny of Rousseau’s 
dictum of natural goodness where men are only made bad by society, we have lost not only the 
taste, but the belief that men are truly capable of genuine and profound evil. This is an admission 
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about our nature we do not easily countenance: Men are not naturally good. They are made good 
by external restraint. 
Publius and the rest of the Founders would have had an embarrassed laugh at the venerable 
Ghandi’s letter to his “Dear Friend” Hitler in July of 1939.17 In it Ghandi makes an impassioned 
plea to the Fuhrer in the name of “humanity”18 encouraging him, in effect, to “Make love, not war.” 
Ghandi appeals to a “universal friendliness” which knows no “race, color or creed” in the face of 
Hitler’s military aggression and genocidal racism which he characterizes as “monstrous and 
unbecoming of human dignity.”19 Ghandi never seems to consider the possibility, despite the facts 
before him, that brotherly love and understanding are not the sole features of “humanity.” One 
cannot but imagine Hitler blushing more for Ghandi’s sake than his own while reading this 
hackneyed treacle. Ghandi does not seem to understand that which he abhors so much, is the very 
thing Hitler exalts. Socrates put Thrasymachus in his place before promoting justice as a virtue. 
Ghandi’s plea shows a megalomaniacal over-estimation of the power of his pacificist principles. 
He is tone deaf to what some men really want and will do when their natural impulses conjoin with 
the power to fulfill them. The pacificist alone does not have the tools to defeat those actually 
willing to wage war at their expense. In fact, the pacificist is blind to the very impulses that must 
be acknowledged. The problem is that human nature bears impulses such that the only reasonable 
resistance, is violent resistance. One must also carry a big stick.  
In a spirit Ghandi would have recognized, The Federalist does not depart from Sydney and 
Locke in their understanding of the Law of Nature. Its central concern is human liberty. Publius 
follows their fundamental belief in the dignity of all men. They assault despotism as contrary to 
 





this dignity which is the product of the rational nature of mankind. Since The Federalist is an 
account of political order, its main theme is the proper arrangement of powers that will realize the 
principles of a Sydney and a Locke. Moral principles do not enforce themselves. Like Machiavelli 
or Hobbes, the central theme is power and the likely psychological motives that will weld it. The 
Constitution is an enforcement mechanism. It is an enumeration of powers granted to the officers 
of government. The goal was to arrange those powers in order to balance the sometimes-conflicting 
demands of liberty and order. Might does not make right, but right cannot be achieved if might is 
not properly ordered. The Founders faced this problem much more squarely than a Ghandi. They 
not only repulsed an Empire but engaged in the positive work of building a new nation. They were 
men unafraid to get their hands soiled. “War does not determine who is right,” but they well knew 
it determines “who is left.”20 What would have been the meaning of the principles of 1776 had 
America lost the war? Publius takes men as they are rather than as they would like them to be. 
Despite their love for the principles of the Revolution, the Founders did not believe mere 
“parchment” assertion would guarantee their realization. As practical men they understood the 
necessity of force. Of course force without right is tyranny. Yet, force as a necessary component 
of social and political order is a direct product of the animal dimension of human nature: man is a 
centaur.  
The lack of faith in the natural goodness of mankind is as much a matter of self-preservation 
as principle. The premise of The Federalist is that human nature will transgress against religion, 
morality, law and the public interest when motive and opportunity coincide. In No. 53 Publius 
says, “No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connexion subsists 
between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations 
 




of power.”21 Madison and Hamilton speak of the “depravity” of human nature. Men are depraved 
because they are naturally passionate and reason all too fallible. Hamilton tells us that “momentary 
passions and immediate interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct 
than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice.”22 Reason was  “likely to be 
over-whelmed by man’s passions.”23  The ultimate function of government is to establish “the 
degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good.”24 In his 
October 24, 1787 letter to Jefferson, Madison writes that it is not reasonable to expect individuals 
to have “a prudent regard to private or partial good, as essentially involved in the general and 
permanent good of the whole.”25 And thus, the passions of men will not conform to the common 
interest without a properly ordered constitutional edifice.26  
 The evil they sought to mitigate does obtained from natural desires under inauspicious 
circumstances. Following Hobbes, men will break the rules if their natural motives are given 
opportunity. If both motive and opportunity exist, there is action. If there is no opportunity, 
inaction. Madison says in No. 10, “If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we 
well know, that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They 
are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in 
proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes 
needful.”27 In human nature we find no want of motives. Publius itemizes a vast array of passions 
 
21 No. 53. 
22 No. 6. 
23 Gary L. McDowell. “Private Conscience & Public Order: Hobbes & "The Federalist.” Polity. Vol. 25, No. 3 
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24 No. 13. 
25 James Madison. Letter to Jefferson. October 24, 1787.  
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throughout The Federalist, leaving no doubt than there is no lack of motives on behalf of tyranny. 
Thus, to commit a crime, all that is needed is opportunity, motive is given.  
 In Book I of Plato’s Republic it appears self-evident to all speakers present except Socrates 
that human happiness is found in doing whatever one pleases. Justice is not a virtue, but an 
impediment to the satisfaction of desires which make us happy. Justice is contrary to our self-
interest. To most present, justice is benefiting others at one’s own expense, while injustice is 
benefiting oneself at another’s expense. Justice is an onerous good which benefits others by 
demanding we refrain from any desire that might harm them. This line of reasoning is Plato’s 
admission that men harbor an array of natural desires harmful to others. Furthermore, he 
acknowledges that we are selfish enough to be willing to satisfy these desires at the expense of 
others if not restrained by law. But, power does not merely facilitate the satisfaction of existing 
desires, it piques the mind to as yet unimagined ones. It whets the appetite regarding which desires 
human beings might even consider entertaining. This fact is illustrated in the story of Gyges. The 
myth of Gyges in Book II of the Republic is an allegory of tyranny. The tyrant is a tyrant in part 
by virtue of his individual nature, but also by virtue of the opportunity despotic power presents to 
that nature. Gyges’ ring represents not only invisibility or concealment, but the absolute power to 
satisfy any desire that comes from it and the ability to avoid all earthly consequences. Interestingly, 
Gyges ambitions direct him to sexual and political conquest. The story of Gyges illustrates what 
the desire generated by human nature would look like if completely unleashed without any external 
constraint whatsoever. Gyges is the archetype of the ambitious ruler and a lover of power. The 
love of power “is a problem because at least some men feel it and especially because they can be 
successful in obtaining what they want. Men can be attractive enough to attract partisans, or clever 
enough to lull other men who are inattentive or foolish. These qualities mean that the love of power 
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will not be a vain desire. All government involves the existence of power and thereby raises the 
possibility of ambition.” 28 
This wise skepticism of The Federalist regarding the efficacy of reason, virtue and the 
moral sentiments is all the more germane as men accede to the powers of office. The central 
problem the Constitution had to solve, and The Federalist Papers explain, was how to grant men 
the necessary and sufficient power to govern, yet guarantee the governed remain free from tyranny. 
The recognition of this problem as a problem is only obtains under the premise of the principle of 
limited self-government whose raison d’etre is to secure the natural rights of its citizens. In No. 
10 Madison makes clear that the destruction of liberty is a remedy worse than the disease. Madison 
denies that there are durable and certain remedies to transform the motives of men. In the service 
of liberty, Publius is inclined to tolerate certain acceptable foibles of human nature. The flame of 
liberty, while just, will actually promote these foibles. So how does one grant power and 
successfully mitigate the defects of those who wield it? 
Given all men are subject to the same depredations of their own nature, men must rule, and 
the rulers must be themselves ruled in some manner. The problem in framing government is that 
the same problematic nature in need of rule, also rules. “In framing a government,” Madison says 
“which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”29 Lincoln 
provided an exegesis of Madison. He said no man “was good enough to govern another man, with 
the other’s consent.”30 But the protection of the liberty and consent of the man who is ruled cannot 
 
28 David F. Epstein. The Political Theory of The Federalist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. pp. 193, 
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30 Richard Carwardine. Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power. New York: Vintage Books, 2007. p. 30. 
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be achieved through good will or the mere assertion of principle, but only by providing the proper 
kind and arrangement to government powers.   
In the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788 Patrick Henry stated that the “Constitution 
is not an instrument for the government to restrain the people, it is an instrument for the people to 
restrain the government - lest it come to dominate our lives and interests.”31 But how, if their nature 
lacks the necessary internal sentinels which might restrain them, can officeholders be expected to 
rule themselves? How can rulers rule themselves when they are only men, not angels? In light of 
the “defect of better motives,” how can men govern themselves in an orderly fashion and yet 
remain free? The primary task of The Federalist is to illustrate, in the face of Anti-Federalist 
opposition, just how the Constitution might check and channel these lesser motives of rulers in 
order to make free and stable government possible. 
 The conclusion reached by Madison and Hamilton, as well as the members of the 
Convention, is that no human being can or should be trusted with unchecked power. Therefore, as 
Machiavelli puts it, “it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and orders laws in it to 
presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always have to use the malignity of their spirit 
whenever they have a free opportunity for it.”32 The fanciful coincidence of political power and 
wisdom in the philosopher-king cannot be the basis of any wise political order. Political order and 
liberty cannot reasonably depend on the reason and virtue of rulers alone, because they are not 
reliable sources of motivation. Since men are neither angels nor philosopher-kings all are in need 
of external constraint. The flaw of human nature resides in its lack of internal checks when external 
circumstances are propitious to the satisfaction of their desires. Power corrupts precisely because 
it gives opportunity to the lesser but more powerful motives of men.  
 
31 Patrick Henry Speech in the Virginia Convention, June 5, 1788 
32 Niccolò Machiavelli. Discourses on Livy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. p. 15.  
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 Montesquieu asserts that “the abuse of power is greatest when laws do not anticipate it.”33 
Wise legislators cannot expect to appeal to internal motives in order to restrain and channel 
fractious behavior. One is forced to seek and depend on external controls. Given the ever-present 
existence of a panoply of motives, the lack of opportunity is the only true restraint on men’s 
actions. Scanlan characterizes this solution by writing that “wherever possible, and to whatever 
extent possible, the power or opportunity to act must be withheld from those who might act on 
motives productive of conflict and oppression.” 34 Then, Scanlan writes, “where power cannot be 
withheld – because…withholding it would be inconsistent with the intrinsic requirements of 
federal, republican government - those who are invested with power should have, or be provided 
with, strong motives to use it properly. If the political system can be organized in such a way that 
no individuals or groups will have both strong antagonistic motives and the power to act on them, 
solutions to all the above problems” 35 
The people need rulers, yet the people cannot forfeit their power and rights to a government 
that can easily abuse its power. Government power must be limited by a variety of constraints. The 
Constitution will rule the rulers. More to the point its strategy of separated powers in which these 
powers are set as countervailing forces against one another will rule them. Madison explains in 
No. 10 and Nos. 47-51 that the Constitution’s solution to guarding against tyranny is by preventing 
the “gradual concentration of the several powers” whether in the same department or in any faction 
of society.36 “There can be no liberty,” Montesquieu writes, “where the legislative and executive 
powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates” or “if the power of judging be not 
 
33 Albert Camus. The Rebel: Man in Revolt. New York: Vintage, 1956. p. 124.  
34 James P. Scanlan “"The Federalist" and Human Nature,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Oct., 1959). p. 
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35 Ibid. 
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separated from the legislative and executive powers.”37 This concentration is a recipe for 
despotism. “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,” writes Madison, “because his 
interest would certainly bias his judgment” and he would have the concentrated power to enforce 
it.38 Judging one’s own case makes the accused his own jury and sentencer. In No. 47 Madison 
says, “The accumulation of all powers… in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,…may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”39 Since there can be no guarantee of internal 
self-restraint, no guarantee that power will be used to serve virtue rather than immediate self-
interest, the only solution to the problem of power is to divide it against itself. Powers must be set 
against themselves as countervailing forces which control and inhibit one another. The separation 
of powers Madison describes as the “sacred maxim of free government.”40 Power must stop power 
because no man can be trusted with such power that it endangers liberty.41 
Lack of opportunity comes first and foremost from outright deterrence. Rulers must simply 
be denied a given power or the necessary lethal combination of powers. But since rulers must have 
power they need to be “provided” with “strong motives” in order to deter its abuse. These “strong 
motives” are provided by constitutional circumstance of office and their incentives and deterrents. 
They come by arranging power such that there is a directly opposing equal force. Power must be 
divided and set against itself in a strategy of “divide and conquer.” This is a system of 
countervailing powers motivated by the countervailing passions and interests of officeholders. For 
those who must have power in order to meet the ends and obligations of government, 
circumstances must be orchestrated to incline them toward motivations consistent with the 
 
37 Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 157.  
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common interest. Montesquieu writes, “It is fortunate for men to be in a situation in which, though 
their passions may prompt them to be wicked, they have nevertheless an interest in not being so.”42 
Checks with teeth will alter their calculations of their own self-interest. Strong motives toward 
good conduct will be forged as their perception of a given action’s consequences are altered by an 
arrangement of power with the ever-present likelihood of an equal and opposite reaction to their 
potential abuses. Power,” writes Montesquieu, “must check power.”43 Since power only recognizes 
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6. The Vera Causa  
 
No one will really understand politics until they understand that politicians are not trying to solve our 
problems.  They are trying to solve their own problems -- of which getting elected and re-elected are 
No. 1 and No. 2. Whatever is No. 3 is far behind.1 
- Thomas Sowell 
 
Publius and the Founders made the radical claim to have founded a regime on human nature 
itself. This claim is summed up in the name “republic” and the novel form given to it by them. 
What does it mean for a regime to be founded in harmony with human nature? The Federalist’s 
account of human nature is primarily couched in a science of human motivation. For Publius 
accurate knowledge of human nature would only be discovered by taking human nature as it is, 
rather than as one would hope to find it. The meant knowledge of human conduct would primarily 
be gleaned from experience and history. Publius and the Founders sought to identify the natural 
springs of human conduct. They sought to identify the durable and regular motives of men in order 
to provide a political order commensurate to them. A natural regime is one in conformity with 
those regular and predictable springs of human action. The central principle of a republic is liberty. 
Human nature left freely to its own natural devices pursues its own self-interest. Self-interest is 
then the natural byproduct of the republican principle of liberty and the central motor of human 
conduct.  
Taylor asks, “What, then, are the basic traits which men at all times, in all societies under 
all government allegedly possess? His answer is that the “most fundamental” impulse of human 
nature is self-preservation followed by the “the native desire to secure one’s own well-being.”2 
 
1 Thomas Sowell. “Solving Whose Problems?” in Dismantling America. New York: Basic Books, 2010. p. 77.  
2 Quentin P. Taylor. The Essential Federalist. Madison: Madison House Publishers, 1998. p. 23. 
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“All men desire liberty” and are naturally inclined to “self-love or self-interest.”3 In his Full 
Vindication, Hamilton writes, “A vast majority of mankind is entirely biased by motives of self-
interest. Most men are glad to remove any burthens off themselves, and place them upon the necks 
of their neighbors.”4 The conclusion that self-interest must be understood as the central driver of 
human conduct was as much the result of observation as prudent judgment about what civil society 
can reasonably expect from human conduct, and what it must be prepared to contend with and 
accommodate. 
Publius’ answer as to the central law of human conduct was rooted in his experiences of 
men and the new natural science of human nature of the day. Moral psychology and philosophy 
set out on a scientific quest to determine the true cause of human conduct. Following Hume, the 
goal of this new science was “to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature by 
showing men in all variety of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from 
which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human 
action and behavior.”5 In his Treatise, Hume acknowledges Francis Bacon as the “father of 
experimental physics” and that he sits at the foundation of a group of scientists “who have begun 
to put the science of man on a new footing.”6 Thus, the moral philosophers of the 18th century were 
attempting a similar type of scientific revolution in matters of morality, moral and political 
psychology.7 The method of this new science of man was rooted in the empirical evidence of 
experience and history, and generally accepted that “knowledge of human nature ought to be 
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4  Alexander Hamilton. “A Full Vindication.” The Works of Alexander Hamilton. Vol. 1. New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1904. p. 16 
5 David Hume. Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. p. 
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6 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p 5. 
7 Ibid, p 407. 
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obtained through an application of the scientific method of Bacon and Newton.”8 Its scientific 
method was founded upon appeals to reason, history or experience, and human nature itself.9  
Hume tells us that “the great moral and political philosophers since Hobbes, and including Locke, 
Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson and Butler, though they differed on many key points 
regarding the specific nature of man’s moral faculties “seem all to agree in founding their accurate 
disquisitions of human nature entirely upon experience.”10  
Human nature, says Hume, was the central object of  the “system of the sciences.”11 He 
says “almost all the sciences are comprehended in the science of human nature, and are dependent 
on it.”12 The primary end of this science, writes Hume, was “to explain the principles and 
operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas; morals and criticism regard our 
tastes and sentiments; and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each 
other.”13 The goal was to determine the moral laws of human conduct and society through the 
empirical study of man. In a letter to Montesquieu, Charles Bonnet wrote “Newton discovered the 
laws of the material world. You, Monsieur, have discovered the laws of the intelligent world.”14 
Madison was to say in 1792 that Montesquieu was to the science of man “what Bacon was in 
universal science.” 
The central debate which emerged within the new science of man initiated by Bacon and 
others was the question of prime or true cause, the vera causa, of human conduct. The vera causa, 
or true or real cause, was a technical concept of Newtonian philosophy which stood for “the true 
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cause of a natural phenomenon,” whose existence is known independently of its causal role and 
the effects it produces.15 Thus the paradigm of Newtonian mechanics and kinesthetics was applied 
by way of analogy to human psychology and the faculties which motivate men’s actions. The “vera 
causa principle” developed by Newton would be analogous to the pursuit of the prime cause of 
human conduct in the thought of Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, Hume and others.16 The quest for 
this vera causa was motivated by another question: What was the psychological prime mover 
within human nature which compels men to act generally as they do, and what are its moral, social 
and political consequences? They sought to parse the “passions, motives, volitions and thoughts” 
of man in order to determine the causes of conduct that produce harmony and conflict in society 
and to attempt to devise systems of social and political organization to ameliorate man’s natural 
deficiencies and promote those tendencies beneficial to social and political order.17 Self-interest 
would stand as the vera causa of human motivation and law of gravity of human conduct. 
Publius and the Founders were on the whole influenced by a school of thought which Hume 
had come to call the “selfish system of morals.”18 This school posited self-interest as the prime 
mover of human conduct. Self-interest came to be treated as a quasi-scientific term. Numerous 
Enlightenment thinkers regarded self-interest “as a law of the social world akin to the principle of 
universal gravitation in the physical world.”19 It was the ironclad law of man’s psychological 
world, just as gravity was the central law of the physical one. Interest meant mankind’s conduct 
was subject to regular rules which could be described and anticipated. This element of 
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predictability meant society could be thought of as akin to a Newtonian mechanism. “Interest,” it 
was said, “governs the World.”20  It was “a part in the movements” of a great “machine.”21 God 
was a watchmaker who had made an elegant mechanism which ran on ironclad laws of cause and 
effect. Man was merely a component of that mechanism. These features made interest amenable 
to a more mechanistic account of individual and collective behavior. In his De L’Esprit of 1759, 
Helvétius would say, “As the physical world is ruled by the laws of movement so is the moral 
universe ruled by laws of interest.”22 Self-interest was considered the motivational law of gravity 
of man’s psychological faculties and the true cause of men’s conduct.   
Self-interest was now “the principle motive” and “driving force” of all human action.23 
Cardinal de Retz had summed up this view saying, “The most correct maxim for accurately 
appraising the intentions of men is to examine their interests which are the most common motive 
for the actions.”24 de Retz was a keen reader of Machiavelli, and Madison was well acquainted 
with his commentaries on the nature of man and society.25 Meanwhile Rohan had captured the 
radical role assumed to be played by interest saying “princes order their people around and interest 
orders princes around.”26 Interest was the “tyrant of tyrants” and the “commander of princes.”27 It 
was interest which ruled the rulers as the true sovereign of the world.  
The philosophy which posited self-interest as the vera causa of man’s conduct was closely 
associated with the economic and political liberalism central to the American Founding.28 This 
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natural republic would be built on the true cornerstone of self-interest. When Montesquieu writes 
that “self-interest is the strongest monarch in the world” he implies that it is the single and true 
ruler of all men.29 A natural regime must assume self-interest as the natural and regular cause of 
human conduct. In 1776, Smith would say interest is a “desire of bettering our condition.”30 Here, 
the seeds of the “pursuit of the Happiness” and the American Dream are sow. If, for example, 
Publius and The Founders could have never foreseen the scale and complexities of the modern 
administrative or national security state, or the degree of centralization in Washington D.C., their 
clear-eyed vision of human nature correctly foresaw the self-interested nature wielding those 
immense powers. Self-interest rules all.   
Interest is a modern term of moral psychology unmentioned by the Ancients. The language 
of interest was well-worn by the time of the American Founding. Self-interest is not simply 
identical to self-love. Interest is a hybrid notion, a synthesis of reason and passion. An interest is 
a form of motivation which involves a desire for some good deemed advantageous, whose pursuit 
is the product of calculating reason working in concert with the passions to in order to satisfy them. 
An interest is passion modified by rational foresight. Rational calculation can foresee the 
consequences of acting indiscriminately or impulsively. Reason transmutes the object of 
immediate interest into a long-term interest, or interest “properly understood.” Tocqueville writes 
that the principle of self-interest rightly understood “obtains a great empire with ease, and 
preserves it without difficulty because it turns personal interest against itself, and to direct the 
passions it makes use of the spur that excites them.”31 Long-term interest counteracts and checks 
immediate interest. Reason works to mitigate the consequences of passions, but also to alter their 
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object. Calculating reason teaches the passion how to better satisfy themselves without suffering 
their pitfalls. And, self-interest rightly understood teaches others how to satisfy those desires in a 
manner that is mutually harmonious with the interests of others.  
The history of self-interest never confined this notion to any single object of desire, but 
rather the selfish and calculating manner in which one pursued it. An interest could be any type of 
good perceived as advantageous by an individual. Only in the 19th century did the concept become 
decisively primarily associated with material well-being.32 This shift was not so much a deviation 
from its historical use, as a definite narrowing of its scope. While the notion became increasingly 
associated with economic striving, it did not begin that way. From the Renaissance to the 
Enlightenment its meaning had never been limited to material welfare.33 Instead, for Publius and 
the Founders, “interest,” encompassed “the totality of human aspirations.”34   
“The essence of all political thinking,” said Attorney General William Barr, “is about how 
to reconcile the claims of the individual with the interests of the broader community.”35 The 
problem of government remains the problem of self-interest, or the gap between the interest of the 
individual and the broader community. The existence of government necessarily implies human 
beings have desires and motivations which run contrary to the public interest. Hume says, “The 
private interest of everyone is different; and though the public interest in itself be always one and 
the same, yet it becomes the source of as great dissentions, by reason of the different opinions of 
particular persons concerning it.”36 Human nature itself creates a conflict between individual self-
interest and the common one in need of management. Government must establish a harmony 
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between the two. Achieving this reconciliation while maintaining order and liberty was the 
challenging goal of republican justice the Convention and The Federalist Papers sought to solve 
and explain.   
 From this quest for the vera causa of the human soul emerged a fundamental dispute over 
the central psychogenic motor of man’s conduct. This dispute had powerful implications for the 
nature of political order. If political order must be commensurate to human nature, any dispute 
over that nature necessarily leads to a dispute over the best possible arrangement of government. 
The answer over the role self-interest played in human conduct divided moral philosophers and 
psychologists into two conflicting camps. One believed mankind was fundamentally selfish, and 
the other, while often acknowledging the role played by self-interest, also recognized the material 
effects of man’s natural moral or social sentiments. Of these two schools of psychology, one 
believed in the universal natural self-interest of man while the other believed in the efficacy of 
altruism manifest through moral sentiments and sympathy. Their different conclusions as to the 
true mover of man’s conduct had vital implications for the best possible political order suited to 
man’s natural dispositions. Each school posited, by its interpretation of man’s moral psychology, 
either a greater or smaller distance between the natural interest of the individual and the common 
interest of the political community. The further the distance between these two the more hardened 
political institutions needed to be in order to bring them into sufficient alignment. If human nature 
had sufficient natural resources inclining it to social harmony, man could be more trusted with 
power and government need not be a fear-inducing Leviathan of compulsion. If human nature 
evinced a lack of such resources, government would have to be primarily geared to providing the 
necessary “dykes and damns” to restrain and manage man’s factious and conflictual tendencies. 
Man could not be trusted with power. 
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The centrality of self-interest to political science and philosophy traces its provenance to 
those hard-boiled observers of human conduct such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and 
Mandeville. Their thought asserted a more egoistic model of human motivation centered on self-
interest. Tracing the origin of this way of thinking to Hobbes, Hume dubbed this school the “selfish 
system of morals.”37 For this school “the fundamental and ruling passion is self-interest.”38 The 
thesis of the selfish system is that “all human action can be explained in terms of a calculation of 
self-interest.”39  
Despite their vital differences, both schools agreed in their unwillingness to afford reason 
the exalted place in either man’s soul or his society, as master of his conduct, that the Ancients 
had given it. Hobbes, Mandeville and even Locke asserted that human nature was primarily 
motivated by passions and calculations of self-interest. Meanwhile those like Hume, Hutcheson 
Smith and Rousseau gave much greater credence to natural sentiments that had a fundamental 
social and moral content inclining men naturally to co-exist in harmony with their fellow man, not 
simply out of need or utility, but out of a deep emotional sense of shared humanity manifest in 
such sentiments. Hume, in many ways split the difference between these two schools. He was 
openly critical of Hobbes and Mandeville, acknowledging the vital role played by moral 
sentiments. Yet, at the same time, he resigned himself to the fact that self-interest was the prime 
mover and bedrock of human conduct especially in matters of political order and community. In 
matters of political organization, all men, said Hume, must be considered a self-interested knave.  
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The Federalist Papers account of human nature identifies self-interest as the architectonic 
spring of human motivation. It was the true spring, or vera causa, of human action. Founders are 
obliged, by this dictate of human nature, to build and orchestrate the arrangement of political 
powers in conformity with the ironclad law of conduct. Hume writes that in framing wise political 
institutions “every man must be supposed a knave.”40 A “knave” is by its very nature a “self-
interested creature.”41 In other words he must be supposed “to be always seeking his own 
interest.”42 Hamilton’s speech at the New York State Ratifying Convention in 1788 follows in the 
footsteps of the selfish school. He asserted the doctrine of self-interest plainly saying that “Men 
will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change human nature, as to oppose the strong current43 
of the selfish passion. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to 
the public good.”44 
The Federalist Papers identifies self-interest as the fulcrum of the constitutional order. For 
society to rely on motives such as reason or virtue is to expect the unlikely coincidence of wisdom 
and political power. Therefore, it is unwise for the founder or statesman to assume men in society, 
or those holding political power, will act disinterestedly on their own. Paraphrasing Publius, 
constitutional scholar Richard Epstein asks: “What is the driving force of human nature with which 
constitutions must contend?”45 His answer: “self-interest.”46 He writes that there is “unfortunately 
no set of institutions which can escape the ravages of misdirected self-interest.”47 The problem, 
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writes Epstein, “is to design a set of institutions which at some real, admitted, positive cost curbs 
the worst of its excesses. In order to design that system of governance, it is not enough to simply 
condemn self-interest. Such condemnation cuts too broadly, for then there is nothing left to praise. 
It is necessary therefore to distinguish among the different manifestations of self-interest.”48 To 
simply condemn self-interest is to condemn human nature without solving the problems it poses. 
Mansfield concludes the “constitutional republicanism” of the American regime, “is based on self-
interest.”49  
The Constitution is designed as a mechanism of impulse control which compels “men to 
take long views” of their interests.50 In 1784 Hamilton wrote that, “The safest reliance of every 
government is on man’s interests. This is a principle of human nature, on which all political 
speculation to be just, must be founded.”51 The Constitution allows them “to identify their private 
interests with the general good” by erecting “an edifice of reason and virtue on a foundation of 
passion.”52 This requires an understanding of both what is to be expected from citizens in their 
aims as well as the aims of government. A rights-based, rights ensuring government is by definition 
designed to be in harmony with the enlightened self-interest of its citizens. The Constitution is 
designed to produce circumstances and situations which encourage citizens to pursue their own 
self-interest in a manner that does not jeopardize the right of another to do the same. “Private rights 
and public happiness” would be brought in line with one another as the common interest demands 
self-interest be pursued correctly.53 
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Self-interest boils down to the way in which human action is motivated by common sense 
perceptions of potential rewards and punishments. It is another way of speaking of those two 
universal masters of all human conduct, pleasure and pain. Helvétius had said that “pleasure and 
pain are, and always will be, the only principles of action in man.”54 Men seek pleasures for 
themselves and to avoid the pains that might befall them. Pleasure and pain are the signposts on 
the path of a human life. Nor are men inclined, without consequence, to concern themselves with 
the inconveniences incurred by the satisfaction of their desires suffered by others. In No. 72 
Hamilton says “the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct.”55 The 
corollary to “reward” is the “fear of punishment.” In No. 65 Hamilton describes the “fear of 
punishment and disgrace” as the “motive to good behaviour.”56   
Civil society itself is nothing other than “a web of reciprocal pleasures and pains created 
by everyone’s conduct.”57 But just how we define “pleasure” and “pain” matters. What is 
pleasurable is often bad, and what is “painful” is often good. Through the best political order 
possible, society must be habituated to the correct understanding of pleasure and pain in order to 
bring it into general alignment with what is good and bad in relation to the common interest. Yet 
if society is to obtain the correct understanding of pleasures and pains and the proper impetus to 
pursue these particular pleasures, a system which punishes conduct contrary to those ends must be 
established. Government is the monopoly of legitimate coercion and force which is the arbiter of 
rewards and punishments in its establishment of justice. Everyone’s self-interest is served by 
pursuing pleasures and avoiding pain. The goal of the Constitution is to set up a system of rewards 
and punishment operating in conformity with man’s natural selfishness which would satisfy the 
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needs of liberty and order. By appealing to man’s self-interest, they could partially transcend it. 
Through its arrangement of powers, a set of circumstances which create the right incentives and 
deterrents could motivate and shape men’s individual interests to conform to the common one.   
Even J. G. A. Pocock’s more classical rendering of the American Founding acknowledges 
that in the arguments of The Federalist human beings “were less and less seen as possessing virtue 
in the classical sense.”58 Pocock says The Federalist Papers represent the “locus classicus” of “an 
increasing recognition of the importance, and the legitimacy” of individuals and factions pursuing 
“particular interest.”59 The shift from a dependence on virtue to interest marks the transition from 
Classical republicanism to Publius’ novel liberal republicanism.60 Taylor writes that the political 
science of The Federalist accepts “the prevalence of self-interested behavior” as “compatible with 
republican government” and acknowledges that classical civic virtue was “not essential for its 
viability.”61 He describes this assertion as “one of the most startling political revelations to appear 
since the Renaissance.”62  If the central virtue in a republic is patriotism,63 in a liberal republic civic 
virtue would entail love of a nation dedicated to a form of liberty which allows each citizen to 
pursue their own individual self-interest.  
While Publius acknowledges the necessity for a certain degree of virtue in both the rulers 
and the ruled in a self-governing republic, history taught that republics which lean to heavily on 
virtue come to their ruin. Good government must depend on reliable and durable motives as their 
cornerstone, even as this reliance is merely necessary, if not entirely sufficient. The Federalist 
“seeks to ground republican government on the most reliable aspect of human nature: self-interest. 
 
58 J.G.A. Pocock. The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. p. 522.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid., p. 523.  
61 Quentin Taylor. The Essential Federalist. Madison: Madison House Publishers Inc, 1998. p. 36. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. xli.  
 
 285 
By self-interest, Publius means that most men, if left alone, will naturally seek to satisfy their own 
interests and desire, rather than look to the well-being of the whole.”64 Publius’ depiction of self-
interest as the motor of the republic, whether government or society, comes in the form of 
“interest” as distinct from “ambition.” All men are interested in society, some are ambitious. In 
this distinction we have the distinction between the few and the many or the rulers and the ruled. 
Some will be ambitious enough to seek fame and glory and others will seek their interest primarily 
in the form of material or economic well-being.65  
Self-interest will substitute for virtue as the psychic spring of a modern extended 
commercial republic. The Modern republic would “be based on liberty and commerce rather than 
virtue, and was to emphasize the private life rather than communal solidarity.” 66 Hamilton simply 
asserts that, “Men will pursue their interests.”67 The Constitution is designed in a manor so as not 
to “demand self-sacrifice” but to “attempt to channel self-interest in useful directions.”68 Publius 
does not condemn such impulses as selfish or ignoble. Instead of a system which would education 
such passion and interests out of men, or to moderate them in the Classical sense, these impulses 
will be prudentially diverted, directed and channeled, to the greatest degree possible, toward the 
public good.69 
The great French student of The Federalist Papers and the American Founding, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, described “private self-interest” as the “only immutable point in the human heart.”70 
Writing in the Age of Jackson he says that the doctrine of self-interest is “not new; but among 
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Americans of our day it has been universally accepted.”71 Self-interest is the “low but solid” 
foundation on which the Constitution is built.72 Tocqueville writes that principle of self-interest 
takes human nature as it is by being “marvelously accommodating to the weaknesses of men.”73 
The doctrine of self-interest does not aim “at mighty objects, but it attains without excessive 
exertion all those at which it aims. As it lies within the reach of all capacities, everyone can without 
difficulty learn and retain it.”74 Tocqueville writes, “If the principle of interest rightly understood 
were to sway the whole moral world, extraordinary virtues would doubtless be more rare; but I 
think that gross depravity would then also be less common.”75 “This principle,” writes Tocqueville 
“perhaps prevents men from rising far above the level of mankind, but a great number of other 
men, who were falling far below it, are caught and restrained by it. Observe some few individuals, 
they are lowered by it; survey mankind, they are raised.” 76 While the sights of the few are lowered 
by the doctrine of self-interest, those of the many are raised. As an “immutable” element of human 
nature it was a “clear and sure” cornerstone on which political order could be founded.  
Raw, untutored self-interest however, is in need of education. Mansfield writes that 
American republicanism is really only based “on self-interest properly understood.”77 Self-interest 
must be “self-interest rightly understood.”78 The pursuit of enlightened or rational self-interest is 
only possible when citizens are guided by good government. “Self-interest rightly understood,” 
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writes Tocqueville, “is a doctrine not very lofty, but clear and sure.”79 Tocqueville illustrates how 
far the dependence of Publius’ political science on self-interest deviates from Classical political 
philosophy. He writes that while self-interest rightly understood “suggests daily acts of self-
denial,” it “produces no great acts of self-sacrifice” and “by itself it cannot suffice to make a man 
virtuous.”80 Nonetheless it “forms a multitude of citizens who are well regulated, temperate, 
moderate, farsighted, masters of themselves; and if it does not lead directly to virtue through the 
will, it brings them near to it insensibly through habits.”81 Tocqueville concludes that “the minds 
of the moralists of our day ought to turn” toward the doctrine of self-interest as the vera causa of 
human conduct. Even if “they judge it imperfect, they would still have to adopt it as necessary.”82  
The centrality of self-interest in The Federalist’s arguments is less an unmitigated 
celebration selfishness, than a realist’s observation about human motivation. Self-interest must be 
rightly understood. Immediate or impulsive pursuit of interest is represented throughout The 
Federalist as a vice and an evil which threatens political prosperity. Meanwhile the calculations 
of remote or long-term interest, while something short of virtue itself, are understood as virtually 
synonymous with the common interest. Publius does not pretend to make a virtue of naked self-
interest or greed. The thinking of Publius and the Founders rejects pure selfishness and regard it 
as a vice. To coin a phrase, greed is not good.  
Compare this attitude to the title of Ayn Rand’s book, The Virtue of Selfishness. For Rand 
selfishness is a virtue in the economic sphere. All the Founders, influenced by Christianity morality 
and the moral thought of the Scottish Enlightenment, thought the interests of men in society must 
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be made to converge toward mutual concern, lest they diverge toward raw individualism and the 
deadly disease of faction. This is the very individualism observed by Tocqueville in the 1830s, 
which he identified as a dangerous threat to American society and the Founders’ achievement. 
Excessive divergence of interests would lead to excessive factionalism and spell the end of the 
American experiment in republican self-government. Publius and the Founders did not rely on the 
spontaneous generation of order in a free-market sans the restraints of moral education. Rather 
they all saw that avarice in office needs either to be checked by an equal and opposite 
countervailing force, or coaxed in society by moral education into self-interest rightly understood. 
Under the correct restraints, modern commercial virtues like “industry” and “enterprise” could be 
mutually beneficial to members of society.  
Publius’ emphasis on self-interest is an indictment of the Ancient trust in reason no less 
than the Modern faith in mankind’s natural benevolent sentiments. This emphasis departed from 
both classical republicanism and contemporaneous theories which emphasized the efficacy of 
moral sentiments. Those like Hume, Hutchinson, Rousseau and Adam Smith, hardly denied the 
significance of self-interest, but believed certain social passions or “moral sentiments” like 
“humanity,” “sympathy”, “pity” or “compassion” played a greater role in making men concerned 
for one other. Jefferson, for example, asserted the natural goodness of mankind. He believed moral 
precepts were impressed “so indelibly on our hearts that they shall not be effaced by the subtleties 
of our brains.”83 He wrote to John Adam’s that man’s sense of justice is “innate”, a matter of 
“instinct” and that “the moral sense is as much a part of our constitution as that of feeling, seeing, 
or hearing.” 84 His study of the American Indians led him to conclude “that man was a social, 
 




harmonious, cooperative, and just creature who, under the appropriate socioeconomic conditions, 
could happily live in a community that did not need the presence of the Leviathan.”85 
In founding their system of government on self-interest, Publius and the Founders self-
consciously rejected the supposed efficacy of sympathy to produce social harmony. They did not 
believe that moral sentiments alone could bring the interest of the individual spontaneously in line 
with the common one. Publius acknowledges the existence and role of such sentiments, but does 
not trust them. The hard-boiled decision to place self-interest at the center of human motivation 
reflects Publius’ conclusions from observations of men, past and present, that moral sentiments 
cannot be reliably counted on to restrain men’s behavior. Experience shows they are not the central 
spring which motivates human action. They are too weak for durable and just political order to 
depend upon them. Moral sentiments were real and vital, but they could not be trusted as the prime 
movers of men. It is precisely this observation that makes self-interest the vera causa. While 
sympathy might be considered the foundation of a social order, Publius, like Hume, suggest that it 
cannot be the cornerstone of a political one. For Publius such sentiments only find sufficient 
encouragement once the Damocles’ sword of the Leviathan already hangs over the people’s heads. 
Self-interest, not moral sentiment, must therefore be considered, the natural law of political order.  
Political order then, must be founded on calculations of self-interest. Taking men as they 
are means neither celebrating nor condemning human nature, but correctly provisioning for its 
tendencies and limitations. Hume does not place blame on the perceived vices or virtues of human 
nature but on the wisdom or foolishness of civic designs to remedy its vulnerabilities. Civic order 
must obey the regular laws of human nature. Hume agreed with the “selfish system of morals” 
which rooted political order in a foundation of self-interest. Hume says, “Nothing is more certain, 
 




than that men are, in a great measure, govern’d by interest, and that even when they extend their 
concern beyond themselves, ’tis not to any great distance; nor is it usual for them, in common life, 
to look farther than their nearest friends and acquaintance. ’Tis no less certain, that ’tis impossible 
for men to consult their interest in so effectual a manner, as by an universal and inflexible 
observance of the rules of justice, by which alone they can preserve society, and keep themselves 
from falling into that wretched and savage condition.”86 This is why the founder or statesmen 
crafting or maintaining political order must consider men as self-interested “knaves.” Thus within 
the domain of society and the family moral sentiment can play a central role in social order, but 
political order must then be founded on calculations of self-interest 
In his account of the origins of justice, Hume makes clear that the moral sentiments 
communicated by sympathy are not sufficiently strong to establish it. It turns out justice itself is a 
product of the collective expression of self-interest, each man advocating for himself for equal 
treatment under the law. He says, “If public benevolence, therefore, or a regard to the interests of 
mankind, cannot be the original motive to justice, much less can private benevolence, or a regard 
to the interests of the party concern’d, be this motive.”87 He says that “in general, it may be 
affirm’d, that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, 
independent of person qualities of services, or of relation to ourself.” 88 Hume acknowledges that 
our selfishness is central to our bonds to those around us and that if civil society is to be successful 
as a remedy for our natural deficiencies, it must successfully appeal to our selfishness.89 
 
86 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 342.  
87 Ibid., p. 310.  
88 Ibid., p. 309.  
89 Ibid., p. 313.  
 
 291 
Indeed, Hume concludes that self-interest was “the original motive to the establishment of 
justice.”90  Hume acknowledges that the “principle of sympathy is too weak to control our 
passions.”91 There was no faculty in man’s psychological endowment which would naturally 
motivate them to the compliance of obligations which justice demands. The existence of 
government and “an universal and inflexible observance of justice” turns out to be the best way to 
serve one’s interest, “preserve society, and keep themselves from falling into that wretched and 
savage condition.”92 Only from “the selfishness and confined generosity of man, along with the 
scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin and we should add, 
necessity.”93 
Taking men as they are means neither celebrating nor condemning human nature, but 
correctly provisioning for its limitations. Pointing to a central strategy later employed by Hamilton 
in No. 72, Hume acknowledges our selfishness is the solution to the problem to human selfishness. 
He says “whether the passion of self-interest be esteem’d vicious or virtuous, ‘tis all a case, since 
itself alone restrains it: So that if it be virtuous, men become social by their virtue; if vicious, their 
vice has the same effect.”94  Self-love is both the source of our bonds with others, but also our 
indifference and enmity to those more distant individuals who do not directly figure in or obstruct 
our pursuit of happiness. Justice is achieved, says Hume, not by “departing from our own interest, 
or from that of our nearest friends,” but in being forced to recognize and respect the interests of 
others as well as our own.95  
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It is in the individual interest of all citizens to uphold a government which correctly 
preserves their right to pursue their self-interest by means of the proper administration of justice. 
Indeed, “we cannot better consult both these interests” because they are the means by which we 
maintain society which are necessary and beneficial to the interests of  all.”96 Hume says “the rules 
of justice are established merely by interest,” and that the connection between justice and interest 
is “singular.”97 Therefore interest is the “requisite to induce” citizens “to perform an act of 
justice.”98 Justice involves promise keeping and rule following, that can only be guaranteed by 
external sentinels. It is in the individual interest of all citizens to uphold a government which 
correctly preserves their individual right to pursue self-interest through the proper external 
restraints and administration of justice.  
The arguments of The Federalist repeatedly acknowledge the limits of sentiment and the 
necessity of depending on man’s self-interested nature. Given the limits of sentiment, government 
and society must provide sentinels to restrain the passions. Passions can only be restrained the 
equal countervailing force of other passions. In No. 43 Madison recognizes that real constitutional 
checks are achieved only when passions are set against themselves. His analysis implicitly admits 
that moral sentiments alone are not sufficient to inhibit abuses of the powers granted by the 
Constitution. Yet, when destructive passions are properly neutralized, men are able to begin to 
pursue their proper interests. With this hard architecture in place, moral sentiments borne of 
sympathy can play a secondary role in society and government.  
With the correct provisioning of constitutional circumstances, some passions can be 
transmuted into sentiments and channeled toward the common interest. Man’s natural and self-
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interested concern for himself and the opinions of others, could ultimately be leveraged toward 
good conduct. Human beings seek many rewards which are only obtained through intercourse with 
their fellow citizens. Ambition and the desire for recognition make men concerned with the 
opinions of others. The “sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation” provide the carrot 
and stick, moral pleasures and pains, which guide men’s actions toward the modification and 
satisfaction of their desires in a manner which harmonizes with the interests of their fellow 
citizens.99 Proper circumstances of action would establish a process of identification where men 
would see themselves through the eyes and opinions of others. As Tocqueville acknowledges, 
Spartan virtue would not be required for this task. Interest could be coopted by interest. Self-
interest could be leveraged against itself through the natural exploitation of an inward impulse 
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IV. The Science of Human Nature & The Motives of Man 
1. The Language of Human Nature 
 
The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the 
nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider 
men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, 
Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be 
acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind. 1 
- Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature 
 
The Federalist is a distinctly American work of modern political science. The attitudes of 
its authors regarding human nature were heavily colored by their firsthand experiences of 
American colonial society, their life in politics, as well as their readings of history and the Biblical 
tradition. They inherited a large repository of well developed ready-made concepts and 
frameworks of understanding from the various phases of the European Enlightenment and the 
nations which contributed to it. This inheritance of ideas on human nature is centered on the 
modern Natural Law tradition and a subdivision of moral philosophy called faculty psychology. 
Publius largely adopted the terminology he inherited without nuanced analysis of its precise 
meanings. Yet, the Enlightenment legacy on the science of human nature was not unequivocal. 
Within this common framework were numerous disputes and disagreements. Despite the 
derivative elements of The Federalist’s science of human nature, its originality is to be found in 
its decisive judgments and conclusions in unresolved and openly disputed matters within the larger 
discourse.   
 
1 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 4.  
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The Federalist sums up the needs, desires and ambitions of man, or the nature and power 
of his psychological faculties with the expression “human nature.” “Human nature” was simply 
the term of art used to speak of the common and essential attributes of the human species at the 
end of the 18th century in Europe and America. Unlike the contemporary specialization of labor 
within the human sciences, this term connoted a broad wholistic approach. It summed up the 
totality of features of the human identity, from mind to body, reason to passions. It was understood 
as the foundational object of inquiry for the epistemological, moral, social and political sciences. 
Hume says it is “evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature.”2 
He concludes that the moral and political sciences are “most closely connected with the study of 
human nature and human understanding.”3 Today, the main thrust of Publius’ account of human 
nature would be considered “political” or “faculty psychology.” Political psychology addresses 
the nature and springs of human psychology pertinent to the collective life of human beings in 
civil society. In particular, The Federalist is concerned with the enduring psychological features 
of human nature which led to the failures of the Articles of Confederation in the past, and attempts 
to determine their future effects under the Constitution. 
Later terms like “psychology”, “political” or “moral psychology”, or “political 
anthropology” connote greater narrowness of scope and a more differentiated specialization within 
the human sciences. These 20th century terms cover what was called epistemology, and moral and 
political philosophy. All are built on the foundation of human nature as their central object of 
study. Howe has noted that their analysis of human psychology linked political theory and rhetoric 
because they all came under the same “enormous intellectual structure called moral philosophy, 
 
2 Ibid. 
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the ancestor of all the modern social sciences as well as of ethical theory and epistemology as we 
know them.”4 The more wholistic approach of 18th century science reflects a more wholistic and 
integrated conception of human nature. While Publius would have understood these modern 
disciplines, such language was not available to him. The wholistic nature of 18th century 
anthropological science gave Publius permission to speak in boarder terms about the human animal 
and on a wider range of topics than these modern counterparts.  
The Enlightenment bible of the human sciences was David Hume’s A Treatise on Human 
Nature. The fundamental goal of the Treatise was to provide “a new science of human nature.”5 
This was an experimental text, no less experimental than the new political science of The 
Federalist and its new republicanism.6 Hume described the Treatise as “an attempt to introduce 
the experimental philosophy into moral subjects.”7 This text exerted significant influence over 
Hamilton and Madison. Their contemporary Adam Smith credits Hobbes and Locke as having 
initiated the modern investigation of human nature which culminated in Hume’s Treatise.8 The 
Treatise was largely responsible for a significant displacement in nomenclature. The term “man” 
was displaced for the expression “human nature” in naming the central object of scientific inquiry 
within the discourse of the human sciences.9 There is an analogous substitution in Hume’s Treatise 
of the “mind” for what was once called the “soul”. Both former terms were freighted with the 
baggage of theology and its immaterial realities, whereas the latter terms spoke to the empiricism 
and materialism of the day. In his section of the Treatise entitled “The Immateriality of the Soul” 
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Hume calls into question the possibility of the soul being an “immaterial substance.”10 Instead 
Hume’s term “mind” represents, less a thing-in-itself, and more a kind of conceptual placeholder 
which characterizes the locus of the mental actives of reason and passion. Montesquieu’s The Spirit 
of Laws was equally influential on Hume, Hamilton and Madison. This text repeatedly employs 
the term “nature humaine”, the French cognate for the English term. When for example 
Montesquieu employs the word “l’homme”, invariably he refers to a specific human being and not 
the species at large.  
As if to reinforce the broad nature of this category Montesquieu writes in The Spirit of 
Laws of a broad range of particular peoples with distinct habits across time and space, who despite 
their differences, all serve as exemplars of this common human nature. Montesquieu’s repeated 
emphasis on the plurality of the conditions, habits and character of the human species 
paradoxically reveals the commonalities which cut across this apparent diversity. Krause writes 
that despite Montesquieu’s emphasis on human variability he nonetheless identifies “cross-cultural 
and ahistorical consistencies.”11 These “consistencies” are the locus classicus of human nature 
itself. It is by way of reference to a fixed human nature that Montesquieu is logically able to 
condemn categorically as “appalling ills” and “insults to human nature” despotic and tyrannical 
forms of government and their central principal of fear.12 Krause describes forms of despotism as 
“empirically discernable violations” of human nature in Montesquieu.13  
The phrase “human nature” brought in tow a specific set of scientific assumptions, 
connotations and allusions distinct from previous epithets used to articulate human identity. The 
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 298 
word “nature” implied human being was reasonably fixed and universal. Nature is that which 
endures and persists under normal circumstances despite extremes, superficial changes or 
accidents. Nature implies necessity while accidents are contingent. Publius and others well 
understood that human character was changeable and fugitive to circumstance and custom. There 
was no doubt a first and a second nature. On the other hand, human nature was the unchanging 
underlying cornerstone of the human identity. It was the object on which political order is founded 
and must contend. If human nature is fundamentally changeable and transformable it cannot be the 
subject of scientific inquiry because it does not abide by laws that are sufficiently fixed. Its effects 
cannot reasonably and consistently be traced to regular and reliable, or even observable causes. 
Predicting human conduct would involve a trip to the oracle at Delphi rather than observations of 
men throughout history.  
“Nature” not only suggested that which is permanent but connoted the elimination of any 
supernatural causes in the psychology and conduct of men. For example, the prior term which held 
currency, “man”, had come to be associated with the supernaturalism of Christian theology and 
Cartesianism dualism. Hume’s Treatise and its nomenclature represented an explicit departure 
from a still influential dualism, and replaced it with a strictly immanent naturalistic account of 
human action. The immaterial and immortal soul would be reduced to the mortal mind, strictly a 
special function of the body and its organs.   
Human nature was therefore continuous with the natural world at large. If human being 
was a material phenomenon, then it was a product of imminent causes. This made it empirically 
observable and sufficiently, if not perfectly, knowable. Since man was an immanent phenomenon, 
the causes of his conduct could be found in the empirical and observable realm of the natural 
world. As such, our second nature was continuous and derivative from the first. This made human 
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nature and conduct, to some basic degree, subject to the same types of material and mechanical 
causes, laws and explanations as the natural world. Taylor says the French “philosophes were 
eminently impressed by the discovery that the world (and perhaps everything in it) obeyed a set of 
basic natural laws. The universe was not only intelligible – it was rational; indeed, it was 
intelligible for this very reason.” 14 Human nature was then a proper object of scientific inquiry.  
Hume’s ambitious work hoped to initiate this investigation. Identifying human nature as a 
particular type of being in the order of things then allowed the political philosopher to assess the 
immutable laws of that nature. As Montesquieu says in The Spirit of Laws, “the intelligences 
superior to man have their laws, those beneath have their laws,” and “man has his laws” too.15 
They are called the laws of nature, Montesquieu says, “because they derive solely from the 
constitution of our being,” and in order to understand them “we must consider a human being prior 
to the establishment of societies” in a “state of nature.”16 Striped of the ornaments of culture and 
civilization the primordial impulse of such a being would be to ”give thought to the preservation 
of its being.” 17 Prior to any moral meaning given to them, the laws of human nature are the 
primordial laws of biology and psychology, ironclad impulses and instincts which determine 
fundamental needs and desires. As fundamental drives they are universal and natural drives on 
which all human beings can be expected to act. The goal of civil society is then to establish its 
positive laws, as much as is possible in light of circumstance, in harmony with the natural laws of 
human nature. “Laws,” says Montesquieu, “are the necessary relations deriving from the nature of 
things; and in this sense, all beings have their laws.”18  If physical nature has laws, so too does 
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human nature.19 Montesquieu says “Man, as a physical being, is governed by invariable laws like 
other bodies. As an intelligent being, he constantly violates the laws god has established and 
changes those he himself establishes; he must guide himself, and yet he is a limited being; he is 
subject to ignorance and error, as are all finite intelligences; he loses even the imperfect knowledge 
he has.”20 Where in fact does Montesquieu ground these laws, what is their bedrock? The answer 
is, the passions. Like Hume, Montesquieu denies the meaningful efficacy of reason in motivating 
and determining human action. “Passions, and the behavior they generate,” says Pangle, “are what 
Montesquieu means by the ‘laws of human nature’ in the strictest sense of the term.”21 Passion is 
the bedrock which provides the constants for the laws of human nature. In his Dissertation on the 
Passions, Hume says, “that, in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular 
mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, 
hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy.”22 The science of human nature would provide 
knowledge of the laws of man’s being which would allow him to structure his individual and 
collective live in conformity with that nature and live in some degree of happiness.  
Publius and the Founders followed this lead. Notwithstanding their respect for the moral 
function of Christianity, there was virtually no religious or supernatural element to be found in 
either the method or the substance of their deliberations on human nature at the Convention or in 
The Federalist Papers. While The Founders repeatedly asserted the practical necessity of religion 
to a self-governing society, they made virtually no mention of it in the intellectual calculations 
which contributed to crafting that political order. This approach included a keen awareness of the 
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psychological and political power of religious belief as well as its pitfalls in the form of the 
factionalization of religious sects.23 Their deliberations would be guided by the mortal light of 
reason alone. Political order would be crafted on the cornerstone of human nature understood in 
naturalistic terms. Human nature was a worldly phenomenon subject to human reason. The springs 
of action habitually reiterated in The Federalist such as self-love, vanity and pride, self-interest, 
fear, ambition, love of power, party animosity, resentment, jealousy, avarice, venality and the like, 
all speak to a distinctly terrestrial conception of human psychology.  
In his famous work on the Declaration of Independence, Carl Becker writes Montesquieu 
was seeking “that which is common to all peoples.”24 Becker says the Founders’ thinking was 
distinctly colored by the determination to discover the grail of the Enlightenment which were the 
universal laws of human nature.25 He writes, the Founders “held up the lantern of Enlightenment” 
in order “to go up and down the field of history looking for man in general, the universal man, 
stripped of the accidents of time and place.”26 This is a rather overstated simplification on two 
counts. Like Montesquieu, The Founders were extremely sensitive to the way different forms of 
government habituate the dispositions and behaviors of men differently. Each produces its own 
distinct human character. They understood the fugitive nature of human identity, but identified a 
common thread underlying its variable historical expression.  In a sense the Declaration of 
Independence was the “easy” part of the American Founding, adapting those principles to an 
existent society in practice was the challenge of the Grand Convention and the Constitution it 
crafted. 
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The variability of the human animal is also a permanent feature. Second, a constant refrain 
throughout The Federalist warns of the limits of human reason in our capacity to know, coupled 
with the distorting effects of the passions and interests on our opinions.  The authors of The 
Federalist clearly applied these reservations to their own efforts as much as to the psychological 
make-up of the people and their representatives. In No. 37 Madison writes that our imperfect 
human faculties are the very “medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed.”27 
Thus their claims to depict a universal human nature are acknowledged as tentative, imperfect and 
experimental in light of the limitations of the same fallible nature observing itself as its own object. 
Rational analysis of the human animal was not simply a matter of seeing facts. It dictated the need 
for wise judgment. Human reason must make a prudential acknowledgement of the limits of the 
rational faculty itself. The acknowledgement of reason’s limits must then impact the judgments 
and conclusions of any science of human nature. The Convention and The Federalist were carried 
out, appropriately enough, in the spirit of a great experiment whose effects were not certain 
because the causes were not knowable with mathematical certainty.  
The Constitution was means to ends established by the Natural Rights doctrine of the 
Declaration. This meant the central concern of The Federalist was a science of human conduct and 
motivation rooted in empirical observations and not the content or speculative origins of Natural 
Rights.  The Enlightenment science of man directly relevant to Publius’ account came under the 
rubrics of moral and political philosophy. The central theme of the Scottish Enlightenment, which 
so influenced Publius, was moral philosophy. John Witherspoon had been the central American 
exponent and transmitter of this school to many including Madison and indirectly to Hamilton who 
had sought to study with him. The Scottish Enlightenment understood moral philosophy as a 
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science of the faculties or powers of the human mind.28 Its central focus was to understand the way 
these powers shape and determine human action, and by extension man’s moral, social and 
political life.  It sought to discern the psychological springs of vice and virtue on the individual 
and collective levels. These springs were the causes of harmony and conflict within society at 
large.  
By the end of the 18th century, the inquiry into human motivation came to be called “faculty 
psychology.” Faculty psychology is the analysis of the various powers of mind which determine 
human action. The history of faculty psychology starts with the analysis of the soul and its parts 
by Plato and Aristotle. This analysis took its modern form in the writings of Descartes, Hobbes, 
Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Reid and others. The Moderns starting with Descartes initiated an 
emphasis on epistemology. Epistemology, a term coined in the 19th century,29 is primarily 
concerned with how men know what they know about the world and the psychological faculties 
used to attain this knowledge. The same facilities mankind uses to know the world around them 
also turn out to be the ones which drive their opinions and conduct.  
In the 18th Century faculty psychology was a central branch of moral philosophy which 
sought “to describe those divisions of knowledge concerned with the human subject.”30 Under the 
rubric of moral philosophy human psychology was the fulcrum which linked the sciences of 
politics, ethics and rhetoric.31 Thomas Reid’s writings contemporaneous to The Federalist, such as 
his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man of 1785 and Essays on the Active Powers of the 
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Human Mind of 1788 exemplify the predominance of faculty psychology within the disciplines of 
moral and political philosophy at that time. The Federalist’s use of faculty psychology places its 
arguments well within “the context of Enlightenment behavioral science.”32 Since faculty 
psychology had established a “widely shared set of assumptions, it was natural for Publius to 
employ it.”33 In a 1792 essay, Madison glosses The Spirit of Laws saying “Montesquieu has 
resolved the great operative principles of government into fear, honor, and virtue.”34 
Montesquieu’s arch principles of government are nothing other than what he determined to be the 
central ruling passions of the soul which cause men to act as they do. A given faculty of the mind, 
or “modification of the soul”, was understood by Montesquieu as “the spring that makes a 
government act.”35 
The wholistic approach of The Federalist’s moral psychology respects the breadth of 
potential motivations which drive men to act. It does not engage in simplistic or abstract 
reductivism. Obviously it reduces human motivation to self-interest, but self-interest only specifies 
a type of object beneficial to oneself without specifying the nature of the object. Such objects are 
potentially unlimited. By respecting the natural diversity of human nature, The Federalist respects 
the natural diversity of objects of desire it might aim. Publius does not couch self-interest in simple 
economic or material terms as is so common today. One popular current account of human 
psychology is Rational Choice Theory derived from economics. Rational Choice Theory operates 
under the assumption that all behavior is singularly motived by “choosing a course of action which 
maximizes expected utility. The theory however tends to treat “utility” in a narrow and reductive 
way. It makes utility reducible to maximizing quantities and ignores certain ends of action entirely. 
 
32 Ibid, p. 491. 
33 Ibid., p. 486. 
34 James Madison. “The Spirit of Governments.” National Gazette, February 18, 1792 
35 Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. xli.  
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It describes as rational a “maximin” conception of utility. This is a strategy “employed to maximize 
a player's minimum possible gain.”36 The underlying goal is to try and guarantee maximal gains 
and minimize losses.37 This is considered, “rational.” 
Rational Choice Theory does not take seriously a whole range of motivations which 
political thinkers from Plato to Publius took for granted including those of ambition, honor, glory 
and fame. The theory is abstract and does not draw on historical examples or the personal 
experiences of its progenitors. How much someone wants something, is simply a matter of 
counting. This approach fails to consider all those “irrational” desires and endeavors that do not 
conform to this quantitative model. It is not equipped to understand self-sacrifice, martyrdom or 
the desire for fame or glory. It deems such motives “irrational” and demonstrates just how narrow 
its explanatory power is. This is psychological model of risk aversion. Great actors of history rarely 
if ever conform to such a model. It does not account for all-or-nothing modes of thinking. It is hard 
to imagine a Madison or a Hamilton every making such generalizations about human motivation. 
Men want to gain and acquire that which is useful to them, but what do they understand as the 
useful, legitimate or truly desirable end of their actions? The political scientist must acquaint 
themselves with specific human types starting from the natural divide of humors between the few 
and the many. Hamilton and Madison understood men as motivated by particular ends peculiar to 
their own natures. What is perceived as useful to one man is not to another. Nor is this a matter of 
pure subjectivity, or arbitrary cultural construct. Their reading and experiences led then to identify 




37 John Rawls. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999. pp. 152-57.  
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Within the scientific inheritance The Federalist took from the Enlightenment there were 
significant disputes over the precise nature and division of human psychology. There was 
particular disagreement over the relative power of its faculties. What was the specific nature of 
faculties like reason, passion, interest and moral sentiment? And, what was the relative force of 
these motivations under specific circumstances? The nature and urgency of its practical and 
rhetorical task meant The Federalist Papers were not intended to address these matters in the 
granular or systematic way a philosophical treatise might. Its essays do not have the time, space 
or scope to address such matters from first principles. Its faculty psychology is less than systematic. 
Madison even acknowledges they are unable to resolve certain ambiguities inherited from others.38 
It takes clear stands on some matters, while on others is content to leave loose ends. Often it seems 
to simply rely on the common sense of the thing without adding distinct contributions of its own.  
Rarely does the text provide precise definitions of key terms, or the philosophical foundations on 
which they might rest. This absence is most noticeable in the use of the elusive term “interest”. As 
we shall see, this ambiguity is built into the concept itself. Lacking explicit clarification, The 
Federalist often relies on context and sense of use as well as the common public meaning of these 
words as understood by an educated public. 
 It has often been said that the focus of the new science on faculty psychology displaced 
prior theories of human nature centered on the doctrine of the Law of Nature.39 The new human 
sciences were apparently relegated to studying the “is” of human conduct while denying the 
possibility of knowing how men “ought” to live. How they ought to live was condemned to the 
purgatories of mere opinion or the zeal of blind faith. The emphasis in Hume and Burke on 
 
38 No. 37.  
39 Gary Hatfield. “Remaking the Science of Mind.” in Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth Century Domains (ed. 
Fox). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. p. 207. 
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experience and history increasingly saw the foundation of human conduct in historical habits over 
and above the kernel of a fixed human nature. An exclusively empirical turn may have been 
increasingly true of the European context, but not so of the American one. Hamilton’s thought for 
example is often seen through the lens of the historical and empirical turn in Hume and Burke. But 
the later Hamilton never refuted or rejected the earlier one who had written that the “sacred rights 
of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records. They are written 
with a sun beam in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself; and can 
never be erased or obscured by mortal power.”40 This was the man who joined the New York 
Manumission Society after it was founded by his future fellow author John Jay in 1785, on the 
premise that slavery was a wrong against human nature.41  
Instead, Publius’ science of human nature is built on the premise that knowledge of the 
human faculties “was knowledge of what it was both possible and right to do.” 42 Publius believed 
that human nature itself provided “a standard for good government.”43 This is as true of Locke as 
it is of the Scottish Moralists. For example, Louis Hartz presented the famed thesis of the enduring 
value of Locke in the American context long after the principles of the Glorious Revolution had 
been transcended in English and European politics and political thought.44 Even the skeptic Hume 
believed there were universal laws of human conduct which could be discerned from the careful 
study of history. The subject of Hume’s Treatise was after all, human nature. 
 
40 Alexander Hamilton. The Farmer Refuted. 1775. 
41 Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. pp. 214-215. 
42 Roger Smith. “The Language of Human Nature.” in Inventing Human Science: Eighteen Century Domains (ed. 
Fox). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. p. 101. 
43 David Epstein. “The Political Theory of the Constitution.” Allan Bloom Ed. Confronting the Constitution. New 
York: AEI Press, 1986. p. 138.  
44 Louis Hartz. The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955.  
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The two tranches of the human sciences, descriptive and normative, need not contradict, 
but instead complement one another. The method of the Natural Law tradition is often said to be 
excessively rationalistic, speculative and abstract whereas the science of human nature initiated by 
Hume was increasingly empirical, inductive and concrete. No doubt the empirical findings of the 
nature of the human mind and the powerful role played by the passions made Humean science 
profoundly skeptical of rational speculation. Madison and Hamilton repeatedly express wariness 
toward armchair philosophy untethered from the test of experience. Hamilton repeatedly railed 
against what he called “dangerous metaphysics” in matters of political.45  
Despite this new emphasis, neither Hume nor Publius succumb to the displacement of 
human nature by History as the ground of human identity. The empirical turn meant a greater 
dependence on and respect for experience and history. History was however understood by Hume 
and Publius as the central fount for empirical evidence of a constant human nature and its motives. 
This, Hume made no bones about. Furthermore Hamilton himself speaks of a certain type of self-
evident truth, like that of the Declaration, which “carries its own evidence along with it; and may 
be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning.”46 This type of truth, he writes, 
“rests upon axioms, as simple as they are universal.”47 Despite the apparent tensions in method 
and substance  between the new science and the prior Natural Law tradition their differences are 
hardly as absolute or mutually exclusive as often portrayed. We need only mention Montesquieu 
as a bridge between these approaches, influential on Madison and Hamilton, who respected both 
the general and the specific in human nature.  
 
45 Michael P. Federici. The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2012. p. 74. 




Publius science extends beyond political psychology. The Federalist’s arguments on behalf 
of the Constitution marry the principles of Modern Natural Law and the empirical observations of 
faculty psychology in a complimentary and logically consistent manner. For example, the Natural 
Law tradition of Hobbes and Locke find common cause with Hume in their agreement about the 
relative fixity and constancy of human nature. Furthermore, Hobbes, Locke and Montesquieu all 
ground the laws of human nature in empirical observations and realities. The foundation of their 
theories of Natural Law starts with core observations of biological impulses. The arch empirical 
realties they observed can be summed up as self-preservation, fear of violent death, self-interest, 
and the desire for a comfortable or commodious existence. These observed empirical phenomena 
dictate normative ends of human conduct as well as the proper ends of political order. Since men 
are understood as equal and all have a fundamental drive to self-preservation coupled with a desire 
to avoid violent death, then men must have a right to self-preservation and a duty to respect that 
right in others. The “self-evident” truths, which form the basis and content of Natural Law, are all 
rooted in universal biological drives of the species. Natural Law is the product of rational 
inferences from these empirical realities. For example, the natural and powerful inclination to self-
preservation culminates in a law which makes preserving life sacrosanct. Locke’s prohibition on 
suicide is the logical ramification of a norm derivative of biological drives.48 Natural Law is 
grounded in our first nature, even as our second nature is required to fulfill it. Reason’s role is not 
to invent laws but to identify them. Natural Law results from the rational ramifications of these 
observations, and in turn provides a normative basis for the ends of law and political order. Like 
Locke and Montesquieu, Publius walks a line between the rationalist tradition of Natural Law and 
the more empirical science of the later Enlightenment. 
 
48 John Locke. Two Treatises on Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p. 271.  
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2. The Two Tranches of Human Nature 
 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.1 
- Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
 
In his monumental commentaries on English Common Law of 1628 Sir Edward Coke 
writes, “Law…is the perfection of reason.”2 “Reason,” said Coke, “is the life of law, nay the 
common law itself is nothing else but reason.”3 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes would later turn 
this adage on its head in his 1881 book The Common Law. His rejoinder to Coke and the rationalist 
legal tradition was to say, “The life of law has not been logic: it has been experience.”4 Is law a 
function of reason or experience? Is not law necessarily a mixture of both? What can be reasoned 
about without experience? Put another way is law derivative of logical inferences from a constant 
human nature, or is it purely the result of contingency responses to changing historical 
circumstances? Experience alone without reasoning cannot alone yield law. History sanctions all 
human conduct and demonstrates that on a material level, we are only restricted by the laws of 
physics and biology. Thomas Hobbes writes “Prudence is but experience” but some gain much 
less wisdom than others because prudence requires both experience and rational reflection on it. 
Thus, the development of law is not a willy-nilly process of experience, but of the conscious and 
unconscious application of reason to judge the consequences of actions and thereby establish rules 
of conduct for the future based on those reflections.  
 
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes. The Common Law. New York: Dover Publications, 1991. p. 1.  
2 Sir Edward Coke. The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. (1628) Bk. 2, Ch. 6, sect. 138.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Oliver Wendell Holmes. The Common Law. New York: Dover Publications, 1991. p. 1.  
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Even Justice Holmes’ legal pragmatism acknowledge a central role for reason despite its 
emphasis on history and experience. Holmes acknowledges that “it is true in the broadest sense 
that the law is a logical development” but was determined to refute what he called the “fallacy” of 
conceiving it as “purely a process of articulated logic” or that it was “worked out like mathematics 
from general axioms of conduct.”5 What are we to learn from experience without reaching 
conclusions which are an outgrowth of inferences deduced from experience which necessarily and 
inevitably go beyond it? Is not law nothing other than reasoning applied to experience in order to 
arrive at statutes which promote the perceived public interest? We need only look at the dire 
consequences at the extremes when law is exclusively associated with either reason or experience. 
Once the rational is equated with the real, or law with absolute reason, as Hegel did, a monstrosity 
can be justified. Likewise, the absolute association of law with experience or the real, is equally 
subject to the same justification of monstrosities.  
Experience, or history, completely untethered to reason is a cloaked version of might makes 
right. What is, is by definition just. In a democratic republic the belief that the life or essence of 
law is experience means that the will of the majority is always just regardless of what it wills. If 
the majority wills slavery, slavery is just. This was precisely the position taken by Stephen Douglas 
in the Lincoln-Douglass debates. The doctrine of popular sovereignty was for Douglas the just 
principle in determining whether new states entering the Union would be free or slave. Jaffa writes, 
“Douglas’ doctrine of ‘popular sovereignty’ meant no more than that: in a democracy, justice is 
the interest of the majority, which is ‘the stronger’.”6 The simple principle of majority rule makes 
the will of the majority infallible. This is what experience and history unmoored from reason teach. 
Where are the constitutional and legal guard-rails to the democratic will to be found without some 
 
5 Thomas Sowell. A Conflict of Visions. New York: Basic Books, 2007. p.50. 
6 Harry V. Jaffa. Crisis of a House Divided. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. p. xi. 
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reference to a rational discernment of human nature which identifies certain practices as naturally 
just and others as naturally unjust? On what ground would Martin Luther King Jr. have stood 
against the positive laws of his day without reference to a law which finds its source and foundation 
in nature or nature’s God, that is, something higher than the democratic will? Were not segregation 
and Jim Crow based on nothing other than what Holmes calls the “felt necessities of the time, the 
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy” and last but not least, “the 
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men”7 Total deference to history and experience 
justifies the tyranny of the status quo. Laws do not always unconsciously emanate from the habits 
and practices of the day, they also emerge in opposition to them. 
At the heart of this debate over law as a manifest in reason or History, is how human nature 
is to be identified and known and the practical consequences of each perspective. Does human 
nature have a general and identifiable transhistorical essence? Is it an ever-present reality across 
time, space and history whose features can be determined through observed and inferred through 
reason? Or is the superficial evidence of human nature only every partial and variable? Is human 
nature simply to be identified with the fluctuating currents of the given present?  Here, human 
nature is only what is observable in experience at that moment and cannot be known through 
rational inferences from particular experiences of men to general truths about human nature.  
This divide finds its origins in the Rationalist and Empiricist traditions of thought inherited 
by Publius and The Founders. The former placed an emphasis on a stable nature, while the other 
increasingly emphasized historical experiences as the foundation on which human identity rested. 
It is obvious that Rationalists are dependent on experience in the same manner that legal positivists 
and Empiricists are dependent on rational inferences, often unacknowledged, which go beyond the 
 
7 Oliver Wendell Holmes. The Common Law. New York: Dover Publications, 1991. p. 1.  
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strict empirical evidence. That the spirit of the times or the majority will be just still demands a 
rational justification of that position. The Rationalist and Empiricist positions are not then mutually 
exclusive. Publius and the Founders sought to walk a line between an acknowledgement that law, 
natural or positive, was the product of reason and also the product of experience. When for example 
Coke spoke of the life of law as reason, he did not, as Holmes derisively insinuates, mean 
mathematical logic or “syllogism”. Reasoning is a process of prudential judging whereas Holmes’ 
“logic”, as he himself says, implies “the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.” Coke 
meant no such thing. Coke clarified to say his identification of law with reason meant, “an 
artificial perfection of reason gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of 
every man’s natural reason.”8 By “reason” he meant prudence, or practical reasoning derived 
from and applied to experience. 
This tension between a Rationalist perspective and an Empiricist, or positivist, pragmatic 
or historicist perspective where utility is king sits as the foundation of the provisions of the 
Constitution and its account of human nature. This tension manifests itself in two intellectual 
tranches of The Federalist’s account of human nature. These tranches represent two frameworks 
of understanding its author’s inherited from the Enlightenment. These frameworks can broadly be 
described as Rationalist on one hand, and Empiricist or behavioralist on the other. These 
frameworks determine both method and substance. Each framework has its own method of 
reasoning and distinct thematic concerns as they are linked to the task of explaining the 
Constitution. In Locke and Hume, we find the broad outlines of these two frameworks, and in 
Montesquieu we find a heady synthesis. Lowenthal writes the American republic is a living 
 
8 Gerald Postema. “Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II).” Oxford University Commonwealth Law 
Journal. (January, 2003). p. 1.  
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embodiment of “the modern representative republic first rationally conceived by Locke and then 
elaborated by Montesquieu.” 9 
The first tranche The Federalist’s science of human nature consists of a Rationalist 
understanding of the principles and ends of government. These are principles gleaned from human 
nature by reason in the form of the Law of Nature. The second tranche is Empiricist. It consists of 
empirical observations of human conduct gleaned from personal experience and history. These 
two tranches offer two distinct methods. These two intellectual frameworks of The Federalist 
divide along the lines of the principles and ends of government on the one hand, and the structural 
means to those ends on the other. The Rationalist component points to how men ought to behave, 
while the Empiricist element observes how they do behave. The Rationalist framework of The 
Federalist establishes the principles of the regime while the Empiricist framework provides the 
evidence of human motivation and action which serve as the basis on which the peculiar 
arrangement, or the means, of the Constitution and its powers are devised. Actually, achieving the 
ends dictated by reason, the doctrine of Natural Rights, necessitates crafting a political order 
sensitive and commensurate to the empirically observed faculties of the human mind. From this 
general understanding of motive and conduct, The Federalist is then able to present a hypothetical 
assessment of how men would act under the provisions of the Constitution. Taylor says The 
Federalist’s “theories were built upon firmly-held political principles, the lessons of experience, 
and the parameters of the possible.”10  
Publius understood the provisions of the Constitution to be commensurate with human 
nature itself. Underlying the logic of its provisions is a presumption about the proper ends of 
 
9 Montesquieu. Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Inc., 1999. p. 19. 
10 Quentin P. Taylor. The Essential Federalist. Madison: Madison House Publishers, 1998. p. 25. 
 
 315 
government along with conclusions about the predictable motives and conduct of men. Derived 
from human nature, these ends dictate how men ought to live. They provide the necessary template 
to determine the type of conduct the Constitution should promote and discourage, reward and 
punish. The peculiar nature and arrangement of its powers are the means to achieving these ends. 
And yet, such ends, however righteous, can only be realized by a prudent assessment of how men 
do act rather than how they ought to. To guide society toward the correct actions and relations 
meant an assessment of the enduring motives and springs of human action. Once these are 
sufficiently known and understood a political order can be devised which induces correct conduct 
by appealing to likely motives in a manner that encourages or compels the desired conduct.  
While the moral principles of the Republic are enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence, it was left to the Constitutional Convention to fashion the appropriate means to 
those ends. Once the ends are established and human conduct known from experience, a political 
order can be prudently devised that will anticipate men’s actions in order to guide and constrain 
them toward those goals successfully. The Articles of Confederation were based on the same 
principles of Natural Right as the Constitution. Yet, they failed to fulfill them precisely because of 
their inability to anticipate and cope with how men actually behave. As a result, they failed to 
achieve the ends, or successfully secure the rights, laid out by the Declaration.  
The dictates of reason are found in the Natural Rights of the Declaration of Independence. 
In 1776, the acceptance of the principles of Natural Right meant that the parameters of any future 
government were already circumscribed by a popular and limited form with the sole task of 
protecting and security those rights. And yet these ends are general and do not articulate the precise 
means by which they are to be fulfilled. As Jefferson himself acknowledged in that document, the 
form government must take in order to fulfill them is left to the will of the people to decide. The 
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people, he says, must “institute new Government,” founded on “such principles” and organize “its 
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” The 
form of government is not simply the product of adherence to principles derived from reason. It is 
made possible only through prudent judgments and conclusions of experience which are the 
product of the people’s deliberations. This process rested on the people’s judicious opinion of the 
form which might best secure their Natural Rights. Madison reminds us in No. 39 that “no other 
form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental 
principles of the revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of 
freedom” than the republican form established by the Constitution.11 
This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along 
with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon 
axioms, as simple as they are universal… 
- Hamilton, No. 23 
-  
The first tranche The Federalist’s science of human nature is a Rationalist account of the 
principles of government. These are principles gleaned from human nature by reason in the form 
of the Law of Nature. The Rationalist frame employs a type of speculative reasoning where moral 
laws are inferred from empirical evidence of human nature and human conduct. The Rationalist 
approach seeks to determine the moral ought from the empirical is. A set of universal moral 
principles are deduced from human nature which dictate how human beings should act. The 
inability of “men and governments to conform to these truths in no way nullifies their validity.”12 
This is like saying that the moral prohibition against murder is nullified by the historical existence 
of murderers. Natural Law is not simply observable through the senses or manifest in physical 
 
11 No. 39.  
12 Quentin P. Taylor. The Essential Federalist. Madison: Madison House Publishers, 1998. p. 30. 
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laws. It can only be fully gleaned through speculative inferences. Its demonstration is dependent 
on rational proofs. Taylor asserts there is “a scale of political knowledge that begins with the 
“plainest and simplest truths” and stretches gossamer-like to the most qualified probabilities.”13  
Publius clearly maintains the capacity of reason to glean moral laws from the evidence of 
human nature. He rejects Hume’s claim that “the rules of morality…are not conclusion of our 
reason.”14 Following Jefferson, Natural Law was understood as axiomatic and self-evident. A 
method of speculative reasoning is employed which reaches a point at which no further evidence 
is applicable. In No. 23 Hamilton says a “self-evident” truth “carries its own evidence along with 
it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon 
axioms, as simple as they are universal.”15 In No. 31 Hamilton writes, “In disquisitions of every 
kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings 
must depend. These contain an internal evidence, which, antecedent to all reflection or 
combination, commands the assent of the mind.”16  
In No. 23 Hamilton clarifies the nature of self-evident truth. He writes, “This is one of 
those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it; and 
may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms, as 
simple as they are universal . . . the means ought to be proportioned to the end; the persons from 
whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess the means by which it is to 
be attained.”17 Employing just such reasoning to the number of the executive, Hamilton says in 
No. 70 that by “quitting the dim light of historical research, and attaching ourselves purely to the 
 
13 Quentin P. Taylor. The Essential Federalist. Madison: Madison House Publishers, 1998. p. 30. 
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dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject, than to approve, 
the idea of plurality in the executive, under any modification whatever.”18 However imperfect 
Hamilton’s conclusion may in fact be, we cannot deny that he accepted this type of rationalist 
method as necessary to their political science and its analysis of human nature.   
Natural Law is the tacit premise on which the constitutional system is based. The principles 
of the Law of Nature, from which Modern Natural Rights are derived, establish the ends of 
government. Natural Rights were understood as rational inferences deduced from human nature 
itself. The essence of Natural Law teaching was that human nature itself dictates an intrinsic moral 
law which can be gleaned by rational inference from the evidence of human conduct throughout 
history, past and present. The Natural Law tradition was primarily transmitted by the teachings of 
John Locke. The Declaration of Independence claims that government is instituted to secure the 
rights of “life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.” This Rationalist, or Natural Law, component is of 
course not the focus of The Federalist Papers. Its account of human nature rests on accepted 
presuppositions about Natural Law that it does not itself argue for, but assumes. These principles 
are the premise on which all the Constitution’s political arrangements are based even as they are 
not the priority of Publius’ analysis. It is however their necessary predicate. Taylor says that in 
The Federalist Papers, “the existence of natural rights is assumed, as is the Lockean theory of the 
origin and role of government.”19   
The rights securing nature of the Constitution is manifest in the nature and structure of its 
power. Natural Rights are the North Star of the Constitution. They demand the Constitution 
establishes a “wholly popular” government based on principles of representation, limited 
government, federalism and the separation of powers. A conception of government as popular and 
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limited, which functions as rights securing mechanism is dictated by the natural freedom and 
equality of men. These structural features are totally unintelligible without reference to the ends 
prescribed by the Declaration. The arguments of The Federalist Papers rest on the premise that 
the Constitution’s brand of republicanism was the best possible government likely to achieve these 
ends. The validity and justice of this form was not predicated on expediency, utility or mere 
conformity with the American ethos of the day. The liberty of republican government was 
commensurate with the moral law which dictates the intrinsic liberty and dignity of human nature. 
Liberty is both commensurate with that nature but also required in order to fulfill it.  
Meanwhile the Empiricist or behavioralist facet of The Federalist is built on empirical 
observations of human nature and conduct. This second tranche traces it heritage to Machiavelli 
and Hobbes, Montesquieu and Hume. Perhaps the greatest exponent of this school was Hume, who 
saw history and experience as the central fount of knowledge of human nature. Hume subordinated 
the influence of reason to the passions. Given the fallibility of the rational faculty, knowledge or 
truth would only reside in hewing to concrete experience as much as is humanly possible. Hume’s 
empiricism, his skepticism toward the findings of deductive reasoning pushed him toward the 
conclusion that “there can be no knowledge of anything beyond experience.”20 Hume made clear 
that passive, weak and slavish reason played no direct role in the establishment of morality. This 
attitude taken to the extreme would seem to deny the possibility of knowledge altogether as human 
knowledge is always dependent on inferences of reason which themselves necessarily go beyond 
experience tout seul. Action, moral or political, demands knowledge. This knowledge is perhaps 
more tenuous and based on prudent judgment, not mathematical certitude. Hume condemned 
flighty speculations of reason founded in apparent hypotheticals such as the State of Nature and 
 
20 I. Bernard Cohen. Science and the Founding Fathers. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2012. p. 253.  
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the social contract. And yet he did not deny that universal laws of human society could be gleaned 
from history. The consequences of this method were to be applied to both theory and practice.  
This behavioralist facet seeks to clearly grasp men’s conduct and the motives for it. While 
the substance of Natural Law cannot be observed by the senses, human conduct can. Evidence of 
human conduct is accessible to all men through their own experiences. This knowledge is built on 
empirical observations of history and experience and seeks to understand how men act under 
particular circumstances including the various relevant forms of political order. It seeks to provide 
an account of human conduct as predicated on the causal foundation of all-too-human impulses, 
desires and passions which dictate how most men act most of the time. The need for this knowledge 
directs the task of The Federalist away from rational speculation and toward the sources of history 
and personal experience which provided ample empirical evidence of human conduct.  
This second tranche is the focus of the account of human nature in The Federalist. This 
account comes primarily in the form of political or moral psychology. This political psychology 
sought to assess the durable and likely motives of men in government and society. Not to be 
confused with the 20th century Behaviorism, this “behavioralist” approach simply places an 
emphasis on how men act under certain historical conditions and arrangements of political power. 
The Federalist’s psychological theory “is primarily a theory of motivation.”21 This approach 
attempts to something foreign to Skinnerian Behaviorism. It seeks to survey and anticipate the 
unseen motives which compel men to act as they do. Such motives can only be inferred from 
human action.  
 
21 Morton White. Philosophy, the Federalist, and the Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.  p. 103.  
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Publius’ interest in moral psychology was guided by pressing political concerns rather than 
an abstract interest in ethics. Manzer writes, Publius took a “strictly political view of the matter.”22 
He viewed morality from the perspective of the legislator and not that of the minister or preacher. 
By becoming “acquainted with the regular springs of human action” Publius could “better 
understand the building blocks of social order and prosperity.”23 This component of the political 
science of The Federalist involves a description and analysis of the reliable and durable 
motivations which determine how people actually do act, despite the moral dictates of reason. This 
method identifies the value of taking men as they are, rather than confining itself to how they 
should be. Men as they are is the only clay from which civil society is made. During one of his 
rare speeches at the Convention Hamilton said: “Take mankind as they are, and what are they 
governed by? Their passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may 
act from more worthy motives. Our great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than they 
are.”24 
Hamilton’s point was both descriptive and normative. Empirical observation identifies 
what men typically do. There is no wisdom in crafting a political order which makes moral 
demands that cannot be met by mere mortals. Such an order is destined to fail before it has been 
established. Such realism contains within it a normative claim about the wisdom of not expecting 
extraordinary feats of virtue from ordinary men. Since men are imperfect, the founder should not 
expect perfection from them. The founder must accept basic truths about human limitation rather 
than engage in wishful thinking or contriving “imaginary republics”. Mansfield has said this aspect 
 
22 Robert A. Manzer. “A Science of Politics: Hume, The Federalist, and the Politics of Constitutional Attachment.” 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 2001). p. 512. 
23 Robert A. Manzer. “A Science of Politics: Hume, The Federalist, and the Politics of Constitutional Attachment.” 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 2001). p. 512. 
24 Alexander Hamilton’s Remarks on the Ineligibility of Members of the House of Representatives for Other Offices 
at the Constitutional Convention. June 22, 1787 
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of the new science is “based on a kind of behavioralism” which “relies on what can be expected 
in human behavior rather than exhorting to deeds that can only be wished for.”25 Therefore we 
ought not demand more of man than can reasonably be expected in light of our empirical 
observations of his conduct. 
The goal of Publius’s political psychology was “to lend support to or to explain 
propositions in the science of politics.”26 The Federalist depicts the Constitution as “a marvel of 
social engineering, based on a sound psychology, that will use human nature to control human 
nature, among both governors and governed, without requiring recourse to tyrannical coercion.”27 
The Constitution sets up a kind of Newtonian machine, a law abiding mechanism, operating 
according the constant and reliable springs and motives of human action. This was to be achieved 
through an explanation and comparison of different motives and their relative strength. The 
structure of constitutional powers and institutions must anticipate these motivations and promote 
beneficial ones while simultaneously redirecting or thwarting those motives destructive of the 
public interest. With this knowledge in hand, Publius sought to illustrate how men will act under 
the particular constraints of the Constitution.  
In accord with the Newtonian paradigm28 of the day, Publius envisioned the individual soul 
and the civil society it produces by means of mechanical metaphors.29 Soul and society were like 
 
25 Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. America’s Constitutional Soul. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. p. 139. 
26 Morton White. Philosophy, the Federalist, and the Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.  p. 102.  
27 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). p. 494. 
28 I. Bernard Cohen. Science and the Founding Fathers. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995. p. 245.  
The Founders were of course familiar with Newton’s Principia. However it is generally recognized today that the 
scientific analogies employed by Publius and The Founders were not strictly Newtonian. In fact, I. Bernard Cohen 
says “the first overt declaration that the Constitution is a Newtonian document or that the Constitution should be 
interpreted as an expression of Newtonian principles was made by Woodrow Wilson in a series of lectures given at 
Columbia University in 1907 and published in 1908 as a book entitled Constitutional Government in the United 
States.” 
29 Ibid., 216.  
“…we shall see that the discussions and debates concerning the Constitution did indeed often invoke principles of 
science, but these were generally not Newtonian.” 
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a watch whose movements are caused by sufficiently regular, identifiable and therefore predictable 
motivational springs. If the causes of human action were sufficiently regular human nature and 
society were sufficiently law abiding. Just as celestial bodies adhere to physical laws of motion, 
man and his institutions adhere to psychological laws derivative of the universal needs and desires 
rooted in human nature. Scientific analogies which appear in The Federalist are employed as more 
than mere literary tropes or persuasive intellectual rhetoric to a literate audience.  
Determined to found a regime on human nature, Publius and the Founders hoped to craft a 
constitution in conformity with what they believed to be the fixed laws of human conduct. The 
very notion of a fixed human nature implied necessity and constancy. Hirschman says, 
“Machiavelli had shown that some powerful propositions about politics can be extracted from the 
assumption of a uniform human nature.” 30 These assumptions result in the ability to predict 
behavior based on nature. Law abidingness meant human conduct was sufficiently predictable. 
Predictability meant the possibility of designing institution in advance which could anticipate and 
accommodate likely motives and the conduct which springs from them. Perhaps the Framers could 
even anticipate and thwart those inclinations in the human soul which had inevitably led to the 
decay and corruption in all regimes past. 
If the Constitution was to achieve the ends of Natural Liberty, its provisions must be 
responsive to how men actually behave in order to encourage them to act as they ought. Knowledge 
of the nature and consequences of the true springs of human motivation would allow Publius to 
anticipate and describe the likely actions of men under the particular constraints of the 
Constitution. Most of The Federalist’s arguments are predicated on general predictions of human 
conduct rooted in a psychological analysis of the motives of citizens in society and political actors 
 
30 Albert O. Hirschman. The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. p. 49.  
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in office operating under the strictures and circumstances of the institutional structure of the 
Constitution. The Federalist’s psychological analysis focuses particular attention on, but is not 
confined to, those who occupy various offices ordained by the Constitution, with their varying 
degrees and types of political power. These predictions were not based on fanciful armchair 
speculation, but the observations of men in history and personal experience operating under similar 
institutions and procedures.  
The overarching rhetorical goal of The Federalist’s advocacy for the Constitution was to 
demonstrate just how it would accommodate these likely sources of motivation. Publius attempts 
to illustrate how the enumerated powers of the Constitution would respond to the likely 
inclinations of human nature. Certain predictable motives are provoked by the particular 
constitutional provisions and arrangements. The lesser and likely motivations would be restrained 
and channeled through mechanisms such as representation and public accountability, checks and 
balances, process of appointment and the specific nature and arrangement of the powers granted. 
This analysis of behavior focuses particular attention on, but is not confined to, the motives of 
those who occupy various types of offices, with varying types of political power. By anticipating 
these motives and their subsequent actions within the proposed structure, Publius could justify and 
defend various provisions of the Constitution.  
The fixed aspect of human nature manifests itself as both an “is” and an “ought”. This 
“ought” and “is” form the two fundamental perspectives of Publius’ account of human nature. 
These two dimensions of thought, based on Locke and Hume respectively, manifest the “ought” 
and an “is” of the American regime. The Rationalist tradition establishes the “ought” of human 
conduct, while the Empiricist tradition observes the “is”. There exists a moral law which is an 
expression of our nature, and commands how men ought to act. And yet there is a record of how 
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men actually act. The “is” and the “ought” are not mutually exclusive or contradictory; they are 
complimentary. Contrary to much contemporary thought since Kant which denies the possibility 
of deriving the “ought” from the “is”, these two facets need not be mutually exclusive. Scientific 
facts and moral values do not, in The Federalist, stand distinct.  
Publius’ new science of politics marries these two traditions. The “is” and the “ought” are 
complimentary. This science is built on the premise that knowledge of the psychological faculties 
of human nature “was knowledge of what it was both possible and right to do.”31 The Constitution 
must have an eye to both aspects of human nature. If the new American regime was to be successful 
it must take men as they actually are, but provide a system to shape their actions in the direction 
of the moral law. If the moral law is the law of human nature, men will not be happy until they 
have devised a government commensurate to their nature. In order to establish a system which 
might fulfill the principle of natural liberty however, it is necessary to carefully observe and accept 
the hard-boiled facts of human nature in order to devise mechanisms conducive to those moral 
ends. Without this “ought” there is no guide, no rhyme or reason to the political order for which 
they advocate. Without the “is”, there is no possibility of successfully determining the appropriate 
practical means of their desired goals. 
The thought of Montesquieu represents a bridge between the Rationalist and Empiricist 
strains of thought Publius had inherited from the Enlightenment. These strains identify a 
permanent first nature of mankind and a variable human character shaped by history. In The Spirit 
of Laws, a concern for Natural Law is married to a heightened sensitivity to the influence of 
circumstance. While Montesquieu was the “oracle” of the separation of powers and modern 
republicanism, less mentioned is his influential navigation between the Scylla and Charybdis of 
 
31 Roger Smith. “The Language of Human Nature.” in Inventing Human Science: Eighteen Century Domains (ed. 
Fox). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. p. 101. 
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rational theories of liberty rooted in a universal human nature and the application of those 
principles in specific historical contexts. The Federalist sought to provide a justification of the 
Constitution that was consistent with both the Natural Rights of men and the nation spirit of 
American society circa 1787.   
Montesquieu remained in the camp of Locke regarding the universality of the Law of 
Nature. Locke however never confronts the challenges of applying the Law of Nature to particular 
circumstances and customs. Montesquieu’s emphasis on the variability of the human character 
actually reinforces the argument for natural equality. The dramatic differences between individuals 
and classes, of master and slave, are not the result of profound differences within human nature. 
Such differences are the result of the circumstances into which men have been thrown. These 
differences are accidents of birth. Circumstance makes one man master and another slave by birth, 
not by nature. Yet, Locke did not address the necessary modifications required of the 
implementation of the Law of Nature in order for it to remain just. The general Law of Nature 
must have respect for specific local conditions. In The Spirit of Laws Montesquieu argues that the 
concrete and distinct spirit of a people must be considered when applying the principles of Natural 
Law.32 In accommodating historical conditions Natural Law may not be fulfilled in its totality. 
This is why we see the variety and disparity of regimes. Montesquieu is sensitive to the way in 
which the imposition of the Law of Nature on a society not fitted for it, can actually run counter 
to the spirit of the Law of Nature.33 The constitutional order must accommodate the given historical 
preexisting society. In fact, some have argued that such a concern, absent in Locke, is less a nod 
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to History and instead a deeper respect for natural liberty. Serious consideration for historical 
























3. Faculty Psychology 
 
The focus of The Federalist’s account of human nature comes in the form of a political 
psychology. This psychological account is couched in an analysis of the relevant faculties of the 
human mind. The function of this theory was “to lend support to or to explain propositions in the 
science of politics.”1 Faculty psychology provided an explanation and defense of the nature and 
structure of the Constitution’s provisions. Sufficient knowledge of the human soul would dictate 
the correct political order commensurate to it. Publius’ advocacy for the Constitution is rooted in 
the claim of its conformity to an implicit psychological “model of human nature” elaborated 
throughout its essays.2 This model is built on the central categories of human motivation. The 
Constitution is designed to both contend with and depend on these likely and unchanging 
inclinations of man. The Federalist presents the Constitution as a strategic response to the regular 
and predictable motives of human nature in order to establish good government and promote 
human flourishing. By illustrating how the proposed structure anticipated the motives and actions 
of men, Publius could justify and defend the provisions of the Constitution. 
The object of this political psychology is to identify and account for the durable and likely 
motives of men in government and society. This account of human psychology is “primarily a 
theory of motivation.”3 Political or moral psychology was in part the science of the faculties of the 
human mind which move men to think and to act. The Constitution sets up a kind of Newtonian 
machine, a law-abiding mechanism, operating according the reliable and predictable springs of 
action they can expect and anticipate whey they take men as they find them, rather than as they 
 
1 Morton White. Philosophy, the Federalist, and the Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.  p. 102.  
2 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). p. 486. 
3 Morton White. Philosophy, the Federalist, and the Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.  p. 103.  
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should be. Publius sought to address how men actually act and to discern and analyze the 
variegated springs of the soul which incite them to these actions.4 Publius’ theory of human 
motivation is primarily one “that compares the strength of what Hume called the different motives 
or actuating principles of human nature.” 5 The task was “to compare the strength of different 
motives in order to support various provisions of the Constitution and to defend those provisions 
against hostile criticism; their interest in psychology was therefore guided more directly by their 
interest in politics than by their interest in ethics.” 6 Unlike Skinnerian Behaviorism, the political 
psychology of The Federalist’s attempts to survey and anticipate the unseen motives which compel 
men to act as they do. These invisible forces of the soul can only be inferred from the speeches 
and deeds of men. No doubt this science served immediate practical ends. But Publius’ broad 
ranging treatment of human motivation and the actions it inspires is a central theme which 
transforms The Federalist Papers from a work of political advocacy simply, to one with genuine 
philosophic and scientific ambitions.  
While theories of Natural Law are predicated on rational inference and self-evident truth, 
Publius’ political psychology is rooted in empirical observations of men drawn from experience 
and history. If theories of Modern Natural Law defined the proper ends of government, the science 
of human motivation would determine how and why men actually behave under the powers and 
constraints of various types of political order. The actions of men, past and present, provided a 
reservoir of data on human motivation under a wide-ranging set of circumstances. This empirical 
evidence provided the necessary knowledge from which to construct the institutional means to 
achieve the ends of Natural Law. The nature and structure of the provisions of the Constitution 
 
4 Ibid.  




would be calibrated to the durable and predictable motives of men in order to achieve the proper 
balance of order and liberty. The authors had an embarrassment of riches when it came to 
knowledge of human motivation and conduct, whether through books or their vast and varied 
practical experiences. The scholarly Madison in particular plumbed works like the Bible, histories, 
and moral and political philosophy in search of a broad array of examples which would provide 
concrete substance for his reflections.  
By the end of the 18th century the scientific inquiry into human motivation came to be 
called “faculty psychology”. Faculty psychology was a central branch of moral and political 
philosophy which sought “to describe those divisions of knowledge concerned with the human 
subject.”7 It was understood as the science of the intrinsic powers and springs of the human soul 
which drive men to think and act. It was the hub which linked the sciences of man, from politics 
and ethics, to rhetoric.8 The central object of this science was “knowledge of the qualities, powers, 
and capacities of humankind’s nature, collectively and individually.”9 It sought to identify the 
fundamental springs of  human action and to discern how these powers shape and determine man’s 
moral, social and political life.10 This science would reveal the psychological springs of vice and 
virtue individually and collectively. These springs were the causes of harmony and conflict within 
civil society. Knowledge of the true psychological sources of harmony and conflict in society could 
then be leveraged to fashion a more harmonious and just civil order.   
 
7 Roger Smith. “The Language of Human Nature.” in Inventing Human Science: Eighteen Century Domains (ed. 
Fox). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. p. 100. 
8 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). p. 488-89. 
9 Roger Smith. “The Language of Human Nature.” in Inventing Human Science: Eighteen Century Domains (ed. 
Fox). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. p. 101. 
10 No. 15. 
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The history of faculty psychology commences with the analysis of the soul and its parts by 
Plato and Aristotle.11 Plato’s city-soul analogy in the Republic establishes a structural relationship 
between the psychology of the individual and the soul of the political community which has 
endured in various forms to the present-day. Faculty psychology took its modern form in the 
writings of Machiavelli, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Reid 
and others. Works such as Hobbes’ Leviathan, Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul and Locke’s 
Essay on Human Understanding and Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature are landmarks in the 
development of the modern science of the soul.  Moderns like Descartes initiated an emphasis on 
epistemology, the science concerned with how men know what they know about the world and the 
peculiar mental abilities they use to attain this knowledge. The very same faculties used to know 
about the world, also drive man’s opinions and conduct. They sit at the foundation of human action. 
One half of this epistemological inquiry was dedicated to the source and extent of human 
knowledge, the while moral philosophy sought an explanation of the origins of morality, society 
and political community as generated out of the inner psychological faculties of man. 
Montesquieu was one of the great exponents of the tradition begun by Plato who directly 
informed the Founders and Publius in particular. His Spirit of Laws presents a new version of the 
city-soul analogy. Madison echoes precisely this analogy when he says government is nothing 
other than the greatest reflection on human nature. Montesquieu’s book is a mediation on how 
each form of civil society establishes a particular psychic principle, or “spirit,” in the souls of 
citizens through its peculiar laws. The distinct form and laws of each regime habituates this distinct 
psychic principle into the soul of its citizens. The “espirit” of the laws, shaped the spirit of the 
people. In Madison’s 1792 essay, he glosses The Spirit of Laws saying, “Montesquieu has resolved 
 
11 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
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the great operative principles of government into fear, honor, and virtue.”12 The psychic principle 
of each government is the central ruling passion of the soul which causes its citizens to think and 
act as they do. Each “modification of the soul” is “the spring that makes a government act.”13   
By the 18th century faculty psychology was a well-developed discipline and a central theme 
of moral and political philosophy. Not until the 19th Century was there a distinct scientific disciple 
exclusively dedicated to human psychology. Moral philosophy was generally understood as a 
science of the faculties of the human mind.14 The Scottish Enlightenment took particular interest 
in moral psychology. A dominate theme of the Scottish Enlightenment, faculty psychology 
received its most formal treatment in the works of Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, and Reid. In 1758, 
for example Helvétius published his De L’Esprit, published a year later in English as Essays on 
the Mind and its Several Faculties.15 In he would say “As the physical world is ruled by the laws 
of movement so is the moral universe ruled by laws of interest.”16 Works like Hutcheson’s A 
System of Moral Philosophy and An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and 
Affections, Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments  and the works of Thomas Reid exemplify some of the 
major milestones in the Enlightenment analysis of the human faculties. In 1815, for example, 
Jeremy Bentham published a book simply called the Table of the Springs of Action.  
The Federalist’s use of faculty psychology places its arguments well within “the context 
of Enlightenment behavioral science.”17 Thomas Reid’s writings contemporaneous to The 
 
12 James Madison. “The Spirit of Governments.” National Gazette, February 18, 1792 
13 Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. xli.  
14 Roger Smith. “The Language of Human Nature.” in Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth Century Domains (ed. 
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15 Helvétius. De L’Esprit: Essays on the Mind and its Several Faculties. London: Dodley & Co. 1759.  
16 Albert O. Hirschman. The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. p. 43.  
17 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
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Federalist, such as the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man of 1785 and Essays on the Powers 
of the Human Mind of 1788, illustrate the predominance of the discipline in framing moral and 
political questions at the time of its publication. Faculty psychology established a “widely shared 
set of assumptions” among the educated public making it “natural for Publius to employ it.”18 
Howe asserts that it was sufficiently familiar that it served as a convenient rhetorical device in 
framing Publius’ arguments to the public. The educated public for which The Federalist Papers 
was written, would have been generally conversant with this scientific paradigm.19 John 
Witherspoon, Madison’s mentor at the College of New Jersey and bearer of the Scottish 
Enlightenment tradition in the American colonies, had integrated Adam Smith’s theories of faculty 
psychology into his own teachings and lectures which influenced the generation of 1776 and 
beyond. 20 Tocqueville had said there was “no country in the world in which the boldest political 
theories of the eighteenth-century philosophers are put so effectively into practice as in America.”21 
Madison and Hamilton are primarily responsible for the analysis of the psychological 
faculties in The Federalist. In light of its political function their science of the soul was guided “by 
their interest in politics than by their interest in ethics.”22 They took “strictly political view” of this 
wide-ranging subject matter.23 Their moral psychology was guided by pressing political concerns, 
not moral rectitude. Moral psychology was viewed from the perspective of the legislator, not the 
minister or the moralist.  The goal was not to save or perfect souls, but devise the appropriate 
political order which could properly account for the “true springs” and likely tendencies of human 
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nature. Theories of Natural Law had already laid out the proper ends of government. Necessary 
was the knowledge needed to devise the appropriate institutional means to those ends. 
The Federalist sought to establish a psychological schema built on the central categories 
of human motivation. 24 In developing a psychological model on which institutions could be 
founded, Madison and Hamilton analyzed those politically germane motives in order to assess 
their likely impact. This analysis involved a comparison of motives in order to assess the relative 
force and constancy of each in motivating human action. This procedure, consistent with the 
Enlightenment psychology on which they drew, sought to compare the relative “strength of what 
Hume called the different motives or actuating principles of human nature.”25 This comparison of 
“the strength of different motives” was partially employed in “order to support various provisions 
of the Constitution and to defend those provisions against hostile criticism.”26 The Federalist’s 
arguments attempt to demonstrate how the Constitution structure of powers properly channel 
dominate motives in conformity with the common interest. Hume held that the science of man, “in 
forming a notion of our species,” should “compare together the different motives or actuating 
principles of human nature” to determine which are “predominant.”27 Whether a given spring is 
stronger or weaker depends on its relative strength and a given circumstance more or less likely to 
stimulate it. It was through these comparisons that the true springs of human conduct might be 
found and accounted for. 
The faculty psychology of The Federalist is a description and analysis of the reliable and 
durable motivations which determine how people actually do act, despite the moral dictates of 
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reason. Publius sought to identify the true, rather than hoped for, springs of human conduct. This 
required taking men as they are, rather than as they should be. Mansfield says the political science 
of the Constitution and The Federalist is based on a kind of behavioralism” which “relies on what 
can be expected in human behavior rather than exhorting to deeds that can only be wished for.”28 
During one of his rare speeches at the Convention Hamilton said: “Take mankind as they are, and 
what are they governed by? Their passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, 
who may act from more worthy motives. Our great error is that we suppose mankind more honest 
than they are.”29 In No. 15 Hamilton says the failure of the Articles of Confederation was precisely 
attributable to their “ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated.”30 
Publius understood the success of political institutions depended on founding them on the 
likely and unchanging motives of men, rather than ones merely aspired to. Hamilton acknowledges 
that “stern virtue” was “the growth of few soils.”31 Consistent with Modern political philosophy, 
Publius lowered the target expected of human conduct from high virtue and duty to a basis in self-
interest. The solution involved narrowing the gap between what is likely and what is right. This 
strategy shrank, but hardly obliterated, the distance between political virtue and vice. The common 
interest would increasingly be brought in harmony with individual self-interest. A regime founded 
on natural self-interest would garner the political virtue of patriotism.  Duty to country and 
inclination would be increasingly brought in line with one another. Patriotism would be love of a 
country which respected the freedom and self-interest of its citizens. 
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Lowering the bar of human conduct by bringing the duties of Natural Law more in line 
with the freedoms of Natural Right, illustrates the Modern disposition of Publius’ new science of 
politics. This science was a direct descendent of a modern tradition which attempted to solve the 
problems of the inevitable decay of political institutions. It followed in the foot steeps of a legacy 
initiated by Machiavelli, and continued by Hobbes and Locke. They hoped to build more durable 
political institutions on the “low but solid” foundation of men as they are rather than as they should 
be.32 Durable institutions must be founded on durable motives. They must rest on the solid 
cornerstone of motivations more durable than high virtue. The cornerstone of this foundation was 
self-interest. Self-interest was “low” but also “solid”. This reliance on less noble motives may have 
had less up-side, but also reduced down-side. The new science asserted that this strategy even 
created collective benefits the Ancients had condescendingly overlooked. While less exalted in its 
aims, such a regime might be more immune to the diseases and decay of those same historical 
examples the authors scrutinized so carefully and lived under.  
‘Men as they are’ provide the only available clay from which civil society can be made. In 
order to establish political institutions which might fulfill the principle of natural liberty it was 
necessary to accept the hard-boiled facts of human nature. Only true knowledge of human nature 
would make it possible to devise mechanisms conducive to liberty. In order to accommodate the 
frailties of human nature institutions must properly anticipate the natural motivations which 
compel men to act as they do in public office and private society. From his observations Publius 
derived an implicit model of human psychology and conduct on which durable political institutions 
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might be founded.33 By identifying the true springs of human conduct Publius was able to “better 
understand the building blocks of social order and prosperity.”34 
Faculty psychology is the science of the soul. The object of this science was to identify the 
various innate powers of mind which determine human thought and action. But what is a “faculty”? 
The term “faculty” is derived from the Latin word for “power”.35 Faculties are powers of the human 
soul. More precisely they are its native powers. This means that the faculties of the soul are coeval 
with human nature itself. In his Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, Thomas Reid says “the 
faculties of the mind, and its powers, are often used as synonymous expressions.” 36 He qualifies 
this by saying the “word faculty is most properly applied to those powers of mind which are 
original and natural, and which make a part of the constitution of the mind. There are other powers 
which are acquired by use, exercise or study, which are not called faculties, but habits.”37 Man’s 
faculties were understood as a product of his nature, not his variable character. This is why faculty 
psychology was so closely associated with the science of human nature itself. The Federalist 
Papers treat faculties as the native powers of the human soul “which can determine action.”38 They 
are the “true springs” of the soul. In No. 33 Madison asks rhetorically "What is a power but the 
ability or faculty of doing a thing?" Faculties of the soul the causes which compel men to think 
and act in a certain way in a given circumstance. They are internal sources which motivate or fail 
to motivate human beings to certain courses of action. Faculty psychology ultimately sought to 
 
33 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). p. 486. 
34 Robert A. Manzer. “A Science of Politics: Hume, The Federalist, and the Politics of Constitutional Attachment.” 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 2001). p. 512. 
35 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). p. 487. 
36 Thomas Reid. Essay on the Powers of the Human Mind. London: B. Griffin & Co., 1827. p. 4.  
37 Thomas Reid. Essay on the Powers of the Human Mind. London: B. Griffin & Co., 1827. p. 4.  




fashion a theory of action by identifying and analyzing these core powers which motivate men to 
act under particular circumstances. The identification of these powers provided the foundation for 
moral and political theories of human action and collective organization.    
Publius identifies the three primary categories of motivation which cause human action as 
reason, the passions and the interests. This triad had, by 1787, a well-established provenance and 
currency within the moral and political philosophy of the day. Yet, in surveying the influential 
works of the Enlightenment, faculty psychology is revealed as “a discipline in flux”. 39 The precise 
meaning and impact of these faculties where hotly contested. The Federalist piggy backed on a 
contemporaneous discourse which itself had failed to resolve their precise meanings. Publius 
himself readily attests to the untidy nature of the discipline in No. 37.  
Complications over the nature of the faculties was a product of the historical state of the 
discipline and the nature of its object of inquiry. The motives of reason, passion and the interest 
were much disputed then, as now. Faculty psychology was preoccupied with taxonomy, seeking 
to distinguish, identify and name the native powers of the human soul.40 While there was consensus 
over general answers to these three tasks, disagreement emerged as theories became more granular. 
Ambiguities abound over the precise divisions of the mind. Practitioners “struggled toward greater 
precision and debated definitions” of the faculties.41 There was significant disagreement over the 
precise meaning and nature each faculty and their relative powers. Fundamental disputes existed 
over the dominate spring of human conduct.  
Sometimes, for example, these terms were used in contradictory ways within the discourse. 
Was “interest”, as a category of motivation, genuinely distinct from those of reason and passion? 
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Was for example “moral sentiment” a more a produce of passion or reason? Moral sentiment was 
often associated with the concept of “sympathy”, but the technical meaning of this term varied 
widely from one theorist to the next. Self-interest was perhaps the most elusive spring of all, even 
as it was often considered the cornerstone on which government could be founded. Self-interest is 
a hybrid term combining reason and passion. Howe acknowledges that faculty psychology 
attributed varying degrees of rationality to self-interest.42 Was the dominate spring of interest 
reason, or was it the passions?  
Independent of the historical discourse, there is a fundamental obscurity in the nature of 
the human soul itself. The faculties are evanescent because the human soul is an invisible enigma. 
In contradistinction to the visible and material body, the soul is the great unseen mover of human 
action. The intangible nature of the soul and its powers make it intrinsically obscure. The soul is 
an invisible force which can only be inferred from visible actions. The speeches and deeds of men 
provide only circumstantial evidence for the nature of the soul and its faculties. The soul is only 
to be inferred, not seen directly. Disagreements which arose over the specific nature and 
boundaries of its powers were a result of the natural opacity of the soul itself. Another challenge 
was to determine which motives were given by nature, and therefore fixed and durable, and which 
were merely products of history. Hume had said “man is a very variable being.”43 Hume wrote of 
the human animal that “what may be true, while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found 
false, when he has embraced an opposite set of manners and opinions.”44 Circumstance conspires 
with nature to blur Reid’s tidy distinction between native powers and those acquired by custom 
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and habit. These difficulties only raised more questions over how the faculties were to be identified 
and understood.  
The enhanced empiricism and skepticism of this new political science made it more willing 
to call into question its own findings. It stressed the limits of what it can know and 
predict.45Mansfield says that the “most interesting difficulty of constitutional order is a “question 
of epistemology” or the nature of the faculties of mind.46 Madison takes up these epistemological 
questions in No. 37. The faculties of mind raise three related problems. The problem is that these 
faculties are both an instrument of knowledge and understanding, as well as an object of their own 
inquiry. The challenge to political knowledge and science is that same obscure instrument is also 
the obscure object of its inquiry. Furthermore, natural human language, as the medium by which 
knowledge and ideas are expressed, is also obscure and equivocal. The “ideas expressed in 
language are inadequate.”47 Rather than invoking skepticism to demonstrate the futility of moral 
or political science, Madison raises these ambiguities to demonstrate “the necessity of moderating 
. . . our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity.”48 Thus the skepticism of the 
new political science culminates in two conclusions. One is the demand for a “spirit of moderation” 
on the theorist’s behalf, which abandons radical extremes and the pursuit of perfection. The other 
is the advocacy for popular sovereignty and freedom of the people on the basis that the scientist is 
and never can be sufficiently wise about what is best for citizens.49 The citizen knows best the 
texture and realities of his own existence.  
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Hamilton and Madison appreciated the experimental nature of their political project and 
the faculty psychology on which it is based. Their new republicanism was largely founded on a 
relatively new approach to and solutions for the likely motives of men. They acknowledge the 
obscurities and disputes within the sciences of the faculties they drew on. In No. 37 Madison 
admits that efforts to establish precise definitions of these faculties had been “plagued by 
obscurity.”50 He says the “faculties of the mind itself have never yet been distinguished and 
defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical 
philosophers.”51 He says of this inherited science, that such faculties as “sense, perception, 
judgment, desire, volition, memory, imagination, are found to be separated, by such delicate shades 
and minute gradations, that their boundaries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain 
a pregnant source of ingenious disquisition and controversy.”52 
A constant refrain throughout The Federalist warns of the frailty of reason and the limit 
this frailty imposes on our capacity to know. This weakness is coupled with the distorting effects 
of our passions and interests on our opinions of the truth. Publius applied these reservations to his 
own efforts as much as to the psychological make-up men in general. This admonition of the limits 
of man’s reason is typically presented as a reminder of the mentality of the many, and its practical 
consequences for social order.  In Nos. 31 and 37 however, this warning applies to the few reputed 
wise and their efforts to obtain theoretical knowledge of human nature. In No. 37 Madison writes 
that our imperfect human faculties are the very “medium through which the conceptions of men 
are conveyed.”53 Thus Publius’ claim to depict a universal human nature is acknowledged as 
tentative, experimental and imperfect in light of the limitations of the same fallible nature 
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observing itself as its own object. In No. 31 Hamilton says that the “sciences of morals and 
politics” find human nature less “tractable” than “figures of pure geometry.”54  As such he says, 
“Caution and investigation are a necessary armour against error and imposition.”55 The problem 
of discriminating the faculties was that they perform double duty. They are both the means of 
understanding and the object inquiry. The same distorting lens which observes is also the elusive 
phenomenon under scrutiny.    
If human nature in general exhibits limitations of its rational faculty this is no less true of 
nature of the political scientist observing it. As Banefield says, “the contribution of reason, in short, 
was to recognize its own limitations.”56 Publius and the Founders would have to recognize the 
limits of their own powers of reasoning, the precipice where reasoning stopped and opinion, 
passion and interest began. The scientist is forced to acknowledge the limits of their reason and 
the science which is its product. Francis Bacon perspicuously observed that “human understanding 
is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolors the nature of things 
by mingling its own nature with it.”57 This statement could stand as the motto and warning for any 
scientist inquiring into the human soul. Echoing Bacon, Hamilton says in No. 31 that “the obscurity 
is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner, than in the subject. Men, upon too 
many occasions, do not give their own understandings fair play; but yielding to some untoward 
bias, they entangle themselves in words, and confound themselves in subtleties.”58  
If reason and self-love are confounded in our opinions, as Madison asserts in No. 10, then 
it is never completely clear if the observer has fully distinguished them and their “reciprocal 
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influence” on their observations of human nature. The scientist must prudently differentiate the 
distinct contributions of each. These epistemological conundrums make a science of the soul more 
than a simple matter of observing empirical facts or employing mathematical logic. They dictate 
the need for wise judgment. Such a science requires the espirit de finesse, more than the espirit de 
géométrie. Human reason must make a prudential acknowledgement of the limits of the rational 
faculty itself. The acknowledgement of reason’s limits must then impact the judgments and 
conclusions of any political science of human nature. The Convention and The Federalist were 
carried out, appropriately enough, in the spirit of a great experiment whose effects were not certain 
because the causes were not simply knowable with mathematical certainty. It is for these reasons 
that the provisions of the Constitution are described by Publius as “inventions of prudence” and 
not dictates of pure or practical reason.59  
The three central springs of action identified by Publius are reason, passion and self-
interest. These terms represent three broad genuses of motivation within which we discover a 
variety of species throughout The Federalist Papers. Within each category exists a variety of 
motives either beneficial or harmful to liberty, order and human happiness. The Classical and 
Premodern Christian worlds, had divided the human soul and its motivational sources in two, 
between reason and the passion. With the emergence of Modern secular philosophy, a third term 
intervened, “the interests”.60 The Ancients had depicted both the soul and society, microcosm and 
macrocosm, as the stage of an agonistic war between reason and the passions. For medieval 
Christianity, the soul of man was a battleground in which virtue and vice motivated by reason and 
passion respectively fought.61 Happiness was only possible when reason was able to restrain and 
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moderate the passions.  To achieve the common good, government had to establish institutions in 
such a way to facilitate reason to rule the passions. The political rule of reason was typically 
represented in the rule of the few wise over the passionate many regardless of the specific nature 
of the regime. Publius’ new science of politics was an attempt to devise wise institutions to guard 
against abuses of power, precisely when wise men did not rule.   
The main challenge to assessing the precise meaning of these three categories is a product 
of The Federalist’s practical function. As a work of political advocacy, it does not invest space 
providing technical detail in the service of purely theoretical ends. Publius takes his central terms 
for granted and rarely defines them. The precise meaning of these central faculties is often left 
implicit. The reader is left to rely on common sense understandings of terms, their historical 
provenance, and context of use. Yet, this usage lacks the system, clarity and technical detail found 
in a philosophic treatise. At times it even appears the meanings of these terms shifts with use. 
Semantic slippage exists between terms and within the use of a single one. Such slippage is not 
surprising in light of the piecemeal and collective nature of authorship from one number and author 
to the next. When context fails to yield fine grained meanings the interpreter is forced to rely on 
those established by the general intellectual climate and the sources on which the authors drew, 
without complete certainty about that dependence. Howe says that “only by examining the theory 
of eighteenth-century faculty psychology can we discover the original meaning and context of 
such crucial terms as “interest,” “balance,” “reason,” “passion,” and “virtue.” 62  
Disputes over the precise meaning of the faculties are hardly academic for Publius and the 
Founders. Clear and accurate understanding of the faculties was essential if secure foundations of 
government were to be laid on them. The meaning of the faculties has direct implications for the 
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scholarly and political understanding of the provisions of the Constitution in the ongoing dispute 
over the precise meaning of the Founding itself. This is no less true of its implications for American 
history itself. This question will remain somewhat open. Were Publius and the Founders 
pessimistic adherents of Calvin and Hobbes? Or Lockean liberals focused on individual liberties, 
commerce and property? Or, were they Classical republicans practicing virtue politics? The answer 
to this question is dependent on the meaning and emphasis they gave to the central faculties of 
mind and their political consequences. In many ways the adopted elements of all these traditions 
depending on the problem at hand. Howe says these disparate traditions are “synthesized within 
the paradigm of the faculty psychology Publius employed, which found places in human nature 
for passion, interest, and virtue.”63  
One thing is certain, the wholistic approach of The Federalist’s moral psychology respects 
the breadth of potential motivations which drive men to act. Its assessment of the faculties avoids 
simplistic or abstract reductivism. It does reduce all human motivation to some form of self-
interest. But self-interest is an underdetermined category lacking specificity beyond identifying 
desire for an object perceived as beneficial to oneself. It does not establish the specific identity of 
that object. Such objects are potentially unlimited. Nor does Publius couch self-interest in simple 
economic or material terms as is so common today. They agreed with Cardinal de Retz, a man 
whose writings Madison admired, who wrote: “You have heard it… as a common saying that 
Interest governs the World, But, I believe, whoever looks narrowly into the affairs of it, will find 
that passion, humour, caprice, seal, faction, and a thousand other springs, which are counter to 
self-interest, have as considerable  a part in the movements of this machine.”64 By respecting the 
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natural diversity of human nature, The Federalist respects the natural diversity of objects at which 
human desire aims. 
There was nothing controversial or particularly innovative in identifying these three 
faculties as the prime movers of the human soul. This triad was a common motif of Enlightenment 
moral philosophy, a fact well-documented by Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests.65 In 
this Publius merely followed the current intellectual climate of the time. In his assessment of the 
powers of the soul we see evidence of Milton, Pope, Mandeville, Hutcheson, Locke, Hume, 
Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, but also the older traditions of Pagan and Biblical antiquity. While 
Publius depended on this general orbit of ideas, he depends on no single thinker in order to fashion 
his image of the human soul. Publius’ arguments do not simply parrot the beliefs of the time, but 
follow conclusions consistent with his own experiences.  
Publius’s new science and his new republicanism were built on its own peculiar assessment 
of these three motivational sources. This novel republicanism is founded on a revised assessment 
of the peculiar nature and power of these faculties. Despite his dependence on the Scottish 
Enlightenment and its systemization of faculty psychology, Publius rejected some of its central 
conclusions regarding the nature and relative efficacy of the faculties. Rather, the Scottish 
Enlightenment provided a convenient and common framework of thinking in the analysis of human 
motivation and conduct. Publius for example exhibits a heavy reliance on Hume in numerous 
matters, yet some of the Scot’s most famous dictums are explicitly rejected. This is particularly 
notable in Publius’ vital role for reason, his demotion of the efficacy of moral sentiment, and 





Despite the acceptance of men as they are and a new theory of human motivation focused 
on self-interest, Publius does not alter the Ancient characterization of human life as a conflict 
between reason and passion. The acceptance of “interest” as a category of motivation is more a 
reformulation than a rejection of this conflict. The modern approach saw the reason-passion 
relationship less as all-out war, as one where the passions could often be coopted and redirected 
rather than their simply opposed by circumstance, reason and moral sentiment. Passions which 
could be leveraged to public benefit would be tolerated as the ends of political community would 
be lowered. Some passions which had been seen by the Ancients as the source of vice, perhaps 
could be leveraged as contributors to modern virtues. Passions properly tinctured with reason 
would become interests. Meanwhile passions that cannot be coopted in service to the public 
interest would be set against one another in countervailing fashion. Instead of reason checking 
passion directly, reason would set up a system in which passions would check each other by being 
pitted against themselves.  
The faculty psychology Publius and the Moderns inherited from the Ancients was 
hierarchical. Man was the middle being within The Great Chain of Being of the cosmos. The 
constitution of the human soul mirrored the cosmic order. Thomas Reid says of the Pythagorean 
school that in “the mind of man” like that state “there are various powers, some that ought to 
govern, and others that ought to be subordinate.”66  Within the soul was a hierarchical tincture of 
heavenly and earthly components. Publius does not abandon this hierarchy, but reassesses certain 
judgements made by the Ancients. In the Nicomachean Ethic Aristotle categorizes those beings 
with souls, plants, animals and human beings. The rational soul which distinguished human nature 
made it superior to the animal and the plant. Reflecting the scala natura, Aristotle says “the soul 
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rules the body with the rule of a master, while intellect rules appetite with political and kingly 
rule.”67 Human conduct was the product of a perennial struggle between reason and the passions. 
This conflict raged within the soul and within society. Man’s reason was his god-like endowment, 
it gave him the power to know but at the same time did not grant full knowledge. The celebration 
of the rational faculty which makes men capable of a free self-governing life was combined with 
a recognition of the limits of reason to effectively regulate the passions. Human nature lacked the 
genuine self-sufficiency and true wisdom which defined the nature of the gods.68 Tallied together, 
the sum total of these assets and liabilities placed man in the middle of things.69   
Mankind’s excellence and power were not absolute, but had definable limits. The limits of 
man’s reason places him beneath the gods. When Madison says “men are not angels” he is 
acknowledging the limits of human nature in both its wisdom and conduct. While some might 
dismiss this statement as rhetorical ornament designed to captivate the sensibilities of a religiously 
oriented audience, it appears to be a frank acknowledgement of the unchanging permanence of 
man’s middle status by juxtaposing him to a superior being of a fundamentally different order. We 
are as different from angels, as the horse we ride is from us. With God superior and the natural 
world inferior, mankind occupies the middle.  
In the Republic, Plato’s divides the soul into reason and the passions. In all the soul consists 
of three irreducible parts, reason, spiritedness and appetite. In a sense all three parts of the soul are 
appetites, motivational sources which differ in their nature and object of desire. Each has a specific 
object of desire which motives action toward that end. These motivational components exist in a 
hierarchy of worth and dignity with reason atop and appetite below. For Plato reason was the 
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rightful ruler of the soul. Reason should rule, and its rule consists of regulating the passions. The 
rule of reason produced harmony and order in the soul and was synonymous with human 
happiness. Plato asserts that “the harmonious and just soul is the soul ruled by reason.”70 Just as 
reason must rule in the soul to produce order and harmony, reason must also rule the soul of the 
city if it is to achieve order and harmony and establish justice. 
The Ancients placed a premium on reason and virtue because they saw human excellence 
as the end of political community. The polis was the self-sufficient and authoritative community 
precisely because its division of labor included all the prerequisites necessary for complete human 
flourishing. Human excellence was conceived as the most complete use of man’s endowment of 
reason. Reason was the highest guide to life, whether practical or theoretical. The rational mastery 
of the passions was the means by which human flourishing would be achieved on the individual 
or collective levels. Living well did not merely mean living comfortably in an ever-expanding 
economy which conquered natural scarcity. The goal of human excellence placed an emphasis on 
civic duties and responsibilities over individual rights and freedoms. For the Ancients there was a 
realm of human happiness above both economics and politics which utilized reason in its highest 
form. This was the life of philosophy. Short of that goal, the end of political community was to 
cultivate moral virtue in the form of patriotism or political virtue, not mere security and material 
well-being. Publius’ historical analysis in Volume I of The Federalist Papers shows that this idea, 
however noble, was rarely achieved in practice in the ancient world. Ancient and premodern 
republics were fraught with factional turbulence precisely because the political liberty they granted 
citizens to realize virtue, also gave excessive free reign to the passions. Despite their angelic aims 
ancient republics ironically gave expression to vices which lead to their demise.  
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Stripped of metaphysical trappings, Publius maintains the hierarchy of the soul. The worth 
of the central faculties of the human mind had, what has been called, a “definite sequence of fitful 
precedence.”71 Reason was first, followed by interest and the passions in a manner that would have 
been intelligible to Plato and Aristotle.72 Each motive existed within a hierarchy of worth, but also 
a hierarchy of relative efficacy. Reason as the most prized faculty, was also the weakest. It was the 
necessary ingredient as the proper guide to life in determining means and ends. As we shall see, 
Publius repeatedly asserts that collective reasoning is necessary to achieve the common interest 
and that proper political order is generally capable of channeling political actors toward courses of 
actions consistent with reason and the public good. Meanwhile the passions were the greatest threat 
to collective well-being but were naturally strongest. Meanwhile, “interest” occupied a middle 
place representing a synthesis and compromise of reason and passion.  
Publius does not condemn man for his fallen nature and implicitly denies that the end of 
government is to save or perfect men’s souls. Nonetheless, Howe says that “the idea of inevitable 
evil in human nature did not surprise men who were well acquainted with the Christian doctrine 
of original sin and its secularized versions in eighteenth-century faculty psychology.”73 Most, if 
not all, passions were understood as a potential threat to civil order.74 That the passions pose a 
direct threat to others, the common good, and even to ourselves is an acknowledgement of the 
permanent existence of evil and injustice within human nature. It is a frank admission that the soul 
generates desires which, if satisfied, can and do harm others. In No. 34 Madison illuminates the 
crux of the problem. He says, judging “from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to 
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conclude, that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more 
powerful sway, than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political 
systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility, would be to calculate on the weaker springs of 
the human character.”75 In No. 42 Madison says that “the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause 
of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned before public bodies as well as 
individuals, by the clamours of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain.”76 In No. 
6 Hamilton says: “Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found, that momentary passions, and 
immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct, than general 
or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice?”77 
The crux of the political problem created by human psychology is how to properly 
compensate for the “defect of better motives” that exists within the human soul. When Madison 
tells us that men are not angels he is asserting that human nature exhibits a “defect of better 
motives” which necessitates they be constrained externally in their actions precisely because they 
lack the internal strength of motive to curb their desires. This defect of human nature demands 
government commensurate to it. Human nature lacks the resources for self-sufficient self-restraint. 
The source of this defect of motives is precisely that the powers of the soul vary inversely to the 
needs of the happiness of the individual and civil society: the passions are strongest, reason 
weakest.78 The motive most needful is weakest and those most destructive, strongest. Howe says 
Publius identifies this problem as the “the tragedy inherent in the human condition.”79 This 
permanent defect makes government and its justice necessary. Government must restraint the 
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governed and then restraint itself. In No. 55 Madison points to the political problem of the faculties. 
Republican self-government requires a sufficient supply of reason and the proper restraint of the 
passions. Yet the need does not guarantee the supply. The challenge of the Founders new science 
of politics was to solve the problem created by the conflict between the demands of a free political 
order and what can be expected of the human faculties. Faculties most necessary to justice are in 
least abundance. 
Political order cannot rely on a foundation of motives men ought to have, such as reason, 
virtue and a sense of duty, but only ones they are likely to act on when granted power such as 
passions and interests. The defect of the human soul is the inverse relationship between the relative 
worth and strength of these motives. Reason is most beneficial but least powerful, while the 
passions and the interests are strongest, yet represent a clear and present danger to political 
prosperity. A free and stable order can only be founded on the reliable, and therefore lesser, 
motivations of human nature. In light of the nature and limits of the faculties it is not wise to 
attempt to found political order on an ethic of self-sacrifice or Spartan restraint since such virtue 
is virtually impossible to maintain in a free society, or any other kind. One cannot demand of the 
faculties what they are not consistently capable of. A Constitutional order will not persist if 
founded on motives that are not in sufficient supply.   
The central problem the Constitution was designed to solve, and The Federalist Papers to 
explain, was how durable institutions could be founded on lesser motives and ordered in 
conformity with them? Maynard Smith writes The Federalist sought “to so organize a republic 
that, insofar as possible, all manner of passions either can be used or rendered fairly harmless.”80 
Government founded on fragile faculties makes for fragile institutions. The new republicanism 
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proposed by Publius, which marks its genuine contribution to political science, asserts that 
institutions need to be fashioned in a novel way and that the role played by the faculties within 
them would be equally novel. The commercial spirit would be promoted as consistent with the 
natural liberties of human nature despite their lack of true nobility. Meanwhile the lowly passions 
would be channeled by institutions so that they could be deployed against themselves and 
neutralized. Passion would be given a degree of free play, but set against itself under a system of 
separation of powers in order that it might check itself.  This permitted a certain encouragement 
of lesser faculties and promoted passions which had the potential to be constructive.  
Once identified, the deliberations of the Convention and The Federalist sought to 
determine how those faculties would operate within the machine of the Constitution so as to 
promote and orchestrate actions in a manner conducive to both liberty and the public good. Fiering 
describes the eighteenth century “as a the time of an intellectual revolution” in which reason and 
virtue were “displaced from supremacy by ‘the lowly and dangerous passions’.”81 This is an 
overstatement. Certain ancient vices would become modern virtues, yet there remained a set of 
passions Publius considered dangerous to all forms of political order. Nor was the belief that 
certain passions could be considered virtuous synonymous with the believe that an Invisible Hand 
might create spontaneous order through the raw unleashing of certain passions and interests where 
private vices would produce public benefits. Publius and the Founders where not libertarians; the 
Federalists asserted the primacy of the political and the vital role of a strong central government. 
Nor did they ignore what they believed was the absolute necessity of reason, virtue and a morality 
underwritten by religious belief and habits for the proper functioning of society. The authors of 
The Federalist make clear that reason played a necessary and permanent role in fashioning of 
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institutions and the ongoing functioning of government and society. As demonstrated, Publius does 
not found government on the passions, but rather on self-interest, and in particular self-interest 
rightly understood. As hybrid of reason and passion, this meant reason was the inextricable 
ingredient of good government. The Founding, if not the operation of the regime, must rely on 





















V. A Theory of Human Motivation 
1. Reason 
 
Reason in man obscured, or not obeyed,  
Immediately inordinate desires 
And up start passions catch the government 
From reason, and to servitude reduce 
Man till then free…”1 
-      Milton, Paradise Lost 
 
The story of reason in The Federalist Papers is one of its necessity for political prosperity, 
coupled with its limited supply in human nature. Plato’s depiction of the human soul as a puppet 
pulled in conflicting directions by its faculties is a poetic depiction illustrating how “faction is 
sown in the nature of man.” The myth of the puppet of the gods illustrates how the soul is not in 
harmony with itself without the pull of reason dominating the soul’s other chords. When human 
nature is guided by its reason, its motivations work in unison coherently toward the same ends of 
action. Reason was master by right, yet lacked a master’s might in man’s nature. Therefore, reason 
needs to be augmented by external incentives and deterrents, rewards and punishments. Most 
political actors will only conform to the dictates of reason under the external threat of compulsion. 
With the proper accommodations, raw passion could be tamed to conform to the common good. 
Or, put in the modern idiom, self-interest can be made to align with the common one.  
Publius certainly did not believe in the Enlightenment myth of a society entirely remade 
by an all-too-certain reason in the manner of Robespierre’s Republic of Virtue. There would be no 
Cult of Reason. Publius vehemently denied this was either feasible or desirable. It was a recipe for 
 
1 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). p. 488. 
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tyranny. Despite Publius’ recognition of reason’s limits and the power of the passions, he 
nonetheless recognized the same necessity of reason as the Ancients. Despite some crucial nods to 
modern moral psychology which placed the seat of judgment in the passions and sentiments of the 
human soul, Publius does not depart from the Ancient’s belief in the necessity and sufficient 
efficacy of reason. Rather he sought to order a regime that would not make demands of reason 
which reason could not meet. Despite innovations in thinking about the efficacy of the moral 
sentiments for civic order and a growing acceptance of commercial passions as relative virtues 
rather than vices, reason remained the guide to correct action individually and collectively. Siding 
with the Ancients and departing from Hume, Publius accepted the necessity and supremacy of 
reason as the ultimate guide to human life. This does not mean man’s capacity for reason easily 
meets his needs, or that other motivations did not need to be correctly employed in order for him 
to heed its sedate and mild voice.  
Reason is the crown jewel of human nature. Logos, speech and reason, is the medium which 
allows human beings to represent the world and our own situation to ourselves. This representation 
is achieved through the tools of speech and thought and the notions they make possible such as 
past, present and future. These notions allow us to conceptualize and frame our experiences to 
ourselves, to reflect on past actions and foresee future consequences of present choices. The faculty 
of reason is simply the act of reasoning and thinking through the medium of language. By allow 
us to represent our situation, reason allows us to conceive of alternative courses of actions, 
including the rejection of following mere impulse, or being blindly hidebound to tradition. These 
powers make reason capable of serving as the rudder and guide of our actions. The capacity to 
choose between motivations and the courses of action they represent, gives the human animal 
relative freedom from the imperiousness of the passions, hard-wired instincts.  and the ironclad 
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laws of matter and motion. Reason does not merely allow us to choose, but to reflect and deliberate 
on the correct course of action and the correct way of life. All forms of political deliberation are 
merely collective manifestations of the reflective capacity make possible by our rational faculty. 
In the Politics, Aristotle says the essence of citizenship is to participate in collective reasoning and 
deliberation about laws which will determine the city’s way of life.2 The fundamental power of 
reason as a guide to human life is invoked by Hamilton when he tells us that it is left to the United 
States to determine whether it is possible for any people on the globe to found government on the 
basis of “reflection” and “choice” rather than being forever in thrall to “force” and “accident”.  
As the rational animal, human beings are capable of discerning the law of their own nature.3 
Reason is the compass of human action. It discerns general rules of human conduct in light of 
human nature.  It adjudicates between the passions and can help moderates their excesses. The 
problem with the passions is that they are blind. They lack foresight and cannot discern the 
consequences of their own fulfillment. Reason is the one and only facility of the soul with the 
ability to foresee the potential consequences of actions and calibrate conduct accordingly. It 
adjudicates between various desired means and ends in light of consequences foreseen by 
reflection on past experience applied to present circumstance. Rational reflection and deliberation 
place a pause between a desire and its fulfillment. In No. 71 Hamilton implies reasoning involves 
“time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.”4 In this pause it is potentially able to 
determine both the appropriate means and ends of a given action. There is of course no guarantee 
 
2 Aristotle. Politics (translated Carnes Lord). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013. p. 64. 
3 John Locke. Two Treatises on Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p. 309.  
“The Freedom then of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own Will, is grounded on his having Reason, 
which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, an make him know how far he is left to the 
freedom of his own will.” 
4 No. 71 
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of the infallibility of human reasoning in practical matters. Rather, if there is any best available 
guide to action, it is reason.   
In scouring The Federalist Papers for its concept of reason, we see that it divides into two 
types not fundamentally different from those identified by Aristotle and the tradition. For Aristotle 
the rational part of the soul, the intellect or nous, was divided in two. There was a “scientific part, 
which enables us to study or engage in theoretical activity or contemplation (theoria), and the 
deliberative part, which enables us to engage in practical activity.” 5 Throughout the Politics and 
Ethics Aristotle speaks of theoretical reason and practical reason. Theoretical reason produces 
knowledge and science while practical reason produces wisdom which culminates in right action. 
This division persisted historically and was still quite evident, with important modifications, in the 
moral and political philosophy of the Enlightenment. It remained the basis of the divisions of the 
faculty of reason in Hume’ Treatise. Hume speaks of “the understanding” as the rational faculty 
of the mind which is divided into “speculative” and “practical” reasoning.6 
Theoretical reason is employed toward knowledge of the general and universal truths of 
nature. Theoria or contemplation literally involves looking on the phenomena of the world at a 
distance as a passive spectator in an attempt to gain critical distance. Critical distance is gained by 
removing oneself from direct involvement in what is being observed. The verb, theorein from 
which theoria is derived, means “to consider; to look at; to speculate as a spectator.”7 A theoros is 
literally a “spectator” or “one who looks.”8 The word “theater” is derived from the same verb and 
refers to the place where an audience acts as a nonparticipant spectator, and looks at and reflect on 
 
5 Aristotle. Politics (Trans. C.D.C Reeve). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998. p. xxviii.  





the action of the stage. This type of knowledge aspires to be disinterested and independent of 
practical influences such as the needs, demands and desires of life.   
Meanwhile, practical reasoning pertains to deliberations which produce choices related to 
specific actions. Practical reason is derived from praxis which means “practice, action, doing” or 
simply, living.9 Praxis is derived from the verb prattein which literally means “to do” or “to act”.10 
Practical reasoning, by definition, culminates in action. Practical reason is addressed to identifying 
and solving the problems produced by the needs, desires and demands of life. Practical reasoning 
involves understanding and judging the meaning and consequence of actions. It attempts to foresee 
consequences and calibrate means and ends accordingly. Practical reason pertains to knowledge 
of what is right, or what is best to do under the pressure of circumstances. Aristotle calls correct 
judgement in practical matters, “right reason.” Practical reason acknowledges that the thinker 
operates within a specific context which influences their thinking. It recognizes they are committed 
to various life purposes and are directly involved in the matters which they consider and judge. 
The practical thinker is also an actor in the play, they are situated and not detached from the 
consequences of their own judgments.   
Practical reasoning about matters of action stands in contradistinction to theoretical 
reasoning which produces knowledge for its own sake. Theoretical reasoning may be a prerequisite 
for sound practical reasoning, but it is not a substitute for it. Aristotle compares these two types of 
reasoning to geometry and carpentry.  Theoretical reason deals in abstractions, operates by 
mathematical precision and ironclad logic, and is founded on certain self-evident axioms which 
cannot be conclusively proved by simple reference to empirical facts. It obtains knowledge for its 






and induction. One is an exercise in pure logic. The other is an exercise in phronesis, or prudence 
and wisdom. Prudence is sound judgement in practical matters. Prudence is knowledge gained 
from reflection on extended experience.  It is particularly necessary in those circumstances in 
which the general rules of human conduct do not spell out clear or conclusive courses of correct 
action. Carpentry is practical; it seeks to build, not merely understand, actual structures. While it 
depends on geometrical knowledge and mathematics, it is only a practical approximation of the 
perfect precision and logic of geometry. Its measurements must accommodate themselves to real, 
not ideal, conditions. The success of carpentry is demonstrated by empirical evidence found in the 
structural integrity and functionality of what it makes. The “proof” of carpentry is that it works as 
intended, not that it conforms to pure logic or abstract truths.  
The Federalist demonstrates an obvious synergy between these two forms of knowledge. 
Publius and the Founders were builders attempting to craft a political edifice on the blueprint of 
the self-evident truths of human nature. Sufficiently accurate theoretical knowledge of human 
nature could serve as a guide to the practical construction of the constitutional architecture 
necessary to achieve ends dictated by that same knowledge. Despite the emphasis on experience 
and practical judgement throughout The Federalist, both of these forms of reasoning, intellectual 
and practical, are necessary to Publius’ arguments. In No. 23 Hamilton speaks of “self-evident” or 
“primary” truth which “carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be 
made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms, as simple as they are universal.”11 
He says there are “those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence 
along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests 
upon axioms, as simple as they are universal . . . the means ought to be proportioned to the end; 
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the persons from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess the means 
by which it is to be attained.”12 This passage calls to mind the “self-evident” truths of the 
Declaration of Independence which the architecture of the Constitution is dedicated to fulfilling. 
Theoretical reason and knowledge, Publius asserts, is relevant to the science of ethics and 
politics. Publius makes certain claims that are simply axiomatic, not subject to simple empirical 
proofs. The basis of Natural Law and the self-evident truths of Natural Right on which the 
Constitution rests, are drawn from this kind of reasoning. In a rather stunning claim for Publius, 
who calls experience the “oracle of truth,” and the “oracle of wisdom” he says in No. 70 that “by 
quitting the dim light of historical research, and attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason 
and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject, than to approve, the idea of 
plurality in the executive, under any modification whatever.”13  
In No. 31 Hamilton say that “In disquisitions of every kind, there are certain primary truths, 
or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal 
evidence, which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the 
mind…Of this nature are the maxims in geometry… Of the same nature, are these other maxims 
in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be 
proportioned to the end.”14 He concludes by saying that “in the sciences of morals and politics, 
men are found far less tractable” but that “this untractableness may be carried too far” and that 
“though it cannot be pretended, that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in 
general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics; yet they have much better 
claims in this respect, than, to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we should 
 
12 No. 23 
13 No. 70 
14 No. 31.  
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be disposed to allow them.”15 In short reason is capable of sufficient enough knowledge of 
fundamental moral and political truths to found just political institutions rather than one merely 
reflective of the times.16  
In Hamlet, Shakespeare, the faculty psychologist, has his Player Duke say, “Our thoughts 
are ours, their ends none of our own.”17 Shakespeare’s modern psychology suggested that men’s 
goals and purpose were not shaped by their conscious thoughts or reason. Pascal had said that “the 
heart has its reasons, which reason knows not.”18 Such ends were given naturally by inchoate 
speechless emotional impetuses not fully grasped by the thinking part of ourselves. In his Essay 
on Man, Alexander Pope characterizes the relationship of reason and the tempestuous forces within 
human nature with a nautical metaphor. The human soul was a ship on the sea of life. The passions 
were the “gale” driving the ship forward while reason was the “card”, or rudder, guiding it toward 
its destination.19 The passions were an active motor propelling man to action. Reason was guide, 
but a passive one with no independent power of propulsion. The passions were the true impetus to 
action as they pursued their desired objects. Meanwhile, reason only modified the course.  
In his Treatise Hume rejected the efficacy and existence of practical reason. Practical 
reason, Aristotle believed, could determine ends and motivate action. The modern revolution of 
moral psychology beginning with Descartes and Hobbes which culminated in the thought of 
Locke, Hume and the Enlightenment, largely inverted the relationship of reason to passion. Passion 
was the ruler and reason the slave. Ancient moral psychology asserted reason was an active 
constituent of the soul and passion passive impulse generated by the soul with need of the 
 
15 No. 31. 
16 Ibid. 
17 William Shakespeare. Hamlet. New York: Bloomsbury, 2006.  p. 120.  
18 Blaise Pascal. Pensées. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 158. 
19 Alexander Pope. “Epistle II.” Essay on Man.  
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permission of the will. Hume asserts the opposite; reason is passive, and passion becomes the 
active generator of human conduct. Reason, a slave to passion was its instrument. Reason was only 
instrumental, capable of calculating the best means of achieving passion’s end. 
Reason was, for Hume, in no way the motivator or ruler of our actions as Plato, Aristotle 
and Descartes suggested. It was neither strong enough, nor independent enough to motive action. 
Speculative or theoretical reason could obtain some degree of knowledge, but reason lacked a 
proper object of desire for Hume which might motivate social, moral or political action. Descartes’ 
dualism permitted reason, practically speaking, to stand apart independently from the passions and 
be their judge and adjudicator. The mind or soul was “independent of the passions, and so can 
exercise control over them.” 20 Since the mind and its reasoning powers were independent it was 
“free to judge the meaning of the feeling, and what to do about it.” 21 But Hume had collapsed 
Cartesian dualism, by collapsing the soul into a special feature and function of the body. Man was 
just a special instance of matter, subject to physical, chemical and biological laws. Mental states 
were merely a special class of physical states. This in turn collapsed the critical distance reason 
might have over the sensations and passions of the body.  
“Reason,” writes Hume, is “of itself is utterly impotent” in its ability to “produce or prevent 
actions.”22 Therefore “reason has no original influence” on our actions.23 In the Treatise Hume 
states that reason “can never be a motive to an action of the will or oppose passion in the direction 
of the will.”24 Reason was then, in no way, the cause of human motivation.25 For Hume it “is the 
 
20 Stephen Buckle. “Hume on the Passions.” Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 340 (April 2012). p. 192. 
21 Ibid.  
22 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 294. 
23 Ibid., p. 266. 
24 Ibid., p. 265.  
25 Stephen Buckle. “Hume on the Passions.” Philosophy. Vol. 87, No. 340 (April 2012). p. 199. 
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passions and the passions alone” which motive human beings.26 Nothing, says Hume, can oppose 
passion, but passion.27 Reason has no motivational power of its own, and it was too intermingled 
with the pleasures and pains of the body to gain any kind of critical distance from its needs and 
desires. Reason was passive because it was “purely speculative,” an “observational” faculty that 
discerns or discovers relationship among ideas or matters of fact.”28  
Departing from the Classics, Hume held that reason is a good servant, but a poor master. 
Hume famously asserted the impotence of reason in practical matters.29 The passions are 
impervious to the powers of reason.30 Reason is,” writes Hume, “and ought only to be the slave of 
the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”31 The 
impotence of reason reduces the faculty to a tool where passions are the ultimate arbiter of our 
ends. By denying the motivational efficacy of reason, Hume relocated all motivation within the 
passions. This relegated reason to the status of a servant and instrument of calculation for the 
passions. Reason is re-employed as a consigliere which the passions consult with and abets them 
in their most effective satisfaction. Reason ministers to the passions as their instrument. It colludes 
with passion, plotting and designed how best to achieve their ends. Instrumental reason aids and 
abets the passions. Hobbes wrote, “the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies, to range 
abroad and find the way to the things desired.”32  
 
26 Amelie Oksenberg Rorty “From Passions to Sentiments: The Structure of Hume's Treatise.” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 2 (Apr., 1993).  p. 172.  
27 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 264. 
28 Amelie Oksenberg Rorty “From Passions to Sentiments: The Structure of Hume's Treatise.” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 2 (Apr., 1993).  p. 171.  
29 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). p. 490. 
30 Albert O. Hirschman. The Passions and the Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. p. 24.  
31 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 266.  
32 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994. p. 41. 
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Hume’s entire oeuvre calls into question whether reason can gain any meaningful critical 
distance in moral matters, situated as it is within the flux of history and habit, operating within a 
being who by its very nature, must constantly address the interested needs of life. In denying 
efficacy to reason, Hume denied reason as “the source of our moral ideas.”33 “The rules of 
morality,” he concluded,  “are not conclusion of our reason.”34 “Since vice and virtue are not 
discoverable by reason or the comparison of ideas,” Hume wrote, “it must be by means of some 
impression or sentiment that they occasion…Morality therefore is more properly felt than 
judged.”35 In denying its efficacy Hume also establishes a fundamental realignment between 
reason and passion. The great war in the soul of man between reason and passion Plato, Aristotle 
and the tradition identified, was illusory. Reason and passion were really not at war. There is, says 
Hume, “no direct combat between reason and the passions.”36 Therefore the “principle, which 
opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense. 
We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of and 
reason.”37  Instead the soul is an arena where various passions compete and war amongst 
themselves for our attention, impetuously demanding to be the spring of our conduct. What man 
called the conflict of reason and passion, was in fact a war between calm and sedate passions on 
the one hand, and more violent and tempestuous ones. Man’s internal existence and external social 
life is nothing other than the play and conflict of various passions. 
 
33 Amelie Oksenberg Rorty “From Passions to Sentiments: The Structure of Hume's Treatise.” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 2 (Apr., 1993).  p. 171.  
34 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 264. 
35 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 294. 
36 Amelie Oksenberg Rorty “From Passions to Sentiments: The Structure of Hume's Treatise.” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 2 (Apr., 1993).  p. 172.  
37 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 266. 
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It is precisely because reason is weak that it does not enter in conflict with the passion, but 
it is passively employed in meeting their demands. Only passion is capable of thwarting passion.38 
Despite his acceptance of reason’s limitations and the partial reshuffling of certain ancient vices 
as modern virtues, Publius does not simply relegate reason to passion’s slave.  Like Aristotle, 
Publius implies reason is both instrumental in achieving ends, but is also capable of defining them. 
Departing from Hume he does not deny the necessary role and efficacy of reason as master in its 
capacity to determine ends. This is most obvious in their adherence to Natural Law theory where 
unaided reason could determine a universal moral code from the evidence of human nature. Publius 
acknowledges that in order to achieve the most just society possible, reason had to rule over men 
in the manner of which it is capable. This meant the rational and prudent decision to lower 
expectations of human conduct and a strategic embrace of passions and interests. True wisdom 
knows its limits.  
Nonetheless, Publius harbors many of the Hume’s suspicions regarding the efficacy of 
reason whether in founding political order or its regular operations. Therefore many of Hume’s 
observations about the interested and passionate nature of men serve as fundamental signposts in 
Publius’ considerations in crafting and maintaining civil society.  The Constitution is rather 
Humean in its acceptance of the timidity and weakness of reason to cause or oppose action most 
of the time. While rejecting Hume’s larger theoretical claims about the precise role of reason, 
Publius and the Founders embraced their inevitable practical consequences.  
While some few might have wisdom and practical reason, the generality of mankind must 
be considered as knaves. Intuitions must be contrived in a manner to expect reason’s impotence. 
Like the Ancients, Publius denied that reason was merely instrumental or passive but could move 
 
38 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 264. 
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one to act. Reason was not merely the henchmen of the passions but uses their gale and directs the 
ship based on foresight of consequences. In the matter of reason, Publius “stood by the more 
conventional” position of Reid and Ancients like Plato and Aristotle. He rejected “Hume’s view 
of human motivation as entirely passionate.”39 Publius maintains the power and possibility of 
reason to guide political life and provide a cornerstone on which to found it. Reason can infer the 
moral ought of Natural Law, and can reach conclusions about human nature based on experience 
and history. Practical reason pertains both to the ends of political action and the appropriate means 
by which they might be achieved. It is clear that Publius believes reason capable of establishing 
the broad ends of human action, not merely the means of achieving them. Reason is not solely 
merely an instrument of the passions. Practical reason must determine how the ends dictated by 
the Law of Nature can be achieved in particular circumstances. It must devise the concrete 
infrastructure to realize the general principles established by Natural Law.  
Publius’ assessment of human nature involves prudential judgments of how the 
Constitution will regulate human nature. Practical reason is necessary to devise the provisions of 
the Constitution and imagining just how men will act under their constraints. As an invention of 
prudence, the Constitution is a product of practical reasoning calculated to restrain passion and 
fortify the weak but vital rational element in human nature. The design of the Constitution must 
fortify the rational faculty in both the rulers and the ruled. Publius readily concedes that these 
inventions designed to “control the caprice and wickedness of men” may be “all that government 
will admit, and that human prudence can devise”40 
Moreover, as regards a city and a private individual, it'll be clearer that the latter should acquire 
within himself true reasoning about these cords and live according to it, while a city should take 
 
39 Daniel W. Howe. “The Political Psychology of The Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Vol. 44, No. 3, 
The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987). p. 490. 
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over a reasoning either from one of the gods or from this knower of these, things, and then set up 
the reasoning as the law for itself and for its relations with other cities. Thus, certainly, vice and 
virtue would be more clearly distinguished for us.41 
- Plato, The Laws 
Publius repeatedly alludes to the Classical assertion that reason should rule in some form 
through the institutions of society, if not in the same manner as Ancient republics. Reason should 
rule because it is capable of determining the ends of civil society and the public good. In No. 15 
Hamilton asserts the original function of government is to make human nature “conform to the 
dictates of reason and justice.”42 There was significant agreement with the Anti-Federalists 
regarding reason. It was precisely the belief of the Anti-Federalists that officers of the government 
would be ruled by their passions that they feared the power the Federalist party sought to grant it. 
Likewise, the Federalists saw the necessity of regulating the passions of the people and the states 
with a sufficiently robust government, predicated on the belief that properly ordered institution 
could check the lesser tendencies of officeholders as well.  
A central message of The Federalist echoes the ancient wisdom: passion should not “wrest 
the sceptre” of political power “from reason.”43  In No. 49 Madison say “it is the reason, alone, of 
the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled 
and regulated by the government.”44 In No. 63 Hamilton says “the cool and deliberate sense of the 
community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail 
over the views of its rulers.”45 He says that “the republican principle demands, that the deliberate 
sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they entrust the management 
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of their affairs.” 46 In No. 57 Hamilton says that “the aim of every political constitution is, or ought 
to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, 
the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for 
keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust.47 In No. 48 Publius speaks 
of how “passion, not reason, must have presided over” the decisions of men who have erred in 
their understanding of the public good.48  
This “cool and deliberate sense of the community” is nothing other than its rational sense. 
Collective reasoning and deliberation as manifest through the constitutional edifice and its 
processes should be master of the collective passions. In No. 63 Publius says “how salutary will 
be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the 
misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until 
reason, justice, and truth, can regain their authority over the public mind?”49 In No. 48 Madison 
asserts that a legislature of the correct size is “incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by 
means which reason prescribes.”50 When in No. 15 Hamilton juxtaposes  “general considerations 
of peace and justice, to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion” he implies that peace 
and justice are achieved through rational deliberation and considerations of long-term interest.51  
In his Laws, Plato associates law with reason.52 True law is synonymous with reason. Law 
is discerned by reason. It is a dictate of reason. The Law of Nature was for Locke nothing other 
than the “Law of Reason”.53 The dictates of law and justice were merely the dictates of practical 
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reason writ large in civil society. In No. 48 Madison says, “A reverence for the laws would be 
sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason.”54 In No. 81 Hamilton conflates “the 
general principles of law and reason.”55 In No. 78 Hamilton says “reason and law conspire to 
dictate” what ought to be done. The law of reason is synonymous with justice. In No. 48 Madison 
associates reason with “the public good.”56 Like Locke, Publius “identifies reason with justice.”57 
When Hamilton says “the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, 
without constraint,” the dictates of reason and justice are synonymous with each other and the 
public good. Justice is merely the “dictates of reason” made law.58  
In No. 13 Hamilton says that the ultimate function of government is to establish “the degree 
of authority required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good.”59 Presumably 
justice is achieved by educating the passions through external structures and forces devised by 
reason in order to encourage them to conclude that adherence to law is of greater benefit than the 
spoils of injustice. Justice administered by government is necessary to compensate for the 
deficiencies of human nature which create discrepancies between the individual and public 
interest. The “original motive for the establishment of justice is self-interest.”60 The common 
guarantee of justice to all, is to the benefit of the self-interest of all. The raw interest of the 
individual does not simply align with the public interest. Hamilton tells us that “momentary 
passions and immediate interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct 
than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice.”61 However rational and capable 
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of self-government, human nature is in need of the external constraint of government and its laws 
grounded in practical reasoning.  
To acknowledge the necessity of reason for civil society, is to acknowledge the necessity 
of virtue. The consequence of practical reason employed by actors in office or in society is virtuous 
conduct. Civic virtue is a product of practical reason. Virtuous conduct in office is synonymous 
with the fulfillment of one’s duties and obligations to the people and the public good. For the 
Ancients reason was inextricably linked to duty and virtue. For Plato and Aristotle, the essential 
virtues or excellences of human nature were virtues of the soul. In light of man’s rational nature 
all of the soul’s excellences involved the proper employment of reason. All virtues of the soul 
exhibited commensurate types of reasoning which made the expression of virtue possible. The 
proper use of one’s practical reason resulted in virtuous actions. Duty and its fulfillment were the 
product of correct reasoning. The dictates of duty and justice were merely the dictates of practical 
reason writ large.  
Political scientist Paul Rahe correctly asserts that the new American Republic “certainly 
was not a republic of virtue.”62 Reason and virtue however remained an essential ingredient to this 
novel form of government. Despite the acceptance and exploitation of the passions and the interests 
The Federalist acknowledges the need for reason in a manner intelligible to Plato and Aristotle. 
To the extent Ancient vices might be leveraged as a Modern virtues, good men would still be 
necessary. Support for this conclusion could have been provided by their observations of history 
and their own experiences, as well as the ample literature of the period exalting classical 
republicanism. The need for virtue was reinforced by Christian morality and the teachings of the 
Classics. Just because they sought to modify failures of Ancient political science, did not mean the 
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believed they could simply transcend or eliminate the problems of political order they faced. The 
lowered expectations of Publius’ new science in terms of reason, virtue and duty still 
acknowledged them as instrumental.   
The Federalist Papers seem to suggest that good government “does not require enlightened 
statesmen, unless perhaps to institute it.”63 To completely depend on virtue is to wish like Plato 
that “a philosopher can be a king, or like republican theorists that a citizen can be a statesman.”64 
Meanwhile to believe one can do without virtue altogether is to “suppose that cunning and stupidity 
will rule the world; in the manner prescribed by Machiavelli, through ‘accident and force’.”65 
While government was no longer in the business of perfecting souls, both virtuous men and 
virtuous institutions were necessary for good government. No Founder said otherwise. Only 
virtuous citizens, as Adams, Jefferson and Madison agreed, “were capable of exercising freedom 
responsibly.”66 Bad men do not make good citizens and statesmen. Power and virtue must then 
have sufficient overlap however virtuous conduct might be attained. Together Madison and 
Hamilton helped author Washington’s Farewell Address which stated: “It is substantially true that 
virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with 
more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it can look 
with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric?” In No. 37 Madison says, 
“Happy will it be for ourselves, and most honourable for human nature, if we have wisdom and 
virtue enough, to set so glorious an example to mankind.”67 If virtue and duty were not ends in 
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themselves of the modern republic, they certainly remained a necessary means to good 
government. 
In light of the deficiencies of reason The Federalist alters the relation of reason to virtue. 
Reason’s frailty necessitated this alteration. Reason is weak and scarce, and men are primarily 
passionate and interested. Echoing the tone and substance of Hume, in 1802 Hamilton wrote, “Men 
are rather reasoning than reasonable animals for the most part governed by the impulse of 
passion.”68 Hamilton writes there are “a few choice spirits, who may act from more worthy 
motives” in every government, but taken as they are, men are governed by their passions.69 In No. 
6 Hamilton tells us “momentary passions and immediate interests have a more active and 
imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or 
justice.”70 The despotism of the passions all too often wins the day over reason. 
When Hamilton asserts that experience is the “least fallible guide” in politics, he tacitly 
admits there are no infallible ones. Hume says “man falls much more short of perfect wisdom, and 
even of his own ideas of perfect wisdom, than animals do of man, the latter difference is so 
considerable, that nothing but a comparison with the former can make it appear of little moment.”71 
Publius recognized that wisdom was necessary for the founding and perpetuation of a just regime, 
but that it was scarce and limited even amongst the so-called wise. This sobriety tempered his 
outlook about what could be hoped for in a new civil society and extended to those shaping it. 
Hamilton asserts that it is unwise to “expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man.”72 Hume 
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acknowledged his “deep misgivings about the possibility of establishing a viable political system 
that deviated too far from established practices.”73  Given reason’s impotence, Hume was oft 
inclined to fall back on tried-and-true customs rooted in the wisdom of the ages. The American 
Founders were rather more brash, yet they recognized that there was no proper rational justification 
for the hope of a wholesale remaking of society by bringing all tradition and custom before the 
tribunal of so imperfect a judge.  Fatovic concludes that Hamilton’s No. 85  “contains more 
references to the impossibility of perfection than any other contribution,” including an extended 
critique of the “chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan” of government.74 In it Hamilton quotes Hume 
approvingly, saying that “to balance a large state or society…is a work of so great difficulty, that 
no human genius, however comprehensive, is able by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to 
effect it.”75 Fatovic concludes that Hamilton’s defense of the proposed Constitution rested instead 
on a “rather prosaic and straightforwardly pragmatic claim”76 that the Constitution was “the best 
which our political situation, habits, and opinions will admit.”77 
Publius’ weary attitude toward man’s reason made him a great skeptic of abstract arm-
chair speculation and the utopianism typically associated with it. This rejection of utopianism 
included a parallel rejection of its method of reasoning. Hume speaks of the “absurdity of abstract 
reasonings in politics.”78 In matters of political science, Hamilton repeatedly railed against what 
he called “dangerous metaphysics.”79 The speculative flights of fancy of the Ancients which 
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produced merely “imagined republics” were exchanged for hard-boiled empirical observations. 
Observations from experience and history were the only oracle of truth. The mind of the founder 
and statesman should never stray too far from the concrete facts of experience.  
In his “Vindication of the Funding System,” Hamilton refers to “the difference between 
the true politician and the political-empyric.”80 He says the “true politician...takes human nature as 
he finds it, a compound of good and ill qualities.”81 This distinction separates the prudent man of 
action with realistic expectations from the theorist who harbors visionary hopes of the perfection 
of human nature and civil society. The true statesman and political scientist, said Hamilton, will 
take human nature as it is, and “will not attempt to warp or distort it from its natural direction.”82 
Lacking true knowledge on such matters, government has no legitimate basis for attempting to 
alter human nature or entirely defining the happiness of the people. The limits of reason relegate 
government to a matter of political opinion, not technocratic expertise. Limits on rational 
understanding translated to procedural and substantive limits on government. Such limits 
demonstrate that centralized social engineering was neither possible, nor wise, given the tyrannical 
consequences of concentrated power in the hands of a human nature, more self-interested than 
wise or knowing.  
The inefficacy of reason justifies the authority of opinion as the true basis of government. 
A wholly popular government was to be ruled by the opinion of the people. Popular government 
and the principle of majority rule respect the consent and opinion of the people because there is no 
justification for the rule of experts. In his Essay “Of the Coalitions of Parties” Hume says, “Reason 
is so uncertain a guide that it will always be exposed to doubt and controversy: Could it ever render 
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itself prevalent over the people, men had always retained it as their sole rule of conduct.”83 Reason 
is an uncertain guide because of its weaknesses and its admixture with the passions within the soul 
of mankind. In No. 10 Madison sounds this same tune saying “As long as the reason of man 
continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as 
the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will 
have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will 
attach themselves.”84 In No. 49 Madison goes so far as to say even the “the wisest and freest 
governments” depend on “prejudice.”85  
Madison followed Hume who held that even in the few who rule, the voice of reason is 
weak. Those in power are no more, but perhaps less, immune to the charms of self-interest. 
Hamilton says a “further reason for caution” is to be “drawn from the reflection, that we are not 
always sure, that those who advocate the truth are actuated by purer principles than their 
antagonists.”86 They too are governed by their passions and opinions. Hume says that “the 
governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore on opinion only that 
government is founded.”87   
In No. 49 Madison follows Hume asserting that “all governments rest on opinion” because 
only a nation of philosophers would listen to “the voice of an enlightened reason” alone.88 “But a 
nation of philosophers,” says Madison, “is as little to be expected, as the philosophical race of 
kings wished for by Plato.” 89 Since “no human genius” by their individual reason alone is able 
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either to found or maintain a regime, Hamilton says that “the judgments of many must unite in the 
work: experience must guide their labour: time must bring it to perfection: and the feeling of 
inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into, in their first trials and 
experiments.”90 If reason cannot autonomously devise and perpetuate institutions, the diversity of 
opinion which reflects the natural diversity of individuals and groups, must be given free play in 
society.  
Thus, a central contribution of reason to the Founding “was to recognize its own 
limitations.”91 Publius and the Founders would have to recognize the limits of their own powers of 
reasoning, the precipice where reasoning stopped and opinion, passion and interest began. 
Certainly, they “did not believe that in the future men would [simply] subordinate passion to reason 
or self-interest to the public good.”92 It is reason’s own observation of its limits which dictates the 
rule of opinion. Thus, the supremacy of opinion turns out to be an insight of reason. Reason rules 
indirectly. Since man’s reason is fallible, government is not founded on expertise or a universal 
grasp of the truth. Since reason does not rule in society, the opinions of the rulers rule. Jefferson’s 
Declaration reminds us that the fundamental principles it asserts hold the status of opinion. It 
presents the ruling opinions of American society as self-evident truths. He writes, “We hold these 
truths to be self-evident.” The people of the United States hold an opinion about the truth, they do 
not assert knowledge of it.  And, despite the universality of its claim, that “all men are created 
equal,” this opinion is self-consciously asserted only on behalf of the American people, not all 
mankind.  
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In light of these limitations, The Federalist gives a new meaning to virtue. Aristotle had 
defined virtue as the result of free choice.93 The virtues, he says, are voluntary.”94  Being compelled 
to do the right thing could not be considered true virtue. This is precisely because, as Aristotle 
explains, voluntary action is the result of internal self-governance whereas involuntary conduct is 
the product of “external constraint.”95 Aristotle asserts that true virtue is only achieved by 
voluntary choice. Their actions are not naturally in conformity with the common interest. In No. 
75 Hamilton voices skepticism regarding the efficacy of reason and the reach of virtue. He says, 
“The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue, which would 
vest all the authority of a nation in its intercourse with the rest of the world in one man.”96 In a 
letter to James Bayard Hamilton writes, “Nothing is more fallacious than to expect to produce any 
valuable or permanent results, in political projects, by relying merely on the reason of men.”97 This 
means that most men will only conform to the dictates of reason when they have sufficient motive 
to align their self-interest with its demands as expressed through law. Reason in the form of virtue 
might need to rule, but its limitations do not allow it to rule simply. It must be externally fortified. 
One must depend on wise institutions and not hope for rational men to occupy them. Perhaps 
rational institutions could produce sufficiently virtuous men. 
Man’s reason alone does not provide sufficient impetus for him to act in accord with law. 
The “defect of better motives” is that his internal means of self-restraint like reason or moral 
sentiment, are not in sufficient supply. This deficiency of human nature necessitates the use of 
external compulsion. Hamilton says that the “passions of men will not conform to the dictates of 
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reason and justice, without constraint.”98 Hobbes explains solution. There must be a “coercive 
power to compel men” to abide by the social contract.99 But, promises are only kept, by the external 
means of the “terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach” of 
their covenants.”100 In No. 73 Hamilton says that while there are a few virtuous men who can 
“neither be distressed, nor won, into a sacrifice of their duty,” on the whole “it will be found, that 
a power over a man’s support, is a power over his will.”101 To the extent Publius embraces virtue 
politics as necessary to good government, he nonetheless accepts that good conduct is rarely 
voluntary. The extended commercial republic and the checks and balances of the Constitution will 
either encourage or compel virtuous behavior. Evident in The Federalist’s usage, what Publius 
often calls “virtue”, is good conduct achieved under circumstances which provide virtually no 
alternative to good conduct. For Aristotle acts performed under such conditions of necessity are 
not called “virtue” properly speaking. 
Nor is collective harmony and virtue spontaneously generated. Machiavelli says that it is 
necessary in establishing a republic and its laws to “presuppose that all men are bad.”102 We must 
consider every man a knave in order to craft political institutions sufficiently resilient and immune 
to the defect of motives in human nature. But actual knaves will not produce good government. 
Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees asserts the premise that civil order can be generated from nothing 
more than “an aggregation of self-interested individuals necessarily bound to one another neither 
by their shared civic commitments nor their moral rectitude, but, paradoxically, by the tenuous 
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bonds of envy, competition and exploitation.”103 Mandeville’s premise is that from selfish interests 
alone, civil order could be spontaneously self-generating from the bottom-up. The law of 
unintended consequences by itself will not produce order, harmony or virtue. An invisible hand 
which promotes “an end which was not part” of a man’s intention is an insufficient guard against 
political vice.104 Smith’s invisible hand “is not understandable independently of his theory of moral 
sentiment.”105 He believed God had “designed human nature that people, on adequate reflection, 
can and do share the feelings of others.”106 Thus, Smith’s thesis of the spontaneous harmonization 
of interests in society was predicated on a theory of moral sentiment made possible by sympathy. 
Publius explicitly rejected such a theory, especially on the political level. For Publius, “private 
vices” cannot become “publick benefits” without the assistance of a properly constructed civic 
order.  
For Publius civic order was still the bailiwick of the statesman, not the social scientist. 
Priestly and Godwin for example thought social harmony “develops naturally from self-interest 
and that the business of politics is to dismantle government.”107 While Hamilton sought to promote 
financial, commercial and industrial activity, and the economic liberty provided by property 
protections, he believed in a strong role for the national government. Smith for example explains 
how the division of labor and its origins were “not originally the effect of any human wisdom” but 
rather the spontaneous product of a “very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in 
human nature.”108 Hamilton was not an admirer of laissez-faire capitalism precisely because 
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human nature left to itself did not have the natural motivations which gave rise to both order and 
prosperity. The defect of motives in these matters made government indispensable. Instead, he 
favored economic nationalism which, in the 19th century, came to be known as the American 
School of economics or the “National System.”  
No doubt Hamilton and Madison hoped that property protections and appropriate 
regulations would facilitate a free market, which made its own parochial decisions regarding the 
division of labor and the allocation of resources based on local knowledge. This is however a far 
cry from saying that such markets and division of labor can flourish without the playing field set 
by limited government and its rule of law. The Federalist explicitly rejects a model where self-
interest unguided by institutions flourishes and foments civic harmony spontaneously.  In the 
context of the Founding the Federalist party was obviously arguing for a relatively powerful central 
government. The Federalist Papers implicitly reject the spontaneous generation of order through 
the free play of interests. Liberty, order, and free markets still presuppose a relatively powerful 
top-down political order. This was precisely because there were not sufficient resources within 
human nature to generate such order without the arch external support of government. They make 
clear that there is no good government without some modicum of reason and virtue, and that there 
will not be sufficient virtue without good government. The question is not whether virtue is 
necessary, but how it might be generated. 
In Publius’ explanation of the motivational impact of the Constitution on officeholders, we 
see his alteration of the meaning of virtue. Voluntary virtue will not be expected, precisely because 
it is too unlikely, especially when men hold the reins of power. The correct constitutional 
circumstances will compel virtue by overcoming the “defect of better motive.” Publius separates 
right reasoning from correct conduct. The Constitution must be concerned to produce good 
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conduct, but does not expect or desire to reach into men’s souls and compel them to have the 
correct intentions and reasonings. While men are more or less defective in their virtue, the great 
innovation of the Constitution is to depend on virtuous motives as little as possible. Good 
institution must make men sufficiently good in their conduct if not their motives. Institutions must 
be structured in a manner to bend the motive of self-interest into conduct which sufficiently 
conforms with the public interest. The Founders well understood why this was necessary. With 
characteristic pith, Franklin said at the Convention that, “The first man put at the helm will be a 
good one. Nobody knows what sort may come afterwards. The executive will be always increasing 
here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a monarchy.”109 In No. 10 Madison writes, “It is in vain to say, 
that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all 
subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”110 The 
Constitution was designed to establish the conditions which generate incentives to this type of 
virtuous conduct. Institutions must be designed to cultivate and select the best men as they are 
necessary. Hamilton went so far as to say the Constitution will create the “constant probability of 
seeing the station filled by characters preeminent for ability and virtue.”111 If this is so, the 
parameters of office must be designed to perpetuate good conduct. 
Despite their sober views, in No. 51 and 76, Madison and Hamilton assert that ordinary 
human nature has a sufficient “portion of virtue and honor” which should garner “a certain portion 
of esteem” and justify the experiment in self-government.112  The frail springs of reason and moral 
sentiment are in need of fortification. The Constitution depends on virtue and “attempts to call it 
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forth both from the people at large and from the more virtuous among the people.”113  At the 
Virginia Ratifying Convention Madison said “that the people will have virtue and intelligence to 
select men of virtue and wisdom…If there be sufficient virtue and intelligence in the community, 
it will be exercised in the selection of these men. So that we do not depend on their virtue, or put 
confidence in our rulers, but in the people who are to choose them.”114  
Institutions will be devised in a manner to make men virtuous. No. 57 Hamilton says “The 
aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess 
most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the 
next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue 
to hold their public trust.”115 Thus, “effectual precautions” are designed into the Constitution “for 
keeping them virtuous.” These men do not choice virtue freely, but are made virtuous by 
circumstances generated by institutions. Meanwhile representative institutions would “refine and 
enlarge” public sentiment by providing a mechanism to winnow candidates to those of “fit 
characters.”116 This process will keep the window of public opinion within the realm of the 
respectable. A cautious Hamilton concludes that all these inducements to good conduct “may all 
be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of men. But are they not all the government 
will admit, and that human prudence can devise?”117  
The Federalist’s acknowledgement of the necessity of virtue is an admission that even the 
most ingeniously devised institutions are not sufficient for the perpetuation of a just regime. A free 
nation and its institutions cannot simply compel the virtue necessary for good government. A free, 
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self-governing, nation is in most need of virtue if it is to remain so. Despite Publius’ of compelled 
or involuntary virtue, the common interest of any form of government still demands voluntary 
virtue. This makes virtuous men indispensable to good government. Publius understood the 
necessity of public spiritedness despite the ingenuity and prudence of institutions. Cicero had said 
great men make good institutions and good institutions will produce good men. If this were simply 
true, we must then explain why and how the best institutions mortal wisdom “will admit” still 
decay. Where is the Roman Republic? No amount of institutional tinkering can take bad men and 
make them into a good republic. Patrick Henry said, “Bad men cannot make good citizens. It is 
impossible that a nation of infidels or idolaters should be a nation of freemen. It is when a people 
forget God, that tyrants forge their chains. A vitiated state of morals, a corrupted public conscience, 
is incompatible with freedom.”118 George Mason tells us, “No free government, or the blessings of 
liberty, can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, 
frugality, and virtue; and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.”119 At the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention Madison said “No theoretical checks--no form of government can render us 
secure. To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue 
in the people, is a chimerical idea.”120 
Even if Publius’ exhortations to virtue are both rhetoric and science, they indicate the 
necessity of the rhetoric of virtue, and hence the necessity of virtue itself. This rhetoric is an 
admission that free government demands it, and that they believed human nature sufficiently 
capable of meeting the demand. In No. 55 he says “Were the pictures which have been drawn by 
the political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference 
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would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less 
than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.”121 
There will be enough reason and virtue among elected officials “to withstand whatever temptations 
are offered by whatever power they have.”122 Epstein says, “If men are utterly depraved, there 
would be no one worthy of being elected to any office, that is, trusted with any power however 
widely shared, closely watched, or limited in time.”123 What must be true of their representatives 
must also be true of the people. A completely “depraved people is incapable of self-
government.”124 Federici says Hamilton “judged men by their ability to subordinate self-interest 
and ideological passion to the common good and to conduct public affairs with energy and 
prudence,” in short, “he expected leaders to have a sufficient degree of virtue.”125 In No. 2 
Hamilton says “This convention, composed of men who possessed the confidence of the people, 
and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue, and wisdom, in 
times which tried the souls of men, undertook the arduous task.”126   
While decisively influenced by the Modern science of politics, Hamilton especially, 
maintained the Ancient concern for duty, ambition, glory and fame. He no doubt harbored a taste 
for human greatness. Neither Hamilton nor Madison accepted the Hobbesian hatred of glory or his 
near obsession with a security as the expense of liberty, the central tenant of Classical 
republicanism. Of these virtues Hamilton asks: “Are they not the genuine, and the characteristic 
means, by which republican government provides for the liberty and happiness of the people?”127 
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Thus men’s ambitious quest for honor, fame and glory is capable of raising their sights beyond 
themselves and toward their public duties. Under the correct constitutional edifice such passions 
and interests can be made to coincide with the public good. If talk of virtue were mere rhetoric, 
the supposed virtue of the people, their representatives and their labors were exposed to public 





















2. The Passions 
 
The Founders understood their experiment in republican self-government demanded virtue. 
They had a certain admiration for the principles, if not the practice, of Classical Republicanism. 
They retained some sense of the great dignity and fulfillment possible through public life. They 
understood that reason and virtue are not merely ornaments of the good life, but necessities of a 
free and orderly one. These men were after all founders and statesmen whose characters are 
inscribed in the nation they created. Yet, as we have seen, they harbored no illusions about the 
dominance of the passions within human nature. The passions exhibited a despotic control over 
men’s actions. Hamilton admitted that men are “for the most part governed by the impulse of 
passion.”1 He and Madison had little doubt that “momentary passions and immediate interests have 
a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of 
policy, utility, or justice.”2 While some passions the Ancients had deemed vices might be leveraged 
as modern virtues, the Founder’s all recognized that many passions were not benign. Man’s 
passionate nature, its “defect of better motives,” itself represented the original inducement to civil 
authority. Before all else, government is the arch mechanism for the collective regulation of those 
passions destructive of order and liberty. This regulation makes possible the pursuit of comfortable 
self-preservation, and for some, virtue. Self-government is only possible through proper regulation 
of the passions of the people and their rulers. A free people must be a self-restraining people. And 
so, it is to the passions we now turn.    
When Aristotle called man the rational animal he did not mean most human beings were 
mostly guided by reason most of the time.  He had no illusions about the extent to which men were 
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creatures of passion. Hamilton perfectly paraphrased this predicament when he wrote, “Men are 
rather reasoning than reasonable animals for the most part governed by the impulse of passion.”3 
Aristotle argues that reason is the distinctly human ingredient in man’s nature in contradistinction 
to the nature of plants and other animals. That men have reason hardly guarantees its proper use. 
For Aristotle a fully human existence is only realized when life and action are actually guided by 
right reason. Nor were the passions lacking in some degree of dignity if properly guided by and in 
harmony with right reason. Therefore it is possible, even likely, for man to remain largely a being 
of passionate impulse despite his rational endowment. The problem, as Hamilton states in No. 6, 
is that the passions and immediate interests “have a more active and imperious control over human 
conduct” than those of reason and the common interest.4  Hume says “our primary instincts lead 
us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited liberty, or to seek dominion over others: And it is 
reflection only, which engages us to sacrifice such strong passions to the interests of peace and 
public order.”5   
Much Ancient and Medieval Christian moral thought “characterized the passions as 
fundamentally negative and at odds with our better selves as represented by reason.”6 This was a 
model of simple and stark opposition between reason and the passions. Human psychology was an 
agonistic battlefield where reason warred with the passions. Passions were “lawless or untamed 
forces ready to overpower reason, the rightful master of the soul.”7 The Stoics for example 
“represented the passions as diseases that take illicit control of the mind or soul,” which are “cured 
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only by being eliminated.”8 The goals was to cultivate a “person devoid of passion.”9 The Calvinist 
tradition Hamilton and Madison were immersed in associated the passions with the body and hence 
the fallen nature of mankind. The passions were the primary source of evil individual and 
collectively. Therefore, they must be restrained by religion, morality and the laws of civil society.  
This psychological model of simple opposition between reason and the passions gave way 
to a new framework in Early Modern philosophy and the emerging liberal tradition of political 
thought. A new attitude was taken toward the passions and a revaluation of the Ancient perspective 
was underway. The passions might not be simply bad, they may even partake in the promotion of 
some or all virtues. Modern philosophy began to treat “the passions as integral and positive features 
of human nature and conduct in need of a new explanation by the emerging human sciences.”10 
This transformation of the stance taken by moral and political thought toward the passions is a 
story famously told in Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests. Machiavelli’s realistic 
depiction in The Prince of a self-interested world driven by ambition, the love of power and 
domination, and the spirit of material acquisition, marks the opening salvo in the increasing 
acceptance of the passions. Given that they are a core fact and force of nature means that to 
denigrate the passion is simply to denigrate human nature itself.  
For Machiavelli if the passions were not in themselves good, they were at least natural, an 
ironclad reality that the Ancients in their sedate imagined republics failed to sufficiently account 
for or respect as a force of nature. By looking above, they were self-consciously ignoring what 
was lurking below at their own peril. Descartes’ essay On the Passions of the Soul marks an 







that of moving us to want things and to act on these wants.”11 Hume, who decisively influence 
Madison and Hamilton, followed the lead of Spinoza, a Cartesian who dropped Descartes’ dualism 
by collapsing the psychological into the physiological. The embrace of the passions was the natural 
consequence of an emerging political science rooted in a material and empirical epistemology 
derived from a maturing Modern natural science. This empirical political science was determined 
to reject “imagined republics” and to “take men as they are.” Men as they are, are beings of passion. 
Hume says such an outlook does not seek “a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would 
endow them with every species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice.”12 This is the 
province of the priest. Meanwhile, the magistrate “aims only at possibilities.”13 
The passions appear more central to human nature and conduct as it actually is, whereas 
the Ancients only sought to conceive of men as they should be, guided by reason. Aristotle’s model 
of reason as master of the ship was decisively overturned when Hume asserted reason ought to be 
slave to the passions.14 If reason is but a slave, then all human conduct is motivated by various 
passions where reason is an instrument, merely playing a passive and subordinate role. Alexander 
Pope would say that passions are the gale, the driving force of human action, whereas reason 
merely guides the direction of the ship without moving it toward its end. If man was merely an 
embodied animal and the mind did not and could not stand distinct from the passions of the body, 
then the passions were the source of all motivation and therefore all human action.  
The revaluation and rehabilitation of the passions involved a denial of their total depravity. 
This revaluation hinged on the assertion that the passions were so integral to human nature that to 
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condemn them is to condemn human nature itself. Passions, says Hume, are innate as they “arise 
immediately from nature.”15 They are instinctual forces “implanted in human nature.”16 “All our 
passions,” say Hume “are a kind of natural instinct, derived from nothing but the original 
constitution of the human mind.”17 They arise “from a natural impulse or instinct, which is 
perfectly unaccountable.”18 Hume says the precise origin of our particular passions and instincts is 
not understood because they are given by nature. The passions are “inseparable from human 
nature” and “cannot be explained by reference to other, more basic qualities.”19 Hume and Publius 
clearly acknowledge how custom, habit, history and circumstance shape and affect the passions, 
but despite their shaping powers, the passions remain at their core unadulterated impetuses given 
by nature.  
The elevation of the passions was also rooted in a simple observation that many of their 
objects are salutary both for mere life and the good life. If the passions were the prime mover of 
the soul and the ultimate cause of men’s motive and conduct, they must be the source of both vice 
and virtue. Passions as desires, Descartes suggested, motivate us to act in order to obtain the 
necessities of life which humans identify as unmitigated goods. Descartes went further, asserting 
the passions also represent “the crepuscular beginning of virtue.”20 For Rousseau, Hume and others 
of the Scottish Enlightenment, the passions were not only the source of vice or mere self-
preservation, but of virtue as well. Moral sentiments, which encouraged benevolence and social 
harmony, were the source of moral virtue. These factors considered, it would be irrational to 
 
15 Ibid., p. I50. 
16 Ibid., p. 289. 
17 Ibid., p. I50. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. I50. 
20 Amelie Oksenberg Rorty “From Passions to Sentiments: The Structure of Hume's Treatise.” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 2 (Apr., 1993).  p. 166.  
 
 392 
condemn the passions in toto. From the Modern perspective, moral and political philosophy had a 
renewed obligation to confront the passions as a serious and righteous source of human action, and 
not merely dismiss them as negative defects to be purged from soul and society alike. The passions 
were potentially as much responsible for anarchy and injustice, and they were for civil order and 
harmony.  
Hume’s celebration of the passions is not merely a disagreement with the Ancients over 
matters of human psychology, but a moral and political dispute over the nature and ends of civil 
society itself. Ancient moral psychology asserted reason is and should be the active ruling element 
of city and soul. The end of political life was virtue achieve by reason, and classical republicanism 
was the political form in conformity with this end. To the extent Ancient political practice 
celebrated the passions, it was confined to the public political virtue of patriotism, or love of 
country. The modern revolution of moral psychology largely inverted the relationship of reason to 
passion. Hume asserts reason is passive and impotent, whereas passion is the active generator of 
human conduct. The passions not only provided the gale, but also much of the soul’s card or rudder 
as well. Reason as passive slave was calculating instrumentally how best the passions might be 
satisfied.  
It was because Hume situated passion as the spring of all action that he rejected the efficacy 
or existence of practical reason. Practical reason, Aristotle believed, could determine ends and 
therefore motivate action. Meanwhile Hume’s assertion of reason as passive meant that virtue must 
be primarily a product of the passions. Therefore, a central role of civil order is to promote 
beneficent passions through laws, custom and habit. Certain Ancient vices, could be considered 
Modern virtues precisely because the passions on which those “vices” rested were re-evaluated as 
beneficial to society. These emotions were increasingly private and self-interested passions in 
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contrast to love of country. Others were sentiments that bonded citizens and neighbors into 
communities of shared feeling. The end of the just society was no longer a patriotic republic of 
virtue, but a commercial society which produced comfortable self-preservation for the many, 
primed by the acquisitive passions of human nature. Patriotism would be a by-product of loyalty 
to and affection for a society whose liberties permitted men to indulged in collectively beneficial 
passions and interests. Men love a nation which allows them the liberty to pursue their own 
understanding of happiness, and protects them from others who pursue theirs with excessive zeal 
or disregard for the rights of others.  
There were numerous Enlightenment thinkers, like Hutcheson and Reid, who were not 
inclined to follow this train of thought to its conclusion. They remained steadfast in their belief 
that the passions were primarily a source of vice and depravity rather than virtue. Publius walks a 
line between the Ancient and Modern orientations to the passions and their relationship with 
reason. Steeped in Calvin’s image of fallen man, Publius rejects the natural and simply goodness 
of mankind and his passions. He rejected the more salubrious image of Rousseau and Hume and 
hedged toward their depravity. Yet, Publius views the passion as hard facts that must be wrestled 
with and respected, not wished away. He identifies a series of emotions as moral or social 
sentiments as having beneficial if limited powers. Nevertheless, he clearly identifies the source of 
man’s frailty, depravity and wickedness in the passions. He does not denigrate them, but identifies 
them as the source of civil strife which threaten both order and liberty if not properly restrained or 




Publius clearly acknowledges the passionate nature of human psychology and motivation, 
but denied “Hume’s view of human motivation as entirely passionate.”21 Reason was not merely a 
passive and instrumental slave but could also determine the ends of action. The Federalist 
repeatedly illustrates the belief in reason’s efficacy to regulate the passions and that it must be 
relied upon if a just society is to be established and maintained. Yet, in No. 10 Madison makes 
clear that the passions are to be given liberty and are not to be educated out of human nature, or 
purged from society altogether as the Stoics would have them purified from the soul of the 
individual. An expanded role would be given to certain passions which produced Ancient vices 
that could be leveraged as Modern virtues. Acquisitive passions like avarice, industry and 
enterprise, which motivate economic activity could be leveraged for the common interest through 
wealth creation and the comfortable self-preservation which follows in train. If reason could not 
oppose the passions directly, it must oppose it indirectly and rely on its foresight to devise 
constitutional mechanisms to properly regulate them. Benign and salutary passions are to be given 
relatively free play, while the most intractable and destructive passions must be neutralized 
through counterposing them, one passion against another.  
Even Hume, who celebrated various moral sentiments which he thought provided a basis 
for the natural sociability of mankind, clearly acknowledged the limits of such sentiments in 
establishing political order and the administration of justice. If private society could maintain itself 
on benevolent sentiment alone, politics and the public sphere remained the hardboiled domain of 
self-interest. In fact, the moral sentiments of society could only achieve social harmony if fortified 
by a political superstructure encouraging them under conditions of ordered liberty. From the 
perspective of political order, Hume was in agreement with the school of the selfish system of 
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morals. There would be no peace in society if politics was not founded on a more certain bedrock 
than moral sentiments. Moral sentiment was not enough to regulate destructive passions when 
conjoined with the powers of government. Publius agreed. Madison speaks of the ability of moral 
sentiments such as “humanity” and “sympathy” to produce harmony between the people and their 
representatives, but such sentiments only function effectively when the sword of Damocles hangs 
over the heads of public officeholders and private citizens alike.  
A passion is a specific type of feeling, emotion, or impulse. It is a “kind of motion,”22 a 
“moving, stirring,” or “agitation” of the soul.23 Passions consist of internal sensations connected 
with a corresponding amount of pleasure or pain. Passions are feelings, emotional states which 
“one suffers or undergoes”24 They are experienced passively by the soul without full voluntary 
control.25 In the Ancient and Medieval worlds the passions were a “suffering or enduring.”26 In 
Latin, “passion” is connected with a verb meaning “to endure, undergo” or “experience”.27 A 
passion is “that which must be endured.”28 The passion of Christ consisted of the stations of 
suffering he was compelled to endure. The Ancients tended to treat passions only as passively 
experienced emotional states. Meanwhile, the Modern conception of a passion is a motion of the 
soul which is also the cause of human action. While they are experienced without voluntary 
control, this does not mean they inspire passivity. Descartes, for example, treated passions as 
something more than passive feeling undergone, but instead as an impulse and source of 
motivation which compels action. Hume concluded that the passions are “deep-seated and 
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apparently universal motivations for human actions.”29 The Federalist treats the passions as the 
most primordial and powerful instigators of action within the human soul.   
In the Treatise Hume says, human nature is composed of “two principles parts, which are 
requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding.”30  The central faculties of human 
psychology are feeling and thinking. They are analogous, but not identical, to Aristotle’s 
distinction between passion and reason. He says it is “certain that the blind motions of the former 
without the direction of the latter incapacitate men for society.”31 Hume differentiates all the 
perceptions of the human mind into two categories, “impressions” and “ideas”.32 Hume says, 
“Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence” are called “impressions”.33  
Impressions include “all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance 
in the soul.”34 Meanwhile, “ideas” are “faint images” of impressions which find their way into our 
“thinking and reasoning.”35 Hume makes no fundamental qualitative distinction between feeling 
and reasoning, rather they exist on a continuum. Since ideas themselves are the product of a train 
of impressions there is no absolute dividing line between emotion, on the one hand, and reason on 
the other.  Hume indicates that passions are often an extreme or particularly intense form of 
emotion.36  He makes a subsequent distinction between “passions” on the one hand, and 
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“sentiments” on the other.37  This distinction is vital to the analysis of the emotional springs in The 
Federalist.38   
Hume offers notoriously blurry distinctions between many of his key concepts in light of 
the confessedly experimental and essayistic nature of his Treatise. Nonetheless numerous salient 
points can be gleaned which contribute to our understanding of The Federalist’s account of the 
passions. First, not all feelings are passions. Hume distinguishes between “sensations” on the one 
hand, and “passions” on the other. For Hume, the passions were a subset of “impressions”, feelings 
of pleasure and pain, which he divided into “original” or “direct” and “secondary” or “indirect” 
impressions. “Original impressions” are caused “without any antecedent perception” in the soul, 
“from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to 
the external organs.”39 Original impressions include “all the bodily pains and pleasures,” while the 
secondary impressions include “the passions, and other emotions resembling them.”40 An original 
impression caused by external stimuli is a “sensation”.41  Meanwhile a “passion” is a “secondary” 
or “reflective” impression. Passions are generated internally.  
Passions and other emotions are secondary or derivative effects which arise from primary 
ones.42 They are impressions caused indirectly by external stimuli. They are internal reflections 
and responses to them. As “reflective impressions” they “proceed from some of these original 
ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea.”43 A passion is an internal sensation 
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often tinctured with ideas.44 Central passions identified by Hume include love, hate, pride, 
humility, hope fear, desire, aversion, ambition and love of fame.45 Passions either originate from 
original impressions or their ideas, or arise “from certain natural instincts.”46 Hume divides 
passions into two categories, “responsive” and “productive.”47 Responsive passions are those 
which are the product, or response, to external stimuli which produce pleasure and pain.48 Pride, 
humility, love and hatred are internal responses to external events which Hume claims, by 
themselves, do not produce action.49 Meanwhile productive passions are those which produce 
actions which result in pleasure or pain.50 For example hunger, thirst, sexual appetite or the desire 
to see friends benefited and enemies punished, are passions which all produce actions.51 Despite 
this distinction, the boundary between responsive and productive passions is ambiguous. Moral 
and political philosophy are obliged to account for any passion which might be the cause of men’s 
action. 
Spinoza among others had characterized the passions as passive responses to external 
stimuli which produced affective internal states, but not action.52 With the emergence of Modern 
epistemology in Descartes, Hobbes and later Hume, passions were no longer mere feelings one 
underwent passively, but impulses with the ability to motivate action. Descartes understood the 
passions as “the source of all motivation.”53 He was instrumental in redescribing “the passions as 
motivating forces directed to those things “which may harm or benefit us, or generally be 
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important.”54 In Hume’s analysis the passions were no longer “reactions to exogenous causes,” but 
“became internal sources of motion and action.”55 Passions could also be generated spontaneously. 
As secondary impressions they did not require external stimuli. They could also be generated by 
the body and soul in concert with external stimuli, indifferent to our hopes and wishes. As drives, 
appetites or desires, passions could motivate action blindly without regard to foreseen 
consequences. These factors make them universal.  
In Hume the passions become the arch spring of human conduct. Passions are distinguished 
in Hume from other feelings precisely because “they have effects”56 No longer were they mere 
feelings to be savored or detested. Instead, passions are “the feeling of an impulse,” that 
“corresponds to the cause of the action.”57 They are the cause of “volition because volition is 
simply the feeling of such an impulse.”58 In light of reason’s impotence, all actions for Hume are 
motivated by the passions. This ability to motivate and cause action is what makes them faculties. 
Faculties are powers, causes in the soul whose effects are human conduct. In Hume’s account 
“there is nothing outside of the impulses of the passions, and so nothing capable of opposing 
them.”59 This is why as forces, only passion is of sufficient magnitude to counteract passion. Since 
not all passions can be educated away, the magnitude of the passions relative to other faculties will 
become an integral consideration in Publius’ analysis of the arrangement of powers.  
Hobbes’ materialism which influenced Hume, and Publius by way of Hume, saw emotional 
states of the body as material facts with mechanically causal relationships.60 Hobbes language of 
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“feeling” captured the tangibility of an emotion. A word originally referring to tactile experience 
came to mean a slightly less tangible emotional movement of the soul.61 Buckle says Hume defines 
passions as “feelings” precisely “because they are internal motions in a material being.”62 Pathē, 
or passions, were now “emotions”.63 “Emotion” captures the way internal states compel men to 
move and to act. With the active power to motivate conduct, the concept of the passions shifts 
from a purely psychological phenomenon to a “mechanical physiological meaning, an impulse 
which is a cause of volition and action.”64 Passions were now “mechanical forces” and the primary 
cause of human behavior.65 This line of thought, so influential in the arguments of The Federalist, 
shifts the focus of emotion from passive responses to a “motivating condition” which propels 
human action.66  
Redescribing the passions as active emotions allowed them to sit at the foundation of a 
mechanistic account of human psychology and action. In Hobbes, a passion is a “special kind of 
effect of the body’s interaction with an external body; but when that same condition is the cause 
of motion and action, it is a desire.”67 Rejecting mind-body dualism, and identifying mental states 
with physical ones, mechanistic psychology becomes the effect of a mechanical physiology. The 
distinction between passion and desire, in Hobbes ironclad chain of psychological causes and 
effects are “as stages in a continuous causal sequence.”68 Emotion produces action “because it is 
bodily motion, and bodily motion brought into contact with other bodily parts imparts an impulse 
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to those parts.”69 “The human being is a machine,” says Buckle, “set into motion by external 
impulses which set up internal motions within it.”70  These motions include thoughts and feelings. 
Buckle says, “In so far as they are thoughts, they belong to the imagination. In so far as they are 
feelings, they are passions, and these are the beginnings of what we call voluntary acts.”71 Internal 
passion and external action were now part of an orderly mechanical system of cause and effect 
which could be observed and the subject of a science. Its regular tendencies could be understood 
by general laws of human action. If founders and statemen where able to master those laws they 
might be able to correctly establish, order and maintain civil society.  
Passions which produce action sit then at the root of social and political order. If they are 
the sole motor of human conduct their comprehension and regulation becomes a primary task of 
the founder and statesman. Since Hume rejected the efficacy of practical reason, the passions were 
“the cause of human action.”72 Despite Publius’ clear assertion of reason’s motivational efficacy, 
he held no illusions over the extent to which passions are the primary if not sole instigators which 
incline or retard men’s actions. Objects of desire or aversion inspire a given passion in human 
beings which impulsively motivates them to pursue or avoid them accordingly. Unlike reason or 
interest which require the fortification of habit and education, the passions need no training in 
order to establish their imperium over human conduct. As inborn instincts and impulses of first 
nature, they are not objects of our own choosing and compel conduct independent of, even despite, 
conscious deliberation and rational reflection. This is why the passions are the dominate 
motivational source. Unlike the dilatory and sedate nature of rational reflection or the calculation 
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of interest, passions are “sudden, tempestuous” and “violent.”73 In No. 10 Madison acknowledges 
the reciprocal influence of reason on passion and vice versa. While human passion is no doubt 
modified by education and habit, the premise of The Federalist’s account acknowledges the limits 
of historical shaping. The passions are innate impulses which always remain sufficiently feral and 
untamed by external circumstances and history. Reid tells us a faculty such as passion is the 
product of nature, not habit. In light of their relative force and constancy they require ongoing 
habituation or outright constraint if they are to be counteracted.   
Civil society is founded upon two masters, pleasure and pain. Aristotle say “pleasure and 
pain accompany every passion.”74 If passion compels us to act, the pleasures and pains which 
accompany it compel us to pursue or avoid conduct in response to them.”75 Hume says, “The chief 
spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain; and when these sensations are 
removed, both from our thought and feeling, we are, in great measure, incapable of passion or 
action, of desire or volition.”76 The strongest pleasures and pains produce the strongest passions, 
love and hatred. If love and hatred are the primary emotional responses to pleasure and pains then 
they are the primary motivators in all human conduct. Love is associated with objects of desire 
which produce feelings of intense pleasure and encourages us to continually pursue them. Hatred 
is associated with objects which produce intense feelings of displeasure and therefore leads to 
aversion and avoidance. Love drives human being toward certain objects, while hatred drives them 
away from others. If passions are the strongest impressions of the soul then they are the most 
powerful motivators of action in response to the incentive and deterrence of the pleasures and pains 
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they produce. Passions appear to be the strongest incentives or deterrents to action precisely 
because of the magnitude of the pleasures and pains associated with them.  
The proper administration of pleasures and pains is the very definition of justice. Bentham 
says, “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we 
shall do… They govern us in all we do. …In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but 
in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.”77 Government is the system of rewards and 
punishments which induces the appropriate pleasures and pains in order to provide incentive to 
promote conduct conducive of civil order and deterrents to actions contrary to it. Government must 
act as a coercive power to encourage men, through the proper distribution of pleasures and pains, 
rewards and punishments, to conform to its established social contract. The fear of potential pain 
from punishment must be greater than the prospective pleasure which comes from the satisfaction 
of desires prohibited by the social contract. Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries so 
influenced legal theory in the United States, wrote: “The only true and natural foundations of 
society are the wants and fears of individuals.”78 Wants are objects of perceived pleasure which 
motivate individuals, while fears are inspired by objects of suspected pain which act as a deterrent. 
In No. 72 Hamilton says “the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human 
conduct.”79 Hamilton’s analysis of the executive’s desire to maintain office through good conduct 
exemplifies this maxim. Furthermore, Hamilton well knew that a “reward” was as much the 
acquisition of some positive good or pleasure, as the negative avoidance of pain or punishment. 
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While his remedies differ, Publius’ general diagnosis of the passions does not entirely 
depart from the Ancients. There was no natural goodness of mankind and reason was an 
inextricable component of virtue and civic order. Publius’ realism and anti-utopianism recognizes 
there exists in human nature passions destructive of common interest, yet which are also 
pleasurable for the individual to satisfy. Man is not naturally good. Thus, the individual pursuit of 
pleasure is always potentially at odds with the common interest. This is precisely why men are not 
angels. The passions are blind and do not see the worth or correctness of their objects of desire, 
nor the consequences of their satisfaction. They are often oblivious to actual, rather than merely 
perceived, rewards or punishments which might obtain from their satisfaction. In succumbing to 
their immediate passions, men tend to damage their interests. Publius does not believe that the 
unassisted oversight of reason will override the passions in light of their magnitude. Reason in 
most men is relatively weak and loses the battle. It often fails when it might actually assist in a less 
detrimental and ongoing fulfilment of passion moderated and modified. Men fail to act with 
sufficient foresight which might guarantee a greater satisfaction of their desires. Government must 
mitigate the negative effects of passion and fortify reason where possible.  
The Federalist seeks to name the central passions and sentiments with which civil society 
must contend. An analysis of these emotions can be achieved by turning to the sources of moral 
philosophy on which its authors drew. The rich variety of human emotion is a product of the fact 
that passions and sentiments are “the result of complex associations between ideas, pleasure and 
pain and the natural impulses.”80 Hume divided the passions into those which are “calm and 
violent”, and those which are more pleasurable or painful.81 Hume cites love and hatred as what 
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he calls “primary passions”. 82 Under these can be found all others. Hume also divides passions 
between categories of “direct” and “indirect”. “Direct passions arise immediately from good and 
evil” while “indirect passions” proceed from the same sources but are mingled with “other 
qualities.”83 Hume acknowledges his inability to give a less ambiguous explanation of this 
distinction.84 Indirect passions it seems are secondary and derivative of direct passions. Hume 
identifies a variety of passions many of which appear in The Federalist including “direct” passions 
such as “desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security”, and “indirect” passions such 
as “pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, along with 
passions that depend on those.”85  
In The Federalist the term “passion” represents a broad genus of motivation within which 
exists a variety of species. The various numbers of The Federalist acknowledge a kaleidoscopic 
array of passions as rich as one might find in Shakespeare’s political plays. The constitutional 
project forced Publius to sift through the dark and wide cavern of the psyche and attempt to discern 
the regular and dominant passions on which reliable predictions of human conduct might be made. 
Despite its emphasis on self-interest, The Federalist conceives of the passions and sentiments of 
the human soul in expansive terms. Such a broad view of human motivation was no doubt the 
product of their worldly political existence, an intellectual life steeped in history, the Bible and 
political philosophy. No doubt they speak of commercial passions like “enterprise”, “industry”, 
“venality” and “avarice” and “greed.”  But they often speak of other passions, particularly of men 
who pursue office, which are not pecuniary such as “self-love,”  “ambition,” “the love of power”, 








“love of fame,” fear of infamy, obscurity or humiliation, “revenge”, “hatred”, “party animosities,” 
“honor”, “nobility” and “philanthropy”, to name just a few.  
Underlying The Federalist’s analysis of human motivation is the passion of self-love. Self-
love is the ur-passion which underwrites all others. In his “Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity,” 
Benjamin Franklin writes how “the natural principle of self-love is the only and the irresistible 
motive” of all our actions.86 It is perhaps the arch passion from which all the others are generated 
and cannot be entirely extricated and distinguished from other motivations. Self-love is a form of 
egoism and the new science of man which oriented Publius conceded that human beings are 
primarily, if not exclusively, egoistic. Egoism is the flywheel of their actions. This arch passion 
directs individuals toward a concern for themselves and their own desires, pleasures, and pains 
above all else. It is only natural for human beings to be primarily concerned with how any action 
might benefit or harm them first before all others. Such self-regard stems from the fact that they 
themselves are the primary recipients of their own pleasures and pains prior to anyone else. We 
can only experience our own pleasures and pains directly, compared to our secondary experience 
of other people’s feelings. In No. 76 Hamilton says, “There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions 
of mankind as personal considerations, whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be 
the objects of our choice or preference.”87 Self-love prioritizes our own interests to another’s and 
sets up the perennial problem of political theory and practice between the interest of the individual 
and the common interest. This conflict created by self-love demonstrates the need for justice and 
the question of its precise nature.  
The centrality of self-love is found in the earliest moral and political philosophy. Both 
Pagan and Christian thought appreciate its domineering role in human conduct even if they 
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disagree on its meaning and worth. Self-love is a central theme of Plato and Aristotle and figures 
prominently in virtually all subsequent political and social thought. Self-love is a passion which 
sits at the foundation between the tension of the individual good and that of the political 
community. The Greeks capture self-love in the term idion, which refers to that which is “one’s 
own.” or that which pertains to oneself.88  It connotes what is “individual”, “particular” or “public” 
in contradistinction to that which is a “common”, “general” or “public”.89 What is idion is the 
realm of self-interest in contradistinction to the public interest. Aristotle makes clear that because 
the city is the “most authoritative community”90 which provides all that is necessary for the 
possibility of the good life, it is then prior to both the private household and individual the whole 
is superior to its parts.91 The Ancient city deemed a sense of civic duty, public spiritedness and 
patriotism the highest virtue and accorded it the highest honors.92 To be exclusively concerned 
with one’s own economic or private self-interest was literally to be an “idiot”.93 This was the name 
given to those who “retreated from the life of the city” into the private sphere alone to the exclusion 
of active participation in one’s own political life as a citizen.94 Patriotism was an outgrowth of self-
love made possible by the fusion of the individual and the city in the form of citizenship. Patriotism 
therefore was “an energetic sentiment” which was “the supreme virtue to which all other virtues 
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tended.”95 Patriotism habituated citizens to identify with their political community, transforming 
love of self into love of country. 
 Self-love stipulates men love themselves most before all others and all else. Hume says “it 
is evident, that every man loves himself better than any other person.”96 Self-love is a passion 
which compels men to attend to their own needs and desires first. Not only do we love ourselves, 
but we love our passions and interests, because they are ours. This is because we are the 
beneficiaries of our own pleasures. The rewards of satisfying our desires directly benefits us. Each 
man, as Cain understood, is naturally inclined toward being his own keeper only. Satan, as depicted 
in The Book of Job, sums up the primordial pull of self-love when he says: “Skin for skin, yea, all 
that a man hath will he give for his life.”97 Man will forsake all else including God, if it means he 
can save his own skin.  
Self-love also suggests we love that which is most like us. We love things like ourselves 
because we love ourselves preeminently. Aristotle cites the origin of procreation in the “natural 
striving to leave behind another which is like oneself.”98 What is similar, is in a sense an extension 
of oneself. In the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib and Aristophanes myth of love in Plato’s 
Symposium are two stories whose allegorical meaning illustrates our natural affinity for things like 
ourselves. Self-love inspires individuals to be concerned for others to the extent others are 
perceived as an extension and reflection of themselves. This is why mothers love their children 
and families naturally tend to form tight bonds. Aristotle asserts that family and friends “are 
another self.”99 People do things for the sake of family and friends because their good is merely an 
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extension of the good of the self. Sacrifice for family is in reality doing benefit to an external part 
of oneself. It is no sacrifice at all. If self-love stipulates that each human being loves more what is 
more like them, it also suggests they love less things less and less like themselves. The Book of 
Genesis illustrates the power of self-love when it is not extended to others through identification. 
Cain murders his brother out of jealousy and denies that he is his brother’s keeper. Cain does not 
have to concern himself with his brother because he denies the significance of the familiar relation 
which might entail such an obligation.   
At the foundation of love of self is the “powerful sentiment of self-preservation.”100 In No. 
43 Madison speaks of “the great principle of self-preservation” which is a matter of “absolute 
necessity”  and the foundation of “the law of nature and of nature’s God, which declares that the 
safety and happiness of society, are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which 
all such institutions must be sacrificed.”101 One cannot make law contrary to the most powerful 
law of the human soul. This impulse provides the first and fundamental object of government. It 
gives rise to laws which protect life and property. Self-preservation is the most powerful passion 
precisely because it is the most deeply rooted in necessity. In No. 41 Madison writes it is “in vain 
to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation.”102  
Property is necessary to self-preservation. Men love themselves most and all property 
which most immediately figures in their self-preservation and the satisfaction of their desires. We 
love most that which is ours because our possession benefits us.  This means there is no absolute 
distinction between self-love and the love of what we possess. William James says that “a man’s 
Self is the sum total of all that he can call his.”103 The distinction “between what a man calls me 
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and what he simply calls mine,” James writes, is a line, “difficult to draw.”104 Hamilton, speaking 
of an occupant’s desire to keep his office through reelection, emphasizes that “it is a principle of 
human nature that a man will be interested in whatever he possesses.”105   
Self-preservation is achieved through constant striving and acquisition by which 
individuals hope to insulate themselves from external threats to or deficiencies of equipment 
necessary to their general well-being. Self-love is therefore connected to the acquisitive passion 
which Machiavelli saw as the driving passion of ambitious men. Hume says that since “every man 
loves himself better than any other person, he is naturally impelled to extend his acquisitions as 
much as possible; and another can restrain him in this propensity…by which he learns the 
pernicious effects of that license.”106 Publius refers to the drive to acquire under the related names 
of “acquisition,” “avarice,” “industry” and “the spirit of enterprise.”107 The acquisitive passion can 
be either beneficial or harmful to civil society depending on whether it is expressed through labor 
and industry on the one hand, or theft and deceit on the other. These passions represent a nearly 
unquenchable spirit which drives men to acquire more than they have and more than the necessities 
of self-preservation dictate. The extended composite and commercial republic advanced by 
Publius gives explicit sanction to self-interested passions which originate in the instinct of self-
preservation and motivate economic accumulation.  
Physical proximity and distance directly impact the degree to which self-love is extended 
to others through identification. If self-love stipulates that each human being loves more what is 
more like them, it also suggests they love less things less and less like themselves. What we 
perceive as more or less like ourselves is partially determined by relative proximity. Proximity and 
 
104 Ibid. 
105 No. 71. 
106 David Hume. Political Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. p. 196.  
107 No. 7, 11.  
 
 411 
distance affect the degree of our ability to identify with others. Human nature dictates that greater 
proximity leads to greater identification. Men are increasingly indifferent to things and people 
sufficiently remote to their own immediate sphere of existence.108 Distance discourages men from 
seeing others as part of their own personal sphere and shared destiny. The sphere of self-love 
extends only so far as we can perceive how our fate is connected to the fate of others. The greater 
the distance between people, the less and less they are likely or able identify as extensions of one 
another’s own sphere of self. There is a “diminution of the social passions or affections with 
physical distance or infrequent interaction.”109 Meanwhile, the greater the physical proximity the 
more invested they are likely to be in each other’s fate. The closer people are the more they will 
be beneficiaries of the self-love of others.    
In No. 17 Hamilton observes that there is a “strong propensity of the human heart” which 
is “a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the 
distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his 
family than to his neighbourhood, to his neighbourhood than to the community at large, the people 
of each state would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local governments, than towards the 
government of the union, unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better 
administration of the latter.”110 Hamilton later echoed this observation at the New York ratifying 
convention saying, “There are certain social principles in human nature, from which we may draw 
the most solid conclusions with respect to the conduct of individuals, and of communities. We love 
our families, more than our neighbours. We love our neighbours, more than our countrymen in 
general. The human affections, like the solar heat, lose their intensity, as they depart from the 
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center; and become languid, in proportion to the expansion of the circle, on which they act. On 
these principles, the attachment of the individual will be first and forever secured by the states 
governments.”111  
Consistent with The Federalist’s account of human nature, Hamilton’s remarks shift from 
a principal observation of the soul to conclusions of political science and statesmanship. They 
demonstrate the relationship between proximity, identification and political authority. This 
relationship raises the specter of the problem of the closeness or distance of government to the 
people. If government is truly to be “theirs” it must be sufficiently close to the people. Proximity 
encourages government to be responsible and accountable to the people. Increasing distance 
permits government to ignore and eventually tyrannize over the people without qualm. Republican 
self-government demands that those in the centers of power must have geographical proximity to 
those they represent. Geographical proximity manifests as psychological proximity to and 
identification the people and their representatives. We can see how the relationship between self-
love and proximity plays into the central constitutional question of the effects of more centralized 
or more diffused and localized political power. Republican government necessitates government 
sufficiently close to the people if officeholders are to be compelled to genuinely represent the 
interests of their constituents. The principle and effects of proximity on self-love helps provide the 
philosophical underpinnings of the principle of federalism. The effect of proximity on collective 
identification explains the logic behind a composite federal, state and local government.  
Self-love has great affinities with self-interest, but Publius does not treat them as identical. 
Self-love underwrites man’s universal pursuit of self-interest. It is because self-love is the ur-
passion of human nature that The Federalist identifies self-interest as the vera causa of human 
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motivation and action. Throughout the numbers of The Federalist Publius makes a clear, but not 
obvious, distinction between passions and interests. Like all other passions self-love is unreflective 
and blind to the consequences of its fulfillment. While it may often turn out to be reasonable to 
listen to the call of self-love, reason is not operative in any passion. An interest in contradistinction 
to a passion is achieved through some modicum of reflection on and modification of natural 
impulse. Self-interest is a more or less prudent satisfaction of self-love where reason and other 
sentiments dictate which manifestations are appropriate to satisfy and which are not. Self-
preservation is the first principle of self-love. By placing comfortable self-preservation at the 
foundation of moral action, Locke shortened the distance between self-love and self-interest. As 
the most powerful and natural passion it is the most reliable and predictable motive of men.  
As Plato does in the Republic, and Hume in the Treatise, Publius identifies self-love as the 
ur-passion at the root of the political problem. Starting with the desire for self-preservation and 
self-perpetuation all the other passions Publius mentions such as avarice, ambition, the desire for 
honors or the love of power all redound back to the benefit of oneself. They are all species of self-
love. Self-love is the perennial source of the tension between the good of the individual and the 
common good. Self-love has the positive effect of making men increasingly self-sufficient and 
responsible for themselves and loved ones such as family and friends. Nonetheless self-love can 
devolve into selfishness, egoism, vanity, avarice, jealousy and hatred. The acquisitive impulse is 
merely an extension of our self-love. Hume says that the avidity “of acquiring goods and 
possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly 
destructive of society.”112  “Self-love”, says Hume, “when it acts at its liberty,… is the source of 
all injustice and violence.”113 Hume says “each person loves himself better than any other single 
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person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and acquaintance, this 
must necessarily produce an opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions; which 
cannot but be dangerous” to civil society.114  
Self-love breeds injustice because it is always confused and conflated with our opinions of 
our self-interest. In No. 10 Madison says, “As long as the connection subsists between his reason 
and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and 
the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.”115 This reciprocal influence 
means men will always consider their own interest first, and when considering themselves, their 
immediate over remote interest. Self-love conspires with reason to distort our understanding of our 
genuine interests. Our interest comes in a form as it “appears” to us, rather than in its “real and 
intrinsic value.”116 This is why no man can be a judge in his own case and government becomes 
necessary to the administration of justice. This is why self-love needs to be transmuted by good 
government into self-interest properly understood.  
The justice of government must be administered to navigate the gap between self-love and 
the needs of the political community. “Men,” says Hume, are always “inclined to prefer present 
interest to distant and remote.”117 They are unable “to resist the temptation of any advantage, that 
they may immediately enjoy, in the apprehension of an evil, that lies at a distance from them.” 118 
Since our affections and understanding diminish as things become increasingly remote to us in 
space or time, committing injustice against those who are anonymous becomes permissible. At 
such a distance we cannot see the harm or how it might harm our own interest. Distance 
 
114 Ibid., p. 312.  
115 No. 10 
116 David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 343.  




anaesthetizes us to things and people sufficiently remote to ourselves. Distance neutralizes nature 
identification, muting the call of pity and the pangs of conscience, guilt or shame. At such a 
distance we lack the ability to sympathize; we can no longer see others as an extension of our own 
sphere of self-love. Hume says, “There is no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal 
errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and 
remote, and makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value.”119 
Hume says that nothing can restrain human nature from the negative effects of self-love “but 
reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that license, and the total 
dissolution of society, which must ensure form it.”120 He concludes that man’s “original 
inclination…or instinct, is here checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or 
observation.”121 
Of the various passions some are social and others asocial. Because passions generate 
actions either beneficial or harmful to us and others, all inevitably involve us with our fellow 
human beings. Even asocial passions are in a fundamental sense, social. They impact our conduct 
toward and relationships with others. The primary concern of moral and political philosophy with 
regard to the passions is to assess their social and political consequences and fashion civil order, 
what Hume called our “circumstances and situations,” in such a way as to accommodate, channel, 
restraint or perfect them.  
Central to the moral and political problem is that certain passions are more or less 
conducive to collective existence. Some incline human beings toward harmony and peace, others 
toward faction and conflict. Some are more powerful, others weaker. Publius’ political science 
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must first determine the extent to which each passion produces either harmony or conflict in civil 
society. Tracing this divide, Publius establishes a distinction between “amicable and antagonistic 
passions.”122 He itemizes those passions “which promote harmony” and those “which promote 
hostility among men.”123 For example, in No. 5 Jay contrasts  the passions of “confidence and 
affection” on one hand, to “envy and jealousy”.124  In the context of his argument in No. 5, the 
former motives “support international peace, and the latter motives which lead to war.”125  The 
function of the Constitution is, within the bounds of liberty and the substantive rights it entails, to 
encourage social passions and discourage asocial ones. 
Belief in the existence of social or political passions which are natural constituents of the 
human soul goes back at least to the Greeks. Even self-love properly understood carries men 
outside of themselves when they realize their own identity and interests are permanently tethered 
to their families, friends, and those of their fellow citizens. In the Republic, Plato identifies thumos, 
or “spiritedness,” as a moral or social sentiment which draws men out into the public square into 
a concern for others’ opinions of themselves. Thumos is the “principle or seat of anger or rage” in 
the soul.126 It is the source of “natural courage”.127  It is this passion of self-assertiveness which 
motives men to demands honor and recognition from the world. It demands their will be realized 
and others respect its force and worth. Anger is universally caused in men by the failure of the 
world or others to recognize their will. Spiritedness drives men to acts of self-assertion in order to 
achieve the satisfaction of their will in the face of obstacles that would thwart it. It is the source of 
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man’s quest for honor and glory and therefore intimately connected with ambition. Spiritedness 
then, drives men to seek recognition from their fellow human beings. Often recognition is achieved 
by conforming to the expectations of others, society’s laws or the established norms of right and 
wrong. Such concern for the public opinion can shape men’s actions in conformity with the moral 
principles of the community. Thus, thumos can be a moral or social sentiment. Plato says 
spiritedness, acting in coordination with reason, is the source of moral virtue. Yet, the ambition 
inspired by thumos can equally compel a man to confirm to society, as to drive him to compel his 
fellow citizens to meet his own expectations of them. Spiritedness can therefore be the source of 
harmonious social sentiments or those which produce conflict.  
If human nature harbored a reserve of natural moral sentiments political science needed to 
identify and leverage them in the service of political order. As Enlightenment thinkers of various 
stripes gradually viewed human nature more naturalistically as an animal being or biological 
machine, they increasingly viewed human action as mechanically driven by impulse and instinct 
over the more elevated forces of reason, will or conscious choice. The passions were “natural 
products of the normal workings of the human being.”128 They were increasingly viewed as good 
precisely by virtue of their natural status. Hume says that “a remedy” for the ills of human nature, 
“can never be effectual” without abiding by its propensities.129 Following Bacon it was necessary 
to first obey nature in order to control it. It was a fool’s errand to oppose nature and its regular 
laws.   
This changing attitude toward the status and role of the passions in human motivation led 
to attempts to envision how social order and even political justice might emerge solely on the basis 
of the cultivation of natural moral sentiments alone rather than rational calculations which tallied 
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foreseen rewards and punishments. If men were never that reasonable to begin with, the historical 
existence of social and political harmony cannot be primarily attributed to the workings of reason 
alone. Some type of social or moral sentiment must then be the glue which holds civil society 
together. Smith criticized Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees saying: “It is the great fallacy of Dr. 
Mandeville’s book to represent every passion as wholly vicious which is so in any degree and in 
any direction.”130  
By this view reason was an instrument whose logic only retroactively validated what had 
been motivated and achieved in practice by sentiment. The golden rule was motivated by moral 
sentiment and justified as correct in principle by reason after the fact. Hume says men are 
compelled to moral duties by two sources. First, through the natural instinct of self-love and 
second, by a sense of obligation realized only through restraints on self-love achieved by 
“reflection and experience.”131 For Hume the existence of moral sentiments meant that “men are 
impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates on them, independent of all 
ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility.”132 Hume identified “love 
of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate” as central examples of natural moral 
sentiment.133 These Hume called the “humane instincts.”134 
While many Moderns denied that man was by nature a political animal or that political 
community was natural, they certainly never denied his sociability. John Donne famously 
ruminated, “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of 
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the main.”135 As a social animal the existence and identity of the human individual is always 
tethered as a part to others through some form of community which represents the whole. Human 
beings are tethered to each other through common natural needs, desires and opinions. A reviewer 
of Adam Smith’s 1759 Theory of Moral Sentiments wrote “the principle of Sympathy, on which 
he founds his system, is an unquestionable principle in human nature.”136 “However selfish soever 
man may be supposed,” wrote Smith in this book, “there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”137 Smith asserted even the 
“greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of the society, is not altogether without” 
moral sentiments.138  
Rousseau is often credited as the first Modern who sought to overturn assertions by the 
previous social contract theorists that civil society was primarily knitted together by rational 
calculations of self-interest and fear of violent death. Civil society was not the product of reason 
and interest, Rousseau thought, but of man’s primordial sentiments. Conflict arose not because of 
the imperfections of human nature - mankind was naturally good - but rather a concatenation of 
fortuitous circumstances conspiring to create an unjust system which, over time, corrupted man’s 
natural goodness.139 In the Second Discourse Rousseau went so far as to accuse reason itself as one 
of the central co-conspirators in man’s historical self-subjugation. Through its moral sense, 
mankind was given by nature an “innate knowledge” in the form of an unconscious instinct “of 
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right and wrong.”140  In attempting to refute both Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau asserted that the 
passions alone could provide “the basis for social solidarity”141 For Rousseau, feeling was “the 
cause of social relations” and the basis of social harmony.142 Rousseau contrasts justice based on 
sentiment to what he calls “rational justice.” Men like Socrates, he writes, might “acquire virtue 
through reason,” but “the human race would long since have ceased to be, if its preservation had 
depended solely on the reasonings of the individuals who make it up.”143 Likewise Hume 
concluded, “Morality rests on the passions and the sentiments rather than on rationality.”144 Hume 
asserted that human understanding could only grasp concrete empirical facts and was therefore 
unable to discern general rules of moral obligation through rational inference. He concluded “no 
moral obligation can be derived from observations about matters of fact; justice is an artificial 
virtue, its principles are conventional.”145  
The school of moral sense asserted that shared natural sentiments make community 
possible.146 A central presumption of the school was that man’s innate sentiments and passions 
were sufficiently benign or even salutary to civil order. In contrast to Publius, Rousseau said man’s 
sentiments are more “wild than wicked.”147 The implication was, if “wild” they merely require 
proper training, if “wicked” restraint. Only if the passions are predominately social can one found 
morality and civic order largely or exclusively on them. Hume argued “the passions are not threats 
to morality, but virtuous or vicious according to their pleasurable or painful nature.”148 Rousseau’s 
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assertion of natural goodness suggested that when mankind was finally unburdened of the 
historical yolk of oppressive regimes and their laws it would spontaneously flourish in accord with 
its own inborn moral sentiments. Student of Rousseau, the German Romantic Herder, said “all 
passions of man’s breast are wild drives of a force which does not know itself yet, but which, in 
accordance with its nature, can only conspire toward a better order of things.”149 In the unconscious 
workings of passion which do good without conscious intent were the seeds of Hegel’s cunning of 
reason.  
Hume was similarly intent to demonstrate man’s basic sociability. Man was not, for Hume, 
solely egoistic or self-interested, only compacting and harmonizing with others out of rational 
calculations of gain. In Hobbes and Mandeville, we see a near complete absence of such social 
sentiments in their portraits of human nature and conduct. Against Hobbes, Mandeville, Locke and 
their “selfish system of morals” Hume proposed certain moral sentiments that lead men into 
community and comradeship with one another. 150 He writes, “Were our selfish and vicious 
principles so much predominant above our social and virtuous, as is asserted by some philosophers, 
we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptible notion of human nature.”151 Hume says that 
while “self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice… sympathy with public 
interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.”152  Hume acknowledges 
that the “principle of sympathy is too weak to control our passions; but has sufficient force to 
influence our taste, and give us sentiments of approbation and blame.”153 
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One of this school’s primary innovations is the claim that virtue is the offspring of 
sentiment. In “subordinating reason to passion,” Hume “denies the possibility of rational 
government of the passions.”154 Reason’s subordination to passion’s mastery is not merely an 
empirical observation, but a moral principle. The denial of reason’s mastery led to a normative 
claim which rejects the desirability of rational government altogether. The passions “are not, and 
ought not to be, governed by reason.”155 Hume does not deny that certain passions may well be 
dangerous, “but reason is not the cure: it is not a higher faculty capable of ordering any other 
faculty, and so cannot do the job.”156 Hume denied the central role of reason and rational 
calculation, attributed to it by Hobbes and Locke in establishing justice. The first inklings of justice 
emerge not from “any relation of ideas”, but from “our impressions and sentiments, without which 
everything in nature is perfectly indifferent to us.”157 The “sense of justice, therefore, is not founded 
on our ideas, but on our impressions.”158   
Hume’s account of the moral sense rests on an important distinction between passions and 
sentiments. These two forms of emotion are distinguished by their origin and intensity. Hume 
defines moral sense as a sentiment. Sentiment is a mediating term, a synthesis of reason and 
passion.159 It is passion modified by experience and understanding. As a faculty of the soul it 
“combines some of the functions of the passions with those of reason and the understanding.”160  
Moral sentiments involve an important passive element of judgment akin to reason, but are also 
able to motivate action like the passions.161  They “are calm affective states, susceptible to 
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cultivation, subject to standards and capable of reining in the excesses of violent, passions.”162 
Hume distinguishes between “higher and more refined taste,” associated with sentiments, and the 
violent passions that disturb susceptible souls.”163 If self-preservation and self-love are fixed 
passions of first nature, moral sentiments are historically cultivated sensibilities. Sentiments are 
emotions refined by the “influence of custom” and habit and are therefore tinctured with ideas and 
experience.164 History and national character increasingly shape moral sense. If sentiment is not 
consciously reflective or deliberative in the manner of reason, it can spontaneously respond to 
habituation.   
Was it the case as Aristotle and the Ancients had argued, that virtue is only produced when 
action is guided by right reason? Or, did virtue find its true spring in certain social sentiments? 
Hume breaks with Aristotle’s strict association of reason and virtue. He did not “reject the ideal of 
the virtuous life,” but sought “a new account of how such a life is possible.”165 At the root of this 
debate was the question over the true origin of moral virtue. Like Rousseau, the Scottish 
Enlightenment identified the moral sense, as the innate if mild sense of right and wrong rooted in 
human emotion. Hume stated that morality “is more properly felt than judged of by reason.”166 
They believed this sense could provide a natural moral compass for human action. Moral sense 
was capable of guiding actions toward moral ends and was the primary source of moral virtue. 
Moral sentiments were social emotions which motivate altruistic behavior. They produce “natural 
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alone.167 Moral virtue then is the product of “natural impulses which direct people toward proper 
action.”168  
Emotions which produce virtue might properly be called “virtuous sentiment.” Virtuous 
sentiment is a non-rational impulse and the “natural” source of virtue.169 They act much as reason 
does in the rationalist account by serving as the primary rudder of action. Scanlan says The 
Federalist identifies virtues as “natural impulses that direct people toward proper action but are 
not themselves strong enough to cause action, while ambition provides the motor of action but 
cannot direct action to proper ends. Thus virtue and ambition must be conjoined.”170 Mansfield 
points out that Publius departs from Aristotle by “connecting ambition to interest rather than 
calling it virtue.”171 This reappraisal of ambition is consistent with the reappraisal of human nature 
the ends of governments by Modern political science. Taking men as they are, ambition is as much 
a threat, as an asset to governance. This is not the moral virtue of Aristotle or exponents of the 
Classical tradition. They rooted virtue in the use of reason by an animal whose nature was fulfilled 
precisely by this use. Since virtuous sentiments are part of man’s first nature they produce natural 
virtue which is not learned, but requires the amplification of training and habit. Some moral 
philosophers considered virtuous sentiments as the source of both morality and justice. Civic order 
could be increasingly built on the foundation of the right kinds of passions properly cultivated in 
society. As we shall see however, despite his appreciation of the power and role of the moral 
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sentiments, Publius as did Hume, denies that virtuous sentiments alone are capable of producing 
civic order. The foundation of justice is not to be found in the more sense alone.   
Enlightenment thinkers sought to identify the central sentiments which might provide the 
natural glue of society. The Federalist Papers refer to a variety of related moral sentiments which 
assist in binding society without providing any systematic definitions of these terms. These terms 
had a well-established provenance. The works of Rousseau, Hume and Smith provide ample 
insight into their general meanings. Rousseau had identified the moral sentiment of “pity” as the 
central psychological mechanism of civic harmony. Rousseau writes, “It is then certain that pity 
is a natural feeling, which, by moderating the violence of self-love in each individual, contributes 
to the preservation of the whole species.”172 Pity was the true and natural source of morals and 
virtues. Likewise, Adam Smith identified pity and compassion as “original passions of human 
nature,” and principles which allow us to “feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or 
are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.”173 The emotion of pity allows us to feel the pain 
and suffering of beings like ourselves. Pity inclines men to come to the aid of others “without 
reflection,” or the external sentinels of government and its laws.174 Hume speaks of “sympathy” as 
the central psychological process connected to the moral sense. Sympathy is a “capacity to share 
the feelings of others.”175 It was “a proof, that our approbation has, in those cases, an origin 
different from the prospect of utility and advantage, either to ourselves or others.”176 Sympathy 
was “the binding force of civil society.”177 Adam Smith, following the lead of Hume and 
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Hutcheson attributed to sympathy the same power to knit civil society together. For Smith, 
however “sympathy” was “our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.”178 The existence and 
role of sympathy implied society was gemeinschaft, not merely gesellschaft; it was more than an 
aggregation of knaves and scoundrels bound together by mere self-interest.179  
Since emotions cannot be directly transferred from the bosom of one citizen to that of 
another, Hume says sympathy involves the indirect communication and translation of emotions 
between human beings. Sympathy, for Hume, “is not itself a passion” like Rousseau’s pity.180 
Instead it is causal mechanism, a psychological process by which emotions are communicated 
between human beings through which we come “to feel the passions we suppose others feel.”181 
This process involves identification where the passions and sentiments of one person are 
perceived, internalized and felt in another. The process involves elements of both feeling and 
understanding. “When any affection is infused by sympathy,” writes Hume, “it is at first known 
only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey 
an idea of it.”182  These emotions first appear “in our mind as mere ideas.”183 These ideas are 
subsequently converted into an emotional impression in the observer.184    
More so than Smith, Hume claims sympathy inspires a “very remarkable resemblance” of 
feelings shared by individuals.185 Hume seems to have believed that under the right circumstances, 
the feelings of one person could be communicated to another with a high degree of fidelity. He 
claims that our ideas of others’ emotional states “are converted into the very impressions they 
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represent.”186 The communicated emotion “acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to 
become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection.”187 The 
reason sympathy is able to produce such a resemblance is due to the denominator of our common 
human nature. And the more resemblance between individuals, the greater the sympathetic bond 
felt between them. If we are members of a shared community of habit and custom the identity of 
our emotions will be even stronger. Beside the general resemblance of our natures,” Hume writes, 
“if there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language, it facilitates 
the sympathy. The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does 
the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with 
which we always form the idea of our own person.”188 Likewise, the “sentiments of others have 
little influence, when far removed from us, and require the relation of contiguity, to make them 
communicate themselves entirely.”189 Just as the power of self-love diminishes as distances 
increase, so too does the efficacy of sympathy.  
Adam Smith confronted Hume’s account of sympathy in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Like Hume, Smith acknowledged both a reasoning and feeling component to sympathy. For Smith 
sympathy produces moral sentiments provoked by an imaginative process of identification 
achieved through reflection. Our “fellow-feeling” for the suffering of others is achieved  “by 
changing places in fancy with the sufferer.”190 This allows us “to conceive or to be affected by 
what he feels.”191 Emotional identification through imagination is necessary because we do “not 
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immediately experience of what other men feel.”192 We are unable to have any direct idea of how 
others are “affected, but by conceiving what we are ourselves should feel in the like situation.”193 
For Smith, as opposed to Hume, emotion is not communicated and translated, but rather 
imaginatively reconstructed through a process of observation and reflection. Smith stresses our 
impressions are limited to our own senses, and of others’ only indirectly through our own.194 
“Though our brother is upon the rack,” Smith writes, “as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our 
senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our 
own person.”195  Therefore, “it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what 
are his sensations.”196 Through the imagination “we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some 
measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel 
something which, though weaker in degree is not altogether unlike them.”197  
Imagination is a central component of Smith’s theory of sympathy. It allows us to conceive 
what others feel by representing our own response “if we were in his case.”198  Sympathy depends 
on our own experiences and ability to imagine “the sentiments of the sufferer.”199 This involves an 
imaginative recreation of another’s circumstances and the ability identifying the analogous 
emotions we assume those condition might inspire. Registering another’s feelings through 
sympathy does not guarantee the accuracy or similitude of our own. Smith denied sympathy was 
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a process of direct or indirect emotional transference. The emotions felt through sympathy are our 
own. Instead sympathy allows “us to imagine what it would be like to be in their place.”200  
Moral sentiments are “moral” precisely because of their ability to establish a common 
standard of judgment and instill the proper motives for correct action.201 It is through sympathy 
that sentiments which motivate our notions of right and wrong are felt collectively and socialized. 
All accounts of sympathy allow the human race to have a greater or lesser ability for emotional 
identification. It allows human beings to share in the nature and magnitude of each other’s pains 
and pleasures and grasp each other’s motives for action.  “No quality of human nature is more 
remarkable,” writes Hume, “both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to 
sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, 
however different from, or even contrary to our own.”202 Hume writes that sympathy has the 
capacity “to preserve the character of a nation the same for a century together.”203  
Virtually all feelings we might experience have some social dimension to them shaped by 
our reciprocal sympathetic responses to each other. All feelings are tinctured with fellow-feeling. 
Through sympathy our emotions become freighted with the rules and moral judgements of the 
community. By rendering the sentiments of others “present to us” sympathy makes us naturally 
interested in the judgments of others, particularly those opinions pertaining to ourselves.204 It 
encourages us to unite through compelling us to conform to the opinions and standards of the 
community. Even “men of the greatest judgment and understanding,” find it “very difficult to 
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follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily 
companions.”205  
Sympathy, says Hume, is the primordial cause of “the great uniformity… in the humours 
and turn of thinking of those of the same nation” more than “any influence of the soil and 
climate.”206 Extended proximity to one’s fellow citizens, breeds unity. Feelings like good humor, 
pride, anger, sorrow, hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy are 
produced more by communication between one another than from one’s “own natural temper and 
disposition.”207 Hume acknowledges that there are more primary emotions than those obtained 
through sympathy such as the drives to power or wealth. Yet he says, “Our reputation, our 
character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes 
of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and 
sentiments of others.”208 Sympathy is intimately bound up with our desire for honor and 
recognition and therefore central dimension of the passion of ambition.  
Here, the role of sympathy extends beyond its harmonizing social effects as a moral 
sentiment. Any desire a human being might have, is also mingled, through sympathy, with the 
perceptions and opinions of others.  All desire is a double desire. Every desire is freighted with 
two dimensions which often cannot be distinguished. There is a primary desire for some perceived 
good and our derivative appreciation of that good in light of how we believe others perceive it. 
Each desire is a combination of this primary end with the public perception of that good. An 
ambitious politician seeks power, office or wealth, but is also keenly aware of how she is perceived 
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by the public in the pursuit of such ambitions. Such awareness is felt through sympathy and 
modifies the initial object of desire.  
Identification allows us to see ourselves through the eyes of our fellow citizens and has a 
profound influence on our self-worth which impacts our senses of pride and humility. By 
internalizing the judgements of others sympathy becomes the vehicle of reward and punishments, 
pleasures and pains which guide and shape our conduct in response to or in anticipation of them. 
By influencing the two masters of human action, sympathy is the vehicle through which the 
feelings of others hold a powerful imperium over our conduct. Moral sentiment allows us to rise 
above concern for narrow and immediate self-interest and heed the call of the common interest. 
Hume says “sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends 
that virtue.”209 Thus we have a natural emotional inclination to abide by the common interest 
because of the pleasure we receive by conforming to the aggregate opinions of our community.  
Moral sentiment plays a noticeable but subordinate role in The Federalist’s account of 
human nature, American society and the constitutional arrangement of power. In No. 10 Madison 
speaks of the “virtuous sentiments”210 and in No. 62 Hamilton uses a synonym referring to them 
as “benevolent emotions”.211 The central moral sentiments described by Madison and Hamilton, 
which track Hume’s Treatise, are “sympathy” and “humanity.” 212 Scanlan identifies the moral 
sentiments with which Publius is concerned as built on “family affection, patriotism, and 
philanthropy,” that is to say love of family, nation and humanity respectively.213 All these 
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sentiments are a product of self-love coupled with degrees of identification with others perceived 
as part of our sphere.  
Humanity is a generic sentiment connoting decency and general concern for one’s fellow 
man in light of their common human nature. It is a “kindness, graciousness, politeness” and 
“consideration for others.” 214 “Humanity,” says Hume, is a natural sentiment motivating men to 
“relieve persons in distress” and promote “the happiness of fellow-creatures.”215 Diderot and 
D’Alembert’s French Encyclopedia defines humanité as “a feeling of good will toward all men” 
which inspires mankind “to do away with slavery, superstition, vice and misfortune.”216 They write 
this sentiment is capable of wresting “from the hands of the criminal the deadly weapon with which 
he intended to strike the good man.”217 They say, “It does not impel us to break the bonds that tie 
us to other individuals, but on the contrary turns us into better friends, better citizens, and better 
spouses; it delights in doing good deeds and thus pours out its benefits over those whom nature 
has placed next to us.”218 Publius hardly maintains such an effusive vision of the power and effects 
of natural human decency, yet keenly understands how civil bounds underwritten by force and law 
can be strengthened by such sentiments. 
Madison also speaks of asocial impulses he calls “unfriendly passions”219 while Hamilton 
speaks of the “angry and malignant passions.”220 In No. 1 Hamilton immediately sets in on those 
asocial passions with which government must contend and represent genuine threats to civil order 
such as  “ambition, avarice, personal animosity,” and “party opposition”221 In No. 6 Hamilton 
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speaks of "the impulses of rage, resentment, avarice” and “other irregular and violent 
propensities.”222 These asocial passions are the “latent causes of faction” Madison speaks of, which 
are “sown in the nature of man.”223  It does not go unnoticed that Publius’ ongoing itemization of 
the passions relevant to political order focuses primarily on the asocial and antagonistic variety. 
Publius forcefully recognizes that the existence of asocial passions in the soul of man is an 
acknowledgement that men harbor natural desires whose satisfaction results in harm to others and 
to the public interest. What we see in the tension between social and asocial passions is merely a 
reiteration of the balance between the potential for vice and virtue Publius repeatedly identifies in 
human nature. On the one hand asocial traits necessitate government, and on the other benevolent 
ones makes republican self-government possible. Like Hobbes, Publius dwells on asocial passions 
which incline human nature to self-interest at others’ expense precisely because these are the 
passions constitutional order must confront if free self-government is to be truly possible. Neither 
reason nor moral sentiment appear to hold sufficient sway to restrain them. The observation that 
human nature harbors an equilibrium between social and asocial sentiments illustrates why 
sentiment alone is not sufficient to achieve ordered liberty.  
Publius identifies two main roles for moral sentiment. Like Hume, Publius assumes 
sympathy is a product of the natural ability to identify with individual and groups like oneself 
brought about by exogenous factors such as “geographical and commercial considerations,” in 
conjunction with “habits and prejudices.”224 The first role is the common sense of Union created 
by the sympathy felt by American society as a whole, when bound together by the common 
national project and its common principles of liberty and republican self-government. This sense 
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of national unity is part of The Federalist’s argument for the necessity of the Union. Common 
“circumstances and situations” of American society created by the Constitution will create 
“national sympathy and connection.”225  In No. 16 Hamilton speaks of how fear of foreign threats 
would provide a common “motive of sympathy” binding states together into common cause and 
encouraging them to “unite for common defense.”226  
Publius is sensitive to the balance between national cohesion and localism. This is a 
juggling act of loyalties, between those to the nation which binds the Union, and loyalty to 
sectional factions and the states which differentiate the nation into regional constituencies. In No. 
10 we learn that liberty will produce factions which will divide sympathies and pit them against 
one another. Madison recognizes that in an extended commercial republic that economic factions 
will coalesce around the nature and amount of property each has. Hamilton says, “Every landholder 
will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible; and common 
interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy.”227 
The other vital role played moral sentiment is manifest in the relationship between the 
people and their representatives. In No. 52 Hamilton says it is essential to liberty that the 
government “should have a common interest with the people.”228 In No. 57 Hamilton says without 
a “communion of interest, and sympathy of sentiments” between the people and their 
representatives “every government degenerated into tyranny.”229 This is only possible when 
elected officials have an “immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the 
people.”230 The varying degrees of proximity and distance of each constitutional office between 
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them creates varying degrees and types of sympathy. The pull of sympathy will be one ingredient 
keeping elected officials responsible to the will of the people. Sympathy with the people translates 
into “responsibility to the people.”231  
Moral sentiments figure prominently in discussion over the role of commerce to the 
American nation. The feud between Hamilton and Jefferson over a commercial industrial nation 
versus an agrarian republic of yeoman farmers was in fact a dispute over the central psychological 
type of the common citizen in American society. In fact, it was a dispute over the central passions 
and sentiments which would rule American life. Twice in The Federalist Hamilton declares 
America will be a “commercial people.”232 Hamilton speaks of the “adventurous spirit” which 
“distinguishes the commercial character of America.”233 The American people will be an 
enterprising and entrepreneurial people. The Constitution will perpetuate a “commercial republic” 
motivated by the passions of industry and economic self-interest in the service of wealth creation 
and the comfortable self-preservation it produces.234 A major theme of Montesquieu, Hume and 
Adam Smith was the psychological role of commerce and industry on the mores and habits of civil 
society. Despite Madison’s brilliant description in No. 10 of the vying economic factions produced 
by liberty and property rights, Hamilton is the primary explicator of the role and significance of 
commerce in The Federalist. Much of Hamilton’s economic analysis is directed to issues of power 
and wealth on the international stage more than these psychological factors. Nonetheless as they 
themselves admit, in promoting commerce, Madison and Hamilton were promoting a certain set 
of passions as national virtues.   
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Commerce was in conformity with the Modern vision of republicanism. If a republic was 
most suitable to the needs and demands of human nature it was compelled to consider them 
properly. This involved the acceptance of man’s desire to acquire and for its potential benefits to 
be appreciated, even celebrated. Machiavelli spoke of the “very natural and ordinary desire to 
acquire.”235  Acquisition, for Machiavelli, was a matter of “necessity.”236 Following in 
Machiavelli’s footsteps, Montesquieu believed commerce was a central component of a free 
republic. Montesquieu gave acquisition a distinctly more commercial dimension to man’s 
acquisitive impulses in contrast to Machiavelli’s accumulation through conquest. The modern 
republic would “be based on liberty and commerce rather than virtue, and was to emphasize the 
private life rather than communal solidarity.”237 He observed that there is “a hardiness in states 
which subsist by the commerce of economy not found in monarchies.”238 A commercial regime 
was “the only one which allows man’s natural humanity to fully assert itself.”239 If the American 
republic was to be erected on the principles of human nature, this would be partially achieved by 
orienting its society toward commerce. The commercial way of life was understood as “the most 
adequate response to the needs of human nature.”240 Adam Smith says the desire to accumulate 
“though calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into 
the grave.”241 
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Acquisition is a fundamental passion of human nature. Hume wrote man “is naturally 
impelled to extend his acquisitions as much as possible.”242 This is because this passion is directly 
connected to our self-preservation. “Every person,” says Hume, “ought to enjoy the fruits of his 
labour, in full possession of all the necessaries, and many of the conveniences of life. No one can 
doubt, but such an equality is most suitable to human nature, and diminishes much less from the 
happiness of the rich than it adds to that of the poor.” 243 So central was commercial development 
and trade, Montesquieu asserted that in these matters political interest should give way to economic 
interest.244 Locke believed the promotion of work and commerce would provide the “real 
necessities and conveniency of life,” facilitate the “happiness of the people” and the “peace and 
security” of the nation.245 Governments which ignored labor and commerce were ignorant of their 
benefits and neglected the well-being of their citizens.246 Having absorbed these lessons first-hand, 
Hamilton acknowledges that economic matters such as “national wealth” are “a primary object” 
of a commercial republic’s “political cares.”247 
In 1819 Benjamin Constant recognized the transformative nature of the commercial 
approach to civil society and its psychology. The Ancient and Medieval worlds had despised 
commerce, labor and the psychological effects of luxury. They achieved economic advancement 
not through commerce, but war. “Conquest, theft and looting” were the accepted modes of 
acquisition in the Ancient world.248 Constant wrote, “War and commerce are only two different 
means of achieving the same end, that of getting what one wants.”249 “War is all impulse,” wrote 
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Constant, “commerce, calculation. Hence it follows that an age must come in which commerce 
replaces war. We have reached this age.”250 Western society had seemingly reached an historical 
precipice, shifting from a bellicose age rooted in the passions to a commercial one rooted in 
rational calculations of national economic self-interest. Commerce and industry would replace war 
as the primary mode of wealth creation and competition between nations. In the late 19th Century 
Bismarck summed up this distinction when he contrasted Interessenpolitik to Machtpolitik: 
interest-politics on the one hand, and war-politics as the primary driver of statecraft.251  
Montesquieu believed commerce promoted “a levelling of the differences among nations” 
which allowed them to coexist more peaceably through recognizing their economic 
interdependency.252 Locke says that if “the labor of the world were rightly directed and distributed 
there would be more knowledge, peace, health and plenty in it than now there is” and “mankind 
would be much more happy.”253 “The natural effect of commerce,” says Montesquieu, “ is to lead 
to peace.”254 In No. 6 Hamilton rehearses this thesis saying commercial republics, are by their very 
nature, disinclined to military conflict, strictly governed by recognition of mutual self-interest, and 
naturally inclined to “mutual amity and concord.”255 War, of course did not abate, but modern 
society is a commercial one. Commerce in this sense has been historically vindicated.    
Montesquieu, Hume and Smith keenly recognized the psychological consequences of this 
new attitude toward commerce. Ancient republics promoted martial virtues and patriotism, a 
zealous love of one’s fatherland. The celebration of these virtues was not entirely a choice. It was 
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by- product of the necessity of small Greek republics to protect themselves by means of war. Such 
mores established an intense fraternity within the Ancient city and an equally powerful antipathy 
to those without. To achieve such virtues, Ancient republics had to be “small, strict, and 
homogenous,” precisely those attributes rejected by Madison in No. 10.256 These were closed 
societies typically hostile to outsiders. Montesquieu and Hume were both critical of the Spartan 
virtues which brought nations into conflict and were incompatible with the spirit of commerce. 
Compulsory and demanding virtues would be replaced by “voluntary acts of exchange” in greater 
harmony with the natural proclivities of mankind.257 The “ephemeral nature of riches acquired 
through pillage” would be replaced by “more solid and permanent sources of wealth” found in 
economic growth and development.258 Economic competition would be a win-win “war” 
benefitting all nations. The rising tide of wealth produced by commerce would raise all ships. 
Montesquieu concluded “men who pursue private acquisition of property through trade are much 
less moved by motives of glory and conquest.”259 Competitive passions which placed individuals 
and factions into conflict and lead to war, would be channeled into economic activities which 
would produce mutually beneficial material well-being. Calculating Connecticut Yankees would 
replace the noble knights of King Arthur’s court.    
The Modern commercial republic would promote cosmopolitan habits displacing the 
military virtues and the patriotic zeal of the insular Ancient republic. Its emphasis on civil liberties 
and comfortable self-preservation would create a more open, diverse and tolerant society. Ancient 
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vices became Modern virtues and vice versa. Luxury and vanity would replace pride and glory. 
Montesquieu recognized how commerce brought with it virtues of its own such as “frugality, 
economy, moderation, work, prudence, tranquility, order, and rule.”260 New virtues would be 
cultivated from old vices. Vices condemned by Ancient Pagans and the Christian religion, such as 
cupidity and the desire for lucre would be celebrated, not censured. Vanity, says Montesquieu, 
would be “as good a spring for a government as pride is dangerous.”261 From vanity, says 
Montesquieu, come the Modern virtues of “luxury, industry, the arts, fashions, politeness,” and 
“taste.”262 Luxury and vanity  would “stimulate work and economic vigor.” 263 While the “spirit of 
luxury weakens the ascetic spirit of hard work, it vastly increases the number of objects desired 
and thereby stimulates a broader commerce.”264 Montesquieu asserts “work is a consequence of 
vanity.”265 Hume says “Everything in the world is purchased by labour; and our passions are the 
only causes of labour.”266 Unleashing mankind’s avarice, channeled through commerce, would 
provide the motor to the creation of wealth.   
Labor gained a new sense of dignity. The Ancient republic and Modern aristocrats 
characterized work and its related virtues as ignoble. Locke says they “brought honest labour in 
useful and mechanical arts wholly into disgrace.”267 The spirit of commerce celebrated the creation 
of wealth through labor as much as the consumption which motivated it. Locke preaches the 
benefits of “honest labor” to body and soul for all human beings.268 Locke remarks that it is “a 
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mark of the goodness in God that he has put us in this life under a necessity of labour” in order “to 
keep mankind from mischiefs that ill men at leisure are very apt to do.”269 Labor is a “benefit even 
to the good and the virtuous which are thereby preserved from the ills of idleness or the diseases 
that attend constant study in the sedentary life.”270  
Philosophers and saints in their leisure were no longer welcome. The vita activa would 
displace the life of piety or contemplation as the prized mode of existence, but the active life would 
be characterized more by work and exchange than public engagement and civic duty.271 The 
enterprising bourgeois would replace the idle aristocratic voluptuary as the ideal social type.272 
This logic set the path for the replacement of the master-slave relation by the employer and wage-
earner who would be commensurately remunerated for their time and faculties.273 Locke says, “a 
Free-man makes himself a Servant to another, by selling him for a certain time, the Service he 
undertakes to do, in exchange for Wages he is to receive.”274 No different than Genesis or Lincoln, 
a man’s brow sweat would be equitably exchanged for bread. In 1843 Thomas Carlyle spoke of 
the forever-enduring Gospel: “Work, and therein have well-being.”275 The gospel of work preached 
that the industrious would inherit the earth.   
Machiavelli had set in motion the condemnation of the life of contemplation in favor of the 
active life of the interested and acquisitive patriot. Work and its virtues were celebrated while 
idleness and prodigality were condemned.276 Mandeville suggested that luxury was a lesser evil 
that “sloth.”277 Consumption stoked by luxury would motivate labor and produce wealth, while 
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sloth would guarantee a lack of industry and material well-being. Such a logic would encourage 
moral philosophers to choose in favor of the lesser vice. The new ethic was the work ethic. Max 
Weber keenly recognized how the spirit of capitalism was less about decadent consumption, and 
instead an ascetic and industrious ethic postponing the satisfaction of present desires in the service 
of greater material rewards in the future.278 “Capitalism,” writes Weber, “may even be identical 
with the restraint, or at least a rational tempering,” of the “irrational impulse” to unlimited 
acquisition.279 Locke eulogizes work, saying “half the day employed in useful labour would supply 
the inhabitants of the Earth with the necessaries and conveniences of life, in a full plenty.”280 Given 
the new centrality of labor in wealth creation, Locke recognized that the central role of government 
was to “establish laws of liberty to protection and encouragement to the honest industry of 
mankind.”281 If Modern society could unchain commercial passions, it would provide the necessary 
incentives to labor and industry. This logic illuminates the connection between Natural Rights, 
such as the right to property, and the spirit of commerce. Property rights are essential to the 
possibility of comfortable self-preservation. They promote the common good through wealth 
creation. Wealth is created when labor is incentivized through a right to property. Men are inclined 
to labor more when the acquisition and possession of its fruits are legally secured. Acquisitive 
passions propel individuals to accumulate only if they know they can keep what the work for. 
Since labor is painful and provokes natural aversion, the prospect of securing its rewards outweighs 
the discomfort and inspires men to work.   
Commerce would be mildly corrupting. Increasingly, as work gained a newly found 
dignity, so did the pursuit of material well-being. As the desire to acquire became associated with 
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the wise pursuit of one’s self-interest, it lost the taint given it the Ancient Pagans and Christians 
alike. The spirit of commerce does not aim at human excellence. It acquiesces to mankind’s natural 
venality, but also produces the spirit of sympathy. Commercial virtues are not noble, but they are 
peaceful and practical. Montesquieu says commerce “produces in men a certain spirit of exact 
justice, opposed on the one hand to banditry, and on the other hand to those moral virtues which 
both restrain one from always pressing one’s interest rigidly, and allow one to neglect one’s own 
interests for the sake of the interests of others.”282 Montesquieu writes: “The laws of commerce 
prefect the manners and morals, exactly as they destroy the manners and morals. Commerce 
corrupts pure manners and morals: this was the subject of Plato’s complaints; it polishes and 
softens barbaric manners and morals, as we see it doing every day.”283 Impure virtues like vanity, 
cupidity and avarice would make men more sociable by slaking material desires and neutralizing 
more contentious one. The virtues of self-restraint and self-abnegation were replaced by the virtue 
of pursuing and unleashing acquisitive desires. Passions like “greed, avarice, or love of lucre, could 
be usefully employed to oppose and bridle such other passions as ambition, lust for power, or 
sexual lust.”284 Montesquieu dubbed this “doux commerce.” Doux Commerce would soften the 
manners and morals of men. Part of the logic of the softening effects of commerce was that the 
spurring acquisitive passions could temper more destructive ones. Commerce would remove the 
hard edges produced by those combative asocial passions, like pride and glory, which lead to 
conflict and war. Montesquieu writes, “it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are gentle 
mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores.”285 The 
theory, drawn from his reading of history, was that men became more civilized and genteel through 
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commercial exchange as it compels them to recognize the intwined nature of their interests, and 
more cosmopolitan as trade increasingly brought them in contact with peoples of differing ways 
of life. Smith writes, “Society may subsist among different men, as among merchants, from a sense 
of its utility, without any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it should owe any 
obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a mercenary exchange 
of good offices according to an agreed valuation.”286 
Montesquieu, Hume and Smith understood commercial passions as fundamentally social 
ones. Commerce would displace martial virtues with moral sentiments like sympathy and 
humanity. Economic exchange brings diverse peoples together in proximity to one another. It 
encourages social intercourse between different nations and between factions and classes within a 
single society. Unlike war, it permits the existence of enduring mutual projects between various 
peoples. The ongoing proximity of social intercourse brought about by exchange, leads to degrees 
of identification and sympathy. Montesquieu, Hume and Smith all believed the intensification and 
multiplication of social interactions created by exchange would allow sympathy and social 
sentiments to work their course. Such sentiments could affect relations, both domestically and 
internationally. Social intercourse would foster good will, trust and encourage identification 
through the recognition of the common and intertwined nature of their material interests.  
Above all, Montesquieu says, commerce encourages the new virtue of “humanity.”287 
Humanity is the moral sentiment of “gentleness and compassion” generated between human being 
through a mutual recognition of their common nature.288 It is that “mutual feeling of pleasure 
experienced” in the State of Nature, “when one of the lonely, fearful beasts encountered and 
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recognized another frightened being akin to him.”289 Humanity is brought “to the surface” through 
human intercourse.290 Through commercial exchange “man’s humanity toward his neighbor 
extends also to foreigners.”291 Nations which “trade with each other become reciprocally 
dependent.”292 Exchange makes men realize their collective interdependency on one another for 
the satisfaction of their individual needs and desires. The spirit of commerce “unites nations” as 
they recognize their common humanity through trade.293 
Sympathy produced through exchange would enlighten men, soften habits and diffuse 
strife. Montesquieu asserts that “the more communicative peoples are,” the more readily they 
change and adapt their manners to one another.294 In exchange “mankind discovers a sense of 
compassionate humanity that blurs previous religious, ethnic, national, and party sectarianisms.”295 
The enlightenment produced by exchange would neutralize contentious differences such as 
religious and factional affiliations. Montesquieu writes, “Commerce cures destructive 
prejudices.”296 “Knowledge” gained through social intercourse, “makes men genteel, and reason 
inclines them toward humanity; only prejudices cause these to be renounced.”297 Zealotry and 
prejudice would fade, and opinions soften, as diverse peoples brought together by commerce 
would recognize their common humanity, in the mutual satisfaction of their common material 
needs. 
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Publius certainly advances the moral transformation suggested by the commercial nature 
of the American character. He speaks of the centrality of passions like “enterprise”, “industry”, 
“venality” and “avarice” to commercial society. He asserts that “human avarice and enterprise” 
will “vivify and invigorate all the channels of industry.”298 Modern virtues would displace Ancient 
ones. Hamilton says the “industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the 
pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible 
with a nation of citizen soldiers which was the condition of the people of ancient republics.”299 
Hamilton asserts that “the spirit of enterprise” is the genius of the commercial element of American 
society .300 Hamilton celebrates labor and the laborer as the model character-type of American 
society. He says, “The assiduous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and 
the industrious manufacturer” and “all orders of men,” will “look forward with eager expectation, 
and growing alacrity, to this pleasing reward of their toils.”301 Madison illustrates in No. 10 how 
the freedom of industry and commerce, coupled with robust protections of property, will incentive 
the pursuit of material self-interest.  
Hamilton’s advocacy of an “active commerce” however rests on the “commercial 
prosperity” produced from trade between states and between their Union and the world.302 He says 
“prosperous commerce” is “the most useful, as well as the most productive, source of national 
wealth.” 303  But, did either Hamilton or Madison think commerce would actually soften and subdue 
the contentious impulses of men? Hamilton celebrates the salubrious economic effects of 
commerce on society, but rejects the psychological thesis of “doux commerce.” He denies 
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commerce would produce more harmony and less faction through softening mores and manners. 
This is precisely because he rejected the theory of moral sentiments on which this hypothesis is 
founded.   
In No. 6 Hamilton provides his rebuttal of “doux commerce.” This refutation hinges on the 
enduring frailty of the human character as well as the denial that the acquisitive passions which 
motivate commerce are less potentially bellicose than those which motivate war. Turning 
Constant’s argument on its head, if war and commerce are merely two means of acquisition, they 
remain bound together by a common passion and end. For Hamilton these two perennial activities 
of mankind are more akin than different, merely two sides of the same coin. He begins by 
paraphrasing the doux commerce thesis: “The genius of republics,” they say “is pacific; the spirit 
of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable 
humours which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be 
disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by 
mutual interest and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.”304  
He dismisses the notion that commercial republics, such as the United States, will be 
immune from factional conflict, either internal or external, because of the softening effects of 
trade.305 He castigates “idle theories” which promise exemptions from the intrinsic 
“imperfections,” “weaknesses,” and “evils” of human nature.306  With tongue in cheek he says 
there remain “visionary, or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual 
peace between the states.”307 Hamilton rhetorically demands empirical evidence for “those 
reveries, which would seduce us into the expectation of peace and cordiality between the members 
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of the present confederacy, in a state of separation.”308 For Hamilton history conclusively illustrates 
that “momentary passions, and immediate interests” forever maintain “a more active and imperious 
control over human conduct” than reason or supposed moral sentiments produced by commerce.309 
Hamilton’s rejection of doux commerce is based on what he calls the “concurring testimony 
of experience.”310 He need only look as far the “present confederacy” and to imperial England for 
his refutation. His argument focuses on an historical summary of the conduct of the great 
commercial republics, Ancient and Modern. Hamilton prefaces this summary with a litany of 
rhetorical questions: “Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are 
not the former administered by men as well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, 
rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisition, that affect nations, as well as kings?... Has commerce 
hitherto done any thing more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as 
domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many 
wars founded upon commercial motives, since that has become the prevailing system of nations, 
as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, 
in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite both for the one and for the 
other?”311 Hamilton concludes that two exemplars of a commercial republic, Athens and Carthage, 
were “as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighbouring monarchies of the 
same times.”312 Of England he says, “Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that 
country” and “yet few nations have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars, in which 
that kingdom has been engaged, have in numerous instances proceeded from the people.”313  He 
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concludes that many of these wars in fact grew out of “commercial considerations” and the 
competition they produce.314  
In fact, contrary to peace, Hamilton says that the modern commercial republic has produced 
an entirely new division of labor with its “arts of industry” and “sciences of finance.”315 Precisely 
these arts and sciences have shaped the habits of modern nations and “produced an entire 
revolution in the system of war,” which “have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body 
of the citizens, the inseparable companion of frequent hostility.”316 The wealth produced by 
modern commerce and finance has in fact created great standing armies including a great game of 
trade competition which provided a pretext for them to be deployed. Hamilton identifies one 
bellicose benefit of international trade, it will encourage a robust navy with a global presence 
which will help keep economic rivals like England at bay.317 Meanwhile in No. 7 Hamilton shifts 
from international relations, to those between the states under the Articles of Confederation. He 
proceeds to itemizes a series of abuses between them, each attempting to get the upper in interstate 
trade competition. The reader of The Federalist can see how Publius’ sober vision of an 
unchanging human nature is applied with consistency. Whether they are engaged in political 
matters or economic exchange, men remain the same.  
As we have seen, the ur-passion of the soul, self-love gives rise to a series of related and 
powerful passions which neither reason nor moral sentiment alone can constrain. As an outgrowth 
of self-love, the central passion with which the constitutional order must contend is ambition. 
Ambition in Greek is philotimia, literally “the love of honor” and recognition.318 It is closely 
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connected with the love of power, fame and glory. Ambition is a thymotic desire characterized by 
a form of self-assertiveness which motives men to seek regard, stand superior to their peers, or 
even dominate them. Ambition is closely linked to self-interest. As a form of assertiveness, it 
motivates men to pursue their interests. The fact individuals need power to satisfy their interests 
guarantees that they will always pursue the means of attaining them as well. Human beings must 
strive to attain the means that will fulfill their ends. 
“Ambition,” writes Epstein, “is the love of power.”319 Recognition is an acknowledgement 
of one’s superior power in whatever form it may come. The centrality of the love of power is an 
observation made by Thucydides, and is central to the Bible and the political thought of St. 
Augustine, Machiavelli and Hobbes. Hamilton refers to the extreme form of the love of power as 
the “lust of domination.”320 Hume says the “love of domination is so strong in the breast of man, 
that many, not only submit to, but court all the dangers, and fatigues, and cares of government; 
and men, once raised to that station, though often led astray by private passions, find, in ordinary 
cases, a visible interest in the impartial administration of justice.”321 Publius’ naturalistic vision of 
constitutional order, as a mechanism managing psychological forces, places a natural emphasis the 
love of power as a kind of Newtonian force.  
In No. 6 Hamilton describes the “the love of power” as “the desire of pre-eminence and 
dominion.”322 The rare few seek “an odious pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow citizens.”323 
Augustine called this extreme passion the libido dominandi. The libido dominandi is the “lust for 
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mastery” and “desire to dominate others” against their will. 324 This passion “refuses to accept that 
all men are by nature equal.”325 Augustine said man’s natural self-love makes him “constantly 
subject to destructive emotions and impulses” which make him “envious and vindictive.” 326 Man’s 
love of power drives him to desire glory and material riches.327 Augustine recognized the ambiguity 
of the love of power. It was the source of the desire to rule but also to dominate. On one hand it 
was the root cause of civil society which he says “arose out of man’s lust for power and 
violence.”328 It was also the arch passion which beset the City of Man and the perennial source of 
its problems.  
Ambition is the double-edge sword of civic order. It is the fundamentally ambiguous 
passion of the soul as it relates to the public good. This ambiguity forced Publius and the Founders 
to view it with great ambivalence. Publius identifies ambition as one of the greatest threats to 
political prosperity, but also a necessity for government, and even the cause of virtue in 
officeholders. This ambiguity is caused by the varied manifestations of ambition. The nature and 
consequence of ambition varies by nature and intensity. Ambition at the extremes of excess and 
deficiency is a vice. There can be “too much or too little, implying a mean that is the right amount 
and therefore a virtue.”329 As the love of domination it is the mother of tyranny, as the love of fame, 
Publius recognizes it as perhaps the highest source of public spiritedness which inspires 
benefactors to great deeds.330 
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Ambition is a threat to liberty, but nor can civil society do without the humors of the 
ambitious few. Ambition and the desire to rule is a necessary passion if men are to govern 
themselves at all. Publius’ analysis of ambition applies both to private citizens in society and public 
officeholders.331 Machiavelli spoke of the two humors found in human nature. There are those 
many who neither want to rule, nor to be dominated, while there are the few who desire to 
command, oppress and dominate.332 Mankind is divided by the degree and kind of their ambitions 
into the political and apolitical.333 Ambition can be a common passion held by the ordinary man 
who hopes to see his designs executed and desires fulfilled. Publius’ characterization of the 
ambitions of private citizens centers on the fulfillment of economic self-interest. Meanwhile, the 
truly ambitious seek recognition through the kinds of “honors and distinctions” only gained 
through public office. This ambition tends toward the love for power and fame.334 A public office 
stands for a publicly recognized power over others. The ambitious desire to differentiate 
themselves from the great mass of the common people. Only the few have a desire to pursue public 
office and seek its challenges and rewards. In No. 10 Madison refers to political leaders as those 
who are “ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power.”335 Moderated ambition leads to a 
concern for the opinions of others. This encourages officeholders to conform with public opinion 
and even the opinion of posterity. They are inclined to see the fulfillment of their destiny as 
tethered to the common interests of their constituents. Ambition properly channeled and 
constrained, can lead to virtue and even greatness.  
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Like the love of power, the love of fame is another extreme form of ambition. The desire 
for fame exceeds the ordinary recognition seeking of the ordinary officeholder. It is an 
extraordinary desire of the rarest of statesmen. Those seeking fame do not merely hope to be 
recognized by their constituencies.  Nor are they simply in competition with their immediate peers. 
Instead they vie with the great statesmen and rulers of history. They seek to be appreciated not 
only in the present but create “lasting monuments”336 and “earn the perpetual remembrance of 
posterity.”337 Love of fame is perhaps the universal passion of men which inspires them to 
greatness. In No. 72 Hamilton says the love of fame is “the ruling passion of the noblest minds” 
which prompts them “to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public 
benefit.”338 This passion has the power to spur men “to act with nobleness and greatness,” and 
make them “rise above petty interests.”339 It is the noblest passion because of its ability to 
“transform ambition and self-interest into a dedicated effort for the community.”340 Adair says 
Publius and the Founders understood the pursuit of fame as “a way of transforming egotism and 
self-aggrandizing impulses into public service.”341 It is one of the few extreme passions where 
individual self-interest might harmonize with the demands of the public good.342 
Publius and the Founders understood “public service nobly performed” as the primary path 
to human greatness.343 If the statesmen could be renowned for their deeds, the founder all the more 
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so. Not surprisingly, they understood the greatest product of the love of fame as the act of founding 
a political order itself. Adair and Cesar argue Publius and the Founders were motivated by such a 
desire. Adair believes the Founders had “become fantastically concerned with posterity’s judgment 
of their behavior,” and were “concerned with the image” that would “remain in the world’s eye.”344 
In No. 38 Madison acknowledged the Founding “as fair a chance for immortality, as Lycurgus 
gave to that of Sparta.”345 
Outside the act of founding, Hamilton saw the executive as the nation’s central outlet for 
political ambition.346 His essays in The Federalist and his proposal on the executive at the 
Convention make this clear. His analysis of the nature of the executive places “more stress” on the 
salutary dimension of this passion than Madison was willing to.347 Madison held a more jaundiced 
view of ambition than Hamilton. As Hamilton describes it, the executive is designed to allow rare 
natures of extraordinary men to flourish. The nature of the executive will draw character types 
motived by this passion. The faculties and virtues of extraordinary individuals find an office 
commensurate to their nature. The unitary and national nature of the presidency make it the natural 
platform for individuals of “irregular ambition.”348 In a self-governing republic stands as a 
monarchical stage for individual human greatness. Hamilton asks whether it is wise to deny the 
existence of such an office suited to men of such ambitions who might instead wander like 
“discontented ghosts” in society without the opportunities it provides.349 With the necessity of 
managing dangerous passions in mind, we must ask: Where in society would such extraordinary 
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natures produce the greatest benefit and the least harm? Instead of creating their own platforms for 
greatest within society, they will instead be housed within the confines of Article II. These 
designing individuals will be limited by the office, constrained by the people, the states, and the 






















3. The Interests 
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but 
from their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and 
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.1 
- Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 
 
The language of interest was well-worn by the time of the American Founding. Hirschman 
says this faculty was for them “an important intellectual tool for the purposes of constitutional 
engineering.”2 Publius and the Founders rested their political calculations on what they believed 
to be the sure and reliable foundation of self-interest. Hamilton wrote that “a vast majority of 
mankind is entirely biased by motives of self-interest.”3 Therefore, he concluded, “The safest 
reliance of every government is on man’s interests. This is a principle of human nature, on which 
all political speculation to be just, must be founded.”4 Interest, properly understood, is perhaps the 
fulcrum of The Federalist’s account of human motivation and conduct. It was to be the cornerstone 
of the constitutional edifice even as the concept itself remained somewhat open-ended and 
malleable.  
The conclusion that self-interest was the vera causa of human conduct was one part 
description and one part prescription. It was a general observation of experience as much as a 
necessary presupposition and heuristic in crafting a political order. When for example Hume 
followed Machiavelli and spoke of the necessity of treating men as self-interested knaves in 
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matters of political calculations, he did not of course mean to say all men were. Self-interest would 
instead serve as a motivational model providing the basis for making general predictions about 
human behavior within the confines of civic order. With this model in hand, institutional order and 
circumstances could be arranged accordingly. Interest, because it was built on a dialogue between 
common desires and rational calculation, was deemed more predictable - less capricious than the 
passions, but more reliable and durable than feeble reason. Its element of rational cost-benefit 
analysis, coupled with its close association with economic desire, made this motivation ripe for 
the attempt to predict and quantify its behavioral effects compared to the other more elusive 
psychic motors.5  
With the Enlightenment self-interest became a kind of Grail in its pursuit of the 
fundamental laws of human conduct. This great hope was built on a more mechanistic and 
naturalist vision of the human soul which sought to glean general laws of action from an analysis 
of its faculties. If human motivation followed regular rules, its conduct could be predicted in 
general terms. Thus, from the motive of interest, a “political arithmetic” could be devised and serve 
as a reliable basis for civic order.6 This order would be a kind of Newtonian machine of political 
kinesthetics set in motion by psychological forces centered on interest. Like any abstraction the 
notion provided explanatory power to a variety of particular instances without always doing justice 
to their distinct peculiarities. And, despite the centrality of self-interest to their thinking, the 
authors of The Federalist remained keenly aware that it failed to capture the full range of vital 
motivations necessary to the considerations of the founder or statesman. They never lost sight of 
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those peculiarities of the human soul which overflow the banks of mere self-interest. Men of great 
ambition, are often also, the most mercurial.  
“Interest” is a term of Modern origin. While the likes of Plato and Aristotle clearly had 
related concepts, there is no direct cognate for the Modern notion as a source of psychological 
motivation. In its most general meaning, one’s interest is one’s real or perceived advantage. 
Interest generically involves a thing that benefits oneself. The notion came to mean not only a 
thing, such as a “concern, “benefit”, “profit” or “advantage,”7 but is also associated with a 
psychological state of “being concerned or affected advantageously.”8 “Self-interest” is in a sense 
redundant, as all interests refer by their nature to a desire for gain on behalf of the individual or 
collective which possess them.9 Self-interest is not simply identical to the self-love spoken of by 
the Ancients. Unlike interest, “self-love” connoted a primordial animal passion independent of and 
prior to all reasoning. Perhaps the closest word in the thought of Plato and Aristotle is “advantage.” 
Both recognized those in power tended to make laws in their own advantage, or interest. Versions 
of this claim are made in the famous argument of Thrasymachus and in Aristotle’s Politics. 
“Advantage” however has none of the psychological connotations of either self-love or self-
interest. The Modern notion does not merely denote a benefit, it is a faculty of mind wedged 
between the competing forces of reason and passion. Self-interest has been called “reasonable self-
love”, or self-love tempered by sedate reflection and rational calculation.10 Self-interest is then a 
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Interest became a psychological spring of both permission and restraint. It combined 
traditionally distinct elements associated with reason on the one hand, and passion on the other. 
The doctrine of interest allowed the self-serving nature of men’s actions to shift from an 
observation to a kind of moral imperative. While it preaches moral acceptance of man’s selfish 
pursuits, it also dictates those ends be pursued with rational restraint, prudence and moderation, 
not the impulsiveness of unbridled passion.11 Unlike self-love, one’s true interests are found in 
passion tempered and in greater harmony with the interests of others. Ancient Pagan and Christian 
thought condemned the selfishness, vanity and greed which originate in self-love. Meanwhile, self-
interest had the potential to be politically, economically and even morally beneficial.12 
The concept of interest has a “long and complicated history of shifting meanings.”13 
Hirschman describes the notion as “extremely versatile” to the point of being “ambiguous.”14 This 
history accounts for its ambiguities of meaning and use. Central to its historical transformation is 
the shifting frames of reference through which its senses of meaning have been understood. First 
a legal notion, it migrated to politics. From there it came to have moral, social, and economic 
significance. Despite its variability, two aspects became essential to during the Enlightenment. 
First, the notion implied self-centeredness regarding the ends of “interest propelled” conduct, and 
second, it involved an element of rational calculation as an essential but not exclusive means of 
achieving those ends.15 In the hands of Modern moral and political philosophy it took on a 
psychological sense as a ubiquitous source of human motivation. The concept came to signify the 
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“fundamental forces” in the human psyche rooted in the “drive for self-preservation and self-
aggrandizement, that motivate or should motivate” statesman and citizens alike.16    
The Modern use of the term originates in Roman Law. The Latin inter esse, literally “to be 
between,” referred to legal “procedures for compensation” between individuals in a court of law. 
Id quod interest meant “that which matters” or “that which counts.”17 An interest was “what one 
has a legal concern in.”18 To have an “interest” meant to have a material stake in a legal preceding 
which gave one standing under law to be involved.19 The origins of self-interest as the foundational 
motive of conduct lie in political theories of the Renaissance. A new doctrine of interest emerged 
from a new theory of the state designed to improve statecraft.20 In the first half of the 16th century, 
around the time Machiavelli was writing The Prince, Francesco Guicciardini refers in his Ricordi 
to “self-interest” and how it “prevails in nearly all human beings.”21 In his writings, Guicciardini 
had already established the distinction and tension between the particular interest of the individual 
and the public interest.22 Later that century Giovanni Botero spoke of a “reason of state,” or “reason 
of interest,” expressions synonymous with the interests of the state.23 Renaissance thinkers 
concluded “state interest” was “the only legitimate principle of action” for statecraft.24  
The 17th century German jurist, Pufendorf, is credited with establishing interest in the 
language of moral philosophy.25 Pufendorf’s doctrine of state interest was a theoretical formulation 
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of the practical principles of Renaissance statecraft such as Cardinal Richelieu’s Raison d’État.26 
The prudent discretion of calculating statesmen became a moral principle of Natural Law. Self-
interest was no longer simply a prescription for princes, it was part of the moral calculus of 
international law. Later Vattel, a jurist carefully read by Hamilton, asserted a state’s primary task 
is to preserve “the national interest” on the world’s stage.27 Given all nations were in a State of 
Nature relative to one another, national interest was the only guiding principle of statecraft over 
and above more noble considerations of morality and religion. 
Machiavelli is often credited with making the first and boldest formulation of the modern 
theory of interest avant le lettre. In fact he spoke the language of interest without using the term. 
Hirschman says Machiavelli “did not name his child.”28 The concept can be found in his analysis 
of how the prince’s actions under conditions of “necessity” are motivated by the interested 
passions of acquisition and self-preservation. Machiavelli exhorted the prince to act in his self-
interest, describing in brazen terms what this would require. He laid down as a rule of conduct, 
that the prince must always act with an eye to his own advantage, centered on his self-preservation, 
both bodily and political. He must concern himself with his interests prior to moral codes of honor 
and decency if he hoped to maintain power. Machiavelli teaches that any man who does not 
selfishly mind his own interests, or engages in self-sacrificial gestures, is sure to come to his ruin 
in a world of self-interested adversaries. Interest as a concept came to England by way of 
Machiavelli’s migration in the later 16th century.29 While a printed English language edition did 
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not appear until 1640,30 The Prince circulated widely in England by the 1580s in Latin, French and 
Italian editions. Hand-written English translations had begun circulating as early as 1585.31 
Meanwhile the term established itself in the English political vernacular through translations of 
Henri de Rohan’s work, De l'Intérêt des Princes et des États de la Chrétienté of 1638.32 By the 
18th century the idea had travelled from France and England to the American colonies and the 
Founding Fathers.”33  
From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment the notion of interest migrated from statecraft, 
to the marketplace, and on to private conduct and individual psychology.34 Publius’ shifting use of 
the term encompasses most of these related senses of meaning. Interest shifted from an idea 
associated with the state and power politics, to one connected with the “concept of the self” and 
its drives.35 The doctrine extended beyond questions of the prince and politics, to human nature at 
large.36 Interest, in the “sense of concerns, aspirations, and advantage gained currency” in Europe 
by the late 16th century.37 English moralist Charles Herle acknowledged that by 1655 interest, in 
the sense of “concernment and importance” had become a commonplace.38 At this time it took on 
a duel-meaning of “advantage” on the one hand, and the psychological “propensity for seeking 
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benefits” on the other.39 By the 17th century it signified a universal species of human motivation 
applicable to all practical and theoretical frames of reference. Interest as the now ubiquitous 
motivation of mankind became sacrosanct. In 1659, Herle published a tract whose title summed 
up this emerging world-view: “Interest Will Not Lie.”40   
Only in the 19th century did the concept become primarily associated with material well-
being.41  At this time it became a permanent fixture of economic theory. In the hands of political 
economists and Utilitarians it took on almost exclusively material and biological meaning. This 
shift was not so much a deviation from its historical use, as a definite narrowing of its scope. While 
the notion became increasingly associated with economic striving, it did not begin that way. From 
the Renaissance to the Enlightenment its meaning had never been limited to material welfare.42 
Instead it encompassed “the totality of human aspirations.”43   
With the Enlightenment, Western civilization and philosophy were said to have entered the 
“age of interests.”44 The language of interest became a commonplace of moral and political 
discourse. It became the universal “term for understanding human behavior.”45 The philosophy 
which posited self-interest as the vera causa of man’s conduct was closely associated with the 
economic and political liberalism central to the American Founding.46 In 1776, Smith would say 
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interest is a “desire of bettering our condition.”47 Here, the seeds of the “pursuit of the Happiness” 
and the American Dream are sow. By the end of the 18th century numerous philosophers accepted 
that human conduct was primarily “interest driven.”48 Self-interest was now “the principle motive” 
and “driving force” of all human action.49 Cardinal de Retz had summed up this view saying, “The 
most correct maxim for accurately appraising the intentions of men is to examine their interests 
which are the most common motive for the actions.”50 de Retz was a keen reader of Machiavelli, 
and Madison was well acquainted with his commentaries on the nature of man and society.51 
Meanwhile Rohan had captured the radical role assumed to be played by interest saying “princes 
order their people around and interest orders princes around.”52 Interest was the “tyrant of tyrants” 
and the “commander of princes.”53 It was interest which ruled the rulers as the true sovereign of 
the world.  
Interest came to be closely associated with utility. What was useful was directly connected 
to the regular needs and desires generated by a common human nature. The pursuit of that which 
is useful appeared to be the most reliable spring political scientists and statesman could depend 
upon in gauging human conduct. Smith writes, “Society may subsist among different men, as 
among merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affection.”54 Society was 
apparently able to function spontaneously on its interests, because they are so rooted in necessity. 
Interest was natural precisely because it had that element of necessity which Machiavelli had 
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identified. The prince did not choose to preserve his life or power, he did so out of necessity. 
Locke’s right to self-preservation is essentially a right to self-interest properly understood. The 
needs of life would be attained successfully only when the individual pursued their interests over 
their raw impulses. 
Self-interest came to be treated as a quasi-scientific term. Despite being posited as a central 
source of volition, its connection with material necessity made it a more impersonal motive, 
increasingly detached from subjective qualities or one’s sense of willing. As a cause of action, it 
was less like a choice, and more like an act of compulsion. Machiavelli had captured this aspect 
of self-interest in his emphasis on the role of fortune and necessity in human action. The notion 
began to carry with it a kind of sanitized rationality redolent of the Modern scientific attitude, 
detached from the more poetical vision of the soul found in the Ancients. Man was just a 
sophisticated machine responding to exogenous forces. Here lay the incipient foundations of 20th 
century Rational Choice Theory. These features made interest amenable to a more mechanistic 
account of individual and collective behavior. Interest meant mankind’s conduct was subject to 
regular rules which could be described and anticipated. This element of predictability meant 
society could be thought of as akin to a Newtonian mechanism. “Interest,” it was said, “governs 
the World.”55  It was “a part in the movements” of a great “machine.”56 God was a watchmaker 
who had made an elegant mechanism which ran on ironclad laws of cause and effect. Man was 
merely a component of that mechanism. In his De L’Esprit of 1759, Helvétius would say, “As the 
physical world is ruled by the laws of movement so is the moral universe ruled by laws of 
interest.”57 Self-interest had become the law of gravity of human motivation and conduct. 
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The growing discourse surrounding interest was connected to the increasing naturalism of 
18th century thought.58 The more the Enlightenment developed a naturalistic bent, the more it rested 
its analysis of motivation on interest. This naturalism harbored a more realistic view of human 
nature and affairs which animated much of Publius’ thought.59 The acceptance that mankind was 
naturally self-interested has Ancient precedents in the Sophists, Epicureans and Skeptics.60 
Publius’ immediate sources for the skeptical view can be found in the otherwise diverging sources 
of Calvinist Christianity, Bacon, Montaigne and Hume.61 The Westminster Confessions and 
Johnathan Edwards emphasized the fallen, and therefore selfish, state of mankind. Meanwhile 
Montaigne sought to paint a more honest portrait of man than the Ancients, saying that “treachery, 
disloyalty, cruelty” and “tyranny” were merely the “ordinary vices” of mankind.62 Machiavelli, 
wrote that it was “necessary” for anyone devising a republic “to presuppose that all men are bad.”63 
Hume said statesmen must treat ordinary humanity as self-interested knaves. The growing 
consensus was that all men were self-interested and there was no choice in approaching them 
morally and politically from any other perspective.64 
The historical turn to interest was part of this new hardboiled thinking determined to look 
at human nature without pretenses or utopian hopes. Ordinary vices were bad conduct we should 
expect of human beings because they are neither “spectacular or unusual”65 Through a more 
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forthright acceptance of these vices, society would be liberated from the hypocrisy and false hopes 
of the Ancients and their imagined image of man. Taking men as they are, philosophers and 
statesmen acquiesced to the fact that mankind is at base, driven by interest rather than altruism or 
self-sacrifice. This sober observation forced many to conclude that interest was the “only realistic 
rule of political conduct.”66 Interest was the common denominator of action when man is taken as 
he is, rather than as it ought to be. It was more reasonable for the philosophers and statemen to 
depend on interest than reason. They would have to accept that, on the whole, human action was 
motivated by rational calculations of self-interest rather than more noble motives. They would 
show their wisdom by setting expectations of conduct in conformity with the real capacities and 
weakness of human nature. One could only hope for the best, unless they first had assumed the 
worst. What was the value of exhortations to virtue if such goals were virtually unattainable and 
therefore impractical? It was expected the passions would overwhelm reason, so this should be no 
great cause for lamentation. The inability to achieve one’s interest, however, was viewed as a 
failure precisely because they were considered, on the whole, to be regularly attainable. 
The Enlightenment’s tendency toward a greater realism changed the language of moral 
discourse. The hard fact of mankind’s selfish nature was not only accepted, but redescribed as 
good. Interest-motivated conduct had shifted from vice to virtue. Helvétius argued that the 
“moralists might succeed in having their maxims observed if they substituted…the language of 
interest for that of injury.”67 In time the doctrine of interest gave sovereigns and citizens alike a 
new sense of moral license which relieved them from certain traditional moral restraints handed 
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down from Pagan antiquity and Christianity.68 It was morally permissible, even justified, for the 
commoner as much as the king, to pursuit their interest. Ancient condemnations were set aside, 
and the single-minded pursuit of material gain would eventually be praised.69 Private vices were 
recognized for their public benefits. Yet, while Mandeville spoke of “passions” and “vices,” Hume 
and Smith employed the more anodyne, less pejorative language of “interest” and “advantage.”70 
By the 18th century, some private vices were simply private virtues. Even Machiavelli had blushed 
at calling vices by anything other than their proper name.  
Interest shifted from a matter of necessity to a positive moral good and the rule of action 
for the individual.71 For Adam Smith, those seeking their advantage were no longer “knaves,” but 
enterprising citizens. Humanity was fundamentally selfish and self-sacrifice a misguided fiction. 
Altruistic gestures were merely self-interest turned inside out. Good deeds held selfish rewards 
which were their true instigators. Hume acknowledged the average man rarely looks so “far as the 
public interest, when they pay their creditors, perform their promises, and abstain from theft, and 
robbery, and injustice of every kind.”72 Public interest was a “motive too remote and too sublime 
to affect the generality of mankind, and operate with any force in actions so contrary to private 
interest.”73 Smith said a man could not expect others to meet his needs through acts of 
“benevolence only.”74 He would be “more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his 
favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them.”75 
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It was not from the “benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, 
but from their own interest.”76 We must “address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-
love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”77 This is how Tom 
Sawyer got paid for the privilege he gave others to whitewash his fence.  
Once interest had been identified as the prime mover of human conduct in the 16th century, 
the problem of organizing a society composed of selfish individuals became a “dominate 
preoccupation of politics and political theory.”78 The transvaluation from vice to virtue lead to the 
idea that the pervasive pursuit of self-interest, writ large in society, was capable of spontaneously 
generating civic order and the public good without anyone ever intending to do so. Some have 
described this as a transubstantiation of water into wine.79 As men attended only on themselves, 
they would inadvertently contribute to the common interest. Mandeville was one of the earliest to 
assert the seemingly paradoxically notion that “private vices” could ever produce “public 
benefits.” Before Smith gave this idea its classic formulation, Montesquieu captured it succinctly 
writing that each man “contributes to the common good, believing he is attending to his own 
interests.”80 Smith writes that when the average man labors he “neither intends to promote the 
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it…he intends only his own security; and by 
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends 
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an Invisible Hand to promote 
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In fact, Steuart and Smith went further: The pursuit of private interest was the only way the 
public good was achieved. If the road to hell was paved with bad intentions, the road to public 
prosperity was paved with self-interested ones. In 1767, Steuart wrote “were everyone to act for 
the public, and neglect himself, the statesman would be bewildered…were a people to become 
quite disinterested, there would be no possibility of governing them.”82 They would be 
ungovernable because the spring of action which makes them predictable would have been 
disabled. Pursuing the public good was deemed intrinsically unnatural; it was an object lesson in 
how not to achieve it. By contrast, Aristotle had held civic virtue to be one of the highest pursuits 
precisely because it was more in conformity with a fully human existence compared to the mere 
acquisition of life’s bare necessities through exchange. This line of thinking lead to the belief, 
never seriously entertained by Publius, of the supremacy of economic and social forces over the 
political as the determinative sphere of civic society. Supposedly, if society and economy were left 
to themselves, motivated exclusively by private interests, politics and the public good would take 
care of themselves. Despite the centrality of self-interest to Publius’s account of motivation, he 
hardly believed the political dimension could ever be reduced to, or replaced by, the social or 
economic spheres. Madison and Hamilton rejected notion of the spontaneous reconciliation of 
factional interests and instead appealed to the necessity of “good government and national 
character.”83 No Invisible Hand of interest-driven conduct would spontaneously generate order and 
reduce serious political choices about ends, to the fait accompli of administering means.84 
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Two main ambiguities to the notion of interest arose as it developed into the 18th century. 
First was its two related but discreet meanings. Interest was both a good and a state of mind which 
encourages one to pursue that good. A concept which began as an advantage sought, came to 
denote “the manner in which these aspirations were to be pursued.”85 An interest is a concern for 
a good deemed advantageous. But it also came to combine the object of desire and the 
psychological motivation, the sense of being concerned to attain that end. An interest was a good 
and an attitude taken toward it. To be interested, rather than disinterested, is to maintain an attitude 
oriented toward one’s own practical benefit. This ambiguity is evident in Publius’ use of the term. 
Scanlon says, “Action motivated by interest is action expected by the agent to have some 
identifiable result which will be beneficial or advantageous.”86 Yet, the action “may at the same 
time, proceed from an emotional state of the agent...but only insofar as the agent is influenced by 
an expectation of some consequent benefit or advantage is the action motivated by interest.”87 
The other more significant ambiguity was the relationship of the faculty of the interests to 
those of reason and passion. In the 16th and 17th centuries interest emerged as an intervening 
category between the two. Interest became a faculty, wedged between the competing parts of the 
soul.88 It was a derivative term mediating between them. The faculty psychology of the 18th century 
treated it as a hybrid term. It was a synthesis of reason and passion. As a faculty it was a “mixture 
of self-seeking and rationality.”89 Yet, the nature of this synthesis and the precise role played by 
each element was much disputed. Situated between the other faculties, interest was said to 
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participate in both. It partook of “the better nature of each, as the passion of self-love upgraded 
and contained by reason, and as reason given direction and force by that passion.”90 If reason ruled 
in Plato’s model, interest was to be the new ruler of the soul in Modern faculty psychology. Interest 
was the victor as it was said to be exempt from the deficiencies of the other two faculties. It lacked 
the “ineffectuality of reason” and “the destructiveness of passion.”91    
Despite superficial similarities of Plato’s tripartite soul to the three faculties Modern 
epistemology, there were important differences. In Plato, the three parts of the soul represented 
three distinct types of desires defined by their objects. One was logos, or reason, while the other 
two, spirit and appetite, were passions. Despite their likely combination in practice, each part 
specified a precise if general category of desire.  Each was the source of motivation for a specific 
type of good extant in the world. In the Ancient image, the middle term of the soul, thumos, was 
not a synthesis of the other two, but its own unique motivation with its own distinct objects. Interest 
alone does not indicate a specific type of good at all. Instead it represents a category of goods 
defined by the manner in which they are pursued. One can pursue their interests as much through 
the objects of the intellect and commerce, as those of politics. The Ancient tripartite soul was 
reducible to a binary, as two parts were passions, the other reason. Interest as a synthesis of reason 
and passion represented a novel third category foreign to the traditional bipartite division.92 
With interest the common relation of the faculties shifted from war to reconciliation. The 
Ancients viewed the soul as the battleground for a perennial war between reason and passion. In 
this model reason ought to be the soul’s victor and the master of passion. The inclusion of interest 
presented a new model of the structural relationship, or the constitution, of human psychology. 
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Here there would be “no direct combat between reason and the passions.”93 Interest would play 
the crucial role of buffer. It would attenuate direct conflict and establish a partial truce. Interest 
was a middle ground where reason and passion were said to work in concert. Reconciliation was 
achieved by both sides making certain concessions to the middle. In conflict with neither reason 
or passion, interest massaged the assets and liabilities of each to achieve a desired goal. It was the 
solution to reason’s Achilles’ heel in its strife with the passions. Meanwhile, reason gave foresight 
to blind passions. The passions would be educated by instrumental reason on how to best satisfy 
themselves.  With the interests, reason would be coopted by the passions and vice versa.   
Publius partially adopted this new relationship between reason and passion made possible 
by interest, but never entirely abandon the Ancient model of direct conflict. Men were depraved 
because reason is fallible and weak. This frailty meant reason “was likely to be over-whelmed by 
man’s passions.”94 Yet, while passions had a “more active and imperious control,” reason was not 
and should not be their slave. The passions were blind and could not assess the correctness of their 
objects without the guidance of reason. Despite Publius’ repeated acknowledgement of the 
weaknesses of reason, he never questioned its potential efficacy, including the role of practical 
reason as an essential ingredient in human conduct and civic order. Publius, unlike Hume, never 
rejected the ability of reason to determine ends and motivate action. Like the Ancients, he never 
entirely abandoned the idea that reason was absolutely necessary to guide, channel and educate the 
passions.  
As the middle term, interest combined reason and passion into a single hybrid faculty of 
mind. In doing so it combined elements traditionally understood as distinct. Interest represented a 
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certain modification of passion by reason. It was passion cooled and tempered by sedate reflection 
and rational calculation.95 If the passions were “sudden, tempestuous, violent,” interest was 
“steady, calm, rational.”96 Interest was a heady motivation compared to unreflecting impulse. In 
self-interest passion conspired with instrumental reasoning. It was self-love made reasonable.97 
Interest included “an element of reflection and calculation with respect to the manner” in which 
one’s desires were pursued.98 Forgoing conflict, reason could be enlisted in a less detrimental and 
more secure satisfaction of the passions under its tutelage. Rejecting immediate impulse, interest 
implied desire pursued “in an orderly and reasonable manner.”99 Interest represented a peculiar 
marriage of rational foresight and an underlying passion, where reason modified that passion in 
order to better satisfy it. Reason’s aid could ameliorate and avoid the negative consequences of 
impulse, and prolong the benefits accruing from a moderated, but ongoing, satisfaction.  
The doctrine presented “new passions in the more respectable but more mediocre form” of 
interest.100 Tocqueville wrote: 
Self-interest is a doctrine not very lofty, but clear and sure. It does not seek to attain great objects; 
but it attains those it aims for without too much effort. ... [It] does not produce great devotion; but 
it suggests little sacrifices each day; by itself it cannot make a man virtuous; but it forms a multitude 
of citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, masters of themselves; and if it does 
not lead directly to virtue through the will, it brings them near to it insensibly through habits.101 
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The Modern shift of civil ends away from the rigors of virtue and excellence to those of commerce 
and commodious existence brought reason and passion closer together. In self-preservation they 
align and converge as interest. Mankind desires to live, and reason validates this goal established 
by the passions as necessary and therefore correct. Interest gives permission to certain passions the 
Ancients considered vices, but restrains others with an eye toward commodious existence. The 
doctrine of interest made selfish pursuits acceptable, but dictated they be pursued with prudence 
and moderation, not the impulsiveness of unbridled passion.102 
Guided by their interests, men achieved favorable results compared to “the calamitous state 
of affairs that prevails when men given free rein to their passions.”103 Interest was resilient enough 
to restrain the passions by coopting them. La Bruyere wrote, “Nothing is easier for passion than to 
defeat reason: Its great triumph is to gain the upper hand over interest.”104  Montesquieu captures 
the distinction between interest and passion when he says: “Happily men are in a situation such 
that, though their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless have an 
interest in not being so.”105 Wickedness might involve short-term satisfaction, but it is not likely 
to advance longer term goals when its consequences are considered. This description suggests 
passion is not merely using reason instrumentally, but that reason must qualitatively modify the 
given end of an initial impulse. In this model of the soul, reason is not merely the henchmen of the 
passions. Even as it depends on their gale, reason directs the ship based on foresight of 
consequences.   
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The doctrine of interest dictated men learn to curb their desires if they were to successfully 
pursue their interests. Interest is then a faculty of both license and restraint. It is less permissive 
than the passions but also less restraining than right reason. Interest-driven conduct represented a 
“methodical pursuit” of selfish ends, in contrast to the helter-skelter of raw passion.106 Interest 
involved a “disciplined understanding of what it takes to advance ones’ power, influence and 
wealth.” 107  Hume says that it is only by “reflection and experience,” that men learn “the pernicious 
effects of that license, and the total dissolution of society, which must ensure from it.”108  
Mankind’s instinctual impulses must be “checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or 
observation.”109 Spinoza speaks for Publius when he writes, “All men certainly seek their 
advantage, but seldom as sound reason dictates; in most cases appetite is their only guide, and in 
their desires and judgements of what is beneficial they are carried away by their passions, which 
take no account of the future or anything else.”110 Looking back on its development, Max Weber 
recognized how capitalism contained a central element of interested “restraint” and “rational 
tempering,” compared to the “irrational impulse” to unlimited acquisition.111 
If interest became the most powerful explanatory concept of human conduct, it was also 
the most elusive. The term evolved into a catch-all for a diverse set of relations between reason 
and passion. The developing discourse construed the concept in contradictory ways. Numerous 
ambiguities arose. Thinkers differed on the precise roles played by reason and passion respectively. 
Was the dominate spring of interest reason, or the passions? Was interest, as a separate category 
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of motivation, genuinely distinct from reason and passion? It could be seen as a derivative faculty, 
merely partaking in a mixture of the other two, without any distinct characteristics of its own. 
Varying “degrees of rationality” were attributed to faculty.112 Most, if not all, moral philosophers 
held that the interests required some minimal degree of rationality, a minimal amount which was 
absolutely necessary. Not all types of interest were created equal, or simply good. Interest was 
beneficial or harmful depending on the role of reason. Some types were more like passions, while 
others had an essential deliberative component. Others were virtually synonymous with the 
passions. In No. 63 Hamilton refers to “strong passion, or momentary interest” as if they are 
identical. Hume for example refers to the “passion of self-interest” and “interested affection.”113 
Again departing from Hume, Publius’ notions of the true interests of the individual or the 
community recognize a critical element of reason which detaches them from mere passion.  
Another ambiguity was whether passions were tamed by reason or restrained by other 
countervailing passions, or both. The two primary models depict countervailing passions 
neutralizing one another, while reason or moral sentiment, direct passions gale toward one’s true 
interests. In most paradigms, interest was instigated by passion, yet its fulfillment is detached from 
the original impulse by rational calculation. The synthesis starts with passion. Passion remains the 
motivating gale of action. Interest is the gale of passion given the vision of rational foresight. 
Foresight alters the initial impulse. While the impetus for one’s actions is generated by passion, 
reason shapes just how, and perhaps even what, is to be achieved. Interest could dictate one passion 
bend to the force of another. Here, passion fought passion, with a reduced role for reason. As it 
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resigns itself to their force, the superintending function of reason and sentiment was as the 
adjudicator of the passions.    
In another version, reason was unable to enter into direct conflict with the passions at all 
because of its relative weakness. There could be no conflict because passion was the default victor. 
“Nothing,” says Hume, “can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse.”114 
The passions always dominate, while reason is reduced to being their permanent servant. Interest 
is achieved when instrumental reason is employed passively to best meet passion’s demands. 
Hume’s image of reason’s passivity was merely one paradigm. At the other extreme, interest 
“stood in contradistinction to the passions.”115 Interest was not so much a tamed form of passion 
as opposed to passion altogether.116 Meinecke suggested that interest implied a “sophisticated, 
rational will, untroubled by passions and momentary impulses.”117 Here, reason became the “rule 
of action” rather than the “disorderly appetites.”118  
With interest the soul became a battleground for competing passions. Even the rationalized 
model of interest acknowledged the centrality of a conflict between beneficial and destructive 
emotions. Hirschman says interest became “a generic term” for certain beneficent passions which 
served a “countervailing function” to more malignant ones.119 There were benign passions whose 
encouragement could contribute to general well-being, and other more insidious ones needing 
discouragement in order to protect the public good from their ravages. These countervailing 
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passions existed within the psychology of the individual rather than between individuals, factions 
or branches of government.120 
This paradigm suggested that the fortification needed by reason could be found in selfish, 
but non-threatening passions. Beneficial emotions were increasingly associated with “interest”, 
while destructive ones were connected to “passion.”121 Interests became the “tamers of the 
passions.”122 Countervailing passions could be broken down into categories of “the taming” and 
the “to-be-tamed”123 Beneficial impulses counteract destructive ones. As passions contend reason 
calculates and adjudicates the least detrimental satisfaction of the least detrimental desire. Reason 
is more referee than combatant. In this model it became necessary to identify which passions 
typically played “the role of tamers” and which were “truly wild” and “required taming.124   
The two types of passion involved within the soul’s countervailing conflict are in a sense, 
always the same. There is an original passion set against the passion of fear. In this paradigm the 
voice of reason is increasingly replaced by the voice of fear. The immediate impulse can be any 
number of passions, be it ambition, avarice or the love of power. This impulse is set in motion by 
the blind hope of gain. The countermanding impulse is always some kind of fear which arises out 
of an emotional awareness of the risks involved in the satisfaction of the original impulse. Interest 
rests on fear. In the extreme, this is the fear of death, but more often, it is the fear of any loss 
unacceptable in the eyes of the individual. The primary loss would be the thwarting of one’s desire 
or future restrictions on its satisfaction. Fear as the taming passion has the power to restrain 
reckless impulse and grandiose ambition. Fear tempers all others. It can retard, inhibit or modify 
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them depending on the circumstances. Serving one’s interest generally came to mean becoming 
more risk-averse compared to pursuing more all-or-nothing passions like glory and the desire for 
domination.  
Despite the many nuances of his thought, Hobbes can be given credit for envisioning the 
founding of a political order on the principle of self-interest as a kind of Natural Law. Hirschman 
credits Hobbes for providing the original analysis, in his depiction of the State of Nature, of how 
countervailing passions arise in the individual and resolve themselves to produce one’s interest.125 
Self-interest was what was left over after the extreme passions of ambition and fear played 
themselves out in the State of Nature. The middle, more risk-averse impulses remaining, were 
one’s interest. This accounting and calibrating of the passions need not be conscious rational 
calculation. Instead, it need only be the playing out of contending impulses coupled with an 
experiential memory of their past risks and rewards. For Hobbes, prudence was the product of 
nothing other than experience itself.126 Reflection merely confirmed what experience had already 
taught on an emotional level.  
Hobbes identified the politically relevant competing passions in man’s ‘natural condition’ 
as social and asocial, those which incline men to war and those inclining them to peace. The State 
of Nature was by definition a state of war because it lacked the conditions and organization to 
effectively restrain bellicose passions or amplify peaceful ones. The exodus from this condition 
was not to be achieved through transforming human nature, but by transforming the circumstances 
and conditions of people so as to encourage peaceful passions and discourage belligerent ones. 
This would be achieved through the formation of sound political institutions, a government with 
the monopoly of force which alone interpreted and enforced law. Hobbes singles out glory and 
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ambition as the arch passions representing the central threats to peaceful and commodious 
existence. Men cannot enjoy life and the fruits of their labors when they are dead or under the 
permanent cloud of mortal threat.127  The pursuit of glory and the love of domination, said Hobbes, 
could be overcome by “passions that incline men to Peace.”128 The fact that the State of Nature is 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” provides the proper incentives to exit this belligerent and 
destitute condition. Since men seek to avoid suffering or death, they are willing to exchange certain 
freedoms for the rewards and pleasures of a more commodious existence. Men avoid what they 
fear. For Hobbes the fear of death was the only motive powerful enough to thwart these the desire 
for glory and honor and promote the interests of all in the form of peaceful self-preservation. Glory 
and domination are sacrificed for a humbler, but more secure, existence. 
Self-interest boils down to the way actions are motivated by common perceptions of future 
potential rewards and punishments. Judgements about the future, are judgements about the 
expectation of the two universal masters of human conduct, pleasure and pain. One’s interest is 
generally the product of attempting to maximize benefits, while minimizing loses. Aiming at more 
modest benefits, generally speaking, reduces the risk of more extreme loses. Hobbes’ analysis 
foreshadows the “maximin” principle of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Rational Choice Theory. 
Hobbes entire analysis of the State of Nature and the mechanism of departure is dependent on a 
cost-benefit analysis of the alternatives of death and the fear of death, as opposed to aspirations of 
glory. The bargain struck is that the necessary concentration of power will be granted to a 
government for the sake of security. Security means a life liberated from the fear of violent death.129 
In this, Hobbes encourages mankind to trade-in higher motives, like honor and glory, for lower 
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ones, like comfortable self-preservation. Thus, the “primordial interest” of mankind is found in 
leaving the State of Nature.130 This of course is, on the whole, the bargain Modern liberal 
democracy has struck. 
The central purpose of the Leviathan, as a “Mortal God,” was to instill the necessary terror 
and awe, in order to inspire men to abide by the social contract. It is necessary, from Hobbes’ 
perspective, for subjects to be instilled with the fear of God. The state needed to inspire such terror, 
that psychologically, the fear of punishment, in the scheme of costs and benefits, outweighed the 
hope of ill-gotten gains. Only then would men keep their promises. Here, individuals “do the right 
thing” purely out of hard-boiled cost-benefit calculations of interest. This was taking men as they 
actually are. They weigh whether doing the right thing actually benefits them. This is not the only 
reason they do the right thing, but it is the most reliable and predictable one. Therefore, 
circumstances need to be devised accordingly. Hobbes calculus of fear was a substitute to 
alternative sources and explanations of self-restraint such as duty, virtue, or religious piety. This 
calculus warned against indulging in destructive passion for the selfish reason that moderating 
them was more advantageous in the long term. 
Publius’ use of the term “interest” falls well within the parameters of Enlightenment 
thought. As with the faculties of reason and passion, no formal definition of interest is given in 
The Federalist. As a common currency of epistemological discourse, moral philosophy and 
political economy it is not hard to see the general orbit within which Publius’ use of the term 
revolves. The ambiguities of interest, endemic to the broader discourse, are likewise found in The 
Federalist. There are numerous configurations of interest. The term does double duty as a 
motivation generated by impulse, or one properly tempered by reason. It is not so much a novel 
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rendering of the concept which Publius provides, but the uses to which it is put in order to describe 
the mechanics of power that will restrain passions detrimental to ordered liberty.   
Publius’ usage reflects the historical trajectory of the term. Interests can be real or apparent, 
private or public, individual or common. Interest can be viewed in the shorter or longer terms, and 
can be understood more narrowly or broadly, well or poorly.131 Multiple types of interest 
correspond to multiple types of agents under discussion. This answers the question of Whose 
interest? It could be the interest of a nation-state acting on the world’s stage, or the common interest 
of a nation in its domestic affairs. Interest could also reflect economic, religious and political 
factions, as well as the individual officeholder or citizen in society. Officeholders could be acting 
on behalf of their own self-interest or as a partisan on behalf of a factional interest. They could act 
on behalf of regional or economic constituencies no less than the collective interest of the nation. 
Publius’ conception of interest is framed in terms of man qua man, not merely as homo 
economicus. Despite the political orientation of his concerns, man is seen as a whole. There is no 
doubt of the centrality of economic self-interest in The Federalist’s understanding of political 
psychology. The need for material well-being is a central component of human nature. The liberal 
orientation of Publius and The Founders, built around the interlocking elements of Modern Natural 
Rights, limited government, comfortable self-preservation, and a more modest conception of 
human existence, all point to a central role for the pursuit of material well-being. This theme is 
evident in Hamilton’s discussion of commercial republics and Madison’s analysis of liberty, 
property rights and economic factions in No. 10. Madison asserts that the protection of men’s 
faculties “from which the rights of property originate…is the first object of government.”132 This 
 
131 Maynard Smith. “Reason, Passion and Political Freedom in the Federalist,” The Journal of Politics. 
 Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug., 1960). pp. 527-28.  
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economic focus is underwritten by some of their intellectual forebears such as Locke, 
Montesquieu, Hume and Adam Smith. All touch on the psychological implications of wealth for 
society. Hume, for example, tends to treat interest as synonymous with the “avidity of acquiring 
goods and possessions” or he “love of gain.”133 Unlike Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Smith all placed 
great emphasis on the protection of property as the central function of government. The role of 
property placed economic interests at the center of their visions of civil society. Locke concluded 
that “the great and chief end” of government was the preservation of property.134  Montesquieu 
asserted “the public good consists in every one's having his property…invariably preserved” by 
the laws.135 Despite his differences with Locke regarding the naturalness of property, Hume placed 
the protection of property at the center of law and government’s administration of justice.136 Adam 
Smith conceived of interest in primarily economic terms. For Smith interest was desire to be more 
well off.137  
Despite the vision of America as a commercial republic, The Federalist hardly reduced all 
forms of interest to economic well-being. Historian Douglass Adair is credited for recuperating 
the central significance of other motives to the Founders and The Federalist concealed under the 
impact of Charles Beard’s economic determinism. Beard concluded the primary psychological 
motive of the Founders in shaping the Constitution was economic class-interest. This motive was 
said to determine the nature of the document as much as their account of the Founding. Adair 
explicitly rejected the Beard’s premise that the “framing of the Constitution was reducible to 
simple economic interest.”138 Instead he asserted there were moral and intellectual motives at 
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work.139 Adair believed that the Founder’s experiences “led them to redefine their notions of 
interest and had given them, through the concept of fame, a personal stake in creating a national 
system dedicated to liberty, to justice, and to the general welfare.”140 He acknowledged fame as a 
central motivator at the Grand Convention and in the penning of The Federalist. Fame, of course, 
was not immune from the general accusation of self-interestedness Beard had levelled at the 
Founders.   
Beard’s aspersions aside, The Federalist’s framing of the psychological motors of civil 
society extends well beyond material self-interest. This, if for no other reason than the necessity 
of confronting all relevant assets and threats deriving from the passions. Publius never entertains 
the notion that economic self-interest alone, could product public virtues. His rhetoric is often 
concerned with public passions and virtues. Among the numerous motives mentioned which fall 
under the category of private interest, many are not directly connected with economic well-being 
at all. They understood the human soul as more expansive and acknowledged that, as least in the 
few, material reward was not their greatest ambition. No doubt they speak of “enterprise”, 
“industry”, “venality” and “avarice.”  But they also speak of motivations, particularly of men who 
pursue office, such as “self-love”, “ambition,” “the love of power”, “the desire of pre-eminence 
and dominion,” “the jealousy of power”, “pride”, “vanity”, “fear”, “love of fame,” fear of infamy, 
obscurity or humiliation, “revenge”, “hatred”, “honor”, “nobility” and “philanthropy”, to name 
just a few. Meanwhile in No. 10, factions based on religious and political opinion are no less a 
concern, as ones deriving from the division of labor.   
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There are four related categories of interests at work in The Federalist. First, interest exists 
on a continuum from more passionate to more rational. Impulsive interests are set in contrast to 
self-interest rightly understood. This continuum cuts through all the other related categories of 
interest. Second, there is a distinction between real and merely apparent interests. Third, is a 
temporal distinction been short and long-term interests. Lastly, there is a spatial and numerical 
distinction pertaining to the interests of the one or few who are immediately present, and the many 
who are at varying degrees of distance. This represents the contrast between the partial interest of 
an individual or faction in contradistinction to common interest of the whole. All these categories 
intersect in a variety of ways. They are configured by those interests which act more like passions, 
and those more tempered by reason. 
Apparent interests, for example, stood in contradistinction to “true interest.”141 True 
interests are those which represent a genuine good to the individual and their community in 
contrast to the “temporary delusion” of immediate impulse. Therefore immediate interest is 
associated with a merely apparent interest, rather than a true one.142 Short-term interests are more 
like passion, while longer term ones involve greater rational foresight. Hamilton speaks of 
“immediate interests”143 as synonymous with “private passion,”144 “strong passion,” and 
“momentary interest”145 An immediate interest represents a “transient impulse” or “sudden breeze 
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of passion.”146 Madison describes it as an “impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate 
gain.”147 Such interests are more connected to passion than reason. 
Immediate interests are both “temporary and partial considerations.”148 Interest has both a 
temporal and spatial dimensions. Immediate interests are directed toward objects in the immediate 
present which are in the immediate presence of the individual. They do not consider that which is 
distant or remote in either time or space. They are “temporary” because they lack rational 
forethought of the future. They are “partial” because they do not consider others, or the situation 
as a whole. A situation not only includes the future, but other people not immediately present and 
their interests. Partial interests neglect the common interest for the sake of immediate self-interest.  
Publius generally associates immediate impulse with self-interest, while “distant,” 
“remote,” enlarged, refined, or “permanent” interests are connected with the public good. 
Hamilton sets “immediate interests” in contrast to “general or remote considerations” of justice. 
“Temporary or partial considerations”149 do not reflect the “enlarged and permanent interest” of 
the larger political community.150 “Men,” he writes are “inclined to prefer present interest to distant 
and remote; nor is it easy for them to resist the temptation of any advantage, that they may 
immediately enjoy, in the apprehension of an evil, that lies at a distance from them.”151 Hume says 
there is “no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which 
leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote, and makes us desire objects more 
according to their situation than their intrinsic value.”152 When Publius asserts that republican 
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institutions have the capacity to “refine and enlarge the public views” he is claiming that the 
constitutional arrangement is designed to encourage and compel individuals at all levels of society 
to clarify and broaden their opinion of their own interests in the direction of greater and greater 
conformity with the common one. 153 
Publius account of the countervailing passions at work in the interests leaves open the 
possibility that either passion or reason provide the ballast against raw impulses. Clearly 
immediate, momentary or partial interests are more like passions, while a “common”, “enlarged” 
or “permanent interest” are more influenced by reason. Publius often speaks of the restraining role 
of reason, but we cannot leave out the possibility that this role is actually achieved by adjudicating 
in favor of beneficial passions which act as breaks on destructive ones. When he speaks of how 
“the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought” to “prevail over the views of its rulers,” 
the word “sense” walks a fine line between a form of thinking and a form of feeling.154 
Publius leaves no doubt on the vital and necessary role of reason to interest. If the true 
interests of the political community are to be fulfilled, passion must give way to reason. 155 It is 
“the reason, alone, of the public that ought to control and regulate the government.”156 Meanwhile, 
“the passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government”157 because they do not 
“conform to the dictates of reason and justice.”158 Madison says it is “the mild voice of reason” 
which pleads “the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest.”159 Hamilton writes that it is “the 
deliberate sense of the community” in contrast to “every sudden breeze of passion” or “every 
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transient impulse,” which “should govern the conduct” of its representatives.160  It is the men of 
“wisdom” who can “best discern the true interests” of the people.”161  Publius endorses a version 
of what Tocqueville would later call “self-interest rightly understood.” Self-interest rightly 
understood was achieved with an essential component of reasoning. Here “immediate impulse” is 
tempered by “cool and sedate reflection.”162 This interest reconciles the needs and claims of the 
individual with the needs and claims of the political community. Self-interest rightly understood 
represents the most rational way to satisfy one’s desires in conformity with the rights of others. It 
does not merely involve choice in the means of satisfaction, but the rational modification of the 
object of desire itself. This vision of impulse restrained by rational reflection and deliberation 
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VI. Inventions of Prudence  
1. Auxiliary Precautions 
 
Publius and the Founders were keenly aware of Machiavelli’s insight that the act of 
founding centers on the proper ordering of institutions.1 Madison and Hamilton held a quiet but 
firm optimism regarding man’s capacity for republican self-governance if provided a system of 
properly ordered institutions. In light of the frailties of human nature, genuine self-government 
was only possible with such institutions. Man could be freely entrusted with the powers of office 
only with “carefully constructed mechanisms of self-government.”2 Their focus on proper ordering 
presupposed that no amount of individual virtue can compensate for bad institutions in the pursuit 
of good government.  
Machiavelli’s emphasis on virtuous institutions was a partial rejection of Aristotle’s cycle 
of regimes, which distinguished between virtuous and corrupted versions of the same forms. This 
distinction rested on the existence or lack of virtue in the ruling class. What mattered for Aristotle 
more than the arrangement of virtuous institutions, was the existence of virtuous men. Aristotle 
generally prioritized the matter of government over the form.3 Form was a function of matter. The 
Modern emphasis on institutions is the product of taking men as they are, and recognizing the 
natural scarcity of virtue. Virtuous matter is the exception rather than the rule. Good government 
would be achieved through sound institutions, rather than being left to the mercy of fortune or a 
 
1 Niccolò Machiavelli. Discourses on Livy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. p. xxx.  
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hoped-for arrival of virtuous men. If the founder desires to skirt fortune, he must take matters into 
his own hands, and recognize that good government is a matter of proper ordering.    
In order to establish good government, it is necessary to make “the proper deductions for 
the ordinary depravity of human nature.”4 All threats to the common good emanate from the 
limitations of human nature. The passions do not simply conform to the demands of reason and 
justice. Jefferson spoke for all the Founders when he wrote, that “in questions of power…let no 
more be heard of confidence in man.”5 They recognized self-interest as the “driving force of human 
nature with which constitutions must contend.”6 To accept self-interest as the rule of conduct for 
all human beings is to reject Aristotle’s distinction between virtuous regimes and their corrupt 
counterparts. Machiavelli and Hobbes rejected this distinction and collapsed the higher form into 
the lower. In matters of the rule of one, said Hobbes, the distinction between monarchy and tyranny 
was only a matter of perception, not substance. This was because all monarchs act on self-interest 
in a manner no different than any tyrant.7 Reckoned together, the people who form the matter of 
any regime are by nature no more or less virtuous. Therefore, the primary criterion of a sound 
regime is its form, not its matter. Since self-interested conduct was taken as given, the goal was to 
design a set of institutions which at some “positive cost,” could curb the worst excesses of human 
nature.8 
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Since the founder cannot depend on the coincidence of wisdom and political power, 
Modern political science conceived of government primarily as a restraint against the 
destructiveness of the passions. Madison presents the two central functions of government in the 
negative. “In framing government which is to be administered by men over men,” Madison writes, 
“the great difficulty lies” in enabling “government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself.”9 The central task is to arrange institutions in order to restrain the two 
humors of human nature. Government must simultaneously manage threats originating in the few 
who rule, and the many who are ruled. The primary task of government is then a negative 
restraining function. This negative depiction of government is the product of the Founders’ 
observations of the scarcity of virtue and the perceived foolhardiness of those who attempt to 
depend on virtue. Government is no longer primarily a positive platform for human flourishing 
and excellence. The goal is not to habituate men to virtue, but stave off systemic vice. If men are 
not good, properly ordered institutions must be designed to prevent them from being bad. Publius 
argues that the ordering of institutions must compensate for human frailty. Designing institutions 
commensurate to human nature is a juggling act between what Publius called his “circumspection 
and distrust” and his “confidence” that man is capable of governing himself if provided the proper 
institutions.   
Machiavelli once promised a “perpetual republic” whose institutions would “have a 
remedy for every danger and would represent a perfect conquest of the fortunes that sooner or later 
brings down every human institution.”10 The central threats to the success and longevity of any 
regime come from two sources: human nature and fortune. One is constant and predictable, the 
other is not. Despite man’s unchanging nature, it is most inclined to exhibit its capricious 
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variability in unforeseen or extreme circumstances and situations. Thus, the proper ordering of any 
constitution involves accommodating both these potential seeds of destruction. Government must 
employ and contain human nature as effectively as possible, yet maintain flexibility enough to 
respond to circumstances which can never be entirely foreseen. Flexibility is freedom for those in 
power to meet the demands of unforeseen circumstance. And, yet the unfettered use of power leads 
to its abuse. Since human nature cannot be changed, the goal of the Constitution was to devise 
circumstances of choice and action for society and government alike, by means of properly ordered 
institutions, which would encourage their better angels and mitigate their weaknesses. This remedy 
for the maladies of human nature hinged on contriving constitutional circumstances in such a way 
to encourage the right faculties and motives of individuals under its yoke.    
Institutions must compensate for the defects in human nature. They must supply the “defect 
of better motives.” Absent angels who would rule and be ruled, institutions are the only means to 
provide the necessary sentinels and precautions which might supply the deficiency of motives in 
man’s nature. They must provide the powers and functions to govern the people at large, but must 
also be arranged in such a way as to regulate the passions of rulers naturally inclined by their 
ambition and love of power to wield those powers in destructive ways. Government is by definition 
power concentrated. Concentrated power unchecked is tyranny. Yet, power must be sufficiently 
concentrated in order to govern the people decisively. At the same time this concentration needs 
to be stymied and checked without the diminution of government’s ability to perform its core 
functions efficiently.  
Nature and circumstance conspire to ensure that the supply of virtuous men, or their 
willingness to govern, is never guaranteed. History demonstrates that wisdom and power rarely 
coincide. Ideally, a “well-designed system of government” should allow men in the free “exercise 
 
 494 
of their political faculties” and encourage those “fit characters” who were most desirable.11 
Institutions must encourage the virtuous to rise to office and restrain those of lesser character. In 
No. 68, Hamilton says with feigned optimism that, “It will not be too strong to say, that there will 
be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters preeminent for ability and 
virtue.”12 Yet, in No. 57 he hedges this claim writing that the “aim of every political constitution 
is, or ought to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most 
virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual 
precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust.” 13 If the 
Constitution could guarantee the necessary supply of virtuous men, a whole range of “effectual 
precautions” against vice might have been dispensed with altogether. Publius’ regular refrain of 
man’s depravity leaves no doubt that the Constitution is designed to withstand the expected 
frailties of human nature and the scarcity of virtue they produce.   
This account of human nature obliged Publius and the Founders to recognize that 
“enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”14 If they could not depend on a regular 
source of virtue, they were compelled to depend on good institutions. If all men were not simply 
good, the only alternative would be to make them good through good institutions. While it would 
no longer be the business of “government to cultivate virtue and to improve souls,” Publius 
understood the necessity of reason and virtue for good government.15 Mansfield says that “virtue 
is encouraged but subordinated to liberty.”16 Virtue was not to be the end of this novel republic, 
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yet it remained a vital and necessary means to good government. Virtuous institutions of the proper 
design could be capable of producing virtuous men. Such institutions must be imposed in a manner 
such that men were not simply free to entirely reshape them at a whim in their own image and 
likeness. Speaking of the origins of the Roman Republic, Cicero wrote that “if the state had not 
had such morals, then the men would not have existed; nor, if such men had not been in charge, 
would there have been such morals as to be able to establish or preserve for so long a common 
wealth so great and ruling so widely.”17 Great men make good institutions, and good institutions 
have the ability to make men good.18 Virtuous institutions encourage those of excellence character 
to occupy them, but also have the power to take men as they are and make them as they need to 
be.  
The need for good institutions is a recognition that natural virtue cannot be the only check 
on the abuse of government power. Hamilton and Madison knew it was in vain to believe that most 
men would subordinate their partial interests to the public good.19 Hume thought it was certain 
“self-love, when it acts at its liberty…is the source of all injustice and violence; nor can a man ever 
correct those vices, without correcting and restraining the natural movements of that appetite.”20 
Therefore, government must establish “the degree of authority required to direct the passions of 
… society to the public good.”21 From this Spinoza concluded that “no society can exit without 
government and force, and hence laws to control and restrain the unruly appetites and impulses” 
of all men.22 “Given the universal venality and lust of human nature,” Publius and the Founders 
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knew “that the natural tendency of all governments was to grow in power and for liberty to 
decline.”23 Such was the case of Rome. Cicero had lived in the senescent age of the Roman 
Republic, decaying as it had over time by the inherent weaknesses of its own constitution. These 
weaknesses gave opportunity to men lacking in virtue, and such men gave rise to bad government. 
The Constitution would bind down men and their vices. Necessary was a constitution “that could 
tame and temper the passions through its institutional arrangements.”24 
The Federalist’s account of the problems and solutions of government created by human 
nature are not rhetorically dressed up in abstractions or impersonal forces. Government marks the 
nexus of people and power. Henry Kissinger once remarked that “As a professor, I tended to think 
of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference 
personalities make.”25 Learned in books as they were, the years of experience collectively had by 
Publius and the Founders gave them a first-hand understanding of politics as power, people and 
their ambitions. Publius defines the constitutional order in terms of specific people, with specific 
powers and functions, operating within a specific arrangement of institutions and procedures. He 
recognizes politics and government consists of institutions animated by individuals and their 
psychological faculties. Publius describes the life of the Constitution as consisting of concrete 
circumstances coupled with the personalized forces and drives of the human soul which motive 
individuals to act in the ways they do. The nexus of people and power demonstrates why faculty 
psychology is so central to The Federalist’s account of the Constitution. It speaks not of a 
disembodied rationality or an imagined public sphere with a transcendent good, but of the jostling 
and collision of one man’s interest upon another, one man’s ambitions upon another. In No. 51 
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Madison twice acknowledges how the powers and procedures of any office are animated by the 
personal interests and ambitions of its holder.    
When Publius describes the workings of government, he does not resort to disembodied 
forces of history or arcane abstractions of the closet speculator. He speaks not of “progress,” 
“deliberative democracy,” “public reason.” or a “general will.”26 For Publius politics and history 
were solely a product of human nature tinctured with exogenous circumstances never entirely in 
man’s control. Fortune was the impersonal foil to man’s personal ambitions. There is no notion of 
a spirit driving history, of history as the unfolding of an inevitable process of progress, or as the 
product of a grand dialectic of ideologies where political actors are merely their unwitting pawns 
or victims. Ideas inhered in sects and individuals with interests and ambitions of their own.  
Publius does not describe a “deliberative democracy,” but a “wholly popular” 
representative republic. In this indirect form of democracy officeholders and the public deliberate 
within the bounds of the powers and procedures of the Constitution. “Wholly popular” signifies 
that the people, not an abstraction, are the true sovereigns. Thus, the question of Who rules? still 
matters. The Constitution dictates who rules and how. When Publius asserts that it is not passion, 
but the reason, or the “deliberate sense of the community,” that ought to “ultimately prevail,” he 
is referring to specific people employing concrete faculties of mind which culminate in 
constitutionally sanctioned decision and action. This deliberative sense is primarily instantiated in 
the legislature, as the public body which reasons on behalf of the people. The deliberative process 
involves reasoning together. Reason is not an abstraction floating above the heads of thinking 
individuals and groups. Instead, it is a verbal noun referring to what men and women do privately 
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or together. Publius speaks of representatives acting in their legislative capacity attempting to 
reason and think together in public view. Reasoning is thinking which postpones impulsive action. 
Representatives can reason well or poorly in light of their long-term interests. Often, only time 
will tell. Reasoning does not specify the nature of the outcome of the deliberative process. What 
was “reasonable” at the time was simply what fell within the bounds of the Constitution’s powers 
and procedures, and was capable of gaining a constitutional majority.    
The Federalist makes no mention of anything like a supervening “general will”, nor any 
abstract Thomist notion of “The Good.” The public good is not a Platonic Form, but the 
culmination of concrete institutional process. There is no notion of a supposed good independent 
of individuals and their psychologies acting within the parameters of the Constitution’s procedures 
and their outcomes. Publius’ references to the “public good” or the “common interest,” speak to 
goods defined by the outcome of those procedures. Indeed, there is a constitutional good. The 
constitutional good is established concretely amongst sects and individuals contending within the 
institutional system of the Constitution. Institutions establish the prescribed powers and procedural 
channels for public dispute and deliberation including the concrete criteria for their definitive 
resolution. Constitutional deliberation achieves, not a general will, but a constitutional majority 
and consensus.   
The institutions of government are not marked by the effect of abstract causes, but by the 
force of human psychology. Government marks a confrontation of political power and human 
personality. Hamilton makes no bones regarding the original sources of government’s tendency to 
expand, accumulate and concentrate its powers: this original cause is “the love of power.”27 
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Jefferson asserted political power offers “the greatest temptations” to man’s venal nature.28 The 
flaws in human nature necessitate government, but also necessitate controls on government. 
Government must also govern itself. This second problem is more pressing than the first. History 
demonstrates that ruling over the apolitical many is the easier task because government has the 
monopoly of legitimate authority and force, while the many naturally tend to acquiesce to the 
mastery of the ambitious who are themselves determined to rule.  Even the problem of majority 
faction remains a problem of government governing itself. Rulers are a self-selecting group, whose 
ambitions distinguish them from the many. Ambition and interest are the inevitable springs which 
animates this class of human beings to ascend to political office.   
Underlying the two-fold problem of government identified by Madison is the perennial 
conflict between the ambitious few and the less ambitious many. The few are by nature political 
animals, while the many merely seek to avoid domination and pursue private self-interest. In 
government the love of domination finds the ultimate instrument of its satisfaction, making its 
offices naturally attractive to the ambitious. Power and ambition are a natural, yet menacing, 
combination. Institutions, by their nature, grant such passions immense powers and provide the 
opportunity to satisfy themselves at the expense of the people. Experience taught Publius and the 
Founders “that the passions of mankind were the permanent problem of politics and that it was 
only by a fixed and formidable constitution that they could be made to yield to the weaker restraints 
of reason.”29 Since the American regime is based on the principle of popular sovereignty and good 
government is sought for the many not merely the few, those who rule must themselves be ruled 
by something other than their own appetites. At the Convention Roger Sherman said: “From the 
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nature of man we may be sure, that those who have power in their hands will not give it up while 
they can retain it.”30 Adams simply wrote: “All men would be tyrants if they could.”31    
Despite the ambition to craft an American republic on the rule of institutions over men, we 
must now turn to the inevitable role played by human nature and character. Even if men are ruled 
by institutions, they are destined to strive against their boundaries and each other in the quest to 
enhance their power. Institutions must be designed to withstand the force of bad character and 
corruption and provide mechanisms for their remedy. Ancient political philosophy had placed a 
premium on the ruling faction of a regime. Thus, “the most important question to ask” about any 
regime was: Who rules?32 More to the point, Whose psychology and interests rule? Whether the 
one, few or many, all constitutions were defined and structured with respect to the nature of those 
in power. What defined the character and fate of a given regime was its politeuma, or ruling class.33 
The regime and its constitution were “identified with the class of citizens who rule” as they are 
“the source of the laws.”34 Those in power rule by impressing their character and way of life on 
the political community through those laws. The ruling classes make society in their own image 
and likeness. The psychology of the community at large is then fashioned by the nature of the soul 
of the ruling class. In a democracy the majority impress their psychology on all classes, just as 
oligarchs or timocrats impress their character on the political community and its way of life. The 
character and core motives of the rulers shape the constitution, not vice versa.  Despite the strong 
shackles the Constitution places on rulers, American history testifies to the fact that the character 
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of its statesmen and leaders has often penetrated beyond those restraints and impressed itself on 
American society for better and worse.  
Ancient political thought and practice only understood class constitutions. Three classes of 
men, the one, the few and the many, were legally recognized and reflected in the nature and 
structure of regimes. For thousands of years, some version of these classes and their order of rank, 
was understood merely as a social and political reflection of the cosmic order of things. Class 
hierarchy was simply an expression of the inequalities and diversity of human nature. The mixed 
regime, for example, was not divided by three branches with three distinct functions, but mixed 
three institutions expressing the interests of three classes of men. Institutions and laws were merely 
the product of the interests and psychology of a particular class rather than abstract principles or 
impersonal political ideologies which have become so prominent in the last two centuries. In light 
of their freedom as rulers to impose their interests, their virtue was the only sentinel of good 
government. The possibility of good government was largely, if not entirely, dependent on their 
character.  
The personalized vision of government is illustrated in Madison’s assertion, that despite an 
emphasis on institutions, government remains rule of men over men. Lurking in this statement is 
the observation that political community involves the perennial conflict between the few and the 
many. By definition a republic, in contradistinction to a pure democracy, operates through the 
principle of representation which always guarantees rule by an elite minority. If government is the 
rule of men over men, a conflict between the few who rule and the many ruled is inevitable. At the 
Convention Hamilton observed that, “In every community where industry is encouraged, there 
will be a division of it into the few and many.”35 The Federalist describes the Constitution as a 
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structure devised with “the goal of regulating the conflict between the few and the many” and their 
relative psychologies.36  “Give all power to the many,” asserted Hamilton on the floor of the 
Convention, “they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few they will oppress the many.”37 
Both Hamilton and Madison framed this conflict largely in terms of the distinction between 
economic classes. Madison spoke of the political consequences of the “unequal distribution of 
property” defined by differences in “degree and kind.”38 At the Convention Pinckney recognized 
three politically relevant economic classes: “professional men,” “commercial men,” and a “landed 
interest.”39 Despite the denial of legal classes, it was inevitable American society would be broken 
into political, social and economic ones.   
Part of the Constitution’s psychological management of the passions involves negotiating 
the humors of the few and the many. The question of managing the passions and interests of the 
few and the many is implicit in Madison’s assertion that government must control the governed, 
and control itself. Despite the popular nature of the American republic, it is not hard to see the 
inflection of Aristotle’s distinction between the few and the many and their respective 
psychologies throughout Publius’ analysis.40 The Constitution guaranteed to every citizen “a right 
to the same protection and security.”41  The question of balancing the needs and demands of the 
few and the many is a matter of how to maintain fidelity to the principle of a wholly popular regime 
in the face of differing circumstances, faculties, passions and opinions of men which give rise to 
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factional conflict between them. One obvious challenge to a regime premised on equal rights, is 
that humanity naturally divides itself into unequal camps of the few and the many. The natural 
self-seeking of both sides poses a permanent threat to the equality of civil rights, as both attempt 
to coopt and bend the powers of government to their own purposes. How is a regime dedicated to 
a specific vision of human equality to cope with the other dimensions of human nature which make 
them unequal?  
At the Convention, Charles Pinckney spoke of the nation as a near classless society. “The 
great body of the people,” said Pinckney, “among whom there are no men of wealth, and very few 
of real poverty.”42 Pickney denied their existed any fundamental distinction between the few and 
the many in American society. Instead there was “one great and equal body of citizens ... among 
whom there are no distinctions of rank, and very few or none of fortune.”43 Madison and Hamilton, 
for reasons empirical and philosophical, rejected this image of American society based on the facts 
and those of human nature.  
At the Virginia Ratifying Convention Madison cagily asserted that “there can be no doubt that 
there are subjects to which the capacities of the bulk of mankind are unequal.”44 Nor is it clear they 
saw a near classless society as a positive good, or goal of the American republic. In No. 10 Madison 
strongly recognizes that republican liberty combined with equal protections of law, necessarily 
leads to unequal outcomes. Inequality then was a function of human nature and its faculties under 
conditions of freedom and equality under law.   
Despite the central role played by the middle class as a politically and economically 
stabilizing force, the American regime, as all others before it and since, formed natural divisions 
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between the few wealthy and the many who are relatively less wealthy. These are the two elemental 
constituents of matter American society and government must work with and work on. Just as with 
Aristotle, in our constitutional republic, the few rule and the many are ruled. This political 
distinction runs parallel to economic inequalities and vice versa. The broad nature of the 
relationship remains unchanged even as the mechanisms of rule differ. A Natural Rights republic 
recognizes civil rights for all as a product of its recognition of a common and equal human nature. 
Civil rights are guaranteed to all by citizenship, yet political rights are guaranteed only to those 
few who gain them through a combination of fortune and ambition. Despite the popular nature of 
the American regime, those in government are both a part of and apart from the great mass of 
people. While the absence of qualifications of property or heredity to hold office denied the 
existence of a permanent political class, once men occupy office, they have distinguished 
themselves in political power from those peers not in government.   
Despite the egalitarian element of Natural Rights in the nation’s founding principles, the 
distinction between the non-political many and the ambitious few is essential to the workings of 
government. The Federalist Party of course were not opposed to the few, so long as they formed a 
natural aristocracy of merit, rather than an artificial aristocracy, or an oligarchy of birth, inherited 
wealth or social status. Jefferson affirmed there exists “a natural aristocracy among men.”45 
Jefferson defined an artificial aristocracy as “a mischievous ingredient in government, and 
provision should be made to prevent it's ascendancy.”46 In American society a natural aristocracy 
of merit would persist “despite the abolition of formal ranks and titles.”47 No one had any doubt 
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that the new republic ordained a constitutional aristocracy, in the form of the people’s 
representatives who would rule the nation.  
Our liberal democracy appears to avoid the pitfalls of the few and the many intrinsic to 
class constitutions. There are no Optimates and Populares inscribed in our constitution. And yet, 
in No. 10 Madison recognizes the intrinsic conflict between “those who hold, and those who are 
without property,” because they “have ever formed distinct interests in society.”48 Plato had said 
that oligarchy create two cities within one, factions of rich and poor. Aristotle’s rejoinder was that 
all cities were in nature two, and thus the seeds of factional strife and constitutional decay were 
forever sown into political community. For Aristotle the problem of all regimes revolved to a large 
degree around tensions between the few and the many in a see-saw struggle between oligarchic 
and democratic tendencies. If the few oligarchs were too powerful they would make laws to 
insulate their political power and wealth and deny opportunity to a now politically and 
economically disenfranchised many. If the many democrats took power the concern was 
confiscatory policies borne of jealousy which expropriate wealth from the few. Economically the 
central political problem was to avoid excessive factional strife between the two which leads to 
constitutional decay, and in the case of republics the decay of liberty and equality.   
In class constitutions the very recognition of each faction of society guaranteed class 
conflict. Machiavelli’s analysis of the history of Rome illustrates the corrupting potential of class 
conflict and the way in which a class constitution guarantees that all conflicts are conceived and 
framed through the lens of class. The innovation of our Constitution is based on the assumption 
that direct class conflict is not inevitable.49 Machiavelli and Publius obviously rejected the image 
of society as a static order, like Plato, and instead favored one where factional jostling leads to 
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dynamic equilibrium. But the Modern dynamic perspective did not conclude that all forms of 
conflict were created equal. Unlike the “class warfare constitution” which defined virtually all 
regimes up to the time of the Founding, “the Constitution assumes relative economic equality in 
society.”50 Since the Constitution makes no explicit provision for the recognition of class 
distinctions the government is open to all and in theory represents the people. And yet this same 
feature means there is no guarantee all the people will be represented uniformly or equally.  
The lack of guaranteed representation for all classes makes possible the capture of all 
branches of government by a single elite faction or economic interest. Unlike a class constitution, 
the lower classes have no tribunate to guarantee their political voice. This problem is solved in 
theory by the separation of powers, the distribution of government through federalism and the 
nature and number of offices and their mode of appointment. The House of Representatives, being 
closest to the people, was supposed to guarantee more direct responsibility to all people of a 
district. Meanwhile the Senate, derived from the state legislatures, was by nature more 
aristocratical. The presidency is a mixture. Voted on by the entire nation, yet his appointment is 
still filtered through the principles of federalism manifest in the electoral college. Nonetheless, 
since the Constitution is blind to feudal distinctions, it lacks the very safeguards against class 
government made possible by the political capture of all branches by a single class of society. A 
classless constitution therefore does not do away with the distinction and conflict between the few 
and the many. No constitution can do away with the distinction between the few who rule, whether 
by heredity or election, and the many who are ruled.  
This distinction between the few and the many runs throughout The Federalist Papers. The 





the halls of power. The many are typically characterized by their more passionate nature and less 
elite status in terms of wealth, education and prestige. Hamilton and Madison repeatedly refer to 
the impulsiveness which arises, not so much in the many at large, but when a large group of any 
class of people are brought together, such as in legislative assemblies, to decide matters of public 
policy. “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed,” Hamilton asserts, 
“passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, 
every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”51  
Lurking is a distinction of the different psychologies and motivations of the few and the 
many. The many will be content to rule through their representatives, while the few seek to rule 
directly. Writing to American democrats and Anti-Federalist opposition, The Federalist quietly 
divides mankind into “two different natural orders,” the political few and apolitical many.52 
Machiavelli speaks of the “two diverse humors” found in human nature. The difference between 
the few and the many is in fact a distinction over the nature and magnitude of their acquisitive 
desires. The many are closer to homo economicus, seeking material well-being, driven as they are, 
by the desire for comfort and the virtues of industry and enterprise. Meanwhile the ambitions of 
the few make them political animals by nature. This distinction between the many and the few is 
evident in Madison’s discussion of American society at large in No. 10, in contrast to Hamilton’s 
analysis of the rare nature of the executive driven by great ambitions. The ambitions of the few 
manifests in the desire to acquire, not only wealth, but glory and fame whereas the ambition of the 
many manifests as the desire for comfortable self-preservation.53 In The Prince Machiavelli speaks 
of those many who “desire neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great,” while the few 
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“great desire to command and oppress the people.”54 In the Discourses, Machiavelli says the few 
harbor “a great desire to dominate” while the many “only desire not to be dominated.”55 “Those 
who seek glory,” says Mansfield, “despise those who want security, and the latter fear and hate 
the former.”56 The few seek to dominate by seeking office, while the many say “Don’t tread on 
me!”57 
The preamble of the Constitution asserts that the people are the original source of all 
sovereignty. Lincoln reminds us that the American regime was founded as a “government of the 
people, by the people and for the people.” The people are sovereign and all “streams of national 
power ought to flow immediately from that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority.”58 
The true rulers were to be the people to which the government was to be ever dependent and 
responsive. Government was merely a product of the transference of certain rights, and its function 
was to protect against the invasion of rights from others and from government itself. But this of 
course is not the whole story. Once ratified a written constitution is a social compact which 
compels adherence on the part of the contracting parties. It is the true ruler of the American polity. 
Once the Constitution is in place, the people, if they do not run for office, only express their 
political will through elections. Elections express the people’s opinion of the best candidate or the 
lesser of two evils. Selecting one is also about denying the other. Periodic elections are the arch 
means to hold government directly accountable to the people. In a liberal democracy rule is called 
“representation.” The many authorize the few to wield political power on their behalf.  
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Representational government guarantees the political power of officeholders as much as it 
restricts the political liberty of the electorate. The political authority of the people is only expressed 
at election time. Elections are simultaneously an exercise of political liberty and, a process by 
which the people alienate that liberty to a set of temporary rulers. Elections, then, are “essentially 
aristocratic, not democratic” in nature.59 Representation through election means the average citizen 
turns over their sovereignty to an elected aristocracy at best, or at worst, an oligarchy. Elections 
represent a bargain and compromise between the few and the many.60 At their discretion, the many 
authorize the few to occupy an office whose power and prestige are in conformity with their 
ambition. Likewise, commercial society will provide sufficient objects of desire to those who’s 
ambitions fail to rise to the level of political office. In a society where wealth and industry are 
virtues, there is sufficient honor to be found in wealth that the “ambitious man need no longer seek 
to hold mastery over others.”61  But this logic only goes so far. A sufficient number of the few will 
not be satisfied by material well-being alone. Wealth and political power have rarely failed to go 
hand in hand.  
Whatever ties of dependence and responsibility existed between officeholders and their 
constituents on election day, they are partially voided the day after. Once they have voted, the 
many no longer have any direct say in their own rule. Once in office rulers are free to rule 
independent of the people’s voice until the next election cycle. Officeholders act, not simply 
representatives, but as the people’s rulers.  Rousseau wrote: “The English people thinks it is free; 
It greatly deceives itself; it is free only during the election of members of Parliament. As soon as 
they are elected, it is a slave; it is nothing.”62 Instead of an “exercise of freedom,” elections can be 
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considered “the surrender of freedom.”63 Only a fraction of the people ever rule directly; only a 
fraction exercise genuine political, as opposed to civil, liberty. To translate the principle of 
elections into the language of Machiavelli: elections are the process by which the many who 
“desire neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great,” turn over their political power to the 
few who harbor a great desire to dominate, “command and oppress” them.64 
The perennial conflict of the few and the many presents the central challenge of how to 
resolve the factional conflict generated by human nature within the republican form. Publius 
believes he has a solution to the history of “misfortunes incident” to republican government.65 He 
sought a “republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.”66 Thus, the 
ills of popular government demanded solutions which adhered to the principle of popular 
sovereignty. Publius identifies the risks of the usurpation of the whole by an interested part, 
whether minority or majority. This usurping part of the whole, Madison calls a “faction.” A faction 
is “a majority or minority…united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of 
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community.”67 Publius was obliged to show how the Constitution solves the problems of both the 
tyranny of the few and the many. The most obvious tyranny is that of a powerful minority, rulers 
who oppress the majority. This oppression is the story of human civilization. The threat of minority 
tyranny is a potential feature of all government. Government is by definition a small minority 
given a monopoly of power. Given the nature of their dispute with the Anti-Federalists, Publius is 
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at great pains to illustrate how the quite powerful government of the Constitution will not recreate 
the conditions America liberated itself from in 1776.  
And yet, the history of the republican form they sought was exposed to another common 
type of factional threat. This form was the rare, yet unstable, flower of history, a free regime 
dedicated in principle to the people’s good. Republics were based on popular majoritarian 
principles. Since the emergence of pure democracy in Ancient Athens the primary threat to 
political stability and the administration of justice came from an interested and overbearing 
majority. At the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829 Madison asserted, “In republics, the 
great danger is, that the majority may not sufficiently respect the rights of the minority.” 68 In a 
regime dedicated to majority rule, it is necessary “not only to guard the society against the 
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”69 
Madison identifies the central ill of republics as the threat posed by the tyranny of the majority. 
Experience shows majority tyranny is the natural disease of democratical regimes throughout 
history. The emphasis given to this problem by Publius and the Federalist Party was a product of 
their observations of Ancient democracies as well as the present failures of the Articles of 
Confederation. Madison had already voiced these concerns prior to the Convention in his Vices of 
the Political System of the United States.  
In Nos. 10 and 51 Madison is concerned with the threat posed to the minorities by an 
“interested combination of the majority.”70 A threat arising from “the secret wishes of an unjust 
and interested majority” was a problem endemic to free governments.71 Speaking of government 
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under the Articles, Madison say, that “Complaints are every where heard…that the public good is 
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according 
to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested 
and overbearing majority.”72 Majority tyranny occurs when “a majority... united by a common 
interest or a passion cannot be constrained from oppressing the minority.”73 Here, the interested 
majority comes to dominate politically which allows it to “invade the rights of other citizens” 
including minorities.74 The enflamed passions of the people carry them “away from sound 
government into the violation of the rights of minorities and actions against the interest of the 
whole.”75 A regime dedicated to majority rule necessitated additional protections for minorities.  
Madison is however rather vague regarding the precise meaning of a “majority.” What does 
he refer to by a “majority” in a representative republic? He does not, for example, mention a threat 
posed by “the many” or the mob as the Ancients might have. A “majority” implies a political fact. 
It is the product of political process, whereas “the many” is a reality of demographics and society 
at large. The many might for example be actuated by common malevolent impulse toward a 
minority and yet fail to invade its rights because they lack a sufficient grip on the necessary levers 
of power. When Madison speaks of majority tyranny it is easy to conclude he is referring to a 
majority of the people at large tyrannizing over the few where government fails to control them. 
But he does not necessarily seem to be referring to ochlocracy, or the mob rule of Ancient 
democracies. The mechanism by which a majority, in a republic compared to a pure democracy, 
tyrannizes over minorities, is not identical.  It does not require a popular majority to achieve an 
electoral college majority in a presidential election, nor is a popular majority of society required 
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to gain a majority in the national legislature. Therefore, the central feature of this “majority” need 
not be a numerical majority of the population at large, but rather a large swath of society acting in 
coordination with a constitutional majority of those in power. Only a constitutional majority could 
have necessary weapons of government to tyrannize over a given minority. 
In a representative republic any given majority of society can only manifest its will through 
the instrumentality of their representatives. In a representative, as opposed to a pure, democracy 
the tyranny of the majority can only be achieved with the help of the elected few. Majority faction 
is achieved by combination, an alliance between a faction of the many and the few who govern. 
To successfully “invade the rights” of minorities requires a majority commandeer the instruments 
of government.76 A majority of ordinary citizens can only derive such power through an alignment 
of interests with those who wield the powers of government. Likewise, a constitutional majority 
of government must align with their constituents to remove checks and consolidate power. This 
concentration of power in government is fueled by public support and leads to encroachment and 
usurpation, usurpation to invasion.   
In a representative democracy, an interested majority is either a majority of government or 
a majority of the people able to coopt a constitutional majority. Large factions within and without 
government employ each other as mutual instruments to advance their interests at the expense of 
a given minority. Either the majority of society has captured a majority of representatives, or 
officeholders have succeeded in coopting the collective will of the people against a minority 
through demagoguery. Since Ancient times majority tyranny was often considered the product of 
an alliance between a champion and the people against the nation’s elites. The passions of the 
people would be exploited by “the ambition of enterprising leaders,”77 the demagogue, and the 
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“artful leader”78 Populist leaders come to power “by paying an obsequious court to the 
people…commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.”79 Majority tyranny in a representative 
government, is not so much mob rule, as a particular alliance of the many in society and the few 
in the halls of power. Solutions to the problem of majority faction lie in the extended republic and 
the Constitution’s system of countervailing forces. Demagogue must be set against demagogue, 
the ambitions of one must be set “against the ambition of the other.”80 
The first volume of The Federalist claims to provide the republican “remedy” for the 
problem of majority faction. This solution was the extended republic which would disperse and 
diffuse factions in such a way that they would be unable to coalesce politically into an overbearing 
majority. Despite the notoriety of the problem of the tyranny of the majority, Publius spends much 
more time in the second volume accounting for how government will control itself. The remedy 
was born out of the Federalist Party’s concerned for democratical instability. Meanwhile, 
addressing the problems of power concentrated was a nod to the powerful apprehensions of the 
Anti-Federalists. It was clear that the inefficiencies and instability of the Articles would likely be 
solved by the strong aristocratical nature of the national government proposed by the Federalists. 
Yet, the Anti-Federalists believed that this solution merely created new problems. Therefore, in 
The Federalist Paper’s transition from the Articles to the Constitution, the problem of faction was 
tipped from a threat posed by majorities in society to that of interested minorities in the halls of 
government. The second half of The Federalist is dedicated to confronting the problem of the few 
and explaining just how they will be “obliged” to govern themselves. Publius’ concerns now turn 
to those who rule and “forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their 
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important trust.”81 In a representative republic even the tyranny of the majority remains a special 
species of the problem of power in the hands of the few. The problem of government is that the 
same flawed nature that necessitates being ruled, must also rule.  
Despite Madison’s concern for majority tyranny and Hamilton’s hope that only 
meritocratic elites would occupy positions in the national government, both recognized the threat 
which arises from the elite few. Publius’ concerns about the dangers of concentrated power in the 
hands of the few and the need for government to control itself, make clear his concern regarding 
the threat posed by the few in power. Publius may be naive regarding threats posed by 
“socioeconomic elites” which might form a “natural aristocracy…despite the abolition of formal 
ranks and titles.”82 And yet he held no such naivety regarding those elites wielding the powers 
granted by the Constitution. John Adams, for example, focused more attention on threats posed by 
“the designs of intriguing aristocratic minorities” rather than majority tyranny.83  Thompson argues 
this difference is merely one of emphasis. Publius certainly recognized the necessity of binding 
the hands of those in power with a written constitution, which denies class distinctions and 
promotes the recognition of equal rights.84 To claim Hamilton and Madison did not recognized the 
central threat posed by the few is to misunderstand the mechanics of majority tyranny in a 
representative republic in which a constitutional aristocracy was anointed.    
Man’s “defect of better motives” poses a threat to good government emanating from those 
who rule and the people who are ruled. Human nature demonstrates that there “are not enough 
‘better motives’ to go around, not enough citizens and politicians who will be animated by motives 
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that rise above self-interestedness and the gratification of their own passions so as to get the work 
of government and society done.”85 Despite adherence to the principle of wholly popular 
sovereignty, elections turn out to be an insufficient guarantee of popular government. If elections 
represent an external check on government emanating from the people, such defects also demand 
internal “sentinels” and “auxiliary precautions” to constrain the rulers. The problem of how to 
regulate the people’s officials, once elected, is the problem with which The Federalist concerns 
itself in the second volume. The remedy is to be found in the “proper structure” of government.86 
The revolution of Modern political science was to make good government less dependent 
on the virtue of a given class, and more on the virtues of the arrangement of its powers. The Modern 
state was to be more impersonal than any Ancient republic. It stood as a set of offices and 
institutions, independent of and prior to particular holders of office. Rather than a mere vehicle for 
the ambition of rulers, it would be a constraint, as much as their instrument. Increasingly the central 
question regarding the nature of a given regime evolved from Who rules? to What system rules? 
And yet, any system, remains a form built of mortal matter. Despite a dependence on the people 
through periodic election, a lurking threat from the ambitions of the few remain. The Modern 
political science of Publius and the Founders sought to devise a regime whose institutions would 
both select and dictate the character of those who ruled.  
The constitutional order is designed for virtue of a certain kind to rise to the top. Publius 
makes several references to how the size of each branch and mode of election of each office will 
filter and refine potential candidates to those of good character. It is clear that he took this argument 
seriously, but also only so far. Certainly, Publius believed that without virtue good government 
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was impossible. The question remained: How to achieve it? In articulating a republican form of 
popular government, Publius was not only concerned to explain how elections would check those 
in power, but to illustrate how government would check itself, through the separation of powers, 
absent an impending election. The Constitution is designed to depend as little as possible on the 
native character of individual officeholders. The vice of an individual officeholder would be 
limited by duration of office, the dilution of their power by the total number of other officeholders, 
and by the potential checks and balances of divided government. As described by Publius, the 
Constitution does not merely presuppose their vice, it depends on it.  
The first solution was to leave offices open to all rather than depend on the uncertain virtue 
of a hereditary nobility. Aristotle and Machiavelli keenly observed that a blood-line nobility 
provided no guarantees of noble character. Nature dictates that the virtue of one man is not passed 
to his progeny through paternity. The Constitution does not recognize legally distinct classes or 
titles of nobility. There would be no classical hereditary nobility pre-ordained to rule the many. A 
“wholly popular,” constitution meant all offices would derive their authority, by means election, 
directly or indirectly, from all of the people. The people would elect officials, and officials could 
be drawn from all the people. Offices would be open to any man of merit. “The door,” to the halls 
of power, “ought to be equally open to all” says Hamilton.87 Drawing from the whole of society 
increased the likelihood of finding the few virtuous willing to rule. In No. 36 Hamilton says “strong 
minds in every walk of life... will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command 
the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from 
the society in general.”88 Hamilton is clearly aware of the distinction between inborn social class 
and human merit, and of the natural misalignment between the two found in every society. Opening 
 




the doors to all was the path to a natural aristocracy. The institutional arrangements of the 
Constitution will be responsive to human merit wherever it may be found.  
But another step remained necessary to avoid being dependent on the uncertain virtue of 
individuals. They hoped to devise a virtuous structure of government that would ‘make’ men good. 
Instead of the character of the ruling class defining the constitution of the political community, the 
Constitution would define the character of the rulers. The psychology, character and choices of the 
rulers would be restrained and channeled by something other than the people’s consent. There 
must be additional measures which would oblige government “to control itself.”89 This regime 
would not depend so much on the fortunes of which group came to power and their virtue. Rather 
the constitutional order was designed to take imperfect matter and make it sufficiently virtuous. 
The Constitution would use the very leverage of man’s own egoism, his ambitions and interests, 
against himself in order to regulate those same interests. Given the powers they wield, the 
ambitious are the only ones truly in the position to thwart the ambitious. 
The second volume of The Federalist is dedicated to an illustration of how the provisions 
of the Constitution are animated by the faculties of the human soul which motive men’s actions. 
Those provisions establish institutions, powers and procedures designed to make men act in accord 
with the constitutional good. These institutions are designed to encourage men of natural virtue to 
rise to office, and if necessary, to make men good who are naturally otherwise. The solution to the 
deficit of virtue was not to reach into man’s soul and change his nature, or enforce a stern education 
that would purge vice and habituate virtue. This solution is as destructive as letting man’s passions 
reign unchecked. Rulers capable of such remedies are themselves in possession of an unlimited 
and concentrated power which gives their own passions an unchecked reign. Instead it was 
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necessary to arrange institutional architecture to either leverage destructive passions against 
themselves, or channel, coopt and educate less destructive ones toward the constitutional good. 
Neither Hamilton nor Madison assumed that institutional architecture could be successful if 
dependent on self-interest and countervailing passions alone. Success also depended on fortifying 
and encouraging the relatively weak pull of moral sentiment and reason in order to generate virtue. 
This architecture would provide the hard undergirding of incentives and deterrents which would 
encourage those more delicate and benevolent faculties to flourish.   
What Publius describes in the second volume is the ordering of a constitutional republic. 
The challenge was to devise institutions which would simultaneously manifest republican 
principles in practical structures, and ensure they could actually withstand man’s limitations. Since 
moral and political principles do not enforce themselves, muscular institutions are necessary. This 
form of government originates with a written constitution dedicated in principle to the res publica, 
the public interest, or literally the common thing or property of the people.90 In forming such a 
regime there were two dimension of human nature that needed to be addressed as matters of 
principle and practice. As a “wholly” popular regime, on one hand, it must be arranged to recognize 
the equal rights of all. These rights were a product of nature, or Nature’s god. It must guarantee 
civil if not political freedom for all as a product of their common nature. On the other hand, despite 
this equality, history demonstrated to Publius and the Founders that the failure of ancient 
democratic republics was a product of their inability to properly manage political liberty. Ancient 
republics lacked constitutions with the structural fail-safes to guard against the passions of those 
in political power. In a Modern democratic republic, political liberty would be a privilege achieved 





in a fundamental sense limited. If efficacy and freedom were the principles of this regime it meant 
government must have the power to govern, but also the checks which restrain this power and 
preserve freedom.   
These checks are a function of moral principle and practical utility. The passionate and 
interested nature of men inclines those who rule to disregard the public good. The great problem 
Publius’ describes in framing government was to thwart the natural tendency toward tyranny which 
comes from the “concentration of several powers” in the same hands.91 Publius offers no doubt 
that the threat of tyranny was sown into human nature. The interested nature of human beings 
meant they would use and abuse power to fulfill their own desires if possible. The coincidence of 
opportunity, impulse, and power would result in the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest. The path 
from unchecked power to its abuse is traversed by predictable motives. Power unchecked will seek 
more power; unchecked power will be abused. Therefore, the only way for government to preserve 
the people’s rights and maintain its responsibly to them over time, is for it to be limited in its 
powers and scope.    
Limits on government are then required by man’s natural liberty and his limitations of 
virtue. The problem of government was the problem of the usurpation of power by a faction 
whether the few or the many. Limited government must solve the problem of faction. Publius 
speaks repeatedly of a “limited constitution” which represents a limited grant of power to 
government.92 Limited government, and its various strategies to constrain the passions and 
immediate interests of men, is the mechanism designed to supply man’s defect of better motives. 
The very nature of limited government means the regular exercise of government power manifests 
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as both a positive assertion, but also a negative check on that same power. Efficiency and 
impotence of government are two sides of the same coin.  
Constitutional limitations begin with a written constitution, with expressed powers, whose 
language and institutions are not a matter of opinion, and can be concretely referred to and litigated 
in political disputes. A written constitution limits the actions and impulses of those who governed 
by expressly enumerating the powers of government. This express grant of authority also defines 
powers government cannot arrogate to itself. Despite the claimed inherent powers of the executive 
lurking in the penumbra of the text, or found in a crisis, limitations on government are explicit. 
Government is limited by powers “herein granted,” as well as the Tenth Amendment which 
expressly provides that powers not granted, reside with the states. Despite the absence of the Bill 
of Rights during the publication of The Federalist, the Tenth Amendment makes explicit what 
Publius took for granted.  
Publius’ depiction of limited government is underwritten by a Newtonian paradigm93 
common to the day. Government was a system of forces set in motion by human psychology. 
Publius envisioned the individual soul and the civil society in mechanical metaphors as a series of 
forces and counterforces operating roughly in accord with psychological laws of nature.94 Soul and 
society were like a watch whose movements are caused by sufficiently regular, identifiable and 
therefore predictable motivational springs. Just as celestial bodies adhere to physical laws of 
motion, man and his institutions adhere to psychological laws derivative of universal needs and 
desires rooted in human nature. Employing a Newtonian metaphor of physical forces, Hamilton 
speaks of how “every political association” is formed like a machine with various concentrations 
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of power. The center has satellite powers, or what he calls superior and “inferior orbs” which 
operate through a “perpetual effort…to fly off from the common center.”95  
In Nos 47-51 Madison treats the structure and functions of government as so many quanta 
of power mechanically arranged in accordance with the perceived laws of power gleaned from 
experience. In his analysis of the separation of powers, very little space is actually dedicated to the 
specific function of each branch, executive, legislative and judicial. Instead, these functions are 
reduced to a distribution and arrangement of power. The goal was to properly partition and arrange 
not merely branches of government, but power itself. Government, writes Madison, consists of 
“several classes of power.”96 It consists of a “general mass of power” whose proper structuring 
requires the proper “distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts.”97 Power can 
be dispersed, power can be accumulated. Power must be sufficiently concentrated in order for 
government to perform its task, and sufficiently divided and constrained in order that it not 
overstep its proper limits.  
The Constitution is a kind of Newtonian machine of opposing forces. Government is in 
perpetual motion. Its actions always tend toward the accumulation of power and the overstepping 
of its “proper places.” If government is to be limited, there must be a counterposing force, an equal 
and opposite reaction toward this accumulation. Yet the only forces able to counteract government 
are the people who do not wield political power, and government itself. The central restraining 
features to limit government are “a dependence on the people” and the “auxiliary precaution” of 
the separation of powers.98 As a “wholly popular” regime” based on the “consent of the people.”99  
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Elections are the primary mode of consent and the expression of the people’s original sovereignty. 
The Constitution establishes an unprecedented universal suffrage as well as periodic elections of 
different duration. Only the states, whose representatives were sent to the national government, 
could define the standards of suffrage, not the national government itself. They are designed to 
provide regular opportunity for the people to express their political power and opinion by shaping 
the makeup and direction of the national government. Periodic elections make officeholders 
permanently accountable to the people and compel them to seek the people’s approval if they hope 
to achieve or maintain office. Elections force officeholders to recognize that the constitutional will 
of the people, as much as their own political acumen, is responsible for their power. The psychic 
pull of the people’s opinion can redirect the immediate impulses of officeholders toward their self-
interest rightly understood.  
Elections are, by themselves, insufficient remedy to the maladies to which republics are 
exposed. The people control who rises to office, but have no direct constitutional lever once there. 
Once the people’s opinion is registered, representatives rule until the next election. This defect of 
elections necessitates additional measures to control and limit government.100 This means that the 
mere sovereignty of the people, manifest through representational government is not enough to 
actually ensure their rule. Oddly, the history of democratical regimes illustrates the paradoxical 
principle a simple popular form of government is insufficient to actually achieve genuine popular 
sovereignty. The exterior provision of elections is insufficient. This is what Madison means when 
he speaks of the need for “auxiliary precautions.”  
The central precaution of the Constitution is the separation of powers in all its forms. In 
order to achieve and maintain limits, it would be necessary to contrive “the interior structure of 
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the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means 
of keeping each other in their proper places.”101 The great mass of government power would be 
partitioned into smaller powers, and these powers would in turn be set against themselves, if 
government is to remain limited. The separation of powers functions on the principle of “divide 
and conquer.” In a letter to Jefferson, Madison refers to “divide et impera,” as “the reprobated 
axiom of tyranny.”102 The irony of the separation of powers is that the unprincipled axiom 
employed by the tyrant to control the people, can be applied no less to control the source of the 
abuse of power. The “constant aim” of the principle of separation, in all “distributions of power,” 
is “to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the 
other.” 103   
Madison’s discussion of the workings of the separations of powers is underwritten by the 
mechanical analogy of forces and counterforces. The separation of powers seeks to divide and 
arrange power in a mechanical system of mutually counterbalancing forces. The goal of the 
separation of powers is to keep those “orbs” in place relative to the overall organization of the 
machine. The Constitution delegates power broadly. This allocation takes the whole of 
government’s power and divides it into fragmentary pieces of the whole. The separation of powers 
achieves limits on government not by diminishing the total sum of necessary powers, but through 
the division and special distribution of that sum total. Divided government limits power through 
the strategy of divide and conquer. When power is divided it is weakened and vice versa. 
Government energy and efficiency is only achieved with a broad constitutional consensus or 
majority, such as the concurrence of two or more branches. If the three branches illustrate the 
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separation within the national government, federalism illustrates the principle across the different 
governments. Federalism is a method of limiting power by dividing it between federal and state 
governments and setting them against themselves when necessary.  
The play of forces in government, its assertion of power, is dynamic. Government is 
portrayed as constantly expanding in power. It is an object in motion, constantly and naturally, 
attempting to use its powers to accumulate more power. Since government consists of dynamic, 
rather than static forces, it requires perpetual restraint. Likewise, the power of each department is 
always in action, always dynamic. The proper ordering of institutions “must furnish the proper 
checks and balances between the different departments.”104 Each assertion results in the 
consolidation of more power if not checked by an opposing force. This opposing force is of course 
naturally attempt to expand itself. If forces are properly pitted against one another, their natural 
expansion becomes the means by which both remain limited. The attempted expansion of one is, 
simultaneously, a check on the other and vice versa. Within this play of forces, there are three 
likely outcomes. First, a given power asserts itself unchecked, in which case it expands, and 
proceeds to encroach on and usurp other powers. Second, a given department loses power through 
encroachment and usurpation by other powers. Lastly, power is maintained in a balance through 
the perpetual action and dynamic equilibrium of assertion and checking. Madison warns that in 
republics, the historical tendency is that the legislature is “everywhere extending the sphere of its 
activities and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”105  
The principle of limited government necessitates active and ongoing checks to deter the 
expansion of power. Limited government is a parchment guarantee unless and until there exist the 
proper agencies empowered with the ability to actively check government, and interested enough 
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to motivate the checking action. “Mere declarations in the written Constitution,” writes Madison, 
“are not sufficient to restrain the several departments within their legal rights.”106 Madison speaks 
of the vital difference between the “theory” of the separation of powers in contradistinction to the 
“most difficult task” of providing “practical security” against encroachment of power between 
departments.107 This practical task, he writes, is the “great problem to be solved.”108 One power 
must have the constitutional means to control and limit the other in practice. In No. 51, Madison 
says, “the provision for defence must…be made commensurate to the danger of attack.”109  
How then was the separation of powers to lead to real checks and balances? It is actually 
clear that prior to the analysis done by Madison, the Convention and The Federalist Papers, the 
practical dimension of the separation of powers was not properly or fully understood. Despite the 
fact that all the state constitutions were in principle dedicated to limited government, and self-
consciously employed versions of the separation of power, few states hand actually devised their 
systems to achieve the aims they claimed their institutions were dedicated to. This resulted in 
parchment barriers between the branches of state government whose failures to achieve real 
separation are illustrated by Publius.  
Perhaps the most important feature of the separation of powers, is that it does not merely 
divide power, but sets those divided powers against themselves. “Power controlled or abridged,” 
says Hamilton, “is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controlled or 
abridged.”110 Yet, just how are parchment barriers transformed into effective practical checks? 
Only when powers are properly set against themselves can they check each other and limit 
 
106 No. 49.  
107 No. 48.  
108 Ibid. 
109 No. 51. 
110 No. 15.  
 
 527 
government. The secret to effective checks is that the partition of power cannot be absolute. This 
seemingly paradoxical conclusion, departed from Montesquieu, the “oracle” of divided power. 
The key was to not completely separate one branch from another, but to “mix” and “blend” them 
so a vital portion of their spheres of power overlap.111 
It would be necessary for each department to have a “partial agency” in each of the other 
departments.112 Instead of a total and clean separation, there must be overlapping spheres of 
influence were multiple departments contend over the same or similar powers and functions. This 
means each department cannot possess the whole if its own powers relative to its function. The 
legislative must have an element of executive and judicial power, while the executive must have 
some element of legislative and judicial power and so on. This overlapping results in similar 
powers being exercised concurrently between multiple departments. Overlapping powers are 
contested powers. Partial agency creates a site of contested powers where branches compete and, 
if no consensus emerges through a constitutional process, mutually restrain one another. Only 
through this partial agency can each department actually check the other. So long as sites of 
contested powers are maintained between branches, and the competing powers are effectively 
equal, they can, if necessary, neutralize each other’s attempted encroachments and usurpations. 
The Constitution’s lack of specificity regarding the scope of where one power begins and 
another ends, helps to encourage sites of contested power. The senate’s role in the confirmation 
process of presidential appointments is clear, but did that also mean they had power to fire or 
restrict the firing of an appointment? Likewise, the role of the Senate in passing treaties is equally 
clear, but what if a presidential administration simple establishes an unsigned agreement not 
technically called a “treaty” that amounted to much the same thing? Does the check of 
 




impeachment operate under a merely political standard of the interpretation of “high crimes and 
misdemeanors,” or is there a legally binding definition based on historical precedent, which 
constricts the legislature’s interpretation of those terms? What for example is the scope and limit 
of the executive’s discretion in selectively enforcing the laws of congress or the use of military 
force? In the 1831 decision, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court checked the state of 
Georgia, ruling its laws had overstepped its bounds and were in violation of established federal 
law. And yet, ambiguity arose over what lever of power the judiciary had to respond when Andrew 
Jackson retorted, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” 
The Constitution is not merely a blueprint for the mechanical arrangement of political 
functions and powers, but the orchestration of a psychological forces. Oft discussed are the 
political mechanics of institutional order, less reflected upon is the psychic dimension by which 
those instruments actually achieve their designed ends. The constitutional arrangement of powers 
is a system dependent on an underlying set of psychological assumptions and strategies. This 
despite Madison’s and Hamilton’s numerous depictions of how these arrangements are animated 
by a series of psychogenic forces and dynamics. At a deeper level, beneath the political veneer, is 
a mechanism designed as a strategic response to the regular and predictable motives of human 
nature. Institutions are actually designed to negotiate man’s psychological kinesthetics. The 
enumerated powers of the Constitution are “inventions of prudence” designed to channel and 
constrain, rather than transform, expected motivation and conduct.  
The Constitution is a mechanism of impulse control. It must provide safeguards against the 
tyranny, not only of concentrated powers, but of the passions which wield them. Its provisions 
must manage the conflicts which arise from the human psyche in order to establish good 
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government. 113 It must solve the “defect of better motives” through the proper distribution and 
arrangement of power. Properly order institutions provide external constraints in lieu of man’s 
internal lack of self-restraint.114 They manage those passions which pose a perennial threat to 
political order and liberty, while promoting and strengthening more vulnerable, but salutary, 
motives. Since the Ancient model of repressing the passions through severe moral education was 
rejected, the mechanics of power must harness potentially destructive passions in the service of 
the constitutional good. Lesser motivations would be regulated through representation and 
accountability made possible by periodic elections and the separation of powers.   
This Newtonian machine is a roughly law-abiding mechanism, operating according the 
reliable and predictable springs of human motivation to be expected when men are taken as they 
are. Publius’ observations of human nature led him to conclude political order cannot rely on 
motives men ought to have, but only on those they are likely to have, especially when granted 
power. Since men are primarily passionate and interested, they cannot restrain themselves through 
internal means alone. External regulation of the passions becomes necessary. Lacking internal 
restraint, a sophisticated system of external controls is required to mitigate and manage the 
impulses of those in power. Since government is “administered by men over men,” institutions 
must both contend with and depend on these same inclinations. To control human nature, it is 
necessary to obey human nature. Properly ordered institutions will “use human nature to control 
human nature, among both governors and governed, without requiring recourse to tyrannical 
coercion.”115  
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This psychological mechanism is built on a theory of motivation derived from Publius’ 
paradigm of the human mind and its three motivational faculties: reason, passion and interest. With 
this model in hand, he could identify the “laws” by which the machine would operate. By assessing 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of these motivations, he concludes that political order cannot 
reliably depend on reason, virtue or social passions for the consistent production of action in accord 
with the public interest. Passion is the perennial force. Of the passions ambition and the love of 
power pose the most vigorous threats. The law of political gravity was the motive of self-interest 
deriving from the passions. Like Newton’s laws of motion, men are naturally inclined to act 
according to their passions and interests, unless acted upon by some outside force which alters the 
trajectory of their thought and action. The various structures designed to limit government are 
actually designed to thwart destructive motives or, if possible, redirect them. Institutions provide 
incentives to encourage self-interest to align with the public interest. In case the passion cannot be 
channeled or reshaped, they must pitted against one another through a system of countervailing 
oppositions where motive is set against motive. The principle of the separation of powers is now 
applied to psychological forces of human motivation. The force of passion which deviates from 
the public good, must be met with an equal and opposite force of similar nature and magnitude. 
Publius identifies ambition and its love of power as the passion which represents the arch 
threat to the constitutional order. The task of the Constitution and its separation of powers is not 
merely to restrain and neutralize ambition, it must also harness it. Ambition sits at the nexus of the 
positive and negative functions of government. Ambition is an essential ingredient to govern, but 
also represents a threat to the governed. Great, potentially destructive, ambition is the passion of 
those few who rule. The Constitution is tasked with transforming the ambition of would-be rulers 
and tyrants and making them into genuine representatives, responsible to the people. Its goal is to 
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encourage or compel officeholders to recognize the alignment of their self-interest with the 
common one. This task depends on the character of officeholders. Yet, virtuous character is a 
scarce and unreliable commodity. Since men are not good, they would have to be “made good” 
when necessary by the “circumstances and situations” contrived by the Constitution’s arrangement 
of powers.  
The “defect of better motives” is a defect of human character. How can institutions 
compensate for this defect and make men good? Hume says “a remedy” for the ills of human 
nature, “can never be effectual without correcting” its propensity to prefer immediate interest to 
the remote public good.116 Since it is impossible to “change or correct any thing material” in human 
nature, “the utmost we can do is to change our circumstances and situations, and render the 
observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest and their violation our most remote.”117 To 
remedy such defects it was necessary to contrive constitutional “circumstances and situations” 
through the proper arrangement of powers, in order generate the correct motives and conduct of 
constitutional actors. It is necessary, says Montesquieu, for institutions to place men “in a situation 
such that, though their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless 
have an interest in not being so.”118 Properly arranged elections and the separation of powers are 
the two strategies employed to create the appropriate circumstances of choice and action.  
Knowledge of how human character responds to circumstance is gleaned through history. 
History is the story of a universal nature coming in contact with particular and wide-ranging 
conditions. Hume wrote history demonstrates “the constant and universal principles of human 
nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations” which acquaint us “with 
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the regular springs of human action and behavior.”119 The sweep of history provides the full range 
of circumstances, and therefore examples of the full breadth of human conduct, virtuous and 
viscous. Experience teaches good conduct is largely dependent on salubrious circumstance. Men 
are naturally inclined to do the right thing, when conditions are conducive to good conduct. The 
right conditions can make virtue easy. Publius and the Founders hoped to arrange constitutional 
circumstances in such a manner as to generate correct motive and conduct. Institutional 
circumstances can compel virtue where it does not grow naturally, or when it is corrupted by the 
powers of office. The first volume of The Federalist illustrates the institutional failures of 
premodern republics, along with the Articles of Confederation, to produce the appropriate 
circumstances conducive to good conduct, and hence institutional longevity. Having identified 
those circumstances, the Constitution is designed to establish them in perpetuity.  
The Constitution’s arrangement of the circumstances of each office, ordained by its 
enumerated powers, establishes a system of rewards and punishments. Properly ordered 
institutions anticipate predictable motives and actions and neutralize them through the proper 
arrangement of incentives and deterrents. Institutions represent Hobbes’ “common power” which 
encourages men to fulfill their duties by appealing to their hopes of gain and success, as much as 
their fears of failure and loss.120 Circumstances contrived by elections and the separation of powers 
are strategically designed to create a series of motivational pressures based on the system’s 
deployment of incentives and deterrents. Human beings seek rewards and desire to avoid 
punishment. Properly ordered institutions induce the appropriate pleasures and pains which 
provide the necessary motives to induce conduct consistent with the constitutional good.  Hamilton 
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says “the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct.”121 The distribution 
of pleasures and pains created by the orchestration of constitutional circumstance, is designed to 
deters officeholders from abusing their powers. Circumstances are designed to encourage them to 
relinquish their most extreme passions, and in the process, serve their own true interests. Men are 
made good by correctly orchestrated circumstances which incline them toward rewards consistent 
with the public good while deterrents are meted out on those who attempt to deviate from it.   
Institutional circumstances set up a system of countervailing passions, not only between 
branches, offices and individuals, but within a single individual. Operating within these 
circumstances, officials are pulled in different directions by different passions. The pull of 
divergent passions compels them to consider the benefits and costs of the considered alternatives. 
These circumstances of decision and action “activate and enhance passions out of which the 
virtuous directing sentiments are derived and through which they are enforced.”122 The primary 
countervailing passions are ambition and fear. Circumstances are arranged so ambition and fear 
constantly contend with one another in the mind of officials. Fear is the most common passion 
which enforces virtue. The primal motive is the fear of ‘punishment’, in the form of the loss of 
political power. The central reward is fulfilling one’s ambitions by means of attaining, maintaining 
and using those same powers. One must stay in office to enjoy its perquisites. Ambition and fear, 
reward and punishment are really just two sides of the same psychological coin. Desire for reward 
implies hope of gain, while fear of punishment implies the fear of losing that same reward.   
Constitutional circumstances must shape correct conduct by appealing to the correct 
psychological calculus of incentives and deterrents. Hobbes says “there must be some coercive 
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power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some 
punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant.”123 Fear of 
punishment must be more powerful than hope of illicit gain. Motive for right conduct only comes 
under circumstances in which the Damocles’ sword of the Leviathan hangs over the heads of those 
in power. In other words, if you want individuals to do the right thing, you do not establish an 
obligation or prohibition without the necessary power to effectively enforce it. One does not leave 
men unguarded with the object of their desire. Auxiliary precautions beyond moral principles are 
necessary. The stranger does not rob your house when the front door is locked. Publius would 
concur with the neighbor in Robert Frost’s poem Mending Wall. Only “good fences make good 
neighbors.” Only by contriving circumstances to compel proper conduct can institutions guarantee 
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2. “All That Government Will Admit…” 
 
The founder’s challenge, of properly ordering institutions, is a problem of human 
motivation. Government cannot depend on extraordinarily rare or insufficiently reliable motives. 
Institutions, and the circumstances they create, must provide what Hamilton calls, 
“incitements…to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.”1 They must fortify motivations 
human nature lacks in sufficient abundance by itself. These inventions of prudence must regulate 
and check the tempestuous passions residing within human nature. Proper ordering must provide 
external constraints for the internal deficiencies of the human soul. They must establish appropriate 
constitutional circumstances of choice in order to generate the right motives and conduct. In short, 
institutions must provide what human nature does not. What does it mean then, in practice, to 
supply the defect of better motives through institutions capable of contriving circumstances of 
choice and action in accord with the good of the people? How do the mechanics of the Constitution 
actually fulfill the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble?   
The challenge of the Constitution is to “reconcile the claims of the individual with the 
interests of the broader community.”2 Self-interest does not simply align with the public interest. 
Hume says the “original motive for the establishment of justice is self-interest.”3 The common 
guarantee of justice to all, is in the interest of all. And yet, self-interest is also served by 
transgressing against the public good and avoiding punishment.4 The Constitution must bend the 
interest of the individual toward the common one through the proper arrangement of powers. How 
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can the Constitution ensure this-worldly deterrents given men are naturally motivated to outrun 
justice? Rulers check the passions of the people. Given their love of power, their interests converge 
with their duties. The people are inclined to follow the dictates of justice because government 
establishes the circumstances of their existence through law. It is in the interest of the people to 
follow the law and in so doing avoid punishment. The avoidance of punishment is its own reward. 
It is much less clear how the interests of the rulers will be made to align with the common one.  
 The Constitution must contrive circumstances in order to harmonize self-interest and the 
public good. In No. 72 Hamilton says that the “best security for the fidelity to mankind is to make” 
the interest of officeholders “coincide with their duty.”5 The goal of the Constitution is to provide 
the necessary arrangement of circumstances and situations whose powers and barriers will educate 
and guide passions toward what Tocqueville called “self-interest rightly understood.” Only once 
the correct situations and circumstances are contrived by the correct political order are 
officeholders and society at large “encouraged” to abandon their impulses for their proper interests. 
Properly ordered institutions must encourage, and if necessary compel, officeholders to recognize 
the alignment of their self-interest with the common one. Rulers must be habituated by 
constitutional circumstances which establish the correct rewards and punishments, pleasures and 
pains, in order to bring about this alignment.  
The opportunities of office generate competing passions within officials which must be 
ordered by the circumstances of office. The countervailing function of elections and the separation 
of powers are not however simply intended to neutralize or thwart the asserted powers of the 
opposing office, but to pull and “educate” the motives of its occupant in the direction of the 
constitutional good. The countervailing strategy operates on the interpersonal and the intrapersonal 
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levels. The threat of external checks from other parties, manifests simultaneously as the checking 
passion of fear within the individual. The countervailing passions of fear and ambition serve as 
“opposite and rival interests,” within the souls of officeholders which supplies “the defect of better 
motives.”6 Ambition pulls officials toward immediate self-interest, while fear prods them toward 
the common one. One passion prompts individuals to act, the other retards and checks men’s 
actions. Few men have the daimonion of Socrates. They require circumstances to check them. Yet, 
the demands of government necessitate that its offices not prohibit action altogether. Therefore, 
vice is preempted through the threat of external checks. The circumstances of office prod this 
countervailing play toward what is constitutionally acceptable. Ambition is met by the equal and 
opposite force of fear. Self-interest rightly understood is achieved when ambition is correctly 
counteracted and tempered by fear as a consequence of the circumstances of office.  
The circumstances of office must be organized in such a way as to pull and align the 
passions and faculties of officials in harmony with the people’s interests. In No. 57 Hamilton says 
“Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which” representatives “will be bound 
to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people.”7 Hamilton refers to these psychological 
states as chords of motivation by which those in office are tethered to the people and pulled toward 
their good. Hamilton’s language harkens to the image of Plato’s divine puppet whose soul is 
actuated by strings which animates its actions in different and potentially contrary ways.  Plato 
describes how the passions within the divine puppet work “like tendons or cords, drawing us and 
pulling against one another in opposite directions toward opposing deeds,” either toward or away 
from the common interest.8 The problem as we have seen, is that these internal forces are not 
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intrinsically in harmony with one another or the people’s good. They represent disparate and 
conflicting sources of motivation, naturally pulling in opposite directions. The Federalist describes 
these chords, not as tethered to the gods, but to the people by means of the Constitution.  
The divergent tug of each string illustrates how different motivational sources guide men 
toward different objects of desire concurrently, and hence toward different courses of action all at 
the same time. As such only the proper orchestration of circumstances can bring them into 
harmony. The pulls of reason, duty, virtue and sympathy are soft, while the passions of self-love, 
ambition and the love or power or glory are ironclad. If reason is to have real efficacy over men’s 
actions, its internal pull, needs external allies. The pull of these more delicate forces of the soul 
are “in need of helpers.” 9 If constitutional circumstances can be arranged properly, the pull of the 
three faculties can work in mutual harmony with one another and avoid vice and conflict. The 
“sentinels” and “auxiliary precautions” of the Constitution will act as external constraints on the 
passions and assist reason in the process. Institutional circumstances must help overcome the pull 
of the passions and reinforce the pull of reason, duty and sympathy. 
Publius recognized ambition as the dominate and most problematic chord in the souls of 
those who rule. Untamed ambition is most powerful in its magnitude and destructive in is 
consequences. Thus, the love of power is the central problem of human character for political 
order. Publius identifies ambition as the arch-passion inimical to political order and prosperity. 
Following The Federalist, Becker says, “Ambition is the central problem for the American 
constitutional order, particularly the inequality of political ambition among the citizenry.”10 
Therefore the task of “restraining ambition becomes the proper function of the constitutional 
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government.”11 Government is the coupling of ambition and power concentrated; motive is given 
opportunity. The powers of government provide unparalleled weapons to man’s passions. Since 
government necessitates the existence of concentrated power, it raises the perennial “possibility of 
ambition.”12 Ambitious men are necessary to the existence and administration of government. Yet, 
ambition comes in many forms. Ambition, as the love of domination, is a malignant passion and 
the source of tyranny. 
 The Federalist distinguished between the few and the many by confining “ambition to 
institutional roles bound to serve the ordinary and normal interest of constituencies not inclined, 
or expected, to see beyond their own narrow self-interest.”13 Often those who seek office, not only 
seek to govern, but to dominate others and oppress them. The problem is that they do not merely 
seek to govern other men in the public interest, but to dominate them in order to satisfy their own 
desires. The Founder’s concerns regarding the concentration of power were caused by their 
suspicions of human nature and its motives when given sufficient power to satisfy them. The 
challenge resides in the fact that there are men who will satisfy their passions before their duties. 
Publius recognizes that there are some able and willing to subordinate their passions to their duties, 
but that “this stern virtue is the growth of few soils.”14 Madison recognizes that government must 
control itself. Echoing Madison, Epstein says that “the issue of constitutionalism is just this: how 
to constrain the misconduct of the sovereign while allowing him the necessary power to keep peace 
 
11 Jeffrey A. Becker. Ambition in America: Political Power and the Collapse of Citizenship. Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2014. p. 47.  
12 David F. Epstein. The Political Theory of The Federalist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. pp. 193, 
197.  
13 Jeffrey A. Becker. Ambition in America: Political Power and the Collapse of Citizenship. Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2014. p. 47. 
14 No. 73.  
 
 540 
and good order.” 15 For government “to control itself” the ambitious who hold the reins of power 
must be rule by something other than the force of their own passions.  
The problem of popular government is solved then, by harnessing and channeling ambition 
through its institutions. Mansfield says that the Constitution arranges offices in such a way to use 
“interest to produce virtue.”16 The magnitude and regularity of ambition when coupled with 
political power means that the only human motivation that can be relied upon to check it, is the 
ambition of another. Publius chooses what he believes is the only solution commensurate to the 
force of the passions, amongst the alternatives to controlling political vice. The problem of the 
regularity and magnitude of ambition when coupled with power necessitates the permanent 
division and separation of powers so that power and the passions cannot conspire without check. 
The Constitution seeks to “break and control” this passion through institutional checks. The 
challenge resides in the magnitude of the passions generally and ambition in particular. The nature 
of ambition is such, that it can only be checked by another ambition.  
Countervailing passions must be leveraged to control each other. The separations of powers 
turns out to be an arrangement in which the passions of those who govern are ‘conquered’, by 
being divided and arranged. Through this strategy ambition will be contained in a system of 
countervailing passions where ambition must “counteract ambition.” The only force with the 
sufficient magnitude to thwart and restrain passion, is passion itself. The strategy of mechanically 
counterpoising ambition is not merely to check this passion, however. “Ambitious men,” 
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Mansfield observes, “need to be counteracted by other ambitious men, but still perhaps as much 
to bring out their virtue as to prevent them from doing wrong.”17  
The ambitious are not simply thwarted by checks and balances, their motives are pulled from the 
lower to the higher as they identify their true, over their immediate, interests in the face of the 
circumstantial pressures of office. The foreseen threat of a check, rather than its execution, is often 
enough to guide most men to rethink just where their interests really lie. Having the noose around 
one’s neck allows one to think clearly about the alternatives. Given they ambitious seek 
recognition, officials will be encouraged to seek notoriety through positive rather than negative 
avenues.  
The solution to the defect of better motives is a system of countervailing passions which 
check or channel one another when necessary. As Madison describes, it is not merely a system of 
divided power, but of counterbalancing interests and passions. If the greatest threat to liberty and 
stability is posed by an unchecked concentration of power in the service of the ambitions of the 
rulers, then their passions must be restrained. This will be achieved by two forces, a “dependence 
on the people” through periodic election, and the “auxiliary precautions” of the separation of 
powers. Both are part of the system of countervailing forces. The only way to control power is to 
threaten it with the loss of power by some constitutional mechanism such as, for example, the need 
for reelection, impeachment or some other check. Such potentialities have the power to tame 
ambition and make it responsible to the people. Therefore the system of “rival and opposite 
interests” is as evident in the psychological kinesthetics of elections as much as the separation of 
powers. Through elections, the Constitution is able to provide a necessary, but not sufficient, 
external check through regulating circumstances of time and power in order to provide one set of 
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motives for officeholders to act on behalf of their immediate constituencies and the nation at large. 
Meanwhile the separation of powers provides a perpetual internal check to curb power once in 
office. Through the checks of election and the separation of powers, men are compelled to curb 
their desires and pursuit their true interests. 
At the Virginia Ratifying Convention Madison said “that the people will have virtue and 
intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom…If there be sufficient virtue and intelligence in 
the community, it will be exercised in the selection of these men. So that we do not depend on 
their virtue, or put confidence in our rulers, but in the people who are to choose them.”18 The very 
existence of elections indicates that it is not expected that the people have perpetual confidence in 
their representatives. Elections have consequences which compel prospective officeholders and 
incumbents alike to respect the will of the people. The constitutional circumstances created by 
elections compel officeholders to identify with the passions and interests which animate the 
people’s opinions. They help guarantee the interest of the official is served by fulfilling their duty 
and maintaining fidelity to the people’s voice.  
In No. 52 Hamilton says it is essential to liberty that government “should have a common 
interest with the people.”19 Without a “communion of interest, and sympathy of sentiments” 
between the people and their representatives “every government degenerated into tyranny.”20 The 
people’s passions and interests are given constitutional force through elections. Elections attempt 
to give the people the title of kingmaker. The ambitious never succeed completely by their own 
virtue. They are always dependent on those on whose backs they rose to power. Hamilton says 
“dependence” on the people will be “effectually secured” through frequent elections.21 
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Dependence on the people in achieving their ambitions, encourages gratitude, and reminds 
officials to respect the people’s will. This dependence compels officeholders to be concerned with 
the fate of the people. The election process habituates officeholders to recognize how their 
electoral fate is bound to the fate of the people. The opinions of the people are in turn generated 
by the conditions of existence over which representatives have influence. A representative will be 
concerned with the people because his destiny as a man and politician is tethered to the opinions 
of those who placed him in office.  
Publius’ analysis of the psychological dynamics of elections illustrates how hard 
constitutional checks work synergistically with the natural, if weak, social propensities of human 
nature. The opportunities and threats posed by the election cycle help to engage the reason and 
moral sentiments of those desirous of office, and encourage their sympathy and identification with 
the people. Without the compulsion of the election cycle the faculties of reason and moral 
sentiments would remain largely dormant. Sympathy between the people and their representatives 
is only established and fortified through coercion and the uniform rule of law. The laws made by 
the legislator apply equally to themselves as to the people. Hamilton says that the “strongest bonds” 
which “can connect the rulers and the people together” which will restrain legislators from passing 
“oppressive measures” is that they can “make no law which will not have its full operation on 
themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society.” 22 In No. 35 Madison 
says, “This dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws 
to which he gives his assent, are the true, and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the 
representative and the constituent.”23 The equal application of the same laws to all, creates national 
unity and, out of unity, degrees of sympathy. Sympathy is, in part, a product the recognition of 
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human equality before the law and the denial of feudal estates. Through the uniformity of law, all 
citizens, rulers and ruled alike, are truly made one people. To the extent possible, one constitution 
with one uniform rule of law allows sympathy to harmonize the interests of all.  
The pull of sympathy will be one ingredient keeping elected officials responsible to the 
will of the people. Elections are designed to provide chords of sympathy between the people and 
their representatives. Elections encourage the various chords and faculties of the souls of 
officeholders to be pulled in unison, by the same passions, and in the same direction as their 
constituencies, creating degrees of psychic harmony. Sympathy with the people translates into 
“responsibility to the people.”24 Hume understood that “the original motive and the natural 
obligation to obedience to government is self-interest,” but that a man’s sense of moral obligation 
and approbation comes from “a sympathy with the public interest.”25 This is only possible when 
elected officials have an “immediate dependence on” the people.”26 The psychic pull of the 
people’s opinion, coupled with the hard parameters of the Constitution, can redirect the immediate 
impulses of an officeholder in a general alignment with the interests of the people.  
Elections activate and orchestrate several chords of motivation within the souls of 
officeholders. Dependency created by elections gives voice to the people’s passions, and primes 
sympathy and social sentiment in their representatives. With these necessary reinforcements, 
reason is able to win the battle with the passions. The Constitution provides the electoral 
circumstances to encourage all those chords to pull on the representatives in the same direction 
toward good conduct. These circumstances include the nature and powers of a given office, as well 
as the mode and duration of election. Under the electoral constraints of the Constitution, the 
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dominate passions of the people will guide the motives and conduct of officeholders.27 The mild 
pull of reason, guarantees that it can only act as the guide and rudder of human conduct if assisted 
by raw passions and which counteract the raw ambitions of officeholders and social sentiments 
inclined in the direction of reason. While neither are good in themselves, elections allow the 
people’s passions to serve as a countervailing force to the raw ambitions of those in office. In this 
way, the people’s passions help steer officials toward their self-interest rightly understood. 
Another circumstance is represented by the varying degrees of proximity and distance to 
the people of each office. This proximity or distance created by the mode of election and the nature 
of the constituency of the office which create varying degrees and types of sympathy. The role of 
sympathy is most evident in the numbers on the House of Representatives, the branch closest to 
the people and mostly likely to be motivated by such sentiments. Hamilton and Madison argue the 
period and mode of election, the total number of congressmen, and their geographical closeness to 
the people will be sufficient to establish a “due sympathy between the representative body and its 
constituents.”28 Hamilton indicates such constitutional constraints will inspire in congressmen 
feelings of “duty, gratitude, interest, ambition” which will serve as “the chords by which they will 
be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people.” 29 The Constitution will 
foster a “temporary affection” and gratitude in representatives toward their constituents as a 
product of the people elevating them to office.30  
Elections will compel sympathy by exploiting the fears and ambitions of officeholders. The 
external check of the people’s passions, registers as the internal check of the fear of not gaining or 
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losing power in the souls of officials.31 Here the system of countervailing forces works in a 
complimentary manner both between and within individuals simultaneously. Fear and ambition 
are the tools exploited by the circumstance of periodic election which help guarantee, to the extent 
possible, the convergence of interests between government and the people. Fear and ambition only 
coincide through the force applied by constitutional circumstances. Ambition and fear are 
reciprocal passions. Ambition represents an individual’s most extreme hopes he seeks to achieve, 
while fear represents the direst consequences he hopes to avoid. These primal passions are psychic 
chords activated by the rewards and punishment of circumstances of elective office. The powers 
of office are the instruments of their ambition. Fear, is the fear of losing the opportunities presented 
by the powers of office. An elections loss, is a loss of power representing the political “death” of 
the individual officeholder. Fear is provoked by anything which threatens the reelection of 
officeholders. Fear is generated by the threat of losing the very power which is the pathway to 
achieving their ambitions. Thus, in electoral politics, the first priority is self-preservation. They 
seek to maintain office, by appealing in some fashion to the people, before all else.  
If an officeholder desires to continue in office, “his wishes” conspire “with his fears.”32 
The threat an election loss compels officeholders to respect the liberties of the people. Hamilton 
says the threat of the failure to win reelection provides “the inducements of good behavior.”33 
Ideally, the Damocles sword of fear encourages them to use their powers in ways that do not 
deviate too far from the interests of the people, the law and the Constitution itself. Fear helps pull 
the chord of ambition and direct it toward an object in conformity with the interests of the people. 
Fear of losing office trains his ambitions to choose constitutionally acceptable objects. Fear 
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sharpens his reason and provokes moral sentiments, if for no other reason, than it is in his interest 
to heed their pull.  
Perhaps the clearest explanation of the psychological impact of elections in found in 
Hamilton’s discussion of the term of the presidency and the possibility of reelection. All terms of 
office, excluding the life tenure of judges, are based on a minimum duration to become acquainted 
with the office, yet are short enough to prevent them from ever becoming too sure of their own 
power. The Convention had contentiously debated whether the president should serve a single 
seven-year term or consecutive four-year terms predicated on reelection. On one hand, Hamilton 
argues the occupant of the presidency will take greater care of an office held for a significant 
duration. Hamilton say that it “is a general principle of human nature that a man will be interested 
in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which 
he holds it; will be less attached to what he hold by a momentary or uncertain title, that to what he 
enjoys by a durable or certain title.”34 Hamilton acknowledges that if the occupant of the executive 
is aware “that in a very short time he must lay down his office,” he “will be apt to feel himself too 
little interested in it to hazard any material censure or perplexity from the independent exertions 
of his powers.”35 Publius and the Convention concluded that the four year duration of the office 
meant that it would be held neither too securely nor too loosely. It was long enough for 
officeholders to feel sufficient possession, yet short enough to be constantly reminded that their 
hold on office remains dependent on the people.  
Jefferson had said that “when the government fears the people there is liberty.” Fear of 
losing office is connected with accountability to the people by means of the ballet box. The 
abandonment of the single term in favor of indefinite reelection is central to maintaining the 
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executive’s adherence to the Constitution and the people’s interests. Most men would feel “less 
zeal in the discharge of a duty” when they know it “must be relinquished at a determinate period” 
whereas the “hope of obtaining by meriting a continuance” of office creates the “inducements to 
good behavior” which allow their interests to coincide with their duties.36 The possibility to be re-
elected engages the desire to remain in office, and this passion coupled with fear of losing power 
encourages modifications of passions that tend toward the abuse of power. The avaricious man, 
writes Hamilton, denied the possibility of reelection “would feel a propensity…to make the best 
use of his opportunities, while they lasted; and might not scruple to have recourse to the most 
corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory.”37 And yet, that very same 
man of avarice, given opportunity of reelection, “might content himself with the regular 
emoluments of his station, and might even be unwilling to risk the consequences of an abuse of 
his opportunities.”38  
Add to this,” writes Hamilton, “that the same man might be vain or ambitious as well as 
avaricious. And if he could expect to prolong his honours by his good conduct, he might hesitate 
to sacrifice his appetite for them, to his appetite for gain. But with the prospect before him of 
approaching an inevitable annihilation, his avarice would be likely to get the victory over his 
caution, his vanity, or his ambition.”39 If he can serve but a single term he will recognize that “no 
exertion of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome reverse,” and he may “violently 
tempted to embrace a favourable conjuncture for attempting the prolongation of his power, at every 
personal hazard, than if he had the probability of answering the same end by doing his duty.”40 
 







This ambitious man might threaten the very constitutional order if not given the opportunity to 
reelection. 
Hamilton’s example could not more clearly illustrate the way correctly organized 
circumstances channel immediate interests toward right conduct through the logic of 
countervailing passions. The circumstances of reelection allow for the strategy of countervailing 
passions to play out within the individual. It is not his high sense of duty, but rather his avarice 
which “might be a guard upon his avarice.”41 Thus, his appetite a check on his appetite. Meaning, 
his interests and his appetites are best served by partially curbing them in conformity with the 
expectations of office. His avarice is best served by subordinating itself to the will of the people 
in order to guarantee his continued slaking of his passions in a constitutional modified and 
acceptable form.  
The Constitution was designed to provide the “dykes and dams” necessary to restrain and 
channel the raw passions of the human soul while amplifying its virtuous elements in the cause of 
the preservation of liberty.42  Achieving this task was a matter of an institutional design that would 
provide the proper circumstances to encourage right motive and therefore, right conduct. This task 
might not have been so difficult had they not also sought to achieve it under the principles of liberty 
and popular sovereignty. The Constitution’s arrangement of powers represents the “republican 
remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.”43 This means it is the popular 
solution to the historical ills of popular government. The solution to the weakness of democracy 
proposed by Publius and the Founders, was not more democracy, but a smarter form of democracy, 
a constitutional republic.  
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The appropriate constitutional mechanisms would be necessary to preserve popular 
sovereignty and simultaneously mitigate its ills. This solution maintains the principle of majority 
rule by attempting to solve the very weaknesses of the rule of the majority. Between the 
experiences of history and the trials and tribulations of the nation under the Articles of 
Confederation, the malady of popular government was identified as the usurpations made by 
interested legislatures and their majorities. Without the commensurate checks, legislatures tended 
to draw “all powers” of government “into its impetuous vortex.”44 The proof that Publius and the 
Founders identified the legislature as the central source of the ills of popular government is evident 
in the fact that they did not merely divide it against other branches of government, instead they 
made sure it was the only branch divided against itself. The diseases incident to republican 
government are caused by human limitation, the passionate nature of man. The periodic nature of 
elections is shown however to be an insufficient popular remedy to constrain passions and inspire 
sympathy and virtue. Elections cannot directly protect the people from ambitious rulers until the 
next ballot they cast. That is, if they are able to cast a meaningful ballot when the next election 
cycle rolls around. In the meantime, much can happen. Where is this restraining force to come 
from the day after elections if not from the people themselves?   
Looking at the totality of the Founder’s project, they devised a series of core structures to 
establish properly functioning government, and restrain those who govern. As a republican order 
it is rooted in the popular sovereignty of all the people. All are eligible for office and popular 
consent is registered through suffrage left undefined by the Constitution as a prerogative of the 
states. The extended republic would disperse and diffuse factional conflict, and a composite 
republic devised on the principles of federalism would divide power between national and state 
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governments. Lastly, the final checking capacities were provided by the separation of powers, 
three branches of government divided and set against themselves. In fact, the separation of the 
branches is only one special instance of the separation of powers. The dividing of various powers 
which are set against each other is a condition which exists between individual officeholders, 
branches, and states alike. All examples of the separation of powers are underwritten by the same 
psychological strategy to mitigate the passions, and stave off tyranny. This strategy is what 
Madison calls the “policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better 
motives,” which he says “might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as 
well as public.”45 The appreciation of this system is typically confined to the separation of political 
power and government functions, but as Madison says, it can be traced through the entire system 
of the Constitution’s arrangement of powers. The principle of the separation of powers is based on 
the underlying psychological principle of employing “opposite and rival interests” which mutually 
counteract one another through the entire system of government and society. In No. 5 Hamilton 
speaks of the “the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions”46 The principle of 
countervailing passions, or what Madison called the setting of “opposite and rival interests” against 
one another, is at the heart of every political strategy of impulse control found in the Constitution.  
The Constitution supplies the external remedy to the internal defect of better motives 
through the strategy of countervailing passions.47 This strategy is the solution to the “defect of 
better motives” lacking in human nature. This system is at the heart of all the structures of the 
Constitution, not merely the separation of the three branches. Given Madison’s emphasis in Nos. 
47-51, coupled with the need to allay the fears of the Anti-Federalists, the separation of branches 
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is presented as the most significant manifestation of the strategy to limit government. The 
provisions of the Constitution needed to be based on motives more reliable and durable than 
reason, virtue or moral sense. “Nothing,” says Hume, “can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, 
but a contrary impulse.”48 Since the passions are the strongest spring of human conduct, they can 
only be counteracted by the equal and opposite force of other passions.  
Oddly this places the passions, not reason, as the central focus of The Federalist’s 
psychological account of man. A system of countervailing passion is perhaps the most reasonable 
way of counteracting a force typically stronger than reason itself while, at the same time 
maintaining liberty. Reasonable institutions, which prudently recognize reason’s limits, would 
contain the passions by playing them off against one another. This solution harkens to their 
skepticism that either reason or moral sentiment have sufficient efficacy to restrain men, especially 
when holding the reins of power. Countervailing passions oddly preserves liberty, yet restrains the 
problematic consequences of the passions precisely because they are checked by an equal and 
opposite force. The Constitution channels these forces in order to promote the virtue necessary for 
the public good, without making excessive or unrealistic demands on human nature.   
The principle of countervailing passions arose in the 17th century “on the basis of its sober 
view of human nature and of a general belief that the passions are dangerous and destructive.”49 
The countervailing paradigm was shared by a disparate group of thinkers from Bacon and Spinoza 
to members of the British, Scottish and French Enlightenments. All agreed that reason, virtue and 
duty where defective as sure motives because they lacked power and consistency in most 
circumstances. By the 18th century “both human nature and the passions came to be widely 
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rehabilitated.”50 Man, it was said was more “more wild than wicked.”51 John Adam himself had 
said that it was “weakness rather than wickedness” which defined human nature.52 This 
rehabilitation of the passions intensified among the French particularly in the more radical stages 
of the Enlightenment. Rousseau and Helvétius went so far as to praise passion over reason. For 
most moralists and statesmen, including Publius, this rehabilitation did not result in the passions 
being considered benign simply. Rather taking men as they are, meant abandoning either extreme 
distain for what they are, or excessive hope in something they are not. Indeed, this rehabilitation 
altered the strategic approaches of morality and politics in coping with the challenges posed by the 
passions. Rather than condemning them and imposing repressive moral strategies, they needed to 
be accepted and employed to beneficial effect.  
Statements asserting the superior force of the passions and the necessity of checking 
passion with passion abound in the Enlightenment. Hirschman considers Spinoza the “first great 
philosopher” to give “pride of place to the idea that passions can be fought successfully only 
through other passions” but had no intention of “translating this idea into the realm of practical 
moral or political engineering.”53 Spinoza, following Descartes was the first to treat man’s moral 
life in the tropes of mechanical forces and physical nature. In this spirit, Spinoza called passions, 
“affects.” Speaking the language of mechanics, Spinoza writes, “An affect cannot be restrained 
nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger affect.”54 Hume took this logic to the extreme, 
denying reason’s efficacy, saying that “it is the passions and the passions alone” which motive 
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human beings.55 “Nothing,” wrote Hume, can oppose impulse, “but a contrary impulse.”56 Given 
Hume’s denial of reason’s efficacy, the assertion that only passion can counteract passion, 
necessarily followed. Baron d’Holbach meanwhile stated that “The passions are the true 
counterweights of the passions; we must not at all attempt to destroy them, but rather to direct 
them: let us offset those that are harmful by those that are useful to society. Reason…is nothing 
but the act of choosing those passions which we must follow for the sake of our happiness.”57 
Helvétius meanwhile said that moralists and statesmen must “know how to arm our passions 
against one another…for the purpose of having their counsel adopted…that only a passion can 
triumph over a passion.”58 “No affect can be restrained,” Spinoza wrote, “by the true knowledge 
of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.”59 The central 
message of Spinoza’s teaching on countervailing passions, was that mere wisdom and parchment 
principles alone cannot thwart passion and vice, only the forces of passion and vice, wisely 
deployed, can counteract one another.  
The psychological observation of the unrivalled strength of the passions was then translated 
into a theory asserting that the passions ought to be set against one another in order to achieve 
psychological, social and political order. The recognition of the relative weakness of both reason 
and the moral sentiments, meant the passions where the prime mover of human conduct. This made 
them the bedrock of the theory of countervailing forces. Given that the passion were the strongest 
motors of conduct, only a passion could neutralize a passion. Fire must be fought with fire. Passion 
ought to be set against passion, vice against vice, interest against interest, and so on. By “playing 
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one off against the other,” the passions would control and regulate one another. 60 If destructive 
passions must be neutralized, only the equal and opposite force of another passion, no less 
destructive on its own, was necessary. And yet, if rival passions were given the proper 
circumstances in which to contend, they could neutralize one another and even yield a virtue of 
sorts.  
Once it was recognized as the soul’s strongest force, and that they should be pitted against 
one another, the question remained of the mechanics of just how countervailing passions resolved 
themselves in relation to the other faculties of mind. Hume writes that whether “the passion of 
self-interest is considered “vicious or virtuous,” is irrelevant, “since itself alone restrains it.”61 He 
says that “if it be virtuous, men become social by their virtue; if vicious, their vice has the same 
effect.”62 Hume writes, “There is no passion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested 
affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction. Now this alteration must 
necessarily take place upon the least reflection.”63 Thus the “alteration” of the direction of a passion 
first requires the equal and opposing force of another passion. The opposing passion does the 
“grunt work” of opposition. Even Hume does not deny, once in place, that the alteration of conduct 
through countervailing passions did not involve a modicum reason or moral sentiment. Hume says 
this alteration occurs under the “least reflection.” As we have seen, reason and moral sentiment, 
do not play the role of opposing and thwarting the passions, but rather as provide a guide and 
rudder to conduct once operating in the slipstream of their gale. When circumstances have been 
correctly orchestrated to counterpoise passion against passion, reason and moral sentiment are able 
to pull and direct the course of motive and action. With passion counteracting passion, men to 
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come to the realization with these helpers, that their ambitions are best served by pursuing their 
self-interest rightly understood.  
The logic of countervailing passions was a well-worn trope of moral philosophy by the 
time of its formulation in The Federalist Papers. The logic of countervailing forces which would 
maintain one another in dynamic equilibrium, was a principle of physics and kinesthetics, while 
that of countervailing passions, was its psychological analog. The hope was that a countervailing 
system “would pit one passion against another…to the benefit of man and mankind.”64 Originally, 
the notion of countervailing passions was a psychological theory concerned with “problems of 
individual conduct” which was “imported back” into schemes of political order.65 This theory was 
primarily geared toward observation and analysis, not action. The strategy of countervailing 
passions “laid the intellectual groundwork for the principle of separation of powers” in all its guises 
in the Constitution.66 The novelty of Publius’ formulation was to treat this theory as something 
more than an analytical tool to describe the workings of government, society or individual 
psychology. They took this theory and made it “flesh,” by transforming it into a practical political 
strategy manifest in the provisions of the Constitution. Never before had this theory been so 
concretely applied to the actual building of a political edifice. The innovative use of the principle 
of countervailing passions by Publius resides in a few related facts. First, he appropriated an 
internal model of countervailing passions within the individual and applied it externally across 
individuals and factions, offices and branches. Additionally, he illustrated a how a strategy of 
moral psychology could be designed and redeployed to achieve efficacy in matters of political 
power. Lastly, his achievement rests on the mechanical specificity with which he explains just how 
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this psychological strategy is employed and embedded in the concrete institutions of government, 
which would soon shape American character and history. 
The principle of countervailing passions was neither unknown, nor new, to the Convention 
participants as a whole. Nor was Publius’ exposition an ex post facto rationalization of 
constitutional logic, designed to gussy up mere partisan horse trading with glossy intellectual 
veneer. In his Lectures on Moral Philosophy, John Witherspoon wrote, “every good form of 
government must be complex, so that the one principle may check the other.”67 It was of course 
optimal, he wrote, to have as much virtue in a political community as possible, but it was “folly to 
expect that a state should be upheld by integrity in all who have a share in managing it.” 68 
Therefore, said Witherspoon, government “must be so balanced, that when every one draws to his 
own interest or inclination, there may be an over poise upon the whole.”69 On Tuesday, July 2, 
1787, Gouverneur Morris gave a speech at the Philadelphia Convention employing much the same 
language as Witherspoon and Madison’s No. 51. Morris succinctly articulated the principle of 
countervailing passions, saying, “Vices as they exist, must be turned against each other.”70 On July 
11, Morris himself, paraphrased Madison saying that “the political depravity of men” necessitates 
“checking one vice and interest by opposing to them another vice and interest.”71 He acknowledged 
that the “checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the other branch, one interest 
must be opposed to another interest.”72 Madison and the Convention had already gone through 
numerous rehearsals of this language before it appeared in print in the numbers of The Federalist.  
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The Founders’ belief in the correctness of the strategy of countervailing passions was the 
product of their realistic view of human nature, what Morris called man’s “political depravity.” 
Various redescriptions of the passions however, did not make them good simply. From the 
perspective of Publius and the Founders, it mattered little whether man was “weak”, “wild” or 
“wicked.” Vices where vices, whatever their cause. Regardless of their precise characterization, 
his passions represented the central threat to social and political order and harmony. The question 
remained, just how to employ this undeniable psychological force. Hume wrote statesmen cannot 
wait for a “miraculous transformation of mankind,” which “would endow them with every species 
of virtue, and free them from every species of vice.”73 Instead wrote Hume, the magistrate “cannot 
cure every vice by substituting a virtue in its place.” Instead, the only solution is to “cure one vice 
by another.” 74 The acceptance of countervailing passions is predicated on the rejection of the 
general efficacy of reason. Reason’s all too mild voice necessitated the neutralizing and taming of 
passions by pitting them against themselves. Given the dominance of the passions, virtue was less 
and less considered a product of the rule of reason, but instead made possible once destructive 
passions had neutralized themselves. This did not mean that the passions were good in themselves, 
or that reason played no role. Rather such conclusions addressed the problem of what force in 
man’s faculties might be able to mitigate the worst effect of the passions. Such observations of the 
defects of human motivation befell the citizen and the statesman, no less than the political scientist 
and founder investigating political phenomena and seeking the best possible order.   
Once the principle of countervailing passions was articulated as a psychological 
phenomenon, it was then turned around as a strategy for the ordering political power and 
 





institutions. The connection between the psychological theory and the political theory of 
countervailing forces is found in the intersection between the passions of rulers and the powers of 
their office. “Eternal experience,” writes Montesquieu, “shows that all men who have power come 
to abuse it, and this they will do to the limits of their power.” 75 Power in the hands of appetite 
unrestrained is the source of the abuse of power and the road to tyranny. Montesquieu asserted that 
“the abuse of power is greatest when laws do not anticipate it.”76 To say that mortal men rule, is to 
say political power they wield is always a potential instrument of their appetites, unless 
circumstances of office are properly ordered to provide the necessary checks on those very 
passions. Taking men as they, the goal was not to change this fact, but only to properly account 
for it. Once the precise role of the passions is understood vis-à-vis the abuse of power, properly 
ordered institution can arrange circumstances to anticipate and counteract them. “So that none can 
abuse power,” Montesquieu writes, “we must arrange, by the disposition of things, that power shall 
check power.” 77 If ordered liberty requires that power check power on the political level, passion 
must also check passion on the psychological one. The inevitable combination of the ingredients 
of power and passion in those who govern, only reasonable strategy for limiting power is to set the 
rulers against themselves. In this observation, the separation of powers is born.  
The underlying logic of the divided powers is not only to thwart the concentration of power 
generally, but to prevent the accumulation of different types of power in the same hands.78 Not 
only will an individual, office or branch be denied the general mass of power yielded to 
government, they will be prohibited from performing all its functions, legislative, executive and 
judicial. This prohibition stems from another psychological observation regarding the influence of 
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man’s passions on his judgement. Locke claimed that “it is unreasonable for men to be judges in 
their own cases,” because their “self-love will make the partial to themselves and their friends.”79 
If a man or faction were to have all the powers of government in their hands, they would be judge, 
jury and executioner, with no check on their judgements and assertions of power. With a Lockean 
ring, Madison writes, “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest 
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”80 This is because an 
all too strong “connection subsists between his reason and his self-love.”81  Power concentrated 
will abet motives which need no external instigation.   
Neither Madison, nor Hamilton speak of the “terror” or “awe” inspired by the Leviathan to 
compel men to comply with their covenants. Hobbes was content with a rigid monolithic statism, 
a static top-down monarchy where liberty was subordinated to security. Security was found in 
force-backed guarantees of man’s compliance with the law unwritten by the ‘Mortal God’ of the 
state. In a constitutional republic however, the preservation of freedom cannot be achieved by the 
concentrated top-down power of the Leviathan. The principle of counterpoised passions was 
specifically developed under the premise that it was the most effective strategy of political 
organization and control, which still maintained the liberty intrinsic and necessary to the human 
being.  
Countervailing powers solved the Founder’s delicate juggling act between the demands of 
order and those of liberty. Liberty is here formulated here as the denial of power concentrated. 
This denial is achieved through countervailing, and therefore checking, powers. A system of 
counteracting powers is not necessary in a regime whose goal is domination achieved through 
 
79 John Locke. Two Treatises on Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p. 275.  
80 No. 10. 
81 No. 10. 
 
 561 
concentrated power. The countervailing strategy only functions under the premise of equality. In 
a government dedicated to liberty, checks can only come from rival interests and passions of equal 
magnitude. Powers with the capacity to check, but not dominate, each other must be roughly equal 
by definition. Thus, rival interests operate horizontally in the separation of powers, rather than 
vertically as in the Leviathan. There are no rivals to the Leviathan. Without this equality there can 
be no rivalry, and without rivalry, no genuine checks. Fear remained a central motivator for Publius 
in generating correct conduct, but this was not the fear of a ‘Mortal God’. Instead fear originated 
from the threat posed by “opposite and rival interests” vying for supremacy, yet from a position of 
effective equality. Fear, was fear of interested rivals wielding their powers in ways which 
threatened one’s own political destiny.    
The strategy of countervailing passions is the fundamental principle underlying the 
separation of powers. The separation of powers is then not merely a political strategy, but a 
psychological one. The separation of powers sets up a system not only of counteracting powers, 
but psychological forces. One man’s impulses are set against another’s in order to limit, check or 
channel them toward the constitutional good. This principle, or what Madison called the setting of 
“opposite and rival interests” against one another, is at the heart of every political strategy to 
maintain order and liberty in the Constitution. It is the Constitution’s arch strategy of impulse 
control. All manifestations of the separation of powers are built on the psychological kinesthetics 
of countervailing passions. The separation of branches and their functions is only one 
manifestation. It is the principle of the separation of powers, instead, which provides the 
underlying logic for the division of government into three branches. Divided power does not 
merely set one branch or office against another, but counterpoises the motives, the passions and 
interests of a given man or faction against another. Even elections represent a version of the 
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separation of powers. Through the franchise, the electorate is given a “partial agency” in the 
administration of government. The people’s passions and interests are freely expressed at election 
time, placing potential checks on incumbents. While elections are external to government, the 
countervailing forces set up by the division of branches represents an internal source of checks, 
within government itself. In the absence of elections, only the separation of powers and the 
potential checks of other branches and offices, is able to provide the necessary opposing force to 
resist encroachments, usurpations and the concertation of powers in the same hands.  
Publius’ urgent task is to illustrate how the separation of powers will result in substantive 
checks and balances, as opposed to mere parchment barriers, in the face of Anti-Federalist concern 
that the degree of concentrated power authorized by the Constitution would result in an 
overbearing national government.  
Publius central concern in the second volume of The Federalist is to demonstrate how checks on 
power work, only when the passions, interests and ambitions of officeholders are properly married 
to the powers of their office. The lynchpin of the separation of powers resides in the correct 
arrangement of this marriage. Only in this way does the separation of powers become more than 
paper barriers. Checks would not be guaranteed by morals rectitude, good intentions or simply left 
to chance. Checking and balancing would only be achieved when the “provision for defense” of 
one’s powers are “made commensurate to the danger of attack.”82 Defence and attack both require 
sufficient parity of power and proper spur to motivation. All constitutional officers must have the 
necessary motivation and the proper structure of powers, to be able to successfully deploy them in 
order to “attack”, or “defend” themselves and their office from an encroaching one. Only when 
office and interest were properly married could every action be subject to an equal and opposite 
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reaction. If properly balanced, every attack was merely a defense of the powers of the office, which 
would keep all offices in their “proper places.”  
In No. 51 Madison twice acknowledges how the powers and procedures of any office must 
be animated by the personal interests and ambitions of its holder in order for the separations of 
powers to work effectively.83 Madison asserts that the success of the countervailing system 
depends on the proper tethering of personal motive to the powers of office, or what he calls the 
“interest of the man” and “the constitutional rights of the place.”84 The dynamic equilibrium of 
countervailing powers only occurs when the appropriate “constitutional means” are properly 
married to “personal motives.”85 The counterbalancing of reliable and predictable motives, such 
as self-interest, ambition and fear are only instigated by properly arranged powers. When powers 
are properly structured they provide the necessary circumstances to incite the natural inclinations 
of constitutional officers to assert them. Only in this way does the system of countervailing passion 
operate according to plan and preserve liberty.  
The only protection against tyranny “consists in giving to those who administer each 
department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of 
the others.”86 The “constitutional means” and “rights” are those powers of office which can be 
levied against another office when each is given personal incentive to assert them. Meanwhile 
“giving” an official the “personal motives” to employ the instruments of office, means arranging 
the circumstances of office in a way to activate self-interested motives. Incited by circumstance, 
each officer would be naturally and reciprocally driven by their own self-interest to assert their 








to assert. And, the ability to assert is tied to the necessary powers, and motivation to use them 
accordingly. Offices must be designed in a way that each man’s self-interest is satisfied through 
the assertion of the instruments of that office. If each man’s exercise of his “constitutional rights,” 
is not simultaneously an assertion of his interest, he will not employ his office to proper effect.   
Madison famously says, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”87 He was keenly 
aware that if powers and circumstances were not properly arranged the ambition of one man would 
fail to counteract the ambition of another. The assertion of power, which culminates in a check on 
another office, is only made possible when officers recognize that it is in their self-interest to do 
so. Power is only properly structured when it is first divided, but then also mixed and blended so 
that there are contested areas of overlapping power. Madison says “each department should have 
a will of its own.”88 Each department must have its own general sphere of powers where most 
powers can be employed uncontested, but their must also be a domain in which the wills of 
different departments contest over similar powers. When the separation of powers is not absolute, 
it provides the circumstances in which one office or department can effectively check another. It 
is precisely these areas of overlapping and contested powers which provide the necessary 
circumstances to activate the will and interest of the officeholder to attempt to assert his powers. 
The domain of contested powers gives any officeholder an interest, not only in his own 
office and branch, but one in other offices and branches. In the circumstances created by a domain 
of contested powers, the instigated motive at work becomes self-evident. All government, all 
institutions naturally tend toward the assertion, expansion, encroachment and usurpation of power. 
This is the natural physics of government power. Given ambition and the love of power are the 






either defend, maintain or expand them. The assertion of power by other offices registers as an 
impingement and threat to one’s own power. Power not asserted or power disinterested, is 
necessarily power contracting. Under these circumstances each officer has natural incentive which 
incites his use of office as an instrument of his own self-interest. By asserting his powers, he is 
merely preserving the means to advance his interests and his own political survival. In protecting 
the means which advance his interests, his is also protecting the integrity constitutional powers of 
the place. Thus, counterpoised by the circumstances of the separation and mixture of powers, 
interest would counteract interest, ambition would counteract ambition.89 Without the connection 
between his powers and his personal inclinations, this arrangement would provide no more than 
parchment protections.  
Offices must be designed in a way that each officers’ self-interest is satisfied through the assertion 
of the instruments of his office. Only when interest and office are properly married can “the private 
interest of every individual…be a centinel over the public rights.”90 
On the psychological level, the system of countervailing passions remains an educational 
instrument of soulcraft. It is designed not simply to check power, but to transform raw impulse 
into refined sentiment and perhaps even virtue. This system does not simply operate between 
national and state governments, or between branches and offices, but also within a single human 
soul itself. In his exegesis of No. 51 Hirschman says the separation of powers is designed in such 
a way that “the ambition of one branch of government is expected to counter that of another,” 
rather than establish a scenario where “passions are seen to be fighting it out within the arena of a 
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is pitted against the ambition of another. The countervailing strategy is achieved through the 
counterbalancing of multiple actors and factions throughout the entire government rather than 
within the individual. Meanwhile, the original model of countervailing passions as it developed in 
the 16th and 17th centuries was one which operated within the psychology of the individual. For 
example, fear and ambition battle in the soul and, under the correct circumstances, yield true self-
interest. Madison’s psychological kinesthetics of the separation of powers involves passion 
asserted from one official and counteracted by the like impulse of another. But this, as it turns out, 
is not the whole story.  
In the separation of powers, the orchestrated countervailing passions play out both between 
individuals and branches and within the souls of those individuals simultaneously. Operating 
concurrently with the external drama of counterbalancing offices, there exists an internal drama of 
competing passions within the soul of each individual involved in the conflict. The external 
provocation of the separation of powers is the generates the countervailing passions within the 
souls of parts involved. The external struggle is the cause of the internal effect on the soul. External 
pressure created by an opposing office, causes an internal recalibration of raw impulse within the 
soul of the reciprocal official and vice versa. Both parties experience the action of the other as a 
threatening assertion of power which impinges on their ability to satisfy their interests. Both are 
compelled to reciprocally respond to one another, and both will experience a recalibration of the 
initial passions which originally motivated the clash. This psychological recalibration occurs on 
both sides of the competing agencies so long as their passions and powers are equally employed. 
The jostling between parties is also necessarily a jostling of competing passions within the soul of 
the individual. The external war creates an internal war. Therefore, Hirschman’s claim that the 
countervailing passions of divided power, merely between individuals, is “very different” from the 
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original historical model operating within the “single soul,” is only half true.92 The full story is that 
the passions counteract one another both externally and internally at the same time and that the 
one, in fact, instigates the other.  
How does the strategy of countervailing passions solve the defect of “better motives”?93 
The countervailing function of the separation of powers does not simply thwart the passions and 
asserted powers of an opposing office, but is intended to pull the motives of its occupant in the 
direction of the constitutional good. To understand just how the constitutional good is achieved 
through selfish conduct it is necessary to see how the constitutional circumstances of the separation 
of powers impinge externally on the powers of office, and how this external pressure internally 
compels officeholders to good conduct.  
The culmination of the external drama of countervailing passions is its internal effect on the soul 
of the individual officeholder. The two types of passion involved within the soul’s countervailing 
conflict always the same. The primary countervailing passions identified are ambition and fear.  
The two perennial passions of ambition and fear are the matter which political science must 
orchestrate and mold through the circumstances of government. Ambition and fear must be 
properly set against one another in order to refine motive and produce good conduct. Some form 
of ambition is the initiating and active passion, be it avarice or the love of power. Fear is the 
reactive passion which modifies the initial impulse. The passions being blind, an initial impulse is 
set in motion by the hope of gain without careful considering the consequences of its fulfillment. 
In general, fear has the power to temper all other passions. The countermanding impulse of fear 
arises out of an emotional awareness of the risks involved in the satisfaction of the original 
untutored desire. Fear is fear of any loss unacceptable in the eyes of the individual. In the case of 
 
92 Ibid.  
93 No. 51. 
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divided power, it is the fear which arises from the awareness of the risks of the loss of power or 
office which provide the very instruments of one’s ambitions. The journey toward one man’s self-
interest rightly understood rests on a path trodden by fear. Here, the voice of reason as the soul’s 
guide and rudder, is largely replaced by the voice of fear. Fear has the power to restrain reckless 
impulse and grandiose ambition. The truly ambitious are determined to succeed. For ambition to 
be satisfied it must heed the warnings of fear and consider the pitfalls of impulses which might 
thwart their own satisfaction. Nor does heeding the voice of fear result in passivity. The truly 
ambitious are able to correctly calculate the risks and rewards, costs and the benefits, of their 
overarching desire by coolly and sedately listening to the voice of fear. In fact, they cannot succeed 
without fear. Properly arranged circumstances allow fear to educate the passions which motivate 
action, and alter both their means and ends. 
The system of countervailing forces is designed to established circumstances which 
generate a conflict between the passions of fear and ambition. This conflict ideally moves men to 
best calculate their interests, rather than pursue their immediate impulses. The checking threat of 
an opposing office is designed to provide the circumstances to instigate the necessary fear which 
will modify raw ambition. In No. 70 Hamilton speak of how “the differences of opinion, and the 
jarring of parties in that department of the government… promote deliberation and 
circumspection; and serve to check excesses in the majority.”94 Only through the threat posed by 
another official or branch, and the commensurate fear this inspires, can “deliberation and 
circumspection” be promoted. Reflection and deliberation are the product of passion thwarted by 
passion, not virtuous restraint made possible by reason’s mastery.  
 
94 No. 70.  
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With this model of the tempering of each man’s soul, we turn to Hamilton’s illustration of 
the psychology of the Executive. His description of the Executive emphasizes the fact that the 
branch, the office and the individual are all one and the same. The “constitutional means” and 
“rights” of the office are emphatically married to the “interest of the man” and his “personal 
motives.” Hamilton’s depiction of the Executive is one of the most comprehensive illustrations to 
be found in The Federalist of the way correctly organized circumstances can channel immediate 
interests toward right conduct through the logic of countervailing passions. His account illustrates 
how the countervailing passions within the soul of the Executive collide, and encourage him to 
pursue the constitutional interest. Since the Executive is an office of one, the drama of the passions 
occurring within the arena of his soul, created by the separation of powers, is the most accentuated 
of all constitutional officials.  
Hamilton depicts an “avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office.”95 Hamilton, 
determined to illustrate the resiliency of the office to the raw passions of human nature says, 
consider for example, that this “same man might be vain or ambitious, as well as avaricious.”96 
The force of checks, whether through elections or those coming from other branches, temper his 
immediate passions, compelling him to adjudicate the best satisfaction of his avarice, bound as it 
is, by the constitutional circumstances. Without the appropriate checks the office might merely 
give his passions “recourse to the most corrupt expedients to makes the harvest as abundant” as 
possible. With the proper arrangement of powers and circumstances his avarice might be inclined 
to satisfy itself “with the regular perquisites of his situation, and might even be unwilling to risk 
the consequences of an abuse of his opportunities.”97  
 





Through proper orchestration of institutional circumstances, Hamilton writes, “His avarice 
might be a guard upon his avarice.”98 If by the properly orchestrated circumstances of office, the 
executive could “expect to prolong his honours by his good conduct, he might hesitate to sacrifice 
his appetite for them, to his appetite for gain.”99 But if circumstances are not so designed, “his 
avarice would be likely to get the victory over his caution, his vanity, or his ambition.”100 His true 
interest is a check on his immediate interest, his appetite a check on his appetite. Meaning, his 
interests and his appetites are best served by partially curbing them in conformity with the 
expectations of office. Hamilton depicts a psychological conflict of countervailing passions within 
the soul of the individual. Furthermore this conflict involves the same passion, in which its short 
term and long-term manifestations are set in countervailing opposition to one another.  A conflict 
is also incited between the passions of avarice, and the fear of no longer being able to slake it. The 
circumstances of office, channel and direct these passions, softening if not eliminating their 
corrosive effects. His avarice is best served by subordinating itself to the Constitution and the 
irrepressible force of external checks, in order to guarantee the continued slaking of his passions 
in a constitutional modified and acceptable form. 
The Constitution is ultimately a “character-forming” device.101 Its arrangement of powers 
acknowledges the vital relationship between circumstance and human character. The organization 
of power creates the conditions within which men think and act. Each office establishes a set of 
circumstances which provide parameters which impinge on the motives and actions of its 





101 Leonard R. Sorenson. “Madison on Sympathy, Virtue, and Ambition in the "Federalist Papers".” 
Polity. Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring, 1995). p. 444. 
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the people alike. The system of countervailing passions is designed to habituate men to the needs 
of the republic. Free and limited government depends on the Constitution’s ability to establish the 
necessary circumstances “to correct, mould, or sustain character.”102 These circumstances cultivate 
the character necessary for republican self-government. The regime articulated by the Constitution 
establishes a regiment of conduct. The force of its circumstances will habituate men to the 
constitutional good. Its circumstances and procedures help form constitutional habits. Thus, 
Modern political science did not abandon soulcraft, so much as reconceive it along lines of interest 
and necessity rather than excellence and virtue. The character-forming nature of the Constitution 
attempts “to forge a convergence of the “ought” and the “is,” by contriving circumstances which 
generate the necessary incentives and deterrents to encourage men as they are to behave as they 
ought.103 When institutional conditions incline to men to virtuous conduct, they need only oblige.     
The goal of the constitutional system of countervailing passions is for ambition and avarice 
to be transmuted by circumstance into self-interest rightly understood. The door is open to virtue, 
and some degree of virtue is ultimately required, but not to be regularly expected. Virtue is 
achieved only after counteracting passions have already brawled and done their dirty work. 
Sorenson writes “Madison depends equally upon virtue and ambition: upon virtue to direct to 
restraint and upon ambition to cause that restraint.”104 Here, he reiterates the precise role played by 
each of the faculties in the process by which men’s passions are tempered into their interests. 
Tempestuous passions like ambition provide the gale. Once fear has performed its restraining 
function under circumstance of genuine threat, more delicate social sentiments and reason are then 
 
102 E. E. Constance Jones. “Character and Circumstance,” International Journal of Ethics. Vol. 9, No. 4 (Jul., 1899). 
p. 504. 
103 Leonard R. Sorenson. “Madison on Sympathy, Virtue, and Ambition in the "Federalist Papers".” 
Polity. Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring, 1995). p. 444. 
104 Ibid., p. 439. 
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able to hold the field in their capacity as judges in guiding men’s actions. Reason and moral 
sentiment do not have sufficient force to thwart passions but are only able to act as guide and 
rudder to conduct once passions have neutralized each other. Mansfield says that “the interest of 
the office is a kind of interest that permits and requires the cooperation of virtue.”105 This 
observation is complicated by the fact that “true interest” and “virtue” do not appear to be entirely 
distinct or mutually exclusive in Publius’ vernacular. When true interests are achieved by an 
officeholder, they are generally compelled by the circumstances of the separation of powers. True 
interests are synonymous with “compelled virtue.” Since the office must be married to the interest 
of the man, there can be no real distinction made between private self-interest and the public 
“interest of the office.”106  
The psychic kinesthetics of the Constitution tenuously juggle the demands of liberty and 
necessity. If men of virtuous character could not always be at the helm, a second best was for 
institutions to be arranged in such a way to create circumstances which make men good. Yet, to 
depend on a mechanical system which might be able to do without natural virtue altogether “is to 
suppose like Machiavelli that all rule is the consequence of ‘accident and force.’”107 Such a system 
appears to be at odds with Publius’ bold claim that the American regime will be ruled by “reflection 
and choice,” not merely in the deliberative nature of its founding, but in its general administration 
as well. It is hard to say that men make choices when Damocles’ sword hangs over their head. The 
character of Machiavelli’s prince was shaped by the conditions of necessity. Under such 
circumstances, the prince had no choice but to preserve his life or his power. Under the system of 
 
105 Harvey Mansfield. “Liberty and Virtue in the American Founding.” Never a Matter of Indifference: Sustaining 
Virtue in a Free Republic (ed. Peter Berkowitz). Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2003. p. 28.  
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countervailing passions each officer naturally seeks to preserve their political life and maintain 
office. Yet, Aristotle contends that virtuous conduct can only occur under certain circumstances.108 
Aristotle is concerned with the choice that leads to action and “with respect to what or in what 
circumstances,” that choice is made.109 For Aristotle, virtuous conduct is only possible under 
conditions of free choice. 110 If one is compelled to act, virtue is moot. Choice entails the existence 
of freedom and alternatives in contradistinction to the forcing hand of necessity. Virtue is the 
product of facing challenging circumstances, and often taking courses of action they militate 
against, rather than capitulating to their pressures.  
The institutions of the Constitution are designed to compel officeholders into near 
“choiceless choices.” If circumstances deny choice, action is involuntary. Acts of self-preservation 
are not made by choice and the typical subject proclamations of virtue by moral philosophers. In 
the absence of men of natural virtue, the Constitution must compel them to be good by means of 
the virtuous designs of virtuous founders. We might call this type of virtue, “compelled virtue,” a 
type Aristotle would not have recognized. Does a president typically choose between satisfying 
his desire to act corruptly if this act threatens a potential election loss or impeachment from a co-
equal legislature? Most likely, he will simply modify his initial impulse and instead satisfy his 
desire to maintain office. In most cases such choices become moot. Lincoln’s unilateral executive 
action, for example, at the outset of the Civil War, was one such moment when the forcing hand 
of necessity appeared to be pressing down on all sides. And yet, in the face of what must have 
seemed like insuperable obstacles, Lincoln made a consequential and unprecedented choice which 
manifest real virtue.  
 
108  Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. p. 45, 255. 
109  Ibid. p. 45. 
110  Ibid., p. 26, 35, 46-48. 
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Compelled virtue is the product of the principle of countervailing passions. Like the 
physical force of gravity which holds planets in their proper places, fear is set against ambition. 
The system of countervailing forces comes suspiciously close to making the passions that dwell 
within human nature, the bedrock of the entire constitutional order. It is a system which 
paradoxically depends on necessity in the hopes of preserving liberty. It preserves liberty and 
provides security, by placing the motives of men under circumstances of near necessity.111 We are 
left with the seeming paradox, that destructive passions under circumstances in which they are 
mutually counterpoised can result in virtuous conduct of a sort. No principle calls into question 
the tenuous balance between liberty and necessity as that of countervailing passions. The system 
is premised on the notion that no amount of conscience, choice, reason or virtue is alone capable 
of restraining the power of the passions. Only another passion, not deliberative choice, can 
counteract passion.  
If the possibility of republican self-government is dependent on the perquisite use of reason 
and reflection, the theory of countervailing passions acknowledges that reason and virtue cannot 
regularly hold the field in their war with man’s impulses. Speaking of the separation of powers, 
Rahe says that it strangely “seems to deny what it asserts, and its seeks to vindicate man’s capacity 
for self-government by teaching him to acknowledges the limits of the capacity and to conduct his 
affairs accordingly.”112 Or as Edmond Burke put it, “Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact 
proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites; in proportion as they 
are more disposed to listen to the counsels of the wise and good, in preference to the flattery of 
 
111 Paul Rahe. Republics Ancient & Modern Volume III Inventions of Prudence: Constituting the American Regime. 




knaves.”113 Men are only equipped for free self-government in proportion to their ability to devise 
a virtuous system which might perpetually restrain their lesser appetites. Liberty is only achieved 
by teaching men the limits of their liberties and providing robust sentinels and precautions to 
perpetually remind them of that lesson. Such inventions of prudence appear to be “all that 
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